Order.- An important question whether the Court has power to grant what is called ‘anticipatory bail’, arises for consideration in this revision case. The Tahsildar, Bhalki, lodged a complaint on 23rd January, 1964 with the Police at Dhanura that while the Patwari of Malchapur was collecting revenue, the respondents before this Court, abused the Patwari and assaulted him with shoes and thereby obstructed the public servant from discharging his duties. The Police registered a case against the respondents under section 353, Indian Penal Code and sent the first information report to the Magistrate. Fearing that they might be arrested by the Police, the respondents appeared before the First Class Magistrate, Bhalki, on 20th March, 1964, and made an application praying that they might be released on bail. This application appears to have been opposed by the Prosecutor. The learned Magistrate passed an order on the same day as follows: “Accused persons are released on bail on their executing P. and S. bonds in the sun of Rs. 500 each. The concerned Police be informed. The accused persons should appear before police Dharwar for investigation as and when they are called.” Against this order, the State filed a Revision Petition — Criminal Revision Petition No. 20/6 of 1964 before the Sessions Judge, Bidar. After examining the records; and hearing the Counsel for the State and the accused, the learned Sessions Judge felt that the learned Magistrate had no power to grant bail when the accused had not been arrested nor had any warrant been issued for their arrest. The learned Sessions Judge has made a reference to this Court under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, recommending that the said order of the Magistrate might be set aside. The complaint against the respondent was for an offence punishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. According to the table in Schedule II to the Code of Criminal Procedure, this offence is a cognizable and also a bailable offence. Grant of bail for a bailable offence is governed by section 496, Criminal Procedure Code the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “496. According to the table in Schedule II to the Code of Criminal Procedure, this offence is a cognizable and also a bailable offence. Grant of bail for a bailable offence is governed by section 496, Criminal Procedure Code the relevant portion of which reads as follows: “496. In what cases bail to be taken.-When any person other than a person accused of a non bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a Police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail:....................” (The two provisos are not relevant for the present purpose.) An analysis of the main part of the section makes it clear that on satisfying the following three conditions, namely: (a) The person has been accused of a bailable offence; (b) Such person has been arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court; and (c) He is prepared to give bail; such person shall be released on bail. If these three conditions are satisfied, bail is a matter of right of the accused and not of discretion of the Court. If a complaint or a police report of a bailable offence is made against a person or he is suspected of having committed such an offence, he will be a person accused of a bailable offence. This condition is satisfied in the present case, because the Tahsildar had filed a complaint against the respondents for an offence under suction 353, Indian Penal Code. The respondents had not been arrested nor detained without a warrant by the police nor were they brought before Court. But they themselves appeared voluntarily before Court and made the application, for grant of bail. There is some divergence of opinion as to the interpretation of the word ‘appear’ occurring in section 496, Criminal Procedure Code. The respondents had not been arrested nor detained without a warrant by the police nor were they brought before Court. But they themselves appeared voluntarily before Court and made the application, for grant of bail. There is some divergence of opinion as to the interpretation of the word ‘appear’ occurring in section 496, Criminal Procedure Code. One view is that the word ‘appear’ in the context of this section, means appearance in obedience to a summons or bailable warrant or in pursuance of an undertaking to appear contained in a bond executed by a person when he is arrested and released by the police; the word does not refer to voluntary appearance of the accused to whom no summons or warrant has been issued or who has not undertaken so to appear. The other view is that the word appear’ is wide enough to include voluntary appearance of a person accused of an offence even where no summons or warrant has been issued against him. But it is unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to go into this controversy. I shall proceed on the assumption that the word ‘appear’ includes voluntary appearance of the accused even in the absence of any summons or warrant. In that sense the respondents in the present case undoubtedly appeared, in person, before the Magistrate when they made the application for bail. The respondents-accused have also executed personal and security bonds as directed by the Magistrate. The learned Counsel for the respondents contended that as the respondents had satisfied all the above three conditions, that the respondents were entitled to be released on bail by the Magistrate and that the learned Magistrate was justified in releasing them on bail. In order to find out whether the respondents have satisfied these three conditions and could be granted bail, it is necessary to examine the meaning and implication of the words ‘bail’ and ‘released on bail’. The preponderance of judicial opinion is that the words, ‘bail’ and ‘released on bail’ imply the accused being already in restraint and his being set at liberty from such restraint. In Amir Chand v. The Crown1, Khosla, J., who delivered the leading opinion of the Full Bench, referred to the meaning of the word ‘bail’ as given in several Dictionaries. One of the meanings given in the New Oxford Dictionary is ‘temporary delivery’ or ‘release from prison’. In Amir Chand v. The Crown1, Khosla, J., who delivered the leading opinion of the Full Bench, referred to the meaning of the word ‘bail’ as given in several Dictionaries. One of the meanings given in the New Oxford Dictionary is ‘temporary delivery’ or ‘release from prison’. Whartons’ Law Lexicon explains ‘bail’ as ‘to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required in order that he may be safely protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc., the legal power to deliver him. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary explains ‘bail’ as follows: “Bailee, is when a man. is taken or arrested for felony, suspicion of felony, indicted of felony or any such case, so that he is restrained of his liberty. And having by law bailable, offered surety to those which have authority to bail him, which sureties are bound for him to the Kings use in a certain sums of money, or body, for body, that he shall appear before the Justices of Saole delivery at the next Sessions, etc.” As pointed out by Dixit, C.J., in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Prasad2, the word ‘bail’ has been similarly defined in Tomlins’ Law Dictionary and Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law. As observed by Khosla, J. in Amir Chand v. The Crown1, releasing an accused on bail means releasing him from custody or prison and delivering him into the hands of sureties. Therefore, the concept of bail implies a form of previous restraint. As observed by Chandra Reddy, C.J., in Public Prosecutor v. Manikya Rao3, the power to grant bail does not envisage the grant of bail to a person who is under no restraint. A person, who is under no previous restraint, does not need any order of bail as he is free to go anywhere he likes. On this line of reasoning, the Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court opined in Amir Chand v. The Crown1, that bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested and for whose arrest no warrants had been issued. On this line of reasoning, the Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court opined in Amir Chand v. The Crown1, that bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested and for whose arrest no warrants had been issued. This view has been followed by most other High Courts. Vide, the State v. Hasan Mohanmed4, Muzafaruddin v. State of Hyderabad5, State v. Sajjan Singh6, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kailash7, Public Prosecutor v. Manikya Rao3and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Prasad2. In Juhar Mal v. State8, Wanchoo, C.J., while agreeing with the view taken by the Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Amir Chand v. The Crown1, added that bail can also be granted when an officer-in-charge of a police station manifests his intention to arrest an accused without a warrant by delivering to the officer required to make the arrest, an order in writing under section 56, Criminal Procedure Code. But Mr. Jagannath Shetty, the learned Counsel for the respondent, has commended for acceptance the contrary view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hidayat Ullah v. The Crown9and the view taken by Khan., J., in State v. Mangilal10, and in Abdul Karim Khan v. State of M.P.11. In Hidayat Ullah v. The Crown9, the power of the High Court to grant bail to a person suspected of an offence in anticipation of his arrest, came up for consideration. Cornelius, J., who delivered the opinion of the Full Bench, attached great significance to the difference between the language of section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, on the one hand and that of sections 496 and 497 on the other. His Lordship pointed out that while the words used in sections 496 and 497 are ‘released on bail’ the corresponding words in section 498 are ‘direct that any person be admitted to bail’. His Lordship stated that the power of the High Court to direct that any person be admitted to bail, extends not only to grant bail to persons who are in custody of the High Court or an inferior Court or a police officer, but also includes a power to give directions that persons should be admitted to bail who are not in custody. His Lordship further observed that there is no ground for supposing that the power of the High Court under section 498 would not extend to making an order to the police officer to admit on bail a person against whom information had been laid before the Police that he is guilty of non-bailable offence even though such person may not have been arrested or there was no warrant of arrest against him. The Full Bench of the Lahore High Court was not considering the scope of section 496, Criminal Procedure Code. Even as regards the scope of section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, the view of this Full Bench has been dissented from by the Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Amir Chand v. The Crown1, in which their Lordships have given elaborate reasons for not accepting the said view of the Lahore High Court. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning in Amir Chand v. The Crown1. In Juhar Mal v. State2, Wanchoo, C.J., has pointed out that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court would lead to the following anomalous result. When an accused who is not under arrest and against whom no warrant for arrest has been issued, is granted anticipatory bail, his position may be worse off and he may lose his freedom and may be taken into custody, if he is unable tofurnish security in terms of the order granting bail or if the sureties furnished by him are subsequently found to be not satisfactory or if the sureties want to be discharged and he is unable to find fresh sureties. In the two judgments of Khan, J., in State v. Mangilal3and in Abdul Karim Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh4, I do not find any reason beyond those contained in the opinion of the Full Bench of Lahore High Court, to support the conclusion of his Lordship. I think the view taken by the majority of the High Courts should he preferred to the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court and Khan, J., in the aforesaid two decisions. Mr. I think the view taken by the majority of the High Courts should he preferred to the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court and Khan, J., in the aforesaid two decisions. Mr. Jagannath Setty contended that when a person has been accused of a cognizable offence, the possibility or the threat of the police arresting him, will always be hanging over his head and such possibility or threat would itself be a sufficient restraint in order to enable the Court to grant bail and release him from such restraint. In support of this contention, Mr. Jagannath Setty relied on the following observations of a Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in Sunder Singh v. State5: The Criminal Procedure Code authorises the officer-in-charge of the Police station to arrest the accused without a warrant in a non-bailable offence........ It cannot be said, therefore, that the accused is not without restraint. The threat and the power of the officer-in-charge of investigation of arresting the accused is always hanging on his head. That is a sufficient restraint, in our opinion, for the purposes of this section" (section 497, Criminal Procedure Code). These observations were considered by Wanchoo, C.J., in Juhar Mal v. State2 and by Chandra Reddy, C.J. in Public Prosecutor v. Manikya Rao6, who expressed their dissent. It is difficult to see how a mere threat or possibility of an accused person being arrested could amount to a restraint on him. Until he is so arrested, he is free to move about as he likes. On investigation, the police may find that there is no sufficient reason to arrest him; or on interrogation he may be able to give satisfactory explanation which may convince the Police that there is no reasonable material to proceed against him. With all respect to their Lordships who decided Sunder Singh v. State5, I am unable to agree that a mere threat or possibility of arrest would be restraint, for the purpose of granting bail. In the present case, as the respondents had not been arrested nor was any warrant issued for their arrest, nor was there any order issued by any police officer under section 56, Criminal Procedure Code for their arrest, the learned Magistrate could not grant bail merely in anticipation of any such action against them. In the present case, as the respondents had not been arrested nor was any warrant issued for their arrest, nor was there any order issued by any police officer under section 56, Criminal Procedure Code for their arrest, the learned Magistrate could not grant bail merely in anticipation of any such action against them. In the result, this reference is accepted, and the order of the Magistrate granting bail to the accused, is hereby set aside. The bail bonds stand cancelled. But, nothing stated in this order shall be construed as precluding the accused from moving the Magistrate for bail, if necessary, at the appropriate stage. S.V.S. ----- Reference accepted.