MOHAMED ANWAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD arguments of learned Counsel on both sides. ( 2 ) THIS batch of revisions has arisen from the common judgment dated August 8, 1997 of the lower Appellate Court made in miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 12 to 20 of 1997 filed by the respective respondents, whereby their appeals are allowed holding that the I additional Civil Judge and the Additional chief Judicial Magistrate, Bijapur is competent and empowered to entertain and try their applications made under Section 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 ('the Act of 1936', in short) and reversing the Trial court's order challenged before it which passed taking a contrary view. ( 3 ) THE subject of controversy in all these revisions relates to the interpretation of the authority 'civil Judge and 'judicial Magistrate i Class, Bijapur' notified by the Government of Karnataka under Notification No. SWL 46 lwa 82, Bangalore dated August 5, 1991 in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act of 1936, constituting and empowering such authority to adjudicate all claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages of 'employed persons' within the meaning of the Act including all matters incidental to such claims, for the areas specified in the notification. This notification is hereinafter referred to as the government Notification. ( 4 ) THE undisputed facts of the case are that the respective respondents herein and other 'employed persons' within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Act of 1936 had made their separate applications under Section 15 (1) in the Court of the Principal Civil Judge-cum- chief Judicial Magistrate at Bijapur for recovery of the arrears of wages from the petitioner-employer in terms of the respective awards that were passed in their favour by the concerned Labour Court. Their applications were made over by the learned principal Civil Judge and CJM, Bijapur to I additional Civil Judge-cum-I Additional CJM at Bijapur for disposal according to law. Their applications were made over by the learned principal Civil Judge and CJM, Bijapur to I additional Civil Judge-cum-I Additional CJM at Bijapur for disposal according to law. ( 5 ) THE petitioner was respondent in all those proceedings before the learned I additional Civil Judge and CJM and contested the applications of the employees on the ground, inter alia, that the I Additional Civil judge-cum-CJM at Bijapur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court') is not the competent Authority under the Government notification to entertain and try the said applications under Section 15 of the Act of 1936. After hearing both parties the Trial court passed the common order dated March 5, 1971 upholding the contention of the petitioner and directing return of the said applications to the respective applicants for presentation before Competent Authority. That order of the Trial Court when challenged in appeal before the lower Appellate Court came to be reversed by its impugned judgment. The learned Judge of the Appellate court held that the Trial Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the said applications under Section 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages act, 1936 and therefore, it was directed to comply with the directions earlier given by the appellate Court in M. A. No. 13 of 1996 and other connected appeals by the order dated january 9, 1997 made disposing of those appeals. ( 6 ) MR. Lakshminarayana Rao, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in this batch of revisions, vehemently argued assailing the validity of the conclusions of the lower appellate Court and supporting the correctness of the finding of the Trial Court to the effect that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications of respondent under section 15 of the Act of 1936. Mr. B. Ramesh anneppanavar,per contra, argued in support of the impugned judgment of the Courtbelow. ( 7 ) AS indicated, there is no dispute that the respondents herein and the applicants in other connected matters were the employed persons and the petitioner was their 'employer' as defined by the respective clauses (1) and (l) (a) of Section 2 of the Act and that they had made their said applications for recovery of wages payable to them in terms of the respective awards passed by the Labour court. Section 15 deals with the creation of an authority by the State Government for adjudication of such claims of the employed persons under the Act. The relevant portion of the material provision in sub-section (1) of section 15 is extracted below :"15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims--- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a presiding Officer of any Labour Court or industrial Tribunal, constituted under the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or any commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims: provided that where the State Government considers it necessary so to do, it may appoint more than one authority for any specified area and may, by general or special order, provide for the distribution or allocation of work to be performed by them under this Act". ( 8 ) IN exercise of power under Section 15 (1) of the Act the aforementioned notification was issued by the Government of Karnataka appointing various judicial officers or the Courts of the District Judiciary as the authority thereunder to decide the claims of the nature stipulated under sub-section (1) of Section 15 for the respective area specified against each one of such authority. The authority so appointed at Sl. No. 32 of the notification for the area of bijapur Taluk (including Bijapur City) is shown as 'civil Judge-cum-CJM I Class, Bijapur'. It is not in dispute that there are more than one Civil judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate at Bijapur. The senior-most among them is designated as principal Civil Judge-cum-Chief Judicial magistrate while others are functioning as additional Civil Judges-cum-Additional Chief judicial Magistrate carrying the rank according to their seniority. It is not in dispute that there are more than one Civil judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate at Bijapur. The senior-most among them is designated as principal Civil Judge-cum-Chief Judicial magistrate while others are functioning as additional Civil Judges-cum-Additional Chief judicial Magistrate carrying the rank