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1999 DIGILAW 1826 (MAD)

Public Prosecutor v. Shaik Sheriff

1999-11-30

ANANTA NARAYANA AYYAR, BASI REDDY

body1999
Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.- In Special Case Nos.1 and 2 of 1962, which were pending on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Cuddapah (Special Judge), Shaik Sheriff, who had originally been Municipal Commissioner of Proddatur, was the sole accused. The State represented by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad, was the complainant. In each of the charge-sheets, it was mentioned that the accused had committed offences under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c)and (d)of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Central Act II of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The accused filed Criminal M.P. No. 139 of 1962 praying for being discharged in S.C. No. 1 of 1962.He filed a similar petition, Crl.M.P. No. 140 of 1962, praying for being discharged in S.C.No. 2 of 1962. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge (Shri P. Anjaneya Raju) after full hearing, allowed the two petitions and passed a common order dated 12th September, 1962, discharging the accused under section 251-A (2), Crl.P.C. Against that order, the learned Public Prosecutor has filed Crl.R.C. No. 712 of 1962 so far as it relates to the discharge in S.C. No. 1 of 1962 and Crl. R.C. No. 713 of 1962 so far as it relates to the discharge in S.C. No. 2 of 1962. Both the revision petitions, being against a common order, were heard together by common consent. The relevant facts are as follows: The accused was working as the Commissioner of the Proddatur Municipality during the period 30th September, 1956 to 10th April, 1958, and was a ‘public servant’ as defined in section 21, Indian Penal Code. The Secretary to Government preferred a complaint against the accused to the Inspector-General of Police, Andhra Pradesh. The Circle Inspector of Police Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad, applied to the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Proddatur, by a letter dated 2nd March, 1959, requesting for permission to investigate into the offence which came under section 5 (1) of the Act. The Secretary to Government preferred a complaint against the accused to the Inspector-General of Police, Andhra Pradesh. The Circle Inspector of Police Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad, applied to the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Proddatur, by a letter dated 2nd March, 1959, requesting for permission to investigate into the offence which came under section 5 (1) of the Act. In that letter, he mentioned that, on a complaint preferred by the Municipal Commissioner, Proddatur (who was a successor of the accused and was in office on 2nd March, 1959) against the shroff for misappropriation of one of the items mentioned in the complaint against the present accused, a case had been registered by the local Police, Proddatur, in Crime No. 431 of 1958 under section 408, Indian Penal Code of Proddatur-I Town Police Station and was under investigation. The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate passed an, order dated 4th March, 1959, authorising the Inspector of Police to investigate into the said offence. The case was duly investigated. Subsequently, the Government of Andhra Pradesh passed G.O.Ms. No. 543 dated 19th April, 1960, for institution of Criminal proceedings against the accused and ordered that he be tried in a Court of law of competent jurisdiction. The G.O. has also stated as follows: “Separate orders will issue regarding the appointment of a Special Judge for the purpose under section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952.” Accordingly, Government passed G.O. Ms. No. 2242, Home (Courts-B) dated 27th October, 1960, stating as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Central Act XLVI of 1952), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby appoints the Sub-Judge, Cuddapah, to be a Special Judge for the trial of the cases against Shri Shaik Shariff, ex-Municipal Commissioner, Proddatur and Sri D. Venkateswarlu, formerly Headmaster, Government Basic Training School, Aluru.” This G.O. was duly published as a notification. The Inspector of Police, Grime Branch, Hyderabad, filed two charge-sheets on 25th November, 1960, before the Special Judge, Cuddapah, referred to above. The learned Special Judge registered them as C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1960 and proceeded to hear the cases. Accused filed Cri.R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 in this Court to quash the proceedings of the Special Judge. The learned Special Judge registered them as C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1960 and proceeded to hear the cases. Accused filed Cri.R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 in this Court to quash the proceedings of the Special Judge. Our learned brother, Kumarayya, J., heard those petitions and passed a joint order dated 18th August, 1961 holding that the original G.O. of appointment was invalid and that the proceedings started by the Special Judge were vitiated. He allowed the Cri.R.C. and quashed the proceedings in C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1960. Meanwhile, the Government had passed G.O. No. 595 (Home) Courts B, dated 25th March, 1961, and duly notified it. The G.O. ran as follows: “......the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby appoints the District and Sessions Judge and the Sub-judges-cum-Assistant Sessions Judges mentioned in column 1 of the Table below as special judges to try the offences mentioned in sections 6 and 7 of the said Act (Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952) in respect of cases arising in the district noted in column 2 of the table and investigated by the anti-corruption bureau of Andhra Pradesh.” This was also duly published as a notification. It was brought to the notice of Kumarayya, J., during the hearing of Crl.R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 that G.O. No. 595 of 1961 had been passed appointing the same Judge as Special Judge for cases coming from Cuddapah district and that the defect alleged in G.O. No. 2242 of 1960 had been cured. Thereupon, the learned Judge (Kumarayya, J.) observed as follows: “............But when it is clear that whatever the Assistant Sessions Judge has done in taking cognizance of the cases and framing charges was without any lawful authority, those proceedings cannot be allowed to stand. Of course, it may still be open to the prosecution to start proceedings afresh, after filing a report in accordance with law. But that does not mean that the previous proceedings started without any lawful authority, will gain any legal efficacy.” After the above judgment was passed, the Special Judge, Cuddapah, returned the charge-sheets in C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1960 to the complainant on 26th September, 1961, and closed the cases. Subsequently, the Government passed G.O. Ms. But that does not mean that the previous proceedings started without any lawful authority, will gain any legal efficacy.” After the above judgment was passed, the Special Judge, Cuddapah, returned the charge-sheets in C.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1960 to the complainant on 26th September, 1961, and closed the cases. Subsequently, the Government passed G.O. Ms. No. 281 dated 12th February, 1962, amending G.O. No. 595 of 1961 as follows: “In the preamble to the said notification, the words” and investigated by the inti-corruption bureau of Andhra Pradesh “occurring at the end shall be omitted.” This G.O. was duly notified. Later on, the Police presented the same two charge-sheets quoting G.O. No. 595 of 1961 and G.O. No. 281 of 1962. The learned Special Judge numbered the cases as S.C. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1962 afresh and started proceedings. Accused then appeared in Court on 6th August, 1962, and filed C.M.P. Nos. 139 and 140 of 1962 raising various grounds. The three main grounds raised by him were as follows: (i)(a) the constitution of the Court as a Special Judge under Act XLVI of 1952 was not valid because G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was invalid; and (b)the amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962 was invalid as Government had no power under section. 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to make the said amendment; (ii) the Court could not validly take cognizance of the two charge-sheets as there was no fresh sanction by the Government; and (iii) the investigation of the cases by the Inspector of Police, Special Branch was not in accordance with law as it had not been done with valid sanction required under section 5-A of the Act. The learned Special Judge accepted all these contentions as tenable. In the result he passed the order of discharge under section 251-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code. He held that the other grounds raised in the petitions did not bear any substance and did not deserve or require to be considered. When these revision cases came up for hearing before our learned brother, Mohamed Mirza, J., he passed an order dated 5th August, 1963, as follows: “In these revision cases, a question arises as to the interpretation of the word ‘person’ used in section 6(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. These revision cases are therefore referred. When these revision cases came up for hearing before our learned brother, Mohamed Mirza, J., he passed an order dated 5th August, 1963, as follows: “In these revision cases, a question arises as to the interpretation of the word ‘person’ used in section 6(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. These revision cases are therefore referred. to a Bench for decision.” In consequence, these cases came to be heard by this Bench. The main contentions raised by the larned Public Prosecutor an: as follows: (1)(a)The assumption of the learned Special Judge that notification of G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was bad is baseless and wrong. (b)The finding by the learned Special Judge that the amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962 was invalid was untenable because section 21 of the General Clauses Act (Central Act X of 1897) gave power to make amendments. (2) The sanction already made by the Government was in force and there was no need for a fresh sanction as held by the learned Special Judge. (3) The order of the Magistrate authorising investigation by Inspector of Police was valid and effective and did not contain any incurable defect which could not be rectified or any omissions which could not be supplied by admissible: evidence properly adduced during the trial. Shri T.V. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the respondent, has raised a fresh point of law before us as follows: (4) The appointment order, which is G.O. No. 595 of 1961 is not valid and lawful and did not confer jurisdiction because Special Judge can be validly appointed only by name and not by office. Contention No. 3.-Shri T.V. Sarma contends that, in his order, the Magistrate has not considered or given adequate reason as to why the Deputy Superintendant of Police or other officer higher in rank than Inspector could not hold the investigation. He also urges that the offence concerned in the charge-sheet under section 5(2) of the Act is non-cognizable as it was investigated by the Inspector of Police and that, therefore, separate sanction of competent Magistrate under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code was necessary for a valid investigation and that such sanction was not granted in this case. He also urges that the offence concerned in the charge-sheet under section 5(2) of the Act is non-cognizable as it was investigated by the Inspector of Police and that, therefore, separate sanction of competent Magistrate under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code was necessary for a valid investigation and that such sanction was not granted in this case. Section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, runs as follows: "No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of Magistrate of the first or second class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial, or of a Presidency Magistrate." Section 4 (n), Criminal Procedure Code, runs as follows: ""Non-cognizable offence" means an offence for, and ‘non-cognizable case’ means a case in which a police officer, within or without a Presidency Town, may not arrest without warrant." Section 4(f) runs as follows: "‘Cognizable offence’ means an offence for, and ‘cognizable case’ means a case in which a police officer, within or without the Presidency Towns, may, in accordance with the Second schedule or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant. As we have already mentioned, the charge-sheets in the cases concerned before us cite section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c)and (d)of the Act. Section 5(2) is the punishing section and section 5(1)(c) and (d)are the sections which defines the offence. The body of the charge-sheets and also the letter of the Inspector dated 2nd March 1959, requesting for permission to investigate mention that the offence consisted of the accused, who was Commissioner of Municipality, i.e., public servant, dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriating amounts entrusted to him. It is an offence which is also defined in section 409, Indian Penal Code. In Schedule II, offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code is shown in column 3 as cognizable (entry is ‘may arrest without warrant’). But, section 409, Indian Penal Code is not specifically mentioned in the charge-sheet. At the end of Schedule II, in the portion relating to ‘offences against other laws’, offences coming within the first and second entry are cognizable. Section 5(2) of the Act comes within the second entry as it is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years. But section 5-A of the Act runs as follows: "5-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), no police officer below the rank-(a) .................... (b) .................... Section 5(2) of the Act comes within the second entry as it is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years. But section 5-A of the Act runs as follows: "5-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), no police officer below the rank-(a) .................... (b) .................... (c).......of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any offence punishable under section 161, section 165 or section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act, without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without a warrant. " This section contains a Proviso but we are not concerned with it in this case. To deal with the present question, it is necessary to deal with the history of the provision contained in section 5-A. When the Prevention of Corruption Act was originally passed in 1947, section 3 ran as follows: "An offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Code V of 1893, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein: Provided that a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall not investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class or make any arrest therefor without a warrant." At that time, section 5-A did not exist; but it was introduced by the Prevention of Corruption Second Amendment Act (Central Act LIX of 1952). By section 2 of the same Amendment Act, section 3 was amended by adding the words “or section 165-A” after the portion “section 165” and by omitting the proviso. By section 2 of the same Amendment Act, section 3 was amended by adding the words “or section 165-A” after the portion “section 165” and by omitting the proviso. Thus, sections 161, 165 and 165-A became cognizable offences because of section 3 of the Act in spite of the fact that these three sections were shown as non-cognizable in Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code and the proviso to section 3 was substituted by section 5-A. The new section 5-A covered not only section 161, section 165 and section 165-A, which were offences made cognizable by section 3 of the Act as it stood after amendment by Act LIX of 1952 and before the amendment by Act L of 1955 but also section 5(2) of the Act. Subsequendy, the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (Central Act XXVI of 1955) was passsd. It received the assent of the President on 10th August, 1955. Section 114(b)of the Act ran. as follows: “Section 114(b): In the entries relating to sections 161, 162, 163, 164 and 165. in the 3rd column, for the words ‘shall not arrest without warrant’ wherever the occur, the words ‘may arrest without, warrant’ shall be substituted.” As a consequence of this amendment, section 161 and section 165, Indian Penal Code which upto then had been shown as non-cognizable offences in Schedule II, Criminal Procedure Code, came to be shown henceforth as cognizable offences in that schedule. Therefore, there was no need for their being made cognizable offences by section 3 of the Act. When the Prevention of Corruption Act was amended by Amendment Act of 1955 (Central Act L of 1955), which received the assent of the President on 24th December, 1955, section 3 of the Act was amended by omitting the words and figures “section 161 or section 165 or”. The result was that, section 3 makes section 165-A alone cognizable in spite of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, of the four offences to which section 5-A is applicable, section 161 and section 165 are cognizable by virtue of Schedule II, Criminal Procedure Code. Originally, they had been shown as non-cognizable in the Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code, but made cognizable by section 3 of the Act. Section 165-A, Indian Penal Code, was made cognizable by virtue of the provision of section 3 of the Act. Originally, they had been shown as non-cognizable in the Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code, but made cognizable by section 3 of the Act. Section 165-A, Indian Penal Code, was made cognizable by virtue of the provision of section 3 of the Act. Still, section 5-A expressly applies to those three offences which are cognizable offences unconditionally and under all circumstances. It is. obvious that they cannot be treated as non-cognizable offences when investigated by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police simply on the ground that such investigation cannot be done without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class. In the same way, offence under section 5 of the Act cannot be treated as non-cognizable even when investigated by lowrank officer. Thus, the provision in section 5-A is of the nature of a special provision which applies to offences specified therein which are cognizable offences including those under section 5 under all circumstances. