Krishna Rao, J.- These appeals arise out of the Judgment of the Sessions Judge Khammam, in Sessions Case No. 13 of 1959, sentencing all, the four accused to rigorous imprisonment for seven years each under section 326 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code, and to rigorous imprisonment for two years each under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code; and accused 1 and 2 to rigorous imprisonment for seven years each under also section 392 read with section 397 Indian Penal Code. The convictions under section 326 read with section 34 were upon charges under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of two persons, Narayana and Janakayya, in the village of Jamalapuram at about 4 P.M. on 12th December, 1958. The convictions under section 324 read with section 34 were for hurt caused at the same time to Raghavaiah (P.W.1) and to Seetharamaiah (P.W. 2). The convictions under section 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code, were for the robbery of a cartload of paddy from Narayana’s possession. Appeal Nos. 654, 689 and 694 of 1959 are brought by the accused against their convictions and sentences. Appeal No. 12 of 1960 is brought by the Public Prosecutor and is directed against the acquittal of the four accused for the offence under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is briefly that at about 4 p.m. on 12th December, 1958, while Narayana (first deceased) along with his younger brothers Janakayya (2nd deceased) and Raghavaiah (P.W.1) and his son Seetharamaiah (P.W. 2) was carting the paddy produce of “Khandriga” land to his house at Jamalapuram, the four accused attacked them in one Venkateswara Rao’s pasture land with spears and sticks (M. Os. 1 to 3 and 8) causing fatal injuries to the two deceased and simple hurt to P.Ws. 1 and 2 and removed the entire paddy to the 2nd accused’s house. The motive for the crime was that, the first accused, who is the first deceased’s divided son and is closely related to accused 2 to 4, claimed a share in the paddy produce of ‘Khandriga’ land, after raising disputes sometime earlier over the partition of the family properties which had taken place in 1955. The motive for the crime was that, the first accused, who is the first deceased’s divided son and is closely related to accused 2 to 4, claimed a share in the paddy produce of ‘Khandriga’ land, after raising disputes sometime earlier over the partition of the family properties which had taken place in 1955. When the two carts loaded with paddy passed by one Lakshminarayana’s pasture land which lies between the ‘khandriga’ land and Venkateswaara Rao’s pasture land accused 1 to 3 obstructed them unsuccessfully and chased the carts for some distance pelting stones. This part of the events is spoken to by P.Ws. 1, 2, 7, 8 and 10. When the first cart came on to Venkateswara Rao’s pasture land, the fourth accused appeared, promised to settle amicably the quarrel between the father and the son and prevailed upon the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2 to surrender the two spears (M.Os. 1 and 2) and the two sticks (M.Os. 3and 8) which they were carrying. Immediately, he attacked the first deceased with one of the spears. Accused 1 to 3, who came behind him, picked up the remaining weapons at the same time and attached P.W.1, the 2nd deceased and P.W. 2 respectively. After the victims fell down with injuries, the first accused twisted thehands and legs of all the four of them. Accused 1 and 2 took away the paddy. The attack on the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2 was seen by P.W. 3 to 6 and 11 who were about 20 or 30 yards off, but P.Ws. 5, 6 and 11 were hostile at the trial. A farm servant (P.W. 8) carried the four injured persons, one after the other, to the first deceased’s house and the deceased 1 and 2 died there at about 5 P.M. and 7 P.M. respectively on the same day. The Village Magstrate (P.W.13) went to the first deceased’s house, a little after the latter died at about 5 p.m. questioned P.W. 2, who alone was conscious and sent a report (Exhibit P-8) to the Police. In Exhibit P-8, the names of the four accused are given as the assailants who beat and speared the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2; and the witnesses are mentioned as P.Ws. 4 and 5 “and others”. In Exhibit P-8, the names of the four accused are given as the assailants who beat and speared the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2; and the witnesses are mentioned as P.Ws. 4 and 5 “and others”. The Medical evidence is that the first deceased had 15 injuries including three fractures of the limbs, out of which 10 were incised wounds and could have been caused by a spear and the rest could have been caused by spear sticks. The 2nd deceased had 10 injuries, including a fracture of the right clavicle and four fractures of the limbs, all of which could have been caused by a stick and were of the same age as the first deceased’s injuries. Both died on account of shock due to multiple injuries. P.Ws. 1 and 2 had three and nine simple injuries respectively and all of them could have