Order.- This revision petition raises an interesting question relating to the date from which the order for executing a bond for keeping peace should come into operation. The circumstances, under which the question has arisen, are as follows: The petitioners were directed by the Assistant Commissioner (and executive Magistrate), Gulbarga, on 13th December, 1963, to execute a bond for a period of one year under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Against this order, the petitioners preferred two separate appeals to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Gulbarga. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed both the appeals on 31st August, 1964 and confirmed the order passed by the Magistrate. After the disposal of the appeal, the learned Magistrate issued a notice on 22nd October, 1964, directing the petitioners to be present in his Court on 16th November, 1964, “for executing the bonds for a further period of one year as per orders passed by this. Court on 13th December, 1963, under section 107, Criminal Procedure Code.” The notice further intimated the petitioners that if they defaulted in the execution of the bonds, further necessary action would be taken against them. It is this order that forms the subject-matter of the Revision Petition. Mr. Jagannatha Shetty, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that as the period of one year has already expired by the 12th of December, 1964, according to the original order of the Magistrate dated 13th December, 1963, it was no longer open to the Magistrate to call upon the petitioners to execute the bonds. He further submitted that as the main object of the order is to require the petitioners to keep peace during the period of one year from the date of the order, that period having already lapsed and no breach of the peace having taken place during that period, the order had exhausted itself and could not be implemented by calling upon the petitioners to execute bonds for a further period of one year as indicated in the notice. The learned Government Pleader, Mr. Mahajan, has submitted that the delay in taking the bond from the petitioners was due to the appeals preferred by them and that the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the order of the Magistrate cannot be availed of by them. The learned Government Pleader, Mr. Mahajan, has submitted that the delay in taking the bond from the petitioners was due to the appeals preferred by them and that the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the order of the Magistrate cannot be availed of by them. His submission is that the period of one year should be counted from the date of the order of the Sessions Judge as no other date had been fixed by the learned Sessions Judge in disposing of the appeal. In this connection, reference may be made to section 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It reads as follows: “120. (1) If any person, in respect of whom an order requiring security is made under section 106 or section 118, is at the time such order is made, sentenced to, or undergoing a sentence of, imprisonment the period for which such security is required shall commence on the expiration of such sentence. (2) In other cases such period shall commence on the date of such order unless the Magistrate, .for sufficient reason, fixes a later date.” In the present case, we are not concerned with sub-section (1) as there is no question of any order of imprisonment or the petitioners undergoing a sentence of imprisonment at the time when the Magistrate passed the order on 13th December, 1963. According to the plain meaning of sub-section (2) the period of one year in this case should commence from the date of the order passed by the Magistrate, as the learned Magistrate did not fix any later date from which the operation of his order should commence. It appears from the records of the Sessions Court that as soon as the appeal was admitted an order was passed by the learned Sessions Judge to call for the records of the lower Court. In pursuance of the order, the records seem to have been received in that Court. When the appeal was heard by the learned Sessions Judge, the petitioners do not appear to have raised any question as to the date of the operation of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. In pursuance of the order, the records seem to have been received in that Court. When the appeal was heard by the learned Sessions Judge, the petitioners do not appear to have raised any question as to the date of the operation of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. They do not also seem to have requested the Sessions Judge to fix up any other date for the operation of the order, though more than eight months had elapsed by the date the appeal came to be disposed of. The order of the Sessions Judge, therefore, makes no reference to the point now raised with the result that we have a plain older of dismissal of the appeals confirming the order passed by the Magistrate. So, the short point for decision is from what date the order of the Magistrate should take effect. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the decision of the Court of Judicial Commissioner, Sind in Ghousbux v. Emperor1. In that case, the Court was concerned with the question as to whether the order should operate from the date of the order under section 118 or section 112 of the Code. It was ruled by the learned Judicial Commissioners that time is to run from the date of the order under section 118 of the Code. Further, they had to consider as to whether the order could be deemed to have been under suspension during the period in which the accused were on bail and were in prison. They came to the conclusion that the order could not be deemed to have been suspended under those two circumstances. This view appears to be consistent with sub-section (1) of section 120 according to which the order shall come into operation only on the expiry of the sentence, if such sentence was in force at the time when the order was made under section 118. In other words, according to the Judicial Commissioners, subsequent events either of imprisonment or of bail shall not stop the period which has commenced to run. This decision, therefore, does not throw any light on the point raised in this case. The learned Government Pleader has drawn my attention to two decisions which throw some light on the point at issue and support the stand taken by him. This decision, therefore, does not throw any light on the point raised in this case. The learned Government Pleader has drawn my attention to two decisions which throw some light on the point at issue and support the stand taken by him. In Jaugi Gope v. State2the Court was concerned with the effect of an appeal or revision on the operation of the order passed under section 118 of the Code. The Court came to the conclusion that “the proper course in such cases is that the period during which the petitioners were to keep the peace or maintain good behaviour, as the case may be, should be made operative from the date fixed by the appellate or revisional authority.” In coming to this conclusion the Court took into consideration the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that if the order passed under section 118 expires during the pendency of the appeal, then, there could be no question of calling upon the petitioner for executing the bond as the purpose would have been served by that date. The argument was rejected on the ground that such a construction would lend an easy scope for persons mischievously inclined “by adoption of delaying tactics.” This view also finds support from the decision of the Oudh High Court in Abdul Sattar v. Emperor3The view taken by the Court is that the period would run from the date of the order of the appellate Court. It appears in that case that an order of stay had been obtained during the pendency of the appeal. In the present case, no such order of stay appears to have been passed but only the records seem to have been called for from the lower Court. Considering the principles laid down by these two decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader and the general principles of law regarding the effect of an appeal in such cases on proceedings of the lower Courts, I am of the opinion that the order requiring the execution of the bond under section 118 should become operative where the original order is confirmed by the Court of Sessions in appeal or by the High Court in revision, from the date of the order of the Court of Sessions or of the Court of revision unless such Court expressly fixes some other date for the order to come into operation. In such cases, it is also always open to the petitioners to urge before the Court of appeal or revision to consider the effect of the lapse of time and pray for suitable orders fixing any other date for the order under section 118 to come into operation. In the present case, this is not a revision against an original proceeding. It is only an application against the notice (issued by the Magistrate after disposal of the appeal by the Court of Session) calling upon the petitioners to execute a bond; it is not, therefore, open to this Court to consider what order could have been passed on merits had there been a revision petition against the original order. In this view, the petition is partially allowed and the Magistrate is directed to take a bond only from the date of the order of the Sessions Judge and not from the date of his own original order. S.V.S. ----- Petition partly allowed.