Anna Chandy, J.: This is an appeal by the State against the order of acquittal of the two accused persons in C.C. No. 1222 of 1962 on the file of the Sub-Magistrate, Kuthuparamba. The charge against them was that accused No. 1, the driver of motor lorry No. MYV. 1654 and accused No. 2 the driver of bus No. K.L.C. 1415 were driving their motor vehicles in opposite directions rashly and negligently and in a manner endangering human life collided with each other and caused hurt to a passenger in the bus and thereby committed the offences punishable under sections 279 and 337, Indian Penal Code. A preliminary objection was taken to the legality of the joint trial of the two drivers. The learned Magistrate following the decisions in Umar Bin v. The State1 and Edward Top v. State2, held the joint trial of the accused illegal and acquitted the accused under section 245(1) Criminal Procedure Code. The two points argued by the State in this appeal are: (i) that the accused could have been jointly tried for the offences and (ii) that in any view the order of acquittal is unsustainable and the Court should have split up the charges against each accused and proceeded with the trial of the cases. The stand taken by the prosecutor is that there is no legal bar to the joint trial of the two accused as the offences with which they stood charged were committed in the course of the same transaction coming under clause (a) of section 239, Criminal Procedure Code. In support of the position that the collision between the vehicles is to be taken as the transaction in the course of which the offences were committed, reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in Palliah v. Emperor3, which was referred to with approval in In re, Venkayalapati Gopalarao4. As against this the learned defence Counsel cited the decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and the Saurashtra High Court relied upon by the learned Magistrate. As against this the learned defence Counsel cited the decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and the Saurashtra High Court relied upon by the learned Magistrate. It has to be mentioned at the outset that whatever may be the relative merits of the conflicting views on the legality of a joint trial of the two accused for the offence under section 337, Indian Penal Code, there should be no controversy at least about the impropriety of a joint trial for the offence under section 279, Indian Penal Code. Section 279 penalises rash and negligent driving or riding on a public way in a manner endangering human life or likely to cause hurt or injury to any one. Needless to say that such a rash and negligent act by one driver is independent of the rash and negligent driving of the other driver and as such these two acts cannot constitute the same transaction within the meaning of section 239(a), Criminal Procedure Code. Coming to the charge under section 337, Indian Penal Code, we are inclined to agree with the view taken in the Travancore-Cochin case that it is desirable that the accused should be charged separately. The circumstances under which two or more persons may be charged together are enumerated in section 239 of the Code and where it is doubtful whether a given case can be brought under its provisions it is preferable to deal with the offenders separately thereby avoiding the likelihood of of any prejudice. The observations made by Mahamood, J., in Queen Empress v. Abdul Kadir5, and extracted in the Travancore-Cochin case can well bear repetition as they enunciate the principal considerations which should prevail in dealing with such a question: “Further it seems to me clear upon general principles, that each individual member of the community is, in the absence of exceptional authority conferred by the law to the contrary effect, entitled when required by the judiciary either to forfeit his liberty to have that liberty qualified to insist that his case shall be separately tried. In the eye of the law, each individual citizen is a separate integer or unit of the Commonwealth, and his rights of liberty cannot, without express authority in the law, be dealt with jointly with those of a crowd of other persons with whom, far from having a community of interest, he may have incompatibility of interests in matters of a nature such as this case presents.” In a case like the one in hand it is quite possible that each accused will try to throw the blame and responsibility on the other and it is not desirable that his case should be dealt with another, whose interests are likely to clash with his. The chances are that he will be prejudiced by such a procedure. The Madras decision rested solely on the basis that the collision of the vehicles is the same transaction within the meaning of clause (a) of section 239 and the same view was shared by the Andhra High Court. It is not necessary to canvass the correctness of that proposition in this case where the objection about misjoinder was taken even before the trial started and on the general principles enunciated above we feel that to avoid the possibility-of any prejudice to the accused and to ensure a fair trial which should be the paramount consideration, it is desirable that the accused are separately tried. The question whether the Court has the necessary power to split up the charges in cases of misjoinder has been considered by us in Rappai & others v. State of Kerala1, where we said that such a power can be deduced from the provisions contained in section 227 read with sections 228 and 229 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was also held that the Court can by virtue of the inherent jurisdiction vested in it exercise such a power in the interests of justice. Whether there will be evidence to make out the offence against either of the accused is a matter which has to be decided on the evidence. The order of acquittal passed without recording the evidence and on the ground of mis joinder of charges is unsustainable and has to be set aside. Whether there will be evidence to make out the offence against either of the accused is a matter which has to be decided on the evidence. The order of acquittal passed without recording the evidence and on the ground of mis joinder of charges is unsustainable and has to be set aside. The learned Magistrate will split up the case and confine C.C. No. 1222 of 1962 to the charge against the first accused register a fresh case against the second accused and proceed with the trial afresh. M.C.M. ----- Appeal allowed. Case to be split up and tried afresh.