JUDGMENT This revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution or India is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction and is directed against order dated March 6, 1991 passed by the learned District Judge, Nadia in Civil Revision Case No. 72 of 1990 and also against order No. 17 dated August 23, 1990 passed by the leaned Munsif, 1st Court, Ranaghat in Title Suit No. 136 of 1977 thereby dismissing the suit for non-deposit of handwriting expert's fees. 2. In the aforesaid suit filed by the petitioner, on his prayer a handwriting expert was appointed for the purpose of examination of the signature appearing in a document. It appears from the record that several dates were given for deposit of the fees of such expert but the present petitioner did not comply with such orders. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge by order No. 152 dated April 26, 1990 gave a last chance to the petitioner to deposit the said amount and it was recorded in the said order that in default of such payment, the suit would stand dismissed. 3. The petitioner not having deposited such amount, the learned trial Judge by order No. 17 dated August 23, 1990 dismissed the said suit for non-compliance of the Court's order. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a application under Section 151 of the Code for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit and for giving further opportunity to deposit the expert's fees but the said application was dismissed. 5. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred a revisional application under Section 115A of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned District Judge and by the order impugned, the revisional Court below has rejected such revisional application holding that a Court has inherent power to dismiss the suit for non-compliance of its order. 6. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner has preferred the instant application. He has also challenged the initial order of dismissal of the suit. 7. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that his client had deposited the said amount but due to mistake, wrong number of the suit was mentioned in the challan and as such the amount was deposited in a different suit. According to Mr. 7. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that his client had deposited the said amount but due to mistake, wrong number of the suit was mentioned in the challan and as such the amount was deposited in a different suit. According to Mr. Mukherjee, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that his client was negligent, the Court could at best dismiss his application for appointment of expert and should have proceeded with the hearing of the aforesaid suit. According, to Mr. Mukherjee, a Court has got no power to dismiss a suit except on merit or in the circumstances as laid down in Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure or for violating of any order as mentioned in Order 11 of the Code. According to Mr. Mukherjee in the instant case, none of the aforesaid circumstances being present, the order of the learned trial Judge dismissing the suit under inherent power was without jurisdiction. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee; contends that the revisional Court below ought to have set aside the order of dismissal or ought to have permitted the petitioner to deposit the costs of expert within a specified time. 8. Mr. Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party has on the other hand supported the order paned by the learned Courts below and has contended that a Court has always inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a suit for non-compliance of the Court's order. In support of such contention Mr. Mitra, has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of (1) Lachman Singh v. Sm. Hasi Ram Singh reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta page 196. 9. Mr. Mitra, further, contends that in the instant case the petitioner prayed for time to deposit the amount on number of occasions and the learned trial Judge allowed such prayer on each occasion. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge fixed a last date for deposit of such payment, and specifically mentioned that in default of such payment the suit would stand dismissed. But the petitioner having decided not to comply with said order, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit under inherent power. 10. Mr. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge fixed a last date for deposit of such payment, and specifically mentioned that in default of such payment the suit would stand dismissed. But the petitioner having decided not to comply with said order, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit under inherent power. 10. Mr. Mitra, further, contends that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Court has got no such inherent power, the order of dismissal should be treated as one under Order 17 Rule 3 of the Code. 11. In view of the importance of the question raised in this revisional application, this Court requested Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury, a Senior Advocate of this Court to act as amicus curiae and Mr. Roychowdhury agreed to assist the Court and has given his valuable opinion in the matter. 12. Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that as held by the Apex Court in the case of (2) Kalipada Das & Ors. v. Bimal Krishna Sengupta reported in 1983 (1) SCC page 14, a Court has inherent power to, dismiss a suit for default for non-compliance of the Court's order. Mr. Roychowdhury however points out that the Court should exercise such power in an extreme case where the gravity of the non-compliance is such, that a Court is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. According to Mr. Roychowdhury although there is no provision. In the Code itself for dismissal of a suit for non-deposit of expert’s fees, it is for the Court to consider whether in the fact of the present case such extreme step should be taken. Mr. Roychowdhury has however by referring to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of (3) Colton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank Limited reported in AIR 1983 SC page 1272, has submitted that the inherent power of a Court cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision. 13. Mr. Roychowdhury lastly draws attention of this Court to a decision of Bombay High Court in the case of (4) S.T. Patil & Anr. v. Smt Durga Bai reported in AIR 1987 Bombay page 182. By relying upon the observation of the Division Bench in Paragraph 26 of the said judgment, Mr. 13. Mr. Roychowdhury lastly draws attention of this Court to a decision of Bombay High Court in the case of (4) S.T. Patil & Anr. v. Smt Durga Bai reported in AIR 1987 Bombay page 182. By relying upon the observation of the Division Bench in Paragraph 26 of the said judgment, Mr. Roychowdhury submits that inherent power of a Court under Section 151 of the Code is not intended to enable a Court to confer a right upon a party. The distinction between procedural law and substantial law must be borne in mind. The provisions of Section 151 of the Code do not invest a Court with legislative power but only enable it to pass such order so as to do Justice between the parties. The inherent powers of a Court are in addition to and complementary to the power expressly conferred upon by any other provisions of the Code. They are however not intended to enable a Court to create right in favour of the parties but are meant to enable it to pass such orders for the ends of Justice as may be necessary considering rights which are conferred upon the parties by substantive law. The Division Bench in the said decision specifically held that judicial activism does not permit a Court to do what in effect is legislation. 14. Therefore, on consideration of the aforesaid decisions it is clear that a Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit but such power must be exercised in an extreme case. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Kalipada Das (supra), a procedural step is in aid of Justice and is not substantive Justice itself. Therefore, penalty on failure to comply with the Court's order must be commensurate with or proportionate to the gravity of the lapse or omission. In my opinion in the instant case for non-compliance of the order to deposit expert's fees, a Court should dismiss the application for appointment of expert and could proceed with the hearing of the suit but the order of dismissal of the suit did not commensurate with the fault of the petitioner in not depositing such cost of expert. 15. Although in the case of Lachman Singh v. Sm. Hasi Rani Singh (supra), relied upon by Mr. 15. Although in the case of Lachman Singh v. Sm. Hasi Rani Singh (supra), relied upon by Mr. Mitra, this Court approved the order of the trial Court dismissal a suit under a similar situation, in view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kalipada Das (supra), I think that the order of dismissal of the suit will not be proportionate to the gravity of the omission and as such I am unable to follow the course adopted by this Court in the case of Lachman Singh (supra). 16. I also do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Mitra, that the dismissal of the suit should be treated as one passed under Order 17 Rule 3 of the Code, because the said date was not fixed for further evidence or further hearing. In any event, the suit was not at the peremptory hearing stage. 17. Therefore, in my opinion, the learned trial Judge instead of dismissing the suit under inherent power ought to have rejected the application for expert. 18. In view of the fact that the petitioner had deposited the cost by mentioning a wrong number of the suit, in my opinion it is a fit case where a last chance should be given to the petitioner to deposit such amount. Under the aforesaid circumstances I set aside the orders impugned and direct the learned trial Judge to give a last chance to the petitioner to deposit the expert's cost within a week from dale of communication of the order to the trial Court. In default of deposit of such cost, the application for appointment of expert will be dismissed and the Court will proceed with the hearing of the suit. 19. Thus, this revisional application is allowed. In the facts and circumstances, I however, direct the petitioner to pay a cost of Rs. 1,000/- to the opposite part, to be paid within a fortnight from date. Such cost is to be paid to the learned Advocate for the opposite party, who will grant receipt for the same. Before parting, this Court records its appreciation of the valuable assistance received from Mr. Roychowdhury in disposing of the present revisional application.