JUDGMENT : - J.C. Gupta, J. This is tenant's challenging the judgment and order dated 27-7-1994 passed by the then 2nd Additional District Judge, Meerut allowing the appeal preferred by landlord- respondent against the judgment and order dated 18-2-1992 of the Prescribed Authority. 2. THE disputes relates to a portion of house No. 384 situated in Kabari Bazar, Teli Mohalla Sadar, Meerut which comprised of two small rooms measuring 4' x 8' each with common latrine and bathroom. THE said accommodation is in the ground floor and is admittedly in the tenancy of the petitioner since 1970. THE landlord-respondent moved an application under Scction21 (l)(a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act') for the release of the accommodation in question on the ground that in order to cater the requirement of his family members, he needed additional accommodation. In the application it was stated that his family consisted of his wife and two minor children. It was however, also stated that the father and mother of the landlord were also residing with him. During the pendency of application the landlord further claimed that his grand- mother Smt. Parvati Devi has also started living with him and his requirement of additional accommodation has further increased. THE landlord further alleged that since the tenant has built his own house on a piece of land purchased in the year 1986, he would suffer no hardship as he could shift there without any inconvenience. He also pleaded that the said house was situated in Mohalla Kasampur Nagala Karhi which is in Meerut Urban Agglomeration. In short the landlord's case was that on account of construction of house by the tenant, the Explanation 1 of 4th proviso of Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act was attracted, accordingly the tenant could not be heard in opposition to the application of the landlord moved under Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act. In short the landlord's case was that on account of construction of house by the tenant, the Explanation 1 of 4th proviso of Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act was attracted, accordingly the tenant could not be heard in opposition to the application of the landlord moved under Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act. The release application was con tested by the tenant inter alia on a number of grounds, one of the ground being that during the pendency of release application, the landlord has come in occupation of two big rooms having sizes of 18' x 12' and 12'x20' which were vacated by another tenant Sri J. M. Ghosh with whom the landlord entered into a compromise and got the same released in his favour by the order dated 26-11-1990 and also got pos session of the same on 31-3-1991. As regards the applicability of Explanation 1 to the proviso of Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act, the case of the tenant was that he has not constructed any house as alleged by the landlord. Out of love and affection the father of his wife has got constructed three small rooms in his wife's name but they are not vacant and are occupied by three tenants. He also specifically denied that the said construction laid within the Meerut city or Municipal limits of Meerut. 3. THE parties led evidence and also filed some documents. THE Prescribed Authority by the order dated 18-2-1992 came to the conclusion that Explanation 1 of 4th Proviso of Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act was applicable, hence tenant could not be heard on the question of comparison of hardship. THE Prescribed Authority further observed that even if Explanation