Anna Chandy, J.- This is an appeal against acquittal. The appellant, the Executive Officer of the Ezhome Panchayat, filed a complaint before the Second-Class Magistrate of Cannanore, against the respondent Damodharan charging him with an offence under section 10 (1) of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act of 1961 for having conducted a drama within the jurisdiction of the Ezhome Panchayat without paying entertainment tax. The complainant examined as P.W.1 gave evidence that on coming to know that the accused was preparing to stage a drama called “14 Carat” at the Madai Co-operative Rural Bank Hall on 2nd September, 1963, he issued a notice to the accused on 31st August, 1963, informing him that sale of tickets without getting them stamped by the Panchayat was a contravention of section 5 of the Entertainments Tax Act and directing the accused to show cause within 24 hours why action should not be taken to prohibit the staging of the drama. In response to this the accused put in an application for exemption from payment of tax. The application was filed only on 1st September, 1963 and no action was taken on it before the drama was held as planned on 2nd September, 1963. The admission to the entertainment was by ticket, but no tax was realised on them. The Panchayat on 28th September, 1963 passed a resolution refusing the application for exemption and authorising prosecution of the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty. He admits the staging of the drama but maintained that admission was not by tickets but by “subscription”. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground “The prosecution has not proved beyond doubt that admission to the drama was on the basis of tickets sold”. We do not think the acquittal can be sustained on this ground. Section 10 of the Act provides that if any person is “admitted for payment” and the provisions of section 5 (section 5 relates to the payment of tax) are not complied with, the proprietor of the entertainment becomes liable to punishment. The words used are “admitted for payment” and not “admitted by tickets”. If money is paid for the privilege of admission to the entertainment the provisions of section 5 will come into play irrespective of whether money was paid for tickets or as subscriptions. However, we think there are other grounds for upholding the order of acquittal. The words used are “admitted for payment” and not “admitted by tickets”. If money is paid for the privilege of admission to the entertainment the provisions of section 5 will come into play irrespective of whether money was paid for tickets or as subscriptions. However, we think there are other grounds for upholding the order of acquittal. The learned defence Counsel argues that since the accused had applied for exemption from paying tax he cannot be proceeded against unless there is a final order rejecting the exemption. In this connection it is pointed out that section 7 of the Act which lays down the conditions for exemption from tax also provides that any dispute whether any entertainment is of the character meriting exemption “shall be referred to the District Collector whose decision shall be final”. It is argued that since the accused had claimed that his show was of the character meriting exemption and the Panchayat had ruled otherwise there is a dispute as envisaged in sub-section (2) of the section 7 and it was incumbent on the Panchayat to refer the matter to the District Collector for his decision. This contention we feel is not without merits. In Exhibit P-4, the application for exemption, the accused had stated the entertainment was only a cultural show and that it was not being conducted with a profit motive. He claimed that under section 7 of the Act he was entitled to exemption from payment of tax. The Panchayat authorities rejected this claim by their resolution Exhibit P-5. Thus there is a dispute between the Panchayat authorities and the accused regarding the question whether the entertainment was of a character meriting exemption. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 7 makes the reference of such disputes to the Collector obligatory. This view gains support from a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Panchayat Officer, Thodupuzha v. Joseph Kuriakose1. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 7 makes the reference of such disputes to the Collector obligatory. This view gains support from a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Panchayat Officer, Thodupuzha v. Joseph Kuriakose1. Interpreting the corresponding clause in the Travancore-Cochin Local Authorities Entertainment Tax Act, the Court held that: “Where there is a dispute as to whether an entertainment is of the character referred to in subsection (1) of section 7 of the Act, the liability of the entertainment to tax cannot be postulated until the dispute has been referred to Government and its decisions obtained.” There are other indications also to show that a prosecution need not follow automatically from the proprietor’s failure to pay tax at the time the tickets are sold. Rule 42 of the Entertainments Tax Rules provides that proprietor may apply for exemption even after the entertainment had been held. This would show that the mere fact that the entertainment was held without paying the tax as provided for in section 5 will not be sufficient to render the proprietor liable to prosecution. He may apply for exemption even after the entertainment had been staged. This would indicate that in cases where an application for exemption has been made the proprietor can be prosecuted only after appropriate action has been taken on it. In this case the application bearing the prescribed fee was put in prior to the holding of the drama. No action was taken on it before the date of the drama and no notice was issued on the accused to postpone the entertainment till his application has been considered. Though subsequently his application was rejected, by the Panchayat it was not a ‘final decision’ on the matter as envisaged in sub-section (2) of section 7. We therefore feel that the prosecution was premature. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant that such an interpretation of the law would permit anyone to hold an entertainment at any time and escape prosecution by merely putting in an application for exemption, thereby rendering the law infructuous. We therefore feel that the prosecution was premature. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant that such an interpretation of the law would permit anyone to hold an entertainment at any time and escape prosecution by merely putting in an application for exemption, thereby rendering the law infructuous. In the first place the Act is one concerned with the collection of tax on entertainments and not with the control or licensing of entertainments and therefore the mere fact that a person may hold an entertainment without getting the permission of the authorities empowered to levy taxes on the entertainment, will not nullify the intention of the legislation. Moreover the act itself provides the authorities with ample powers to check evasion of taxes by proprietors of entertainments. Sub-section (2) to section 6 provides that tax in the case of admission otherwise than by ticket shall be recoverable from the proprietor, sub-section (2) to section 4 enables the Panchayat authorities to require the proprietor to give security for the payment of tax and sub-section (2) of section 10 provides that any officer authorised by the Panchayat may enter any place of entertainment and if satisfied that provisions of section 5 are not complied with may prevent the further use of the place for purpose of entertainment. In this case P.W.1 was actually present when the drama was being staged and could well have stopped it if he thought that the provisions of section 5 were not being complied with. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that P.W.1 could not have stopped the show in view of the proviso to section 10 which enjoins that such action can be taken only after the proprietor is given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. We are not impressed with this argument. The proviso should be read with the rest of the section. When the section itself empowers the officer to enter the place of entertainment while the entertainment is going on and prevent its continuation “the reasonable opportunity that must be given to show cause against the proposed action” can only mean what is reasonable in the circumstances envisaged in the section. When the section itself empowers the officer to enter the place of entertainment while the entertainment is going on and prevent its continuation “the reasonable opportunity that must be given to show cause against the proposed action” can only mean what is reasonable in the circumstances envisaged in the section. In other words if the officer can enter the hall while the drama is going on and stop the show in its tracks then one can hardly expect him to issue to the proprietor a notice returnable say within 24 hours showing cause by the show should not be stopped. We are therefore of the view that since the accused’s application for exemption from paying tax has not been finally disposed of, the prosecution for the non-payment of tax is incompetent. The appeal fails and has to be dismissed. M.C.M. ----------- Appeal dismissed.