Judgment.- The appellant herein, Ramaswami alias Rajavelu, was a dealer in Karaikal, a former French possession in India. In 1954, these possessions came under the de facto administration of the Government of India, by a treaty, and were being administered under the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. In the course of 1956, for getting certain quota rights, for import of goods, from the Government, the appellant is alleged to have fabricated certain bills, forged certain signatures and certain departmental seals, thereby contravening Articles 147, 148, 150, 151, 164 and 405 of the French Penal Code. According to the procedure enacted for investigation of criminal offences in the French Code D’ instruction Criminelle (Criminal Procedure Code), investigation by the proces verbal (investigation by the Police) was completed on 15th January, 1958. The next stage of investigation under the French Criminal Procedure Code is the investigation by the Judge D’ instruction and this was commenced on 15th September, 1958 and subsequently completed. Thereafter adopting the procedure of the French Criminal Procedure Code, the Judge D’ instruction sent a report to the Procureur of the Republique, who, following the procedure enacted in Article 133 of the Code D’ instruction Criminelle, placed the matter before the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation. The Jurisdiction of this Chamber, according to the provisions of the French Criminal Procedure Code, is explained in Article 217 and subsequent Articles of that Code. This Chamber has to consider the data gathered up to that time during the stage of proas verbal and during the enquiry by the Judge D’ instruction. But before the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation, neither the accused nor the witnesses nor the complainant (Partie Civile), nor the Public Prosecutor, is entitled to be present. As per Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the facts so far ascertained, amount to a crime under the French law, and if the Chamber finds that the charges justify committal, it shall commit the accused for trial before the “Tribunal Criminal”. After such committal, the accused will take his trial before the Tribunal. As per Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the facts so far ascertained, amount to a crime under the French law, and if the Chamber finds that the charges justify committal, it shall commit the accused for trial before the “Tribunal Criminal”. After such committal, the accused will take his trial before the Tribunal. It is common ground that in this case this particular stage had been reached and the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation, by its order dated 13th November, 1961 decided that prima facie the charges for the several offences of fabrication and forgery, as mentioned above, had been made out and that the accused should be sent to the Tribunal Criminal at Karaikal for being tried according to law. At this stage, again conforming to the French law, the accused Ramaswami made a declaration before the Greffier en Chef (Registrar) at Pondicherry on 20th November, 1961 about his intention for appealing to the Court of Cassation at Paris. Subsequent to the de jure transfer of the former French Establishments to the Indian Union and the conferment on this High Court of the powers of the Court of Cassation in Paris, under the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, this appeal is now before this Court. The accused to whom notice of hearing of the appeal had been given was represented by a learned Counsel and the Public Prosecutor appeared for the State of Pondicherry. At the outset, the learned Counsel for the appellant referred to some provision of the “Code De Procedure Penale” which embodies certain modified provisions of the old French Code of Criminal Procedure and which came into force in France and other French territories, in pursuance of certain amendments to the latter Code, carried out by the appropriate authorities in Paris, after the date when the former French Possessions in India came under the de facto jurisdiction of the Government of India in 1954, and before the de jure transfer of jurisdiction in 1962. These provisions will not have application to the present case. The further argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is based upon Articles 21 and 13 of the Indian Constitution, which will apply to the former French Possessions from the date of the de jure transfer, i.e., 1st August, 1962. These provisions will not have application to the present case. The further argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is based upon Articles 21 and 13 of the Indian Constitution, which will apply to the former French Possessions from the date of the de jure transfer, i.e., 1st August, 1962. Article 21, found in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 13 (3) (a)occurring in the same Chapter, defines “law” as including any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. The contention of the appellant is that after the extension of the Constitution to Pondicherry, only the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code should be applied for the trial of the accused in this case, and not the provisions of the French Code of Criminal Procedure or the French Penal Code. A brief reference can be made at this stage to the successive orders and enactments which define the scope and extent of the laws which have to be applied in the erstwhile French Possessions including Pondicherry. Article 5of the French Establishments (Administration) Order, 1954, states: “All laws in force in the French Establishments or any part thereof immediately before the commencement of this Order and not repealed by paragraph 6 of the French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order, 1954, shall continue to be in force until repealed or amended by as competent authority.” The next stage was the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, which received the assent of the President of India on 