Govinda Minon, J: This is a Revision Petition filed by the Provident Fund Inspector, Ernakulam, who is the complainant in C.C. No. 69 of 1961 and C.C. Nos. 21 and 30 of 1962 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal First Class Magistrate of Ernakulam. The first accused is a private limited company at Alwaye engaged in road motor transport industry. Accused 2 to 4 are officers responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. The provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Scheme framed thereunder have been made applicable to the motor transport industry with effect from 30th April, 1959. The case against the accused was that they failed to pay the employers’ share of the contribution. and failed to submit returns in due time as enjoined in the Act and the Scheme. The cases were taken on file and when the accused appeared in Court they pleaded not guilty to the charges. ,1 he case was, therefore, posted for evidence and on that day the learned Counsel for the accused raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the prosecution. It was contended for the accused that theirs is not a factory engaged in any industry as specified in Schedule I, and the accused is not employing 50 or more persons so as to come within the purview of the Act. Referring to section 19-A of the Act it was contended that unless an authority appointed by the Central Government declares that the first accused company comes within the purview of clauses (1) and (2) of section 19-A the Court cannot proceed with the trial of the case. The learned Magistrate agreeing with the contention ordered that the accused should move the Central Government under section 19-A and that the cases would be taken up for evidence only after orders are passed on the application. The learned Magistrate stated: “Unless these two questions are decided by the authority appointed by the Central Government I do not think it will be correct to proceed with the trial of these cases.” It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Revision Petition. The learned Magistrate stated: “Unless these two questions are decided by the authority appointed by the Central Government I do not think it will be correct to proceed with the trial of these cases.” It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Revision Petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argues that under section 244 Criminal Procedure Code, in a summons case if the accused does not admit having committed the offence charged, the Magistrate is bound to hear the complainant and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces and either acquit the accused or find him guilty and convict and sentence him according to law and that the mere fact that in section 19-A a power is given to the Central- Government to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, that would not be a justification to stay further proceedings in the case or oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to decide the points involved in the case. Now the short question arising in this petition is as to the construction and scope of section 19-A of the Act. Now the short question arising in this petition is as to the construction and scope of section 19-A of the Act. Section 19-A is in the following terms: “19-A. Power to remove difficulties.-If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, and in particular if any doubt arises as to- (i) whether an establishment which is a factory is engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I ; or (ii) whether any particular establishment is an establishment falling within the class of establishments to which the Act applies by virtue of a notification under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 1; or (iii) the number of persons employed in an establishment; or (iv) the number of years which have elapsed from the date on which an establishment has been set up ; or (v) whether the total quantum of benefits to which an employee is entitled has been reduced by the employer, the Central Government may, by order, make such provision or give such direction, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as appear toit to be necessary or expedient for the removal of the doubt or difficulty; and the order of the Central Government in such cases shall be final.” The section thus empowers the Central Government to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. But there is no provision that in every case where a plea is raised that the Act is not applicable to a particular establishment or to a particular person, an application should be made under section 19-A and without that the criminal Court would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the case and come to its own conclusions. An analogous provision in section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act had come up for consideration in the case In re Sankaranarayana1. An analogous provision in section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act had come up for consideration in the case In re Sankaranarayana1. Section 51 of that Act runs: “If any question arises whether all or any of the provisions of this Act apply to an establishment or to a person employed therein or whether section 50 applies to any case or not, it shall be decided by the Commissioner of Labour and his decision thereon shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.” That case arose out of a prosecution under the Madras Shops and Establishments Act for contravention of certain provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Additional First Class Magistrate found the accused guilty who thereupon filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court. One of the points urged was that the Act did not apply to the petitioner who was managing an out-agency of railway and that it was only the Commissioner who could decide whether the Act applied or not under section 51 of the Act and the Magistrate was not competent to decide that question. Ramaswamy, J., overruled this contention and explaining the scope of the application of section 51 of the Act observed: “Section 51 of the Act is a miscellaneous departmental provision which states that when there is a dispute about the application of one or more of the provisions of the Act to a particular establishment or particular individual, the authority who will have to decide that matter will be the Labour Commissioner and that his decision thereon shall be final. It only means that the decision is final in so far as appeals in the department are concerned and not that it takes away the powers of the Court to decide whether in the particular circumstances of the case the Madras Shops and Establishment Act applied or not. I am unable to accept the contention that the decision of the Commissioner of Labour is prerequisite for a Magistrate to find out whether the offence for which the accused has been charged before him has been committed by him or not. I am unable to accept the contention that the decision of the Commissioner of Labour is prerequisite for a Magistrate to find out whether the