been caused by a stick. The Circle Inspector of Police at Madhira (P.W. 20) reached Jamalapuram on the morning of 13th December, 1958, and found bloodstained earth and a trail of blood in Venkateswara Rao’s pasture land. The first accused was arrested on the morning of 14th December, 1958, and was interrogated by P.W. 20 in the presence of mediators. He took them to his house and produced two spears and a stick (M.Os. 1 to 3) from within his room. Then he took them to 2nd accused’s house and showed 22 bags of paddy lying on the veranda. P.W. 20 searched the 2nd accused’s house and recovered a second stick (M.O. 8) and some vessels (M.Os. 4 to 7) which had been in the deceaseds’ cart at the time of the occurrence. Accused 2 to 4 were absconding and surrendered in Court after the police laid the charge-sheet in the case. The defence of all the accused consisted of a denial of knowledge of the occurrence. The first accused said that there were no disputes between him and lis father, The second accused said that he was away at the village of Tallur, but called no witnesses in support of the alibi. The learned Sessions Judge held with regard to the events that took place at Lakshminarayana’s pasture land that the story of P.Ws. The first accused said that there were no disputes between him and lis father, The second accused said that he was away at the village of Tallur, but called no witnesses in support of the alibi. The learned Sessions Judge held with regard to the events that took place at Lakshminarayana’s pasture land that the story of P.Ws. 1, 2, 7, 8 and 10 as to the chasing of the carts and pelting of the stones by accused 1 to 3 was improbable and was an exaggeration and that accused 1 to 3. merely attempted to obtain a share of the paddy at that stage. But he believed the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 as to the events that subsequently took place at Venkateswara Rao’s land and held that the four accused together had indiscriminatelybeaten the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2 with M.Os. 1 to 3 and 8, which originally belonged to the deceased’s party and were identified by P.Ws. 1 and 2. He found that there was no preconcerted plan on the part of the accused to kill the two deceased, and that the common intention of the accused was only to beat the victims. He also found with regard to the removal of the paddy that only the taking of the first cart by accused 1 and 2 was satisfactorily proved. As a result of these conclusions he convicted and sentenced the four accused as mentioned above. The medical evidence and the observations of the Circle Inspector (P.W. 20) at the scene amply bear out the prosecution case that the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2 were attacked in Venkateswara Rao’s pasture land at about 4 P.M. on 12th December, 1958. The main question for consideration in the appeals preferred by the accused is whether the direct evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 as to the acts of attack can be safely relied upon. With regard to the disputes that had arisen between the first accused and the first deceased, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 is supported by P.W.13, the Village Magistrate and P.W.14, a maternal uncle of the first accused. 1 to 4 as to the acts of attack can be safely relied upon. With regard to the disputes that had arisen between the first accused and the first deceased, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 is supported by P.W.13, the Village Magistrate and P.W.14, a maternal uncle of the first accused. P.W. 2 whose wife had purchased the ‘khandriga’ land and leased it to the first deceased, says that on the morning of 12th December, 1958, the second accused in the presence accused 1, 3 and 4 warned him not to go into the land as they have to get the threshed paddy. Thus, although the parties are closely related to one another there is nothing intrinsically improbable in the prosecution story that the accused resorted to violence for the purpose of enforcing the first accused’s demand for a share in the paddy. In order to deal with the comments of the learned Counsel against the reliability of the direct evidence, it will be convenient to review the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4. P.W.1, Raghaviah, is the younger brother of the first deceased and the elder brother of the second deceased. He says that about ten days before the occurrence, he and the 2nd deceased came from their house at Jagannadhapuram to stay with the first deceased at Jamalapuram for the purpose of helping the latter in the work of gathering the crops. He speaks of the disputes over the ‘khandriga’ land that had arisen earlier between the first deceased and the first accused and describes how he and the 2nd deceased and P.Ws. 2, 8 and 10 started from the ‘khandriga’ land at about 4 P.M. on 12th December, 1958, with two carts loaded with paddy to go to Jamalapuram. They were having two spears (M.Os. 1 and 2) in order to protect themselves against wild beasts and also because P.W.12 had told them about the threat of the accused to