Order.- This revision petition arises out of an application made by the first respondent against the petitioner under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, alleging that the petitioner had married her, that the second respondent was born to him and claiming maintenance. The first respondent as P.W.1 has sworn that even though she was originally married to one Muthunayakam that marriage had been dissolved in 1952 and in 1954 the petitioner married her. The contention of the petitioner was that the first respondent was the legally wedded wife of Muthunayakam, that the marriage is still subsisting, that there was no legal divorce and therefore section 112 of the Evidence Act would apply. He also denied the marriage and the paternity of the child. As there could be no legal divorce and her marriage with the petitioner cannot be considered as a legal marriage the first respondent withdrew her claim for maintenance. The learned Magistrate on a consideration of the evidence adduced found that the petitioner was the father of the child and awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.15 to the second respondent-child. Aggrieved with the order this revision petition has been filed. The main argument urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Court below has not correctly understood the scope of section 112 of the Evidence Act and on a correct application of the section the order cannot be supported. Section 112 is in the following terms: "The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten." Therefore, if a child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage there is the presumption in law that the person is the father of the child. To quote the words of Mukherjee, J., as he then was in Venkateswarlu v. Venkatanarayana1: Access and non-access again connote, as has been held by the Privy Council in Karapaya v. Mayandi2 existence and non-existence of opportunities for marital intercourse." In the decision in Krishnappa v. Venkatappa3, Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J., following the Privy Council decision stated: "There is a presumption of legitimacy in favour of a child born in lawful wedlock and this presumption is conclusive unless it can be shown that the husband and wife had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. In the absence of such evidence the child must be deemed to be legitimate even though the wife was living apart and leading an unchaste life. The word ‘access’ in section 112 means opportunity for sexual intercourse and not actual cohabitation. " Non-access can be established not merely by positive or direct evidence, it can be proved undoubtedly like any other physical fact by evidence, either direct or circumstantial which is relevant to the issue, though, as the presumption of legitimacy is highly favoured by law, it is necessary that proof of non-access must be clear and satisfactory. The position in law being thus clear the question for determination is whether on facts and circumstances of this case it could be held that the first respondent has succeeded in proving non-access. Besides the oral evidence of P.W.1 and her witnesses we have the deed of dissolution of marriage executed by Muthunayakam and the first respondent putting an end to their marital life. After that in 1954 the petitioner and the first respondent entered into a marriage relationship under the document Exhibit P.1, and according to P.W.1 there was also the celebration of a formal marriage, like tying of the tali and presentation of cloth. The petitioner’s case that he was forced to sign ExhibitP-1 without knowing the contents of the docu- ment has been rightly rejected by the Court below. In September, 1955, the father of P.W.1 had bequeathed some properties ana cash in favour of P.W.1 and the petitioner under a document Exhibit P.2. There is the further fact that the petitioner and the first respondent were living together as husband and wife in the same house as is evidenced by Exhibit P-6 the copy of census register. In September, 1955, the father of P.W.1 had bequeathed some properties ana cash in favour of P.W.1 and the petitioner under a document Exhibit P.2. There is the further fact that the petitioner and the first respondent were living together as husband and wife in the same house as is evidenced by Exhibit P-6 the copy of census register. It has thus been found by the Court below that the petitioner and the first respondent were living together at the time when the child could have been begotten. Beyond denying that he had married the first respondent and they were living together as husband and wife he had no case that Muthunayakam was ever visiting her and could have had any access. It is also significant that to a notice sent by the first respondent the petitioner did not send a reply denying the marriage and the paternity of the child. On a consideration of all these circumstances I have no hesitation inholding that the first respondent has discharged the onus that lay on her and in proving non-access. I may in this connection refer to a decision of the Madras High Court in Sreenivasan v. Kirubai Ammal1. In that case the petitioner who was a Police Constable was visiting the house of the respondent who was a married woman and when her husband objected the police constable drove him away and the petitioner and the woman were living together in the same house as husband and wife even though her previous marriage was not dissolved. It was held that he was the father of the child. The head-note of the case reads: “It is not quite impossible for children born to a married woman to be legally held to be the progeny of a paramour. The presumption under section 112, Evidence Act, though no doubt a strong one, is not conclusive and can be rebutted, by proving that, at the time when the children or any of them could have been conceived, the husband could not have had access to his wife, either by reason of being imprisoned in some distant place, or by reason of having never visited the house owing to his disgust at his wife’s immorality and having therefore permanently severed all sexual relations with her or for such other reasons. It is not necessary in every case that the marriage should be dissolved before a paramour can be held to be the father of the children. If the paramour is keeping his wife as his concubine, and the husband is driven out of the house and rigidly kept away from approaching the wife, so that he may not interfere with the immoral activities of the paramour, the paramour may well be held to be the father of the children born thereafter though the marriage is not dissolved.” In the result. I confirm the order of the Court below and dismiss the Revision Petition. M.C.M. ----- Petition dismissed.