JUDGMENT D. Raju, C. J, (Oral):- The above writ petition has been filed seeking to quash the order passed by the second respondent-Divisional Commissioner, Kangra Division at Dharamshala - dated December 4 1998 in Appeal No. 20/98 filed as Annexure P-2 where under the second respondent has upheld the acceptance of the nomination and the subsequent election of the fourth respondent herein as Member, Zila Parishad, Una from Ward No. 7 -Momniar, which was said to have been reserved for a Scheduled Caste lady candidate. The said order came to be passed in exercise of the appellate powers under Section 181 (ii) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 while reversing and setting aside the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Una dated December 9, 1997 where under, at the instance of the petitioner who filed an election petition challenging the election of the fourth respondent herein, the fourth respondent has been held not eligible to contest for the Ward in question which was reserved for a lady candidate belonging to the Scheduled Caste, she, in the view of the Deputy Commissioner, Una not belonging to the said community by birth. Per contra, the appellate authority while placing reliance upon certain decisions particularly one reported in AIR 1972 SC 1840, (N.E. Horo v. Smt. Jahan Ara Jaipal Singh) and J 996(3) SCC 545, (Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University & Ors.) came to the conclusion that by virtue of marriage the fourth respondent became assimilated into the community of her husband which was a Scheduled Caste and that, therefore, her nomination was correctly accepted by the Returning Officer and that she was entitled to contest the election for the seat reserved for a lady Scheduled Caste candidate. Aggrieved, the petitioner, who was also one of the contestant in the election for the Ward in question, who had polled 4896 votes as against 5049 votes polled by fourth respondent and lost the election, has come up before this Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner, who was also one of the contestant in the election for the Ward in question, who had polled 4896 votes as against 5049 votes polled by fourth respondent and lost the election, has come up before this Court. The main and only question that was pursued in support of the challenge to the impugned order of the second respondent is that the order passed on appeal is illegal and unsustainable that by contracting marriage with a member of the Scheduled Caste; the fourth respondent could not be said to have acquired the status of a member of Scheduled Caste and that such status is and could be a matter of acquisition by birth only. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. N. K. Thakuar, apart from inviting our attention to the orders of the authorities below, invited our attention to the decisions in AIR 1972 SC 1840 (supra) and 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) and contended that the authority below has misconstrued the scope and ratio of decision of 1996(3) 545 (supra) in rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner and consequently the order is liable to be set aside. Per contra, the fourth respondent who is really the effective and contesting respondent, inspite of notice duly served on her, she has not chosen to respond and appear and make arrangement to contest the claim of the petitioner. Consequently, she was set exparte. In such circumstances, the learned Advocate General while appearing for the second respondent, brought to our notice the relevant judgments including those noticed by the second respondent in the impugned order and contended that the conclusion arrived at, cannot be said to be either illegal or unwarranted or unreasonable and perverse to call for any interference in our hands. 3. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In view of the three decisions of the apex Court, it is unnecessary to advert to some of the other decisions of different High Courts either taking a view similar to the one taken or taking a different view, in different circumstances. The consideration in our view can be confined to, with reference to the decisions rendered by their Lordships of the apex Court. 4. The consideration in our view can be confined to, with reference to the decisions rendered by their Lordships of the apex Court. 4. In AIR 1972 SC 1840 (supra), the apex Court had an occasion to deal with directly a similar issue in respect of an election held for a parliamentary costituency under the Representation of People Act, 1951. The appellant before the apex Court was declared elected to the Lok Sabha seat concerned which came to be challenged by one of the respondents whose nomination papers came to be rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she could not be claimed to be a member of the Scheduled Tribe by virtue of her marriage alone, falling back on the fact that her husband whom she married was a member of the Scheduled Tribe, in the State of Bihar. It is in this context the question came to be considered as to whether a lady can legally claim to have acquired the siatus of her husbands community by virtue of her marriage and their Lordships, of the apex Court held that when a person in the course of time was shown to have been assimilated in the community, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend how a person can be denied a right and privilege which may be conferred on that community even though tribal by constitutional provisions. It was also observed that where a non-tribal woman is married to be tribal man and the marriage was approved and sanctioned by the Parha Panchayat of the tribe and the marriage was valid, she having been married to such a person after due observance of all formalities and after obtaining the approval of the elders of the tribes, would belong to the tribal community to which her husband belonged, though she was not born in the tribe as such. This decision came to be also noticed by their Lordships of the apex Court in two other subsequent judgments. As indicated earlier, the learned Counsel for the petitioner while placing reliance upon the decision reported in 1996(3) SCC 545-(supra), vehemently contended that the same has been misconstrued by the second respondent when a proper understanding of the decision would lead to the only conclusion that the lady in this case could not, ipso facto, be entitled to claim to belong, by virtue of her marriage, to the Scheduled