JUDGMENT : - Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of some of the judgment debtors and is directed against order No. 80 dated August 22, 1992 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Burdwan in Miscellaneous Case No. 80 of 1991 arising out of Title Execution Case No. 10 of 1981 thereby dismissing an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. A suit for partition filed by the opposite party no. 1 was decreed in preliminary form thereby declaring his 8 annas share in the suit property. In the final decree proceeding, the Commissioner for partition suggested that the defendants including the present petitioners would pay a sum of Rs. 6,000/- to the opposite party no. 1 as owelty money within six months from the date' 'of acceptance of report failing which the portion allotted to the defendants out of Plot No. 7527 should form part of the plaintiffs allotment on his payment of the said amount. The said report was accepted by the court and the same formed part of the final decree. 3. The defendants having failed to deposit the said sum of Rs. 6,000/- within the stipulated period of six months, the opposite party no.1 put the said decree into execution thereby giving rise to the aforesaid execution case. 4. In the said execution case the petitioners and some other defendants filed an application under section 47 of the Code thereby praying for acceptance of the delayed deposit of the said sum of Rs. 6,000/- after extending the time fixed by the decree. 5. By the order impugned the learned executing court turned down the prayer on the ground that the executing court could not go behind the decree and as such was not competent to extend the time fixed by the decree. 6. Being dissatisfied, the petitioners have come up in revision. 7. Mr. Chakraborty, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised two points in support of this application. 8. Firstly, it is submitted that the final decree for partition fixing a time limit of six months for deposit of owelty money from the date of acceptance of report as a nullity inasmuch as a Commissioner for partition has no right to give such a direction in the report. Mr. 8. Firstly, it is submitted that the final decree for partition fixing a time limit of six months for deposit of owelty money from the date of acceptance of report as a nullity inasmuch as a Commissioner for partition has no right to give such a direction in the report. Mr. Chakraborty further submits that the Commissioner can only divide the property, assess its valuation and suggest allotments. But, Mr. Chakraborty continues, it was beyond the competence of the Commissioner to incorporate a direction that if the owelty money is not deposited within such period from the date of acceptance of report, the plaintiff will get the said allotment on payment of that amount. Therefore, the final decree on acceptance of such a report is a nullity. In support of such contention Mr. Chakraborty relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.B.S.S. Munnalal & Ors. vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Ors., reported in AIR 1962 SC 1493 . 9. Secondly, Mr. Chakraborty contends that the learned executing court refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by not considering the prayer of the defendants for acceptance of delayed deposit on extension of time although as an executing court it has such power. In support of such contention, Mr. Chakraborty relies upon a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Bishwanath Kundu vs. Smt. Subola Dasi, reported in AIR 1962 Cal 272 . 10. As regards the first contention put forward by Mr. Chakraborty, I do not find any substance in it. In a partition suit, a Commissioner is appointed for effecting partition in terms of the preliminary decree and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give suggestion to the Court. Those suggestions are never binding upon the parties. They are entitled to give objection to such report and after hearing them, the court either accepts or rejects or modifies the report. Therefore the ultimate decree is based on the order of the court. Therefore the direction for deposit of owelty money within the stipulated period as mentioned in the final decree is the order of the court. Therefore such decree cannot be termed as a "nullity" merely because the court after hearing the parties accepted the report of the Commissioner which formed part of the decree. The case of R.B.S.S. Munnalal & Ors. (supra) relied upon by Mr. Therefore such decree cannot be termed as a "nullity" merely because the court after hearing the parties accepted the report of the Commissioner which formed part of the decree. The case of R.B.S.S. Munnalal & Ors. (supra) relied upon by Mr. Chakraborty rather goes against his contention. In the said case, the trial court appointed a Commissioner directing him to submit his proposal for partition and for that purpose authorised him to ascertain the property which was available for partition and the liability of the family thereby empowering him to record evidence on framing issues, if necessary. Even under the aforesaid circumstances, the Supreme Court held that by so authorising the Commissioner, the court did not abdicate its function because it was the final decision of the court after hearing the parties on the report of the Commissioner that would be binding upon the parties. The proposals of the Commissioner could not from their very nature be binding upon the parties nor the reasons in support thereof. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is of no avail to Mr. Chakraborty's clients. 11. So far the second point is concerned, I however find substance in the contention of Mr. Chakraborty. As pointed out by the Division Bench in the case' of Bishwanath Kundu vs. Smt. Subola Dasi (supra), the consistent view of this court is that the question of extension of time for deposit of money fixed by decree comes within the meaning of "execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree" authorising an executing court to pass appropriate order. 12. Mr. Banerjee, the learned advocate' appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/decree holder however tried to distinguish the aforesaid decision by submitting that the said decision as well as other decisions referred to therein arose out of compromise decrees, whereas in the instant case the execution was initiated for enforcing a contested decree. I am however not prepared to accept such a contention. If a question really comes within the purview of section 47 of the Code, the executing court will have jurisdiction to decide such question in an execution proceeding irrespective of the nature of decree, be it a contested decree or one passed on consent. I am therefore not at all impressed by the aforesaid submission of Mr. Banerjee. 13. If a question really comes within the purview of section 47 of the Code, the executing court will have jurisdiction to decide such question in an execution proceeding irrespective of the nature of decree, be it a contested decree or one passed on consent. I am therefore not at all impressed by the aforesaid submission of Mr. Banerjee. 13. Therefore, the executing court refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by not considering the prayer made in the application under section 47 of the Code on merit. The order impugned is thus set aside, the learned executing court is directed to decide the application on merit after hearing the learned advocates for the parties. The decree holder is entitled to take all available defences including the plea that the said application is barred by the principles of res judicata. I make it clear that I have not gone into the merit of the miscellaneous case. 14. No order as to costs. Revisions allowed with directing to Court below.