5th December, 1962. Section 4 of the Act, contains an identical provision to Article 5, providing for the continuance of the pre-existing laws until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. In 1963, the President of India, acting under Article 240 of the Constitution, made a Regulation called “The Pondicherry (Laws) Regulation, 1963”. under which several laws in force in the Indian Union, including the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, were brought into force with effect from 1st October, 1963, in Pondicherry territory. This Regulation contains certain repealing and saving provisions of which we are concerned with sections 4(1) and 4 (2) (d), which I extract below: “4. under which several laws in force in the Indian Union, including the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, were brought into force with effect from 1st October, 1963, in Pondicherry territory. This Regulation contains certain repealing and saving provisions of which we are concerned with sections 4(1) and 4 (2) (d), which I extract below: “4. (1) Any law in force in Pondicherry or any area thereof corresponding to any Act referred to in section 3 shall stand repealed as from the coming into force of such Act in Pondicherry; and all the laws specified in the Second Schedule are hereby repealed. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect- * * * * * * * (d)any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid.” It is clear that this repealing and saving provision has the effect of preserving, for the purpose of the procedure to be applied in this case, the provisions of the French Criminal Procedure Code (as well as the French Penal Code) notwithstanding the general rule that repealing and amending legislation for dealing with procedure will have retrospective effect, unlike similar legislation dealing with substantive rights, which will not have such an effect, unless there is a specific provision therefor. The President’s Regulation consciously provided for such a retroactive effect on the procedural legislation, namely, the French Criminal Procedure Code which we have to refer to in this case. Learned Counsel for the appellant next urged, with reference to Article 21 read with Article 13 (3) occurring in Part III of the Indian Constitution, that “established law” would mean an enactment which would have the force of law in the territory of the Indian Union and that the French Criminal Procedure Code was not such an enactment. It is obvious that this contention overlooks the provisions of the repealing and saving clause both in section 4 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, and section 4 (2) (d) of the Pondicherry (Laws) Regulation, 1963. It is obvious that this contention overlooks the provisions of the repealing and saving clause both in section 4 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, and section 4 (2) (d) of the Pondicherry (Laws) Regulation, 1963. In this connection the well-known principle of International Law relevant for the purpose is the one laid down as early as in Major of Lyons v. East Indian Co.1: “It is agreed, on all hands, that a Foreign settlement, obtained in an inhabited country, by conquest, or by cession from another Power, stands in a different relation to the present question, from a settlement made by colonizing; that is, peopling an uninhabited country. In the latter case it is said that the subjects of the Grown carry with them the laws of England, there being, of course, no lex loci. In the former case, it is allowed that the law of the country continues until the Grown, or the Legislature, change it.” It is this principle that has been carried out successively in section 5 of the French Establishments (Administration) Order, 1954, section 4 of the Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962, and section 4 (2) (d)of the Pondicherry (Laws) Regulation, 1963. By the force of the aforesaid repealing and saving provisions, the pre-existing French law has become as much the established law in force in the territory of India within the meaning of Article 13 (3) (a)of the Constitution, as any other law of the Indian Union, like the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code. That the law thus given validity, was originally a law in force in what was foreign territory, will not affect the question of its being an established law in the territory newly added to the Indian Union. This reasoning is sufficient to dispose of the objection raised by the appellant’s learned Counsel. Further, by reference to the observations in A.K. Gopalan’s case2, the learned Counsel argued that while the Indian Criminal procedure Code as extended to Pondicherry under the Presidential Regulation, will be “established law” within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution, the pre-existing French law will not have that character, even though it may be a law in force. He referred in particular to the observations of Patanjali Sastri, J., at page 205 of the Report. He referred in particular to the observations of Patanjali Sastri, J., at page 205 of the Report. But it appears tome that the very observations of the learned Judge would go to show that the preexisting French law, which is to be continued as the law for the newly annexed territories would be “established law”, in the light of the interpretation given to that term in the decision of the Supreme Court, particularly the observations of Patanjali Sastri, J. The following extract from the observations of the learned Judge makes the point clear: “In the first place, a satisfactory via media between the two extreme positions contended for on either side may be found by stressing the word ‘established’, which implies some degree of firmness, permanence and general acceptance, while it does not exclude origination by statute. ‘Procedure established by law’ may well be taken to mean what the Privy Council referred to in King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma1, as the ordinary and well-established Criminal Procedure, that is tosay,those