obstruct them. When they came to Lakshminarayana’s pasture land, accused 1 to 3 armed with sticks obstructed the first cart, demanding the first accused’s share of the paddy. Thereupon, P.Ws. 1 and 2 armed themselves with the spears M.Os. When they came to Lakshminarayana’s pasture land, accused 1 to 3 armed with sticks obstructed the first cart, demanding the first accused’s share of the paddy. Thereupon, P.Ws. 1 and 2 armed themselves with the spears M.Os. 1 and 2, and along with the 2nd deceased, who had a goad stick, asked accused 1 to 3 to allow the carts to pass, as the first accused was not entitled to a share in the paddy. The carts proceeded but accused 1 to 3 followed, pelting stones from behind. The first cart proceeded for a distance of about 1½ furlongs and got into Venkateswara Rao’s pasture land. The second cart got stuck up in a stream about 60 years behind. By that time, the first deceased had joined them. The fourth accused came to them, pretended that he would adjust the differences between the father and the son and took their spears and sticks from them. He kept one spear with him and threw behind their other spear and two sticks. Accused 1 to 3 came there at this stage and the 2nd accused picked up the second spear while accused 1 and 3 picked up the sticks. The accused commenced the attack immediately and P.W.1 describes it thus: “A-4 immediately thereafter hit my brother Narayana, onthe top of his head, with the wooden part of the spear and then pierced somewhere in the region of the temple of Narayana with the spearhead. So soon as A-4 attacked and hit Narayana A-1 to A-3 pounced upon us. A-1 attacked me; A-3 attacked Sitharamaiah and A-2 attacked Janakaiah. They beat us indiscriminately all over the body with spear and sticks. They continued beating us even after we fell to the ground. A-1 further twisted the legs and hand of all of us after we fell to the ground and were hit, with sticks, and spears.......He did this for all of the four of us. The other three accused were exhorting A-1 not to leave anyone of us alive saying that they would otherwise kill him also, then and there. We were only semi-conscious when we fell to the ground with beating given to us.” The first accused desisted from trying to beat again P.W. 2 only at the intervention of P.W. 5 and all the accused went away thereafter. We were only semi-conscious when we fell to the ground with beating given to us.” The first accused desisted from trying to beat again P.W. 2 only at the intervention of P.W. 5 and all the accused went away thereafter. In cross-examination, he adds that the third accused gave him a spear thrust on the right side of the hand and that after he (P.W. 1) fell down to the ground, he saw the second accused giving a spear thrust to the second deceased. One criticism is that these blows with spears mentioned by him are inconsistent with the medical evidence that he and the second deceased had only stick injuries. But as observed by the trial Judge, they are only inaccuracies natural to an indiscriminate attack by four assailants. Another criticism is that, some of the particulars in P.W.l’s evidence are inconsistent with his statement during the investigation. He told the police that he had a stick and not that he had a spear. This fitted with P.W. 2’s statement before the police that it was P.W. 2 and the second deceased that armed themselves with the spears removed from the carts. P.W.1 did not also tell the police that any others besides the first accused beat him nor about the alleged exhortation to the first accused by accused 2 to 4. But the question whether it was P.W.1 or it was the second deceased who had the spear, which they did not use as they were disarmed, is an immaterial detail. The discrepancies are not such as to affect P.W. 1’s veracity though, of course, no reliance ought to be placed on improvements to the detriment of the accused. P.W. 2 Seetharamaiah, is one of the undivided sons of the first deceased and corroborates P.W.1. He says that when the second cart got stuck up in the stream, P.Ws. 8 and 10 took charge of it. This accounts for P. Ws. 8 and 10 being unable to see the attack, which took place by the side of the first cart. He says further that he alone was conscious after they were beaten and that he was in a state of agony wheu the Village Magistrate (P.W.13) enquired him. This is corroborated by P.W.13 and sufficiently explains why Exhibit P-8 does not contain a full and detailed account of the events. He says further that he alone was conscious after they were beaten and that he was in a state of agony wheu the Village Magistrate (P.W.13) enquired him. This is corroborated by P.W.13 and sufficiently explains why Exhibit P-8 does not contain a full and detailed account of the events. We therefore see no force in the criticism that according to Exhibit P-8, the four accused came to the scene armed with spears and sticks, while the version at the trial is that the fourth accused obtained the weapons from the deceased’s party by a strategem. P.W.13 says that P.W. 2 found it very difficult to talk at the time. It is natural that