according to their seniority. As already stated, the said applications of respondents and other employed persons were filed before the Principal Civil judge and CJM who in turn made over those applications to the I Additional Civil Judge-cum- chief Judicial Magistrate for trial and disposal in accordance with law. ( 9 ) THE contention of petitioner was that the i Additional Civil Judge and I Additional CJM does not constitute and answer the description of the authority indicated at Sl. No. 32 of the government Notification and, therefore, he was incompetent and had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of those applications and proceed with the matters. The Trial Court accepted this contention and had passed the order indicated above. The lower Appellate court, on a discussion of the relevant provision, arrived at its conclusion that the Trial court's order was erroneous in law since the import of the provisions were misconceived by the learned Trial Judge. The sum and substance of the impugned judgment of the court-below is that the Civil Judge and Judicial magistrate I Class, Bijapur indicated in the said notification as the authority under Section 15 of the Act to adjudicate the claims of employed person means the Court of Civil judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate 'which is one Court created and established for the defined local area as the Court of Civil Judge- cum-CJM' although more than one Judicial officer of the rank of the Civil Judge-cum- cjm are appointed to preside over this Court. Therefore, in the opinion of the learned appellate Judge the Court of the I Additional civil Judge and CJM is, in law and fact, the court of the Civil Judge and CJM I Class, bijapur and as such is an authority notified in the said Government Notification. On consideration of the material provisions relating to creation of posts contained in the karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 and the code of Civil Procedure, I find this interpretation and finding of the Court-below legally correct and entitled to be upheld. On consideration of the material provisions relating to creation of posts contained in the karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 and the code of Civil Procedure, I find this interpretation and finding of the Court-below legally correct and entitled to be upheld. ( 10 ) THE aforementioned view taken by the court-below is fully supported by the relevant provisions contained in Sections 3,4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Civil Courts Act, 1964 ('the Courts' act of 1964 for short) and Section 5, Criminal procedure Code. Section 3 of the Civil Courts act contemplates that there shall be three classes of Civil Courts subordinate to the High court namely (1) the District Court, (2) the court of the Civil Judge (Now the Court of civil Judge Sr. Division) and (3) the Munsiff court (Now the Court of Civil Judge Jr. Division ). Section 4 envisages establishment of a District Court for each district to be presided over by a District Judge. Section 5 provides for appointment of one or more additional District Judges to a District Court by the High Court for such period as it may deem necessary. Section 6 provides for establishment of Court of Civil Judge for each district, subject of course, to establishment of such a Court for a part of the District or for more than one District, as the case may be, in consultation with the High Court. Section 8 of the Civil Courts Act is more relevant for our purpose which states that the State government may in consultation with the High court fix and from time to time vary by notification the number of Civil Judges to be appointed for the Court of the Civil Judge. A combined reading of these relevant provisions makes the legal position crystal clear that the additional Civil Judges appointed for the Court of Civil Judge at a particular place do not function as independent Courts of Civil Judge but are deemed to be the presiding Officers of the one and the same court of the Civil Judge subject to the judicial work to be dealt with by them as distributed among them by the Principal Civil Judge on the administration side. Similar is the position in regard to the Chief Judicial Magistrates as obtainable by the dictates of Section 12 of code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Similar is the position in regard to the Chief Judicial Magistrates as obtainable by the dictates of Section 12 of code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The material provisions in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 12 reads :"12. Chief Judicial Magistrate and additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, etc. (1) In every district (not being a metropolitan area), the High Court shall appoint a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to be the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (2) The High Court may appoint any judicial Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, and such Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a Chief Judicial Magistrate under this Code or any other law for the time being in force as the High Court may direct. "section 12 thus makes it clear that Chief judicial Magistrate and Additional Chief judicial Magistrate are Judicial Officers of the same rank and they are also the magistrates of I Class. Therefore, their powers are concurrent. In this view of the matter, the objection raised by the petitioner regarding the jurisdiction and power of the trial Court to entertain and try the said applications of the employed persons made under Section 15 of the Act is wholly without legal substance and that, in the facts and circumstances, it was not desirable on the part of the petitioner-employer to have raised such an untenable and frivolous objection and then insistingly protract the legal proceedings and thereby aggravate their plight. As an employer of sound conduct, in all its fairness, what was expected of it was to respect and readily discharge its liability under the respective awards of the Labour Courts which had become final. Therefore, this Court is of the view that these revisions are liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 11 ) HENCE for the reasons aforesaid these revisions are dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000. 00 payable to each of the respective respondents, in the Trial Court within one month from the date of communication of this order. --- *** --- .