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1999 DIGILAW 1817 (MAD)

Rukmana Naik v. Mohammad Hussain

1999-11-30

K.S.HEGDE

body1999
Order: The question for decision is whether the Court below had no jurisdiction to direct re-delivery of the properties delivered to the First Party in pursuance of the order of this Court. The order of that Court declaring the First Party to be in possession of the properties in dispute was set aside by this Court on the ground that the same was made without notice to the interested parties. The delivery of the disputed properties was given by the Court below to the First Party in pursuance of its order mentioned earlier. Now that order having been set aside by this Court it is but proper the party from whom the properties have been taken possession of should be put in possession of the same. The petitioner before this Court claims that he was in possession of the properties. That was also his claim before the Court below. The correctness of that claim has not been gone into by the Court below. On the other hand the Court has rejected his application solely on the ground that no provision of law was brought to its notice showing that it had jurisdiction to re-deliver the properties. The respondents are not represented in this Court. Sri Appa Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended before this Court that the view taken by the Court below is erroneous. According to him the point in controversy is not covered by any specific provision of law in the Criminal Procedure Code; therefore the Court below had inherent power to do justice between the parties, or more particularly when the rights of one of the parties have been interfered with by a wrong order of the Court. In this connection, he invited the attention of this Court to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nagel Kurdu v. Emperor1, wherein a Division Bench of that Court laid down that so far as the Criminal Procedure Code deals with any point specifically, the provision therein must be deemed to be exhaustive and that law must be ascertained by reference to its provision, but where a case arises which demands interference and it is not within those for which the Code specifically provides it would not be reasonable to say that the Court had not the power to make such order as the ends of justice require. A somewhat similar view was expressed by a single Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Hansraj Hanjiwan v. Emperor2, wherein it was laid down that the Criminal Procedure Code is an exhaustive one, only with regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. Absence of any provision on a particular matter does not mean that there is no such power, and the Court may act on the principle that every procedure should be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by law. It is unnecessary in this case to pronounce as to the extent of the inherent power of the trial Court. But suffice it to say that every Court has jurisdiction to take necessary steps to give full effect to the order of the appellate or revisional Court. If the facts stated by the petitioners are correct, then the order of this Court must be deemed to include an order directing a redelivery of the properties to them. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is allowed and the order of the Court below is set aside. The case is remanded back to that Court for disposal according tolaw in the light of the observations made above. S.V.S. ----- Case remanded.