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, section 155(2), a non-cognizable case cannot be investigated without the order of a Magistrate specified in that section. It cannot be said that the converse principle also must hold good as a law in force, namely, that if a case cannot be investigated without the order of a specified Magistrate, then it is a non-cognizable case. Section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, applies to every non-cognizable case and does not apply to every non-cognizable offence. It has been held by one of us in Kutumba Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, that a case would be non-cognizable case only if every one of the offences concerned in it was a non-cognizable offence and that if a case included at least one cognizable offence, it would be a cognizable case even though it included non-cognizable offences and that section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, would not be applicable to such a case. Section 5(2) of the Act is a cognizable offence under Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code, and it is in the same footing as section 161 and section 165, Indian Penal Code, as they stand after amendment by Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (Central Act XXVI of 1955). Section 5(2) of the Act is a cognizable offence under Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code, and it is in the same footing as section 161 and section 165, Indian Penal Code, as they stand after amendment by Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (Central Act XXVI of 1955). Cognizable offences under- section 161 or section 165, Indian Penal Code, and a cognizable offence under section 165-A, Indian Penal Code, which is made specially cognizable by section 3 of the Act, stand as cognizable, unaffected by the provision in section 5-A of the Act. In the same way, offence under section 5(2) stands cognizable under Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code, unaffected by the provision in section 5-A of the Act. Shri T.V. Sarma strongly relies on the decision in Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra1, wherein it was observed as follows (at page 45): “............An offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, or one under sub-section (2) of section 5, Prevention of Corruption Act, is cognizable so far as officers of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police and above are concerned. But so far as the officers below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police are concerned, the said offences are non-cognizable inso far as they cannot investigate them without the permission of a Magistrate of the First Class.” The portion which we have italicised in the above passage makes it clear that what the learned Judges meant by saying that the offences were non-cognizable was limited to the aspect that they could not be investigated by officers below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police without permission of the specified Magistrate. The learned Judges made the above observation when dealing with the question as to whether it was necessary for a Magistrate, who was giving permission to investigate, to satisfy himself that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is unable to conduct the investigation before giving permission to an officer of lower rank under section 5-A of the Act. The learned Judges traced the evolution of section 5-A including the fact that, under section 3 of the Act originally in 1947, an offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, was made cognizable with a proviso added. The learned Judges traced the evolution of section 5-A including the fact that, under section 3 of the Act originally in 1947, an offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, was made cognizable with a proviso added. They observed regarding section 3 as follows (at page 44): “Thus, it is clear that although section 3, Prevention of Corruption Act, made an offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, cognizable, in effect it remained non-cognizable as far as officers below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police were concerned. By the same Act, new offence called criminal misconduct was created. For the investigation of an offence of criminal misconduct, the same restriction was placed on officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police by section 5(4) of the Act.” Finally, the learned Judges answered the question as follows (at page 46): “Consequently, all that the Magistrate has to see before granting permission is, whether there is a prima facie case or not. If he considers that the information is frivolous or vexatious, he should refuse permission to investigate. There is no warrant for the proposition that he can give permission to an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police only if it is proved to his satisfaction that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is unable to undertake the investigation ............ In the present case, the Magistrate, who granted the permission, perused the F.I.R. before giving permission. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Magistrate did not satisfy himself regarding good and sufficient reasons to conduct the investigation. In our opinion, the Magistrate did exercise judicial discretion in granting permission to the Inspector of Police.” Shri T. V. Sarma does not agree with the above finding of the learned Judges. In fact, he relies on the observations to the contrary in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Mubarak Ali2, to which we are making reference later in this judgment. In fact, he relies on the observations to the contrary in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Mubarak Ali2, to which we are making reference later in this judgment. A perusal of the judgment in Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra1, shows that, when the learned Judges referred to the offences under section 161, Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) as non-cognizable, they only meant to refer to the provision in the proviso to section 5(4) as it existed before the Act was amended by Central Act LIX of 1952 and which provision was substantially the same as the provision in section 5-A which was introduced by Amendment Act LIX of 1952. They did not go to the extent of saying that when investigated by officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, the offence under section 5 (2) or section 161, Indian Penal Code, was non-cognizable in all respects or in particular to the extent of attracting the application of section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. The question of applicability of section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, to an offence under section 5(2) of the Act or section 161, Indian Penal Code, was not raised before or considered by the learned Judges. In their judgment, the learned Judges referred to various passages which are contained in H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi1, and interpreted those passages. The learned Judges, when making a reference to various passages, observed as follows (at page 46): "Reading the paragraph as a whole, there is no doubt whatsoever that Jagannadhadas, J. was dealing with the offences of corruption comprised in the Act as cognizable offences............This leaves no doubt whatsoever that that his Lordship was dealing with the offences comprised in the Prevention of Corruption Act as cognizable offences. He was not dealing with that aspect of offences in which investigation cannot be carried on without the permission of a Magistrate." We find that the learned Judges only intended to emphasise the provision in section 5-A and chose to refer to it as a non-cognizable aspect of the offences comprised in the Act and to describe that aspect also as non-cognizable for the limited purpose of the provision in section 5-A. The above decision does not support the contention of Shri T. V. Sarma that the offence under section 5(2) of the Act is a non-cognizable offence for all purposes and in particular for the purpose of attracting the application of section 155 (2), Criminal. Procedure Code. In H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi1, the relevant facts were stated in the judgment as follows (at page 199): "It appears from the evidence taken in this behalf that such investigation was conducted not by any Deputy Superintendent of Police but by officers of lower rank and that after the permission was accorded little or no further investigation was made. The question, therefore, that has been raised is, that the proceedings by way of trial initiated on such charge-sheets are illegal and require to be quashed." The appellant was Rishbud. The charges against him were under section 5(2) of the Act and also under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code and section 420, Indian Penal Code which two charges were also against other accused who were not public servants. Section 420, Indian Penal Code, is a cognizable offence as per Schedule II to the Criminal Procedure Code. So, the case was cognizable case. To such a case, section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, would not apply even if section 5(2) were non-cognizable as contended by Shri T. V. Sarma. The special provision in the Act in section 5(4) applied to the case as the investigation had been done before the Prevention of Corruption Amendment Act LIX of 1952 was passed. Their Lordships stated that omission of section 5(4) and substitution by section 5-A made no difference. Their Lordships observed as follows (at page 199): "The offence of criminal misconduct which has been created by the Act, it will be seen, is in itself a cognizable offence, having regard to item 2 of the last portion of Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code under the head ‘ offences against the other laws’. Their Lordships observed as follows (at page 199): "The offence of criminal misconduct which has been created by the Act, it will be seen, is in itself a cognizable offence, having regard to item 2 of the last portion of Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code under the head ‘ offences against the other laws’. In the normal course, therefore, an investigation into the offence of criminal misconduct under section 5(2) of the Act and an investigation into the offence under sections 161 and 165, Indian Penal Code, which have been made cognizable by section 3 of the Act would have to be made