Govinda Menon, J.- Appellant Narayanan has been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge of Parur of the offence of murder for having on the morning of 22nd April, 1964 stabbed and caused the death of one Manicka Shenoi and he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. The facts of the case are very simple. The incident took place in front of one Rajeswari Hotel near the Perumbavoor bus stand on the Alwaye-Munnar road. P.W. 4 a boy met the accused that morning in front of the hotel. P.W.4 knew the accused before and wanted the accused to purchase tea for him, but the accused excused himself by saying that he had no money. Then P.W.4 offered to give him tea and took him to the hotel. After getting inside the hotel the accused soon got out saying that he did not want tea. He then stood in from of the hotel. It was at that time that deceased Shenoi came out of the Rajeswari Hotel. As soon as he came the accused stabbed him in the right side of his neck from behind with a dagger M.O.1. The accused then ran away with the weapon in his hand. P.W.1 a Police Constable on duty at the bus stand seeing this pursued and arrested him a few yards away and took the knife from him. The accused was then brought to the scene of occurrence and along with the injured was taken to the Perambavoor Police Station and produced before the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W.17. The injured was unable to speak and a statement was recorded from P.W.1 and a case was registered. P.W. 2, an agent of a transport bus who was present in front of the hotel also witnessed the accused stabbing and running away from the scene and P.W.1 chasing and arresting him. P.W. 3, a betelnut shop keeper near the hotel heard the cry ‘ Ayo ‘ and came out from inside his shop and saw the accused running away with the weapon in his hand. He saw the deceased pressing his wound and saying that he had been stabbed, and witnessed the arrest of the accused by P.W.1 and taking him and the deceased to the Police Station. P.W. 4 also saw the accused running away from the scene and P.W.1 running after him and arresting him. He saw the deceased pressing his wound and saying that he had been stabbed, and witnessed the arrest of the accused by P.W.1 and taking him and the deceased to the Police Station. P.W. 4 also saw the accused running away from the scene and P.W.1 running after him and arresting him. We have been taken through the evidence of these witnesses and find no reason to doubt the truth of their evidence. On the evidence of these witnesses, it is conclusively established that it was the accused who had inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased. This fact has not been challenged by the defence. The evidence of the two medical officers P.Ws.5 and 6 unmistakably show that the deceased sustained a neck injury, that it had cut open the jugular vein and that death was the direct result of the injury. The only question that arises for decision is whether the act of the accused is protected under section 84 of the Penal Code. Learned Judge has considered the entire evidence and has come to the conclusion that the accused has failed to satisfy the Court that when he committed the murder he was not capable of knowing the nature of the act and that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that on the evidence the learned Judge should have held that the accused had discharged the burden placed on him under section 105 of the Evidence Act and that even if he had failed to establish the fact affirmatively the evidence was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court regarding the intention of the accused when he committed the act and the Court should therefore have acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance was placed on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in D. C. Thakkar v. State of Gujarat1. It is true that the prosecution in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death with the requisite intention described in the section. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. It is true that the prosecution in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death with the requisite intention described in the section. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But section 84 of the Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Subba Rao, J., who gave the judgment in the case observed: "Under section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of ‘shall presume’ in section 4 thereof, the Court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption, that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the Court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a ‘prudent man’. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence presumptive, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of ‘prudent man’ the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in section 299 of the Penal Code. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in section 299 of the Penal Code. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively, the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity." The burden of proof resting on the accused to prove insanity is no doubt not so onerous as the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. As observed by Viscount Hailsham, L.C. in Sodeman v. Rex1: "the burden in case in which an accused has to prove insanity may fairly be stated as not being higher than the burden which rests on a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings." As to what is the burden resting upon a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings can best be stated in the words of Wiles, J. in Cooper v. Slade2. That learned Judge referred to an ancient authority in support of what he termed: "the elementary proposition that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict." Applying this rule of burden of proof, if on a consideration of he prosecution evidence and the evidence led by the accused the Court comes to the conclusion that there was a probability of the accused being legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he would be entitled to be acquitted on the ground of insanity. This is the view taken in Nanavathi’s case3. Bearing these principles in mind let us see the facts of this case. Learned Counsel referred to the want of any understandable motive for the accused to have committed the offence as a circumstance indicative of insanity. In Exhibit P-7 dying declaration of Shenoi recorded by the Sub-Magistrate P.W.12 the deceased has referred to the repair of his oil engine by the accused some time before. Learned Counsel referred to the want of any understandable motive for the accused to have committed the offence as a circumstance indicative of insanity. In Exhibit P-7 dying declaration