only a bare outline of how the two deceased and P.Ws. 1 and 2 received their injuries was narrated in Exhibit P-8. P.W. 3 Venkatareddi was extracting jute at a distance of about 30 yards from the scene and corroborates P.Ws. 1 and 2 as to the events that took place there. He is a disinterested witness belonging to a different community. He says in cross-examination that Ramakrishnaiah (first accused) picked up the second deceased’s spear and stabbed and beat, P.W.1 with it although the version in his examination in chief was that this spear was picked up by the second accused and used against the second deceased. In his earlier statement recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, he said that the first accused beat P.W. 2 with a spear and that third accused beat P.W.1. Having regard to the fact that there was a simultaneous attack by the four accused against the four victims, all in close proximity to one another, these discrepancies are natural and do not lead to the inference invited by the learned Counsel that P.W. 3 did not really see the occurrence. It is true that he was not specifically named as one of the witnesses in Exhibit P-8, which merely mentioned P.Ws. 4 and 5 “and others”. But this does not mean that he is a belated witness, as he was examined by the Circle Inspector on 13th December, 1958, itself. P.W. 4, Muneyya, is a dhobi who was washing clothes at a distance of about 20 yards from the scene. He is another disinterested witness who corroborates P.Ws. 1 and 2 as to what happened there. His name is given in Exhibit P-8. P.W. 4, Muneyya, is a dhobi who was washing clothes at a distance of about 20 yards from the scene. He is another disinterested witness who corroborates P.Ws. 1 and 2 as to what happened there. His name is given in Exhibit P-8. There is no force in the criticism that his eye-sight was too bad to enable him to observe the attack, because he says that his eye-sight deteriorated only about a month prior to his giving evidence on 14th September, 1959. After giving our best consideration, we agree with the trial Judge in believing the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 as to what took place at the scene. We have to notice, however, that both P.Ws. 3 and 4 do not say like P.Ws. 1 and 2, that all the accused beat all the injured persons or that they continued to beat even after the injured persons fell to the ground. No doubt, P.Ws. 3 and 4 say that the first accused twisted the hands and legs of the fallen persons. But this act of the first accused did not result in any visible injury because the medical evidence is that, none of the fractures of the two deceased could have been caused by twisting the limbs. From the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4, it appears that the first accused alone hit P.W.1 with stick, the second accused alone hit the second deceased with a spear, that the third accused alone beat P.W. 2 with stick and the fourth accused alone hit the first deceased with spear. On the other hand, according to P.Ws. 1 and 2 all the accused hit all the four injured persons indiscriminately to the end and it is not possible to apportion the injuries caused between the different accused. This conflict raises a doubt as to the extent of the liability of accused 1 and 3, with which we shall deal later in this judgment. It is suggested by the learned Counsel for the appellants that some suspicion attaches to the circumsatances in which Exhibit P-8 came into existence. The suggestion is based on a discrepancy between the evidence of P.W.17, the Head Constable of Yerrupalem outpost and P.W.19, the Head Constable of Mathira Police station. Yerrupalem, is about four miles and Mathira is about 14 miles from Jamala-puram. The suggestion is based on a discrepancy between the evidence of P.W.17, the Head Constable of Yerrupalem outpost and P.W.19, the Head Constable of Mathira Police station. Yerrupalem, is about four miles and Mathira is about 14 miles from Jamala-puram. According to P.W.19, a telephone message about the murders was sent by P.W.17 at about 3-30 or 4 a.m. on 13th December, 1958. On the other hand, P.W.17 who speaks of having received Exhibit P-8 at about 8 p.m. and despatched it to Mathira a little after 9 p.m. on 12th December, 1958, denies having talked to the Sub-Inspector or the Circle Inspector on telephone. In our opinion, the discrepancy has no significance. It appears from the Circle Inspector’s deposition that the information about the occurrence was conveyed by a police constable of Yerrupalem to the railway stationmaster there and that the latter informed the railway stationmaster at Mathira by phone, who conveyed the news through a railway cooly to the Circle Inspector and the Sub-Inspector. As the telephonic information originated at Yerrupalem, P.W.19 seems to have thought that it was sent by P.W.17. The learned Counsel raised a contention that the earliest statements recorded from the witnesses during the investigation, have been suppressed and that the accused have been thereby prejudiced. The Circle Inspector said that he typed the statements of all the