by an officer in charge of a police station and no order of any Magistrate in this behalf would be requited. But the proviso to section 3 as well as sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act specifically provide that ‘a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall not investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class or make any arrest therefor without a warrant’." The order of Magistrate referred to in the words italicised by us in the above passage is obviously an order under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code. The above observation is a dictum directly laying down that no order of Magistrate except an order under section 5(4) of the Act before amendment of 1952 or under section 5-A of the Act is required for investigation of offence under section 5 (2) of the Act and in particular that no order under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, is necessary. Their Lordships also observed as follows (at page 200): "............Therefore, it is clear that when the Legislature made the offences in the Act cognizable, prior investigation by the appropriate police officer was contemplated as the normal preliminary to the trial in respect of such offences under the Act." At page 202: "To appreciate that policy it is relevant to observe that under the Code of Criminal Procedure most of the offences relating to public servants as such, are non-cognizable.......... The underlying policy in making these offences by public servants non-cognizable appears to be that public servants who have to discharge their functions-often enough in difficult circumstances-should not be exposed to the harassment of investigation against them on information levelled, possibly, by person affected by their official acts, unless a Magistrate is satisfied that an investigation is called for, and on such satisfaction authorises the same. This is meant to ensure the diligent discharge of their official functions by public servants, without fear or favour. When, therefore, the Legislature thought fit to remove the protection from the public servants, in so far as it relates to the investigation of the offences of corruption comprised in the Act, by making them cognizable, it may be presumed that it was considered necessary to provide a substituted safeguard from undue harassment by requiring that the investigation is to be conducted normally by a police officer of a designated high rank.“ So, this passage makes clear the following: (1) Offences under section 5(2) and offence under section 165-A, Indian Penal Code, made cognizable by specific provision like section 3 of the Act are cognizable offences, pure and simple. (2) The provision in the original section 5(4) and the present section 5-A are a safeguard to a public servant from undue harassment. (3) The above safeguard under the original section 5(4) and the present section 5-A was a substitute for the original safeguard which existed under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, regarding investigation and regarding arrest without warrant when the offences concerned against the public servant (before the passing of the Prevention of Corruption Act) were non-cognizable offences, so far as such offences were concerned. (4) When there is provision of substituted safeguard under section 5-A of the Act, it alone applies to offences like section 161 and section 165, Indian Penal Code and there cannot be a need for safeguard by an order under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, which has been substituted. (4) When there is provision of substituted safeguard under section 5-A of the Act, it alone applies to offences like section 161 and section 165, Indian Penal Code and there cannot be a need for safeguard by an order under section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, which has been substituted. We find that the offence under section 5 (2) of the Act is a cognizable offence whether it is investigated by officer of rank not below Deputy Superintendent of Police or by police officer of lower rank with valid order of a Magistrate under section 5-A and that there was no need for an order of a competent Magistrate under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, apart and distinct from an order contemplated by section 5-A of the Act. Shri T. V. Sarma points out that in his order dated 4th March, 1959 the learned Magistrate has merely mentioned that he gave the authorisation because”information has been laid“and because”it is stated that the offence has got to be investigated into for ascertaining the offenders“. In H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi,1 it was held as follows (at page 205): ”............When a Magistrate is approached for granting such permission he is expected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to-conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach (breach of a mandatory provision regarding investigation such as contained in section 5-A) is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such re-investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of section 5-A of the Act.“ In State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali2, it was observed as follows (at page 709): ” But in the year 1952, by Act LIX of 1952, presumably on the basis of the experience gained, section 5-A was inserted in the Act to protect the public servants against harassment and victimisation ....................To achieve this object, sections 5-A and 6 introduced the following two safeguards: ....................These statutory safeguards must be strictly complied with, for they were conceived in public interests and were provided as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. While in the case of an officer of assured status and rank, the Legislature was prepared to believe them implicitly, it prescribed an additional guarantee in the case of police officers below that rank, namely, the previous order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. The Magistrate’s status gives assurance to the bona fides of the investigation. In such circumstances, it is self-evident that a Magistrate cannot surrender his discretion to a police officer, but must sxercise it having regard to the relevant material made available to him at that stage. He must also be satisfied that there is sufficient reason, owing to the exigencies of administrative convenience, to entrust a subordinate officer with the investigation. " In the present case, the order of the learned Magistrate does not expressly show that he felt satisfied that there was sufficient reason to entrust an officer;subordinate in rank to the Deputy Superintendent with the investigation. " In the present case, the order of the learned Magistrate does not expressly show that he felt satisfied that there was sufficient reason to entrust an officer;subordinate in rank to the Deputy Superintendent with the investigation. But, their Lordships also observed as follows (at page 710): "............it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily, on the face of it, disclose the reasons for giving the permission. For one reason or other, if the said salutary practice is not adopted in a particular case, it is the duty of the prosecution to establish, if that fact is denied, that the Magistrate in fact has taken into consideration the relevant circumstances before granting the permission to a subordinate police officer to investigate the case." Thus, it is open to the prosecution to establish that the Magistrate in fact took into consideration relevant circumstances before granting permission to the Inspector of Police to investigate the offenee. The learned Public Prosecutor points out that the learned Magistrate has been cited as a witness in the charge-sheet. It was open to the Special Judge to consider, with reference to the evidence let in, whether the permission had been, in fact granted by the learned Magistrate after properly taking into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances. Even if ultimately he found that the order had not been granted properly and that then: was a breach of the provisions of section 5-A, he would have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for re-investigation such as contemplated in H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi1. But, in any case, it was not open to the learned Special Judge to discharge the accused under section 251-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground of breach of provision of section 5-A regarding investigation by appropriate police officer. We find accordingly that this contention is tenable. Contention No. 4.-Section 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act contemplates appointment of Special Judges. Section 6(2) mentions the qualification of a person for appointment as a Special Judge. If a person, who is appointed, has the qualifications prescribed in section 6(2), the requirement of section 6 would be satisfied. In the present case, by G.O. No. 595/61, the Special Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, who was appointed as Special Judge for Cuddapah district has the requisite qualification. The Special Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge is a ‘person’. If a person, who is appointed, has the qualifications prescribed in section 6(2), the requirement of section 6 would be satisfied. In the present case, by G.O. No. 595/61, the Special Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, who was appointed as Special Judge for Cuddapah district has the requisite qualification. The Special Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge is a ‘person’. Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, runs as follows: "Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, may be made either by name or by virtue of office." In view of the above section, the appointment in G.O. No. 595 of 1951 by virtue of office is, therefore, valid. In Public Prosecutor v. Sri Rambhadrayya2, the question arose whether Sanitary Inspectors appointed under section 9 of the Food Adulteration Act had power under section 20 of that Act to file written complaints. Section 9 of that Act ran as follows: "9. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 14, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint persons ............ to be Food Inspectors. " Section 20 (1) ran as follows: "No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of...........a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority;". It was held that, in view of section 15 of the General Glauses Act, Sanitary Inspectors could be appointed by virtue of their office under section 9 of the Food Adulteration Act as Food Inspectors. In State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal1, where prosecutions were filed on the basis of written consents granted by the competent person or authority, it was held that the omission of specification of the name of the complainant did not vitiate the proceedings as such specification was not a statutory requirement as the consent required and contemplated was only to a specified prosecution. In the present case, section 6 does not require that the person should be specified by name or that the person should not be specified by office. We find that the appointment by office is sufficient compliance with section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act read with section 15 of the General Clauses Act. In the present case, section 6 does not require that the person should be specified by name or that the person should not be specified by office. We find that the appointment by office is sufficient compliance with section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act read with section 15 of the General Clauses Act. The contention of Shri T. V. Sarma in this behalf is untenable. Contention No. 2.-The learned Special Judge has observed as follows: "While according sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it is not only the evidence that has to be considered but also the circumstances. In the present case, the present circumstances after quashing the old report were not allowed to be considered by the Government as sanctioning authority, as there was no approach by the complainant to obtain a fresh sanction from the Government in the light of the unexpected developments and the undue delay by lapse of time. " Shri T. V. Sarma says that the relevant developments which have taken place after the order of sanction by the Government in G.O. No. 543 dated 19th April, 1960 and which, according to him, are to be taken into account for a fresh order of sanction are: (1) the observation in the judgment of this Court by Kumarayya, J., in Crl.R. C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 and (2) the fact that the shroff and manager, who were cited as witnesses in the complaint against the accused, have been convicted of offences which they had committed. The observation of this Court in the judgment in Crl. R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 which we have already extracted, does not mean that a fresh order of sanction by "a Government for prosecution is necessary or that the original order of sanction, G.O. No. 543 dated 19th April, 1960, had ceased to be in force. The observation only contemplated starting of proceedings afresh after filing of a report in accordance with law. The police have duly filed charge-sheets (reports) and thus started proceedings afresh. It is not shown that the original G.O. No. 543 of 1960 was not valid or that it has ceased to be in force. The fact that the shroff and the manager have been convicted does not in any way affect the validity of G.O. No. 543 of 1960. It is not shown that the original G.O. No. 543 of 1960 was not valid or that it has ceased to be in force. The fact that the shroff and the manager have been convicted does not in any way affect the validity of G.O. No. 543 of 1960. Shri T. V. Sarma seeks to rely on the decision in S. A. Venkataraman v. The State2. Therein, it was held that in giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 6 of the Act, when a Court was asked to take cognizance, not only must the offence have been committed by a public servant but the person accused must also still be a public servant removable from his office by competent authority if the provisions of section 6 were to apply. Accused concerned in these cases is still a public servant. That decision does not in any way apply to this case or help the accused. The order of sanction G.O. No. 543 of 1960 cannot cease to be in force by mere lapse of time. We find that there is no need for a fresh sanction by the Government and that the G.O. No. 543 of 1960 is now in force and is sufficient. Contention No. 1.-Section 21 of the General Clauses Act runs as follows: "Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-Jaws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued. " Government certainly had power to issue a notification of appointment which was in conformity with the law. Shri T. V. Sarma readily concedes that if the Government had issued a fully-worded notification, the substance of which was in express terms the same as the original unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 after omitting the portion which was directed in amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962 to be omitted, then that G.O. being self-contained, would be valid and lawful and would be sufficient compliance with the law. But he contends (i) that the original unamended G.O.was illegal and, therefore, a nullity; (ii) that the Government had no power to amend the G.O. No. 595 of 1961 as it was an order of appointment and that section 21 did not apply so as to give them any such power; (iii) as the original G.O. was a nullity, it did not exist and, therefore, could not be amended. In support of his contention that section 21 does not give power to amend an order of appointment, he relies on the decision in Kanta Devi v. Rajasthan State1. The relevant facts in that case were as follows. The Municipal Board of Pokaran consisted of eight elected and two nominated members. All the seats became vacant. Eight persons were elected and the Government made two nominations under the provisions of section 9 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act. The District Magistrate fixed a date for election of chairman and issued notice to members including the nominated members. Subsequently, Government issued another noti-fication dated 24th February, 1956 in which they cancelled the earlier notification relating tothe appointment of the members and nominated two fresh persons to the same two seats. The two persons, who had been originally nominated, filed an application in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. They contended that, after the Government had nominated them on 28th January, 1956, it was not open to the Government to cancel that notification and nominate other persons as shown in notification dated 24th February, 1956. The learned Judges held as follows (at page 135): "It (section 21, General Glauses Act) applies to those cases of notifications, which are in the nature of orders, rules or bye-laws or are of a general nature. The present is a notification which, in our opinion, comes under section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, because the nomination of certain persons to a Municipal Board amounts to their appointment as members of the Board. The present is a notification which, in our opinion, comes under section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, because the nomination of certain persons to a Municipal Board amounts to their appointment as members of the Board. " Section 16 of the General Clauses Act runs as follows: "Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then-unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power tomake the appoint, ment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by itself or by any other authority in exercise of that power." "The learned Judges held that the intention of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, as could be gathered from section 14, was that no member of the Board should be arbitrarily removed and that the removal should only take place after certain procedure had gone into. In the instant case, we have to see the intention of section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act; the intention of section 6, so far as the appointment as a Special Judge was made of a person who was already holding office as Assistant Sessions Judge, is only that the Assistant Sessions Judge who already had the extensive jurisdiction and power as such officer should also have in addition the powers and jurisdiction as Special Judge under section 6 and was, therefore, being appointed. The amendment by G.O. No. 281 of 1962, in effect, does not amount to suspending or dismissing the person originally appointed altogether or even from office of Special Judge. It only removes a portion in the original G.O. which amounted to a sort of restriction of the jurisdiction of the Judges as Special Judges to cases investigated by Anti-Corruption Bureau. Thereby, the amendment enlarged the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. Therefore, section 16 of the General Clauses Act will not apply and section 21 certainly applies. The decision in Kanta Devi v. Rajasthan State1 does not apply to the facts of this case. Shri T. V. Sarma also relies on the decision in Bherumal v. Motumal2. Therein, the question arose whether the word ‘order’ occurring in section 21, General Clauses Act, included judicial order. The learned Judge held that it did not. The decision in Kanta Devi v. Rajasthan State1 does not apply to the facts of this case. Shri T. V. Sarma