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Allahabad High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 1813 (ALL)

ESCOTEL MOBILE COMMUNICATION LTD v. UNION OF INDIA

1999-11-17

ALOKE CHAKRABARTI

body1999
ALOKE CHAKRABARTI, J. The order dated 28-6-1999 passed by the appellate authority and the order dated 27-10-1998 passed by the Cantonment Executive Of ficer for removing the antenna tower set up by the petitioner are challenged here. 2. Counter-affidavit and supplemen tary counter-affidavits have been filed and the petitioner filed rejoinder-affidavit. 3. Heard Mr. Sunil Ambwani, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mohammad Isa Khan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Vivek Chaudhary, learned counsel ap pearing for respondent No. 2. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that for setting up the antenna tower the petitioner approached the respondent No. 2 and its authorities and when the communication came about no requirement of permission, antenna tower was set up on the rooftop of the concerned building for providing effective mobile telephone service. Said installation was made in the year 1996. The Cantonment Board on 24-9-1998 resolved taking action under Section 126 of the Cantonment Act and notice dated 27-10-1-998 was issued accordingly to remove the antenna lower. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no legal require ment of any permission for setting up such antenna tower on a rooftop of a building. The impugned notice has been issued upon a resolution which was taken without giving the petitioner any opportunity or notice. Reference has been made to Sec tion 126 of the Cantonment Act for con tending that the preconditions of the said provision are not existing for directing the petitioner to remove the structure and its viability has not at all been considered either with or without any further measures. 6. Mr. Vivek Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 contended that petitioner has made out a case of no requirement of permission but the documents disclosed along with the counter-affidavit show that the petitioner obtained the no objection on a request with regard to aluminium structure and with regard to steel structure of the anten na tower request was rejected by the respondents. It has further been con tended that Section 126 clearly provides power to the authorities relating to building and such building includes the antenna tower set up on it roof top. It has further been con tended that Section 126 clearly provides power to the authorities relating to building and such building includes the antenna tower set up on it roof top. It has further been contended that security of the life of the people as also of the structure has been considered by the technical persons as ap pears from Annexures 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit and, therefore, this writ petition should be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the respon dent No. 1 adopted the contentions of the respondent No. 2. 8. After considering the respective contentions and materials on record I find that with regard to setting up of the anten na tower, the petitioner has claimed that there was a no objection certificate issued for its setting up. The respondents con tended that the letter indicating require ment of no such certificate, was with regard to another structure which was lighter than the one set up actually. Con sidering the materials available I do not find that the same clearly indicate that requirement of no such certificate was ex pressed in respect of the present structure. 9. The next contention of the petitioner is that the impugned notice was issued under Section 126 of the Canton ment Act and the said section provides of a requirement considering also the aspect of repairing or to protect or to enclose the structure in such manner as the Board thinks necessary. 10. The petitioner contends that the structure is standing there for a long period and while issuing the impugned notice the aforesaid aspect has not been considered. The appellate order also has not taken the aforesaid aspect into con sideration. 11. Looking into the legal provisions it appears that the law required the Board to consider the matter and to take a decision. Various situations have been governed by the said section which may require the removal or for taking steps to repair or to protect the structure depend ing upon the circumstances. Materials dis closed do not indicate that the said aspects have been considered. At the time of hear ing records were directed to be produced. Although records were produced, but nothing was available showing that such various situations have been considered. Materials dis closed do not indicate that the said aspects have been considered. At the time of hear ing records were directed to be produced. Although records were produced, but nothing was available showing that such various situations have been considered. Even the inspection report does not disclose any basis justifying formation of opinion as regards extent of danger though impugned notice was issued and that too without even considering the probability of improvement by repairing or protecting or enclosing the structure as contemplated in Section 126. 12. In view of the aforesaid finding. the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27-10-1998 at Annexure-3 and the appellate order dated 28-6-1999 at Annexure-7 to the writ peti tion are hereby quashed. The respondents are at liberty to consider the matter and take appropriate steps in accordance with law and in terms of the observations made hereinabove after giving the petitioner an opportunity. Petition allowed. .