Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein challenges the order of detention dated 24th June, 1998 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Baroda city, whereby the petitioner has been detained under Sec. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti- Social Activities Act. ( 2 ) ALTHOUGH the memo of petition raises a number of contentions, I am dealing with only the one contention raised and argued. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner broadly submitted that as disclosed from the order of detention, the deterue has been found to be a "dangerous person", on the basis of 27 incidents of theft under Sec. 379 of Indian Penal Code, and 3 other independent incidents, disclosed by the victims who were not willing to come forward to file criminal complaints on account of the threats given by the detenue to the said victims. It was therefore in this context contended that on the facts of the case, the averments and allegations made in the order of detention would not constitute or establish a tendency or propensity on the part of the detenue, nor would his activities be classified as such whereby it could be said that such activities are prejudicial to public order. In this context, it was submitted that at best, it may be merely a criminal activity which could be dealt with under normal Criminal Law of the land since it may perhaps affect law and order without necessarily adversely affecting public order. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in support of the broad contention referred to hereinabove sought to refer to and rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Harvinder Singh Bedi, ( AIR 1992 SC 979 ), and in the case of mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh, [1995 (2) GLR 1268]. ( 5 ) THERE cannot be any controversy as to the principles laid down by the Supreme court as to the factors which can legitimately be taken in account by the detaining authority, and as to the relevant factors which would govern the validity or otherwise of the detention order. ( 6 ) IN the case of Mrs. ( 5 ) THERE cannot be any controversy as to the principles laid down by the Supreme court as to the factors which can legitimately be taken in account by the detaining authority, and as to the relevant factors which would govern the validity or otherwise of the detention order. ( 6 ) IN the case of Mrs. Harpreet Kaur, (Supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to observe that the activities of the detenue should be of a nature and character which are not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of "law and order", but must be of a nature where it can be said that the same are prejudicial to "public order". In this context, the activities alleged against the detenue must also be such where they create a fear psychosis and/or adversely affect the even tempo of the society. ( 7 ) THESE principles have been further highlighted in the subsequent decision of the supreme Court in the case of Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya, (Supra ). This decision also lays down that in order to sustain the detention order passed under Sec. 3 of the said Act, it is also necessary to establish that the person habitually indulges in the activities mentioned in the statute, and that in this context, "habitually" must be construed to mean continuity of actions and not merely stray incidents, and that such activities must be such so as to disturb public order. The observations of the Supreme Court in the letter case which are pertinent to the facts of the present case are found in paras 8 and 9 of the said decision. After having examined the grammatical and contextual meaning of the word"habitually", the Supreme Court concluded that the word "habitually" also means usually and generally and implies continuity of an action as opposed to stray incidents. ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court had occasion to clarify the distinction between the activities which merely affect the maintenance of law and order and those activities which adversely or prejudicially affect maintenance of public order. In this context, it was pointed out that public order would embrace more of the community than merely law and order. Public order is said to be affected or involved where the even tempo of life of the community is affected, even if it be in respect of a specific locality. In this context, it was pointed out that public order would embrace more of the community than merely law and order. Public order is said to be affected or involved where the even tempo of life of the community is affected, even if it be in respect of a specific locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. An act by itself is not determinal by its own gravity in its quality. It may nor differ from another but in its potentiality it may be more different, and also more serious. ( 9 ) IN the context of the aforesaid two decision, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 1681/92 decided on 3rd March, 1993 (Coram : A. P. Ravani and J. M. Panchal, JJ), wherein the broad principles laid down by the Supreme Court have been considered and discussed. In my opinion, the aforesaid Division Bench judgment does not in any manner add to the principle nor does it clarify any further the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions. What is material however in the context of the aforesaid decision is to note the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Harpreet kaur, (Supra), and particularly, the observations made in para 14 of the said decision. The said para concludes with the observation that the facts of each case have therefore to be carefully scrutinised to test the validity of order of detention. Thus, to my mind, whether the activities of the detenue affect merely law and order or go beyond this situation, and also impinge upon public order, must necessarily be determined by the facts of each case. ( 10 ) WITH a view to bring about such determination, I may therefore examine the facts of the case particularly those set out in the grounds of detention which lead to the order of detention. ( 11 ) FIRSTLY, it must be noted that the detenue has been lebelled as a "dangerous person". The reason for assigning this lable to the detenue is the sum total of his criminal activities narrated in the grounds of detention. ( 11 ) FIRSTLY, it must be noted that the detenue has been lebelled as a "dangerous person". The reason for assigning this lable to the detenue is the sum total of his criminal activities narrated in the grounds of detention. ( 12 ) FIRSTLY, such grounds of detention take note of three separate independent statements given by three separate independent persons in respect of separate incidents having occurred on different dates. Each of these statements has been made under condition of confidentiality, and the common theme running through each of the statements is that the detenue had on the dates of the incidents not only assaulted the person making the statement but had also threatened the person making the statement with a lethal weapon. In the first incident that