settled usages and normal modes of proceeding sanctioned by the Criminal Procedure Code which is the general law of Criminal Procedure in the country. Their Lordships were referring to the distinction between trial by Special Courts provided by an Ordinance of the Governor-General and trial by ordinary Courts under the Criminal Procedure Code. It can be no objection to this view that the Code prescribes no single and uniform procedure for all types of cases but provides varying procedures for different classes of cases. Certain basic principles emerge as the constant factors common to all those procedure, and they form the core of the procedure established by law. I realise that even on this view, the life and liberty of the individual will not be immune from legislative interference, for a competent Legislature may change the procedure so as to whittle down the protection if so minded. But, in the view I have indicated, it must not be change ad hoc for any special purpose or occasion, but a change in the general law of procedure embodied in the Code. So long as such a change is not effected, the protection under Article 21 would be available.......” Obviously, the pre-existing French law preserved for enforcement in these newly added territories, is not an ad hoc legislation designed to meet a particular contingency or a particular set of persons. So long as such a change is not effected, the protection under Article 21 would be available.......” Obviously, the pre-existing French law preserved for enforcement in these newly added territories, is not an ad hoc legislation designed to meet a particular contingency or a particular set of persons. It was law firmly and well established in that territory and having general acceptance under the well-known principles of International Law, which are explained in the decision cited earlier in Mayor of Lyons v. East Indian Co.2. Under those principles, the citizens of that territory possess a vested right to be governed by those provisions until such time a competent authority introduces new patterns of legislation. I therefore hold that the objections referred to above are not valid. No grounds are made out to show that the procedure so far adopted is illegal or that subsequent hearing of the case of the appellant by the Criminal Court at Karaikal, in pursuance of the Committal (renvoi) by the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation, by the adoption of the pre-existing French Law, should be interdicted, or that a direction should be issued that for the subsequent trial the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, should be followed. Before I part with this appeal, I must draw attention to a point urged by the learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Pondicherry regarding the scope of the powers of the Court of Cassation in Paris, when dealing with such a reference. The law on this subject is summarised in one of the well-known treatises “Delloz Repertoire Pratique”, in paragraph 491. It says that in contra-distinction with the order of a Judge D’instruction, definitive orders of the Chambres Des Mises En Accusation are susceptible to correction in Cassation when the renvoi (committal) by the Chamber is to the Court of Assizes. In such cases, revision by Cassation will be permissible either at the instance of the Public Prosecutor or of the accused on account of the several reasons enumerated in Article 408 of Code D’ instruction Criminelle, like the violation of provision of law or non-compliance with the provision of the D’ instruction Criminelle, leading to nullity and so on. Where the committal is to the Correctionanelle Court, then also the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction to interfere under the general principles of law applicable in such cases. Where the committal is to the Correctionanelle Court, then also the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction to interfere under the general principles of law applicable in such cases. But, at the same time, recourse to the Court of Cassation cannot be had when the order of committal, while recording the particulars of the offences for which the accused has to be tried by the Court, has not dealt with any contested question of jurisdiction. The reason for this decision, according to the commentary of Dalloz, is that such committal should be treated merely as a preparatory step before the actual trial. Put in other words, what this commentary indicates is that the procedure so far adopted in this case, will correspond to the preliminary stage before the framing of a charge, such as what takes place before a Grand Jury, or during a preliminary enquiry before a Magistrate before committal to a Sessions Court under the Criminal Procedure Code in India. In such a case, where no question affecting jurisdiction has arisen for decision, but only a decision has been recorded for a prima facie purpose of framing a charge or charges, the Court of Cassation will not interfere. In this case there is no written record of the Proceedings before the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation. According to section 225 of the Code D’ instruction Criminelle, the decision of the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation has to be taken according to the majority vote and in the absence of the accused, the public and the Public Prosecutor. In other words, it is a decision arrived at a secret session of the Chamber and except the fact that by a majority they have decided that charges should be framed, it is not possible to know the reasons which weighed with them. No doubt, they should be deemed to have taken into account, for the purpose of their decision, all the material gathered during investigation up to that stage, namely, at the proces verbal and at the enquiry by the Judge D’ instruction. No argument was advanced before me by the Counsel for the appellant that these data would not justify the committal by the Chambre Des Mises En Accusation. The appeal is therefore dismissed. P.R.N. ------ Appeal dismissed.