of Shenoi recorded by the Sub-Magistrate P.W.12 the deceased has referred to the repair of his oil engine by the accused some time before. The investigating officer probably was not able to gather any evidence regarding any enmity but the mere fact that an act is without any apparent motive is not by itself sufficient to establish insanity. When a plea of legal insanity is set up, the Court has to consider whether at the time of commission of the offence the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of section 84 of the Indian Penal Code can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime. Now we will see the evidence regarding the mental condition of the accused. What was disclosed during the investigation according to the Sub-Inspector P.W.17 was that the accused had some mental disorder about two years before the occurrence. He has no personal knowledge and he has deposed what other people had told him when he investigated into the case. All that would be hit by section 162 Criminal Procedure Code and ought not to have been admitted in evidence, but whatever that might be, he has categorically stated that no one told him that the accused had violent fits of insanity. P.W.17 sent up a report Exhibit D-1 to have the accused examined by a doctor and he was sent rap for observation to the Medical Officer, Alwaye. Before the committal Court me, doctor was examined and the certificate was proved. She kept him under observation for a week and certified that he is a person of sound mind. The accused was having sound sleep, he was answering questions properly and intelligently and nothing abnormal was noticed. Before the committal Court me, doctor was examined and the certificate was proved. She kept him under observation for a week and certified that he is a person of sound mind. The accused was having sound sleep, he was answering questions properly and intelligently and nothing abnormal was noticed. The plea of insanity was not advanced when he was questioned in the committing Magistrate’s Court and when questioned the accused stated that he had heard and understood the evidence and had nothing to say. At the Sessions Court before the trial was started learned Judge held a preliminary enquiry and from the questions and answers recorded by him he was satisfied that the accused was of sound mind and capable of making his defence and the trial proceeded. After the prosecution evidence was recorded when questioned he only stated that he did not know anything about the occurrence. He did not even then say that he had fits of insanity before, but he examined one witness Narayanan Nambooripad who is said to have treated him for insanity. P.W.1 has deposed that the accused was brought to his illam by some people who found him wandering about saying meaningless things and he treated him between Chingam and Meenam last year. The symptoms that he noticed were that the accused would go about without clothes, utter obscene words and talk indiscriminately. He frankly stated that he had not seen the accused molesting anybody, but he would at times make a show of violence. In Meenam last the accused was taken away from him for some better treatment and when he left, according to D.W. 1 the accused was not completely cured. Having gone through the evidence of D.W. 1 we find ourselves unable to place any great reliance on his evidence. He is not a regular physician and he is not in a position even to give the name of the mental disease from which the accused was suffering or to give the name of the Kashayam or Nassiam which he is alleged to have prescribed. Even if his evidence were to be accepted it does not help the defence and is not sufficient to establish that the accused was suffering from legal insanity. P.W.11 is the brother-in-law of the accused. Even if his evidence were to be accepted it does not help the defence and is not sufficient to establish that the accused was suffering from legal insanity. P.W.11 is the brother-in-law of the accused. He is a blacksmith and the accused was working with him and he gave evidence in examination-in-chief that it was the accused who made the knife M.O. 1 while staying with him a fortnight before the occurrence. In cross-examination the witness stated that the accused was suffering from some mental disorder and had gone to his house to buy some medicated ghee from an adjoining mana, but nothing was elicited from him about the accused’s actual ailment or what he would do when he is afflicted with the malady. His evidence shows that whenever there was any the slightest suspicion of the disease the accused would go to him, get the ghee from the mana and get himself cured. This is not the kind of insanity which would come within the terms of section 84, Indian Penal Code. There is clear distinction between medical and legal insanity. Courts are concerned with the legal and not with the medical view of the question. That he is not a very reliable witness and is trying to help his brother-in-law is clear because when a leading question was put to him in cross-examination whether he was not deposing that the accused had made the knife, under police pressure he nodded his head saying ‘yes.‘ P.W.4 is the first person who contacted the accused just a few minutes before the occurrence and his evidence does not help in showing that he had any symptoms of insanity. No questions were put to him suggesting that he was behaving in any peculiar way or like a mad man. As to what happened immediately after the occurrence we have the evidence of all the witnesses that immediately after stabbing, the accused took to his heels with the weapon obviously because he knew the nature of the act and that what he did was wrong. The evidence of P.W.1 also does not disclose that he was behaving in any strange way. The injured was not in a position to talk and P.W.1 has deposed that it was the accused who gave the name of the injured. The evidence of P.W.1 also does not disclose that he was behaving in any strange way. The injured was not in a position to talk and P.W.1 has deposed that it was the accused who gave the name of the injured. All this would indicate that he was not suffering from any mental disorder or insanity at the time he stabbed the deceased. Thus there is no evidence on record to establish that the accused was suffering from any insanity sufficient to attract section 84, Indian Penal Code. Whatever evidence there exists is not sufficient even to throw any reasonable doubt in our mind that the act might have been committed when the accused was in a fit: of insanity. We, therefore, agree with the learned Judge that the accused cannot claim exemption under section 84, Indian Penal Code. "The conviction and sentence are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. M.C.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.