Caste. No doubt, the second respondent appears to have adverted to only paragraph of the judgment where such consideration has been undertaken to gain support for the view taken in the earlier decisions noticed above and that he has not taken into account the ultimate conclusions arrived at in such case, but at the same time it should be noticed that the learned Judge of the apex Court who rendered the decision in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) despite adverting to the decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 1840 (supra) at more than one place have not chosen to say anything contrary to what has been held in the earlier decision, apparently for obvious reasons too. 5. As a matter of fact, in paragraph 35 of the decision in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) it is made clear that the earlier decisions rendered in AIR 1972 SC 1840 (N.E. Horo v. Smt. Jahan Ara Jaipal Singh) as also in 1984(2) SCC 91, (Kailash Sonkar v. Maya Devi), are to be virtually distinguished on the ground that it was established in those cases that the very community to which they claimed to belong, has accepted them as member of Dalits by the community itself virtually according approval to the claim by their election. Consequently, the decision in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) could not be said to have laid down any proposition of law opposed to the earlier decisions in AIR 1972 SC 1840 or 1984(2) SCC 91 (supra). The decision in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) has been rendered in the context of a claim for employment and reservation made for employment to public office and it was, therefore, in that context that their Lordships of the apex Court have confined the ratio of the decision in that case to such category of claimants. The decision in 1998(9) SCC 217, State of Tripura & Ors. v. Namita Majumdar) dealt with, in the context of the reservation for a public office under the State, the decision rendered in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) and has followed and applied the same. The decision in 1998(9) SCC 217, State of Tripura & Ors. v. Namita Majumdar) dealt with, in the context of the reservation for a public office under the State, the decision rendered in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) and has followed and applied the same. It is useful to advert to paragraph 6 of the said decision wherein it is observed that having regard to the fact that the cases arising under the election law with similar claim, have been specifically adverted to and dealt with already by the decision rendered in 1996(3) SCC 545, the said decision need not call for any re-consideration or re-appreciation one over again 6. On a careful consideration of the principles laid down in the various decisions noticed above as also some of the decisions noticed by their Lordships in rendering such judgments, we are of the view that the claim of the petitioner which found favour of acceptance with the initial authority, namely, Deputy Commissioner in such absolute terms that by birth only a person can claim to belong to at Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, has not been approved or accepted by their Lordships of the apex Court. Apart from the distinction sought to be made by the subsequent two decisions of the apex Court in respect of the election law and service law, even the decision reported in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) which elaborately considered the question has approved on principle, the position that if the large members of the community or communal body as such has accorded approval to the status claimed by k woman on account of her marriage contracted with a man belonging to either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, there is no infirmity or illegality in allowing such claim, at any rate in cases pertaining to the election law. In our respectful opinion, the decision reported in 1996(3) SCC 545 (supra) itself tacitly accepts and approves the principle that in some cases, at any rate, the acquisition of communal status by a woman is permissible on account of her marriage by getting assimilated to and acquiring the communal status of her husband in respect of election law or claims pertaining to or arising under election law. In this regard, observations of their Lordship of the apex Court in para 31 of 1996(3) SCC 545 may be usefully reported as under:- "31. In this regard, observations of their Lordship of the apex Court in para 31 of 1996(3) SCC 545 may be usefully reported as under:- "31. It is well-settled law from Bhoobum Moyee Debia v, Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry that judiciary recognized a century and a half ago that husband and wife are one under Hindu Law, and so long as the wife survives she is half of the husband. She is Sapinda of her husband as held in Lulloobboy Bappoobhoy Cassidass Moolchund v. Cassibai, It would, therefore, be clear that be it either under the Canon Law or the Hindu Law, on marriage the wife becomes an integral part of husbands marital home entitled to equal status of husband as a member of the family. Therefore, the lady, on marriage, becomes a member of the family and thereby she becomes a member of the caste to which she moved. The caste rigidity breaks down and would stand no impediment to her becoming a member of the family to which the husband belongs and she gets herself transplanted." 7. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the same pertains to the election law though arising under the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act in this case also not only her nomination has been accepted as belonging to a lady of the Scheduled Caste based on the community of her husband, but she had got elected also by large number of votes polled than the votes polled by the petitioner, this itself must, on the same principle envisaged by their Lordships of the apex Court, in the decisions noticed above, tantamount to the community itself recognizing (and approving the claim of the fourth respondent therein as belonging to die very same community of her husband after her marriage. 8. In view of the above, we see no infirmity what-so-ever in the order of the appellant authority, the second respondent, upholding the election of the fourth respondent to the office in question. The writ petition, therefore, fails and stands dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.