offence for which the accused has been charged before him has been committed by him or not. This miscellaneous provision in section 51 of the Act is merely for the removal of difficulties in deciding certain questions in so far as the department is concerned and would not stand in the way of the Magistrate at all.” This case was followed in a later Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Joseph Sam v. Caltex (India) Ltd.1It was contended in that case that if any question arises as to whether all or any of the provisions of the Act applied to an establishment or to a person employed therein, before any tribunal or Court, such a question could be decided only by the Commissioner of Labour and the moment the question is raised further proceedings have got to be stayed. His Lordship Rajamannar, C.J., speaking for the Bench stated as follows: “Coming to the language of the section itself, it is true that prima facie, it is very wide. But there are certain singular omissions which are not without significance. Though the section opens with the words”if any question arises “these words are not followed by the words like ,” before any Court or tribunal “. There is nothing in the section which makes it imperative cm a Court or a tribunal before which a question as to the applicability of the Act is raised, to stay further proceedings before it and to refer the question to the Commissioner of Labour for his decision. In recent agrarian legislation there are provisions which make such a course imperative. But in section 51, there is no provision for a compulsory reference. This construction of section 51 does not make it purposeless. There are several provisions in the Act dealing with different subjects like hours of work, holidays, leave, health and safety of the employees, and wages. There may be occasions when a management — or it may be the employees-consider it necessary to obtain an authoritative ruling on the application of such provisions. But then there is no provision for such questions being decided by any other tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Labour could, in such matters, be invoked. There may be occasions when a management — or it may be the employees-consider it necessary to obtain an authoritative ruling on the application of such provisions. But then there is no provision for such questions being decided by any other tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Labour could, in such matters, be invoked. We are clearly of opinion that section 51 does not have the effect of interfering with the functions and jurisdiction of the civil Courts including this Court and judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.” Reference may also be made to an earlier decision in Joseph Sam v. Caltex (India) Ltd.2, where Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., while considering the question whether once a plea is raised that the Act is inapplicable to the establishment or to any person employed therein the Additional Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation before whom the matter was pending should have stayed further proceedings for getting an authoritative ruling under section 51 of the Act observed: “If any employer is prosecuted under section 45 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act there is no provision in the Act to indicate that, when once plea is raised that the Act is inapplicable to the establishment or that the person in regard to whom the offence was said to have been committed was not within the protection of the Act, the Magistrate is instantly deprived of his jurisdiction to determine the matter but that he has to refer this question to the Commissioner of Labour for the latter’s adjudication under section 51 of the Act. The answer to this question must be in the negative. The same reasoning could equally apply to and vest the jurisdiction in the appellate authority hearing an appeal under section 41(2) notwithstanding that this authority is one created by this Act and functioning under it. There is no limitations on the power of this appellate authority to determine the relevant matters in issue before it and in the absence of any provision in section 41 making it subject to the provisions of section 51. There is no limitations on the power of this appellate authority to determine the relevant matters in issue before it and in the absence of any provision in section 41 making it subject to the provisions of section 51. Section 51 could not be read as an overriding provision which deprives the other authorities from their right to determine matters incidental to the enquiry.” I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these cases and hold that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the case and in fact it was his duty to have determined the question himself to find out whether the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offence charged and that he is bound to stay further proceedings and that he has no right to ask one of the parties to approach the Central Government for a direction in the matter and adjourn the case till that order is obtained. The view taken by the Magistrate is clearly wrong. Learned Counsel for the respondents have rightly not controverted this position. The question then would be whether having agreed to stay the hearing of the case and adjourned further proceedings for a period of three months to enable the accused to move the Central Government, this Court should interfere with the direction exercised bythe Magistrate under section 344 (1-A), Criminal Procedure Code. It cannot be disputed that the High Court has got the power of interference whether it be under section 439 or section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. In some cases a mere order of adjournment may amount to an error of law and in such a case this Court can certainly interfere, but it is only in rare cases that the power of interference is used. Section 344 (1-A), Criminal Procedure Code, gives power to the Court to postpone or adjourn the hearing of the case for good and sufficient reasons. Section 344 (1-A), Criminal Procedure Code, gives power to the Court to postpone or adjourn the hearing of the case for good and sufficient reasons. If the respondent had made a request in this case to adjourn the hearing of the case to enable him to get an authoritative ruling under section 19-A of the Act it would have been open to the Court in its discretion to adjourn the hearing of the case, but it is not obligatory to adjourn the case as it might involve considerable delay in the disposal of the case and because the Magistrate has himself the right to dispose of the question. However, in this case it is stated that the matter is already before the Central Government and the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits, that it is not the intention of the department to proceed further in the matter till the Central Government decides the matter. There is, therefore, no need to interfere with the order passed by the Court below. The Revision Petition is dismissed. M.C.M. ----- Petition dismissed.