lethal weapon happened to be a Gupti, in the second incident it happened to be Rampuri knife and in the third incident, it happened to be a swoad. Each of the three statements reiterates that the detenue had issued threats of grievous bodily harm and/or death to any one who attempted to stop him or his associates an confederates, and that on account of this activity, the public that had collected there ran away from the place of incident and an atmosphere of fear and terror pervaded the locality at that point of time. Each of these deponents has stated that they have not filed any criminal complaint in respect of the incident on account of fear of the detenue. ( 13 ) APART from the three incidents narrated by the deponents as discussed hereinabove, other aspect of the criminal activities of the detenue are also significant in nature, character, extent and the detenues uniformity of actions. ( 14 ) THE grounds of detention mention as many as 27 incidents in which the detenue is involved. Each incident is with reference to a particular number of Police Station and index of crime. It is both interesting and significant to note that each of these 27 incidents pertains to theft. Furthermore, each of such thefts pertains to a two wheeler i. e. , motorized two wheel vehicles and not bicycles. Out of these 27 incidents, 15 have resulted in criminal case being filed and which are pending criminal trial whereas the other 12 are under investigation. Furthermore, each of such thefts pertains to a two wheeler i. e. , motorized two wheel vehicles and not bicycles. Out of these 27 incidents, 15 have resulted in criminal case being filed and which are pending criminal trial whereas the other 12 are under investigation. ( 15 ) THESE grounds disclose and indicate the strong criminal propensity of the detenue, indicate that he is a headstrong, vicious person prone to issue threats of grievous. physical harm to any and sundry who come across his way or oppose his wishes: It also appears that the detenue is not merely a specialist but a wholesale specialist in the theft of motorized two wheelers. It also becomes apparent that all the 27 incidents referred to in the grounds of detention pertain to the year 1998. This also establishes not merely the continuity of the activity carried on by the detenue, but also indicate the uniformity and intensity of such activity. The detenue can thus be said to be in the "habit" of committing such crime. ( 16 ) WHEN the aforesaid factual allegations are examined collectively, as they must be, it becomes apparent or obvious that these are not activities which can reasonably be curtailed by prosecution under the normal criminal law of the land, particularly where the complainants do not come forward to file complaints on account of the grievous threats of serious bodily harm or death issued by the detenue to all and sundry. ( 17 ) IT may not be relevant and pertinent for the purpose of issuance of the present order of detention, but nevertheless it is significant to note that this very detenue had been detained by an earlier order under the same provisions in March, 1997, until he was released from detention by a judgment of this Court in August, 1997. I refer to this fact only to indicate that although the High Court apparently quashed and set aside the earlier detention order, it has not had the slightest impact on the activities of the detenue inasmuch as 27 incidents of specialized thefts referred to in the grounds of detention are incidents of the year 1998, i. e. , after the detenue was released by the High court from the earlier detention. To my mind, this itself is an indication that the detenue is a "dangerous person", and also a "habitual offender". To my mind, this itself is an indication that the detenue is a "dangerous person", and also a "habitual offender". In this context, I hasten to a add that this fact has merely been mentioned in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority, while making it emphatically clear that the documents and f. I. Rs. which were referred to and relied upon for the purpose of the prior detention order, have not been referred to and/or relied upon for the purpose of passing the present impugned, detention order, ( 18 ) THUS, as. observed in para 14 of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Mrs. Harpreet Kaur, (Supra), the facts of the case and the incidents referred to and relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention is not only material but also significant, and upon which this Court can determine and adjudicate upon the theme, and draw the necessary distinction between activities which impinge upon merely law and order, as opposed to activities adversely affecting or impeding upon public order. ( 19 ) ON the facts and circumstances of the case discussed hereinabove, I have no hesitation in concluding that the activities of the detenue as factually discussed hereinabove go beyond merely affecting law and order but are also prejudicial to public order. ( 20 ) IN this context, I may also add mirely by way of an observation, and without any attempt or inclination to substantiate the order of detention, apart from the grounds of detention discussed hereinabove. In this context, I may observe that these are hectic times, that society is under more than necessary pressure even in respect of its normal activity. It is also said and perhaps observed that the real function of the police in prevention, detection and prosecution of crimes and criminals has not remained sufficiently efficient on account of diversions of the police force to other non-essential duties. It is also said that criminal cases are pilling up in courts at least pertially on account of the fact that investigation and prosecution is not as speedy as it could be. Under such circumstances, I would not be importing any personal knowledge into the matter if I observe that super specialists in theft of specific items, such as the detenue, create problems not only for individuals in society but also for society itself. Under such circumstances, I would not be importing any personal knowledge into the matter if I observe that super specialists in theft of specific items, such as the detenue, create problems not only for individuals in society but also for society itself. It is only a matter of coincidence that such problems or the magnitude of such problems could possibly or probably result in direct observable and demonstratable effect on public order. However, it is not necessary either in fact or in law to await the day when maintenance of public order or distrubance of public order becomes actually perceptible and/or demonstratable. It is sufficient in law, that where there is a reasonable possibility or probability adjudged from the facts of the case, that continuation of the activities of persons such as the detenue impinging upon"the even tempo of life in society", to hold that the detention of such a person is justifiable. . ( 21 ) THUS, I find and hold that the impugned order of detention passed by the detaining authority is eminently justified. This petition is therefore dismissed with no orders as to costs. .