witnesses by means of his portable Remington Typewriter, while they were making the statements, except that of P.W. 2 which was written in pencil as he was examined on his way to the hospital. The Sub-Inspector recorded the statements of only four or five persons who were not called as witnesses. As against this it was elicited from P.Ws. 3, 4 and 7 in cross-examination that their statements were not typed but were recorded in manuscript. P.W. 3 said: “The police took down my statement...... and not on type.” P.W. 4 said: “The Sub-Inspector recorded my statements with a pen and not on type machine.” Similarly, P.W. 7 said: “I was examined by the Police.......... It was taken down with a pen.” It is urged by the learned Counsel that the evidence of P.Ws. P.W. 3 said: “The police took down my statement...... and not on type.” P.W. 4 said: “The Sub-Inspector recorded my statements with a pen and not on type machine.” Similarly, P.W. 7 said: “I was examined by the Police.......... It was taken down with a pen.” It is urged by the learned Counsel that the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 7 should be preferred in this respect as being more probable, especially as the Circle Inspector did not furnish copies of the statements of the witnesses to the Magistrate on 15th December, 1958, along with his report (Exhibit D-3) for remanding the first accused. It is true that if the earliest statements of material witnesses were suppressed with the result that an accused is deprived of valuable material to test their veracity under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, an almost irresistible inference of prejudice to the accused would arise-Kotayya v. Emperor1. The learned Counsel relies on an observation of Chandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) in In re. B.J. Reddy2, for the position that from the mere omission to send a copy of the entries in the case diary as required by section 167, Criminal Procedure Code, along with the remand report, it may reasonably be inferred that they had not come into existence by that time or at any rate in the shape ultimately given to them. This was followed by Jaganmohan Reddy, J., who spoke for the Division Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 443 of 1957 decided on 7th October, 1958, but was subsequently distinguished by the same learned Judge in Criminal Appeal Nos. 428 etc. of 1958 dated 13th December, 1958 and in Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 1959 dated 1st March, 1960. In B.J. Reddy’s case2, there was other abundant material to show that the case diary was, manipulated and really prepared after the remand report and this was referred to immediately after the observation in question in paragraph 15 of the judgment at page 564 of the report. It was obviously in view of the particular circumstances of the case that the inference was drawn. It was obviously in view of the particular circumstances of the case that the inference was drawn. The observation cannot be regarded as laying down a general rule that whenever a copy of the entries in the case diary is not sent by the Police Officer along with the remand report under section 167, Criminal Procedure Code, the proper inference would be that the case diary is ante-dated and got up subsequently. The omission in a particular case to comply with the duty under section 167, Criminal Procedure, may well be due to the ignorance of the provision or to the erroneous practice of Magistrates in not requiring it and of the police officers conveniently thinking it to be unnecessary work. The question is one of fact and an inference has to be drawn having regard to all the circumstances. The omission would be only one of the relevant circumstances and it is not as if the law raises a general presumption of oblique motive against the police officers. If there is credible evidence that the entries were already in existence, it would not necessarily be outweighed by a mere omission to send a copy of them along with the remand report. In the present case there are absolutely no reasons to think that the Circle Inspector was interested one way or the other or was likely to give a new shape to the statements of the witnessess. P.Ws. 3, 4 and 7 are illiterate persons and had to answer in the witness box from their recollection as to whether their statements were written in manuscript or typed about nine months earlier. They might have naturally made mistakes and the evidence of the Circle Inspector must be preferred in this respect. We must reject the contention that the earliest statements of the witnesses in this case have been suppressed, and it follows that no question of prejudice to the accused arises. In the appeal preferred by the Public Prosecutor, the main question that arises for consideration is whether the attack on the two deceased to the extent to which it was carried out was in furtherance of the common intention of the accused. There can be no doubt that if an individual accused had committed all the injuries sustained by either of the deceased, the act amounted to murder as defined in section 300, Indian