also relies on the decision in Bherumal v. Motumal2. Therein, the question arose whether the word ‘order’ occurring in section 21, General Clauses Act, included judicial order. The learned Judge held that it did not. In doing so, he observed as follows (at page 67): "The word ‘order’ occurring in section 21 obviously refers to subordinate legislation and not to the judicial orders which by their own nature are incapable of revision, amendment or alteration by the same Court unless so permitted by some express provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure." The above decision cannot be held to be an authority to the effect that the word ‘order’ in section 21 does not include an order appointing a Judge under section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act or any order of an administrative nature. Reliance is also placed by Shri T. V. Sarma on the decision in Gopichand v. Delhi Administration1. The relevant facts of that case were as follows. The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 (Punjab Act V of 1949) came into force on 29th March, 1949. Its purpose was to provide for special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order. Section 36 of the Act prescribed procedure for the trial of specified offences. Under sub-section (1), all offences under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force in a dangerously disturbed area, and in any other area, all offences under this Act and any other offence under any other law which the Provincial Government may certify to be triable under this Act, “shall be tried” by the Courts according to the procedure prescribed by the Code, provided that in all cases the procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases by Chapter XX of the Code “shall be adopted”. Sub-section (2) provided that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to the trial of offences mentioned therein. Under section 20, the Provincial Government is authorised by notification to declare the whole or any part of the provisions as may be specified in the notification to be a dangerously disturbed area. Four notifications were issued under section 20. Sub-section (2) provided that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to the trial of offences mentioned therein. Under section 20, the Provincial Government is authorised by notification to declare the whole or any part of the provisions as may be specified in the notification to be a dangerously disturbed area. Four notifications were issued under section 20. By the first notification issued on 8th July, 1949, the whole of the Province of Delhi was declared by the competent authority to be a dangerously disturbed area. On 28th September, 1950, the authority issued a second notification cancelling the first notification with effect from 1st October, 1950. This notification was followed by the third notification of 6th October, 1950, which purported to modify it by inserting the words “except as respect things done or omitted to be done before the date of this notification” after the words “with effect from 1st October, 1950”; in other words, this notification purported to introduce an exception to the cancellation of the first notification caused by the second. The last notification was issued on 7th April, 1951. This notification was issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act, and by it he certified as being triable under the said Act in any area within the State of Delhi not being a dangerously disturbed area, the following offences viz., any offence under any law other than the aforesaid Act of which cognizance had been taken by any Magistrate before 1st October, 1950 and the trial of which was pending in any Court immediately before the said date and had not concluded before the date of the certificate issued by the notification. F.I.R. against the appellant was filed on 30th June, 1948. The trial commenced on 18th July, 1949 and it was conducted according to the procedure prescribed by Chapter XX of the Code. The whole of the prosecution evidence was recorded before 14th August, 1951. The judgment was pronounced on 22nd December, 1951. The Magistrate convicted the accused of offence under section 409 and other offences under the Indian Penal Code. Appeal was filed and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court. Various contentions were raised on behalf of the accused before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The main question was whether the trial was vitiated by following summons procedure. The Magistrate convicted the accused of offence under section 409 and other offences under the Indian Penal Code. Appeal was filed and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court. Various contentions were raised on behalf of the accused before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The main question was whether the trial was vitiated by following summons procedure. Their Lordships observed as follows (at page 616): “In other words, the adoption of the summons procedure would be justified only so long as the area in question could be validly treated as a dangerously disturbed area and it is therefore pertinent to enquire whether at the relevant time the area in question was duly and validly notified to be a dangerously disturbed area.” Their Lordships further observed as follows (at page 616): “The Provincial Government is not authorised to issue a notification in regard to the trial of any specified case or cases; and since it is clear that the notification in question cover only pending cases and has no reference to offences or class of offences under the Indian Penal Code, it (Notification No. 3) is outside the authority conferred by the second part of section 36 (1).” A contention was raised on behalf of the Delhi Administration that under section 19 of the Punjab General Clauses Act (equal to section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897) the competent authority was entitled to modify the notification issued by it. Their Lordships observed as follows (at page 617): "............the said power (to cancel or modify the notification) must inevitably be exercised within the limits prescribed by the provisions conferring the said power. " They also held as follows (at page 617): "The power to cancel or modify must be exercised in reference to the areas of the province which it is competent for the Provincial Government to specify as dangerously distrubed. The power to modify cannot obviously include the power to treat the same area as dangerously disrtubed for persons accused of crimes committed in the past and not disturbed for others accused of the same or similar offence committed later. That clearly is a legislative function which is wholly outside the authority conferred on the delegatee by section 20 or section 36(1). That clearly is a legislative function which is wholly outside the authority conferred on the delegatee by section 20 or section 36(1). We must, therefore, hold that the third and the fourth notifications are invalid and as a result of the second notification the whole of the Province of Delhi ceased to be a dangerously disturbed area from 1st October, 1950. " In that case, the first and second notifications were held to be valid. The second notification completely cancelled the first notification with effect from a particular date, i.e., 1st October, 1950. The third notification dated 6th October, 1950, purported to modify the second notification by introducing an exception which was in the form of a restriction. That exception and restriction were held by their Lordships to be invalid as being outside the scope of the powers given under the Act. In effect, they held that the second notification by itself was good and was valid but the second notification, as it would stand modified by the third notification, was invalid. In the present case, the unamended G.O. conferred territorial jurisdiction regarding the cases triable by the Special Judge concerned. This restriction was by way of exclusion of a certain category in cases tried by agencies other than Anti-Corruption Bureau. The amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962 removed the restriction. The amended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 in effect amounted to giving territorial jurisdiction as Special Judge over area concerned in full to cases investigated by any particular agency alone, without any restriction. In that case, the Notification No. 2 had ceased to be in force on 1st October, 1950, and Notification No. 3 was issued only on 6th October, 1950. (Their Lordships did not decide the question whether it was competent for the authority to modify the second notification under those circumstances). In this case, apart from the question of the legal effect of the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 it stood uncancelled on the date of the amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962. (Their Lordships did not decide the question whether it was competent for the authority to modify the second notification under those circumstances). In this case, apart from the question of the legal effect of the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 it stood uncancelled on the date of the amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962. It was open to the Government to pass an order at any time expressing in full the effect of the amended G.O. Instead of passing a fresh G.O. with entirely self-contained wording which would have the same meaning in substance and effect as the amended G.O., the Government chose to pass an amendment G.O. making reference to the original unamended G.O. which they had already passed, namely, No. 595 of 1961. In effect, they passed the amended G.O. on 12th February, 1962, though the procedure they adopted was to pass an amendment G.O. No. 281 of 1962 (instead of a fresh G.O. which was self-contained in wording). In the amending G.O. No. 281 of 1962, wording was adopted by making reference to an earlier G.O. (unamended G.O.) which had been already notified and could be available to any one concerned, interested or affected. We find that the validity of the amended G.O. is unaffected by the procedure and wording adopted for passing it, notifying it and giving effect to it. Shri T.V. Sarma contends that the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was not valid. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contends (Contention 1(a))that the unamended G.O. was itself not invalid and that the learned Special Judge committed a mistake in assuming that it was not valid. Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act runs thus: "6. Shri T.V. Sarma contends that the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was not valid. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contends (Contention 1(a))that the unamended G.O. was itself not invalid and that the learned Special Judge committed a mistake in assuming that it was not valid. Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act runs thus: "6. The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences, namely,- (a)an offence punishable under section 161, section 162, section 163, section 164, section 165, or section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), or sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947); (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a).........." This section does not specifically mention that every Special Judge, who was appointed for any area, should be given jurisdiction over all the cases i.e., each and every case contemplated by sections 6 and 7 in that area. Section 6(1) indicates that several Special Judges may be appointed for one ares. Section 7(2) runs as follows: " Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or where there are more Special Judges than one for such area,. by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government. " Government can appoint one Special Judge for an area or more Special Judges than one for that area depending on how many they find necessary for that area Government may, in the exercise of sound discretion, delimit an area and also decide on the number of Special Judges to be appointed for that area. Where Government appoints more than one Special Judge for such area, Government can specify regarding every offence as to which of the several Special Judges appointed for the area shall try that particular offence. This is not entirely a new type of provision or a radical departure from the general principles of Criminal Procedure. Where Government appoints more than one Special Judge for such area, Government can specify regarding every offence as to which of the several Special Judges appointed for the area shall try that particular offence. This is not entirely a new type of provision or a radical departure from the general principles of Criminal Procedure. There are provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, as follows: "Section 12(1): The State Government may appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or third class in any district outside the Presidency town; and the State Government or the District Magistrate, subject to the control of the State Government may, from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code. (2) Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of such persons shall extend throughout such district. Section 14 (1): The State Government may confer upon any person who holds............any judicial post..........all or any of the powers conferred or conferable by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second or third class in respect to particular cases or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally in any local area outside the Presidency towns. (2) Such Magistrate shall be called Special Magistrates, and shall be appointed for such term as the State Government may by general or special order direct. " Concurrent jurisdiction to exercise the same judicial power is also found in in other sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, for example, sections 435 and 436. The learned Public Prosecutor draws our attention to G.O. No. 593 Home, Courts-B, Department dated 16th March, 1959 which runs as follows: "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Central Act XLVI of 1952) the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby appoints Sri M. B. A. Murthy as the Special Judge, Hyderabad, with effect from the date of his taking charge to try the offences mentioned in sections 6 and 7 of the said Act in respect of cases arising in the State of Andhra Pradesh. " He contends that this G.O. was in force at the relevant period simultaneously with unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 with the result that for the area concerned in this case, namely, Cuddapah district, more than one Special Judge had been appointed by the State Government under section 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to try offences mentioned in sections 6 and 7 of the said Act and that in particular Shri M. B.A. Murthy had jurisdiction to decide cases which had been investigated by any agency whether anti-corruption bureau of Andhra Pradesh or not. It is not shown that this contention is wrong. We accept it. When there is only one Special Judge for an area, ordinarily, under section 7(2) Government would specify that every offence mentioned in section 6(1) shall be tried by him. When there are more Special Judges than one for an area, under section 7 (2) the Government has power to specify as to which of those Special Judges shall try any one of the offences specified in section 6(1). Section 6 does not, specifically lay down that Judges for one area should be appointed only in such a way as to enable every Judge to try all offences in that area which are described in clauses (a) and (b) of section 6(1). Though the main body of section 6(1) mentions that appointment may be to try the following offences, clause (a)mentions ‘an offence’ punishable under any of the sections mentioned therein and clause (b)mentions ‘any conspiracy’ in singular. The words ‘following offences’ occurring in the main body of section 6 (1) in the plural obviously refer to ‘an offence’ mentioned in clause (a) and ‘any conspiracy’ occurring in clause (b).So, the term * every offence ‘occurring in section 7 (2) means any individual offence alleged to have been committed by alleged act concerned. The power given under section 7 (2) to the Government being wide enough to allow the Government to specify by which Judge any particular offence shall be tried, the power includes the power to indicate which particular category of offences (more than one) may be tried by one Special Judge out of many. So, it does not appear to be beyond the scope of the State Government to appoint a Judge for only some of the offences arising in that area. So, it does not appear to be beyond the scope of the State Government to appoint a Judge for only some of the offences arising in that area. Thus, when the Government has the right to distribute the various offences in an area among various Judges who are Special Judges for that area, there is no restriction imposed by law on the discretion of the Government to do the distribution and allotment so long as the appointment of each Judge is for the area. In particular, there is no indication in section 7(2) that apportionment of cases among the Special Judges appointed for one area should be done only by sub-division of the area among them and that allotment to each Special Judge should be for all the cases arising in a particular sub-area. The Government, in their G.G. No. 595 of 1961, chose to distribute the work by allotting to one Special Judge appointed for a particular area, cases investigated by a particular agency within that area. It cannot be said that this allotment was not covered by the power given to Government under section 6. There was sufficient clear indication as to which case was to be tried by which Special Judge and an order making such allotment is valid. The G.O. No. 595 of 1961 would not be invalid simply on the ground that it does not indicate as to which other specified Judge is to try other offences specified in section 6 (1) and section 6(2) which had been investigated by agencies other than the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Andhra Pradesh or by the fact that there is another Special Judge for the same area. In this case, allotment of work to one Special Judge, as in unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 with reference to the cases investigated by a particular agency is not in contravention of any provision in section 6 and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act or any other law. In the instant case, the original notification, unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961, cannot be said to be absolutely null and void. It was open to the State Government to appoint for the area of Andhra Pradesh State, as many Judges as may be necessary for that local area. In the instant case, the original notification, unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961, cannot be said to be absolutely null and void. It was open to the State Government to appoint for the area of Andhra Pradesh State, as many Judges as may be necessary for that local area. It was also open to the State Government to consider various smaller areas within the big area of Andhra Pradesh State and appoint one or more Judges for each smaller area to try all the offences mentioned in clauses (a) and (b)of section 6 (1). It was open to the State Government to confer jurisdiction on any particular Special Judge by appointment to try some of the offences specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 6. The original unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 appointed each Special Judge for an area as required by section 6, i.e., there was an appointment of one Judge for each area as specified in column 2. It also appointed each Special Judge for trial of offences mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). It only placed a restriction on the power to cases investigated by Anti-Corruption Bureau of Andhra Pradesh. This restrictive clause cannot be said to have made the G.O. a nullity. We agree with the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that G.O. No. 595 of 1961 originally passed on 25th March, 1961, was valid and that the learned Special Judge wrongly assumed that it was not valid. Even assuming for arguments’ sake, without admitting, that G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was defective in the sense that it did not give full powers to try all cases, in the concerned area mentioned in sections 6 and 7 irrespective of whether they were investigated by Anti-Corruption Bureau or any other agency, that defect did not make the G.O. a nullity but only an incomplete G.O. and once the defect was rectified by a proper amendment lawfully made, the G.O. as amended was fully valid. We find that the Government had power to amend the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 under section 21 of the General Clauses Act and that the Government validly passed order in G.O. No. 281 of 1962 and that G.O. No. 595 of 1961 as amended by G.O. No. 281 of 1962 has the same effect as if the amended G.O. were published in full. Shri T.V. Sarma contends that the G.O. No. 281 of 1962 cannot have retrospective effect. We agree with this contention. The G.O. No. 281 of 1962 had effect only from the date on which it was passed, namely, 12th February, 1962 and the amended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 had effect only from 12th February, 1962. The presentation of the two charge-sheets before the learned Special Judge was done after 12th February, 1962. Therefore, the charge-sheets were validly presented at a time when they could be validly entertained. Shri T.V. Sarma contends that appointment in unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 offends Article 14 of the Constitution. His argument is that, some cases coming under section 6(1), Criminal Law Amendment Act, would be made triable by one Special Judge specified in that G.O. whereas other cases would be triable by some other Judge and that therefore there is unjust discrimination which offends Article 14 of the Constitution. In M.K. Gopalan v. State of M.P.1 it was observed as follows (at page 363): “In the present case, the Special Magistrate under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to try the case entirely under the normal procedure, and no discrimination of the kind contemplated by the decision in Nawar Ali Sarkar’s case2, (wherein on the allotment of an individual case to a Special Court authorised to conduct the trial by a procedure specifically different from the normal procedure, discrimination was held to arise as between persons who had committed similar offences by one or more out of them being subjected to a procedure materially different from the normal procedure prejudicing them thereby) and the other cases following it, arises here. A law vesting discretion in an authority under such circumstances cannot be said to be discriminatory as such, and is therefore not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution..........” In this case, it is not shown that any person accused of offences covered by section 6(1) is made liable to be tried by a procedure different from the procedure for persons who are tried of offences coming under unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961. Therefore, there is no unjust discrimination such as would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is no unjust discrimination such as would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Shri T.V. Sarma contends that the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 is not valid as it offends Article 14 of the Constitution on the following other grounds also: (1) Discrimination between cases in which the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Andhra Pradesh investigated them and was the effective complainant and cases in which other competent agencies investigated them and were the effective complainants; and (2) discrimination between accused in cases investigated by the Anti-Corruption Bureau and accused in cases investigated by other investigating agencies. In Asgarali Nazarali v. State of Bombay3 it was held by the Supreme Court that, Article 14 did not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In this case, all the cases and all the accused are liable to be tried only by the same procedure and only by Special Judges appointed under section 6(1) of the Criminal law Amendment Act. We find that these grounds urged by Shri T.V. Sarma are untenable and that there is no unjust discrimination or contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution in unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961. Shri T. V. Sarma contends that the amended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 is null and void because it discriminates between officers who are actually appointed and the other officers who are eligible to be appointed but were not appointed. In particular, he points out that only the Assistant Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, was appointed as a Special Judge for the whole of Cuddapah though under section 6 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions Judge who were working in Cuddapah were also qualified for appointment. The State Government had power and discretion to appoint the number of Judges necessary and for that purpose they are bound to select only from out of those who are qualified under section 6(2). It was neither possible nor necessary that the State Government should appoint as Special Judges all the persons who were qualified under section 6(2). This contention is untenable. The validity of the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was not gone into by our learned brother, Kumarayya, J., in his judgment in Crl.R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 though that G.O. was brought to his notice. This contention is untenable. The validity of the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 was not gone into by our learned brother, Kumarayya, J., in his judgment in Crl.R.C. Nos. 109 and 110 of 1961 though that G.O. was brought to his notice. The learned Public Prosecutor has relied on the judgment of Gopal Rao Ekbote, J., dated 15th October, 1963 in Crl. M.P. Nos. 448 to 472 of 1963. In that case, the relevant facts were as follows. After the G.O. No. 595 of 1961 and G.O. No. 281 of 1962 were passed, Government passed G.O. No. 1169 dated 18th June, 1963, in exercise of the same powers, namely, under section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, appointing with effect from 24th May, 1963 Shri C.V. Avadhani, Subordinate Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge as the Special Judge to try the offences mentioned in sections 6 and 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in respect of cases arising in the State of Andhra Pradesh and investigated by the S.P.E. it Hyderabad. That G.O. was amended subsequently by G.O. Rt. No. 2407, dated 19th August,, 1963. A contention was raised in that case by the learned Public Prosecutor that, except Shri G. V. Avadhani who was Special Judge at Secunderabad, no other Judge in the State was competent to hear cases investigated by the S.P.E. at Hyderabad. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that other Special Judges appointed under G.O. No. 595 of 1961 were alsocompetent to hear such cases within the area mentioned against them in that G.O. The learned Judge observed thus: “The necessary effect of the subsequent Notification is that, to that extent the jurisdiction of the-Special Judge constituted under G.O. Ms. No. 595 is taken away. The amendment to G.O. Ms. No. 1169 is meaningful in that respect. Even otherwise, the necessary implication of G.O.Ms. No. 1169 is that it is Mr. G. V. Avadhani alone who can hear cases under sections 6 and 7 of the Act which are investigated by the Special Police Establishment at Hyderabad.” The learned Judge referred to G.O. No. 595 of 1961 and G.O. No. 281 of 1962 but did not consider or decide the question as to whether either of these G.Os. was. invalid. G. V. Avadhani alone who can hear cases under sections 6 and 7 of the Act which are investigated by the Special Police Establishment at Hyderabad.” The learned Judge referred to G.O. No. 595 of 1961 and G.O. No. 281 of 1962 but did not consider or decide the question as to whether either of these G.Os. was. invalid. We agree with the learned Public Prosecutor on this contention and find as follows: (1) the unamended G.O. No. 595 of 1951 was in conformity with law and is, therefore, valid; (2) the amending G.O. No. 281 of 1962 is in conformity with law and is valid; and (3) the amended G.O. No. 595 of 1961 is valid and effective. In the result, we hold that the grounds raised by the learned Public Prosecutor are tenable. The grounds on which the learned Special Judge discharged the accused are not tenable. In any case, even if the learned Special Judge thought that the three objections raised by the accused were tenable, the proper course for him would have been only to return the charge-sheets and not to discharge the accused under section 251-A(2), Criminal Procedure Code. The order of the learned Special Judge is set aside. The Revision Petitions are allowed and the learned Special Judge, Cuddapah, is directed to proceed with the trial of the cases as expeditiously as possible. A.B.K. ----- Discharge set aside: Trial ordered.