Penal Code. There can be no doubt that if an individual accused had committed all the injuries sustained by either of the deceased, the act amounted to murder as defined in section 300, Indian Penal Code. Both the deceased died as a direct result of the injuries, the first deceased within about an hour and the second deceased within about 3 hours after the injuries were inflicted. The prosecution have specifically elicited from the medical officer (P.W.9) with reference to the first deceased that there was no other contributory cause for his death except the injuries. He does not say this in so many words in regard to the second deceased. But he has recorded in the postmortem report (Exhibit P-7) that there was no abnormality in any of the internal organs. In our opinion, the only possible conclusion from this evidence is that, the injuries of both the deceased are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, although unfortunately the prosecution neglected to directly elicit this fact from P. W. 9, as they ought to have done. An offence of murder was clearly committed in respect of each of the deceased within the meaning of clause 3 of section 300, Indian Penal Code. The learned Counsel urges that none of the accused is proved to have had the intention specified in clause (3) of section 300, Indian Penal Code, because the effect of the medical evidence is merely that the totality of the injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, while the effect of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 is that each of the accused could have inflicted only some of those injuries. He relies in this connection on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in In re, Mahanandi1. There four accused stabbed or hit the murderd man with two spears, a hatchet and a stick, inflicting 12 injuries which caused his death a little while later. The learned Judges upheld the conviction of the accused under section 304, Part 2, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, and declined toconvict them of murder, on the ground that they did not have the intention to constitute an offence under section 300, Indian Penal Code. The learned Judges upheld the conviction of the accused under section 304, Part 2, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, and declined toconvict them of murder, on the ground that they did not have the intention to constitute an offence under section 300, Indian Penal Code. Manohar Pershad, J., who spoke for the Division Bench, dealing with clause (3) of section 300, Indian Penal Code, said: “Section 300 would only apply if it were possible togo a step further and say that the offender intended the injury to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death........” The attention of the learned Judges does not appear to have been drawn to Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab2, where clause (3) of section 300 was construed and Bose, J., said: “It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related not Only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill in the event, the ‘thirdly’ would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section........ To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 ‘thirdly’: First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations; Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under section 300 ‘thirdly.‘It does not mutter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, No onehas a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuried of that kind, they must face the consequences and they can only escape if it can be shown or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” In the present case, whether we accept the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 or of P.Ws. 3 and 4, it cannot be said that the infliction of the totality of the injuries was accidental or unintentional. Having regard to clause (3) of section 300, Indian Penal Code, the learned Sessions Judge was in error in the view he took that for a conviction under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, the existence of a common intention to beat is insufficient and that a common intention to kill is always necessary. Even if the common intention is merely to beat, if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted by the beating is found to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature the mens rea required for liability under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, would be satisfied. The question would depend upon the extent to which the beating was carried out in furtherance of the common intention. The question would depend upon the extent to which the beating was carried out in furtherance of the common intention. But if the acts exceed the common intention, section 34 would, of course, not be applicable. In the case of Kripal v. State of U.P.1, the facts were that, out of the three assailants, Sheoraj beat Jiraj with a lathi causing no visible injury; Kripal stabbed Jiraj with a spear without any penetration causing a simple injury and Bhopal stabbed deep with a spear on the jaw of Jiraj, which caused Jiraj’s death at once. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court found that having regard to the nature of their earlier assaults on two other persons, the parts of Jiraj’s body on which the assaults of Kripal and Shoeraj were aimed and the actual results of these assaults, the common intention to kill Jiraj could not reasonably be attributed to the assailants. A common intention to beat Jiraj and cause only grievious injuries was attributed and in this view, Sheoraj and Kripal were held to be guilty under section 326, Indian Penal Code, and Bhopal alone was held to be guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The conclusion was obviously based on the particular facts which showed that Bhopal’s act exceed their common intention. In the case of Panduranga v. State of Hyderabad2, there was no evidence of any prior concert and on the facts disclosed, there was no warrant for an inference of common intention. It is clear that their Lordships intended to confine their conclusion to the particular facts, because, they observed: “Each case must rest on its own facts and the mere similarity of the facts in one case cannot be used to determine a conclusion of fact in another.” In the present case, the stratagem by means of which the accused disarmed their victims and immediately carried out the attack with the same weapons leave no doubt that they had formed a prearranged plan. We are unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge’s view that the fourth accused might have desired merely to save his friends from a possible attack, because there was no interval between the disarming of the deceased and their men and the attack upon them. We are unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge’s view that the fourth accused might have desired merely to save his friends from a possible attack, because there was no interval between the disarming of the deceased and their men and the attack upon them. The accuseds’ coming unarmed was only part of the stratagem, if they succeeded in which, as they did, there was no risk of an injury to themselves. As they formed the plan with the object of overpowering the deceased’s party and seizing the paddy, the common intention that may be initially attributed to them would be merely at causing hurt to the deceased and their men. If we found ourselves on the evidence of P.Ws. 3. and 4 it would follow that the acts of accused 2 and 4 were in excess of that common intention and accused 2 and 4 alone would be liable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of the second deceased and the first deceased respectively, and accused 1 and 3 would be liable only under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, on the charge against them relating to these murders. On the other hand, if we act on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, all the accused must have developed a common intention, after obtaining the weapons, to commit the murders. They did not stop the beating after the victims fell to the ground, which was sufficient to enable them to seize the paddy, but continued to beat indiscriminately to the ends On the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, it is not reasonable to hold that any one of the accused did what the others did not intend. All the accused would therefore be liable under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The benefit of doubt, arising from the difference between the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and that of P.Ws. 3 and 4 must go to the accused, especially as the trial Judges’ finding with regard to the events in Lakshminarayana’s pasture land implies that P.Ws.1 and 2 were prone to exaggeration. Turning to the conviction of accused 1 and 2 for robbery, the learned Counsel is unable to assail the trial Judge’s appreciation of evidence of P.W.2, on which the conviction is based. Turning to the conviction of accused 1 and 2 for robbery, the learned Counsel is unable to assail the trial Judge’s appreciation of evidence of P.W.2, on which the conviction is based. The first accused used a stick and the second accused used a spear at the time of the robbery. It is not suggested that the stick, which:s either M.O. 3 or M.O. 7 and is described in the panchanamas (Exhibits P-14 and P-16) is not a deadly weapon. Although we have found that the first accused is not liable for causing grievous hurt, as he used a deadly weapon, he is liable just like the second accused under section 397, Indian Penal Code, for the robbery. In the result, the convictions and sentences of all the accused under section 326 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, are set aside. Accused 1 and 3 are convicted instead under section 324 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each, and accused 2 and 4 are convicted under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment for life each. The other convictions and sentences are confirmed and all the sentences will run concurrently. The appeals are allowed in part to the above extent. K.N.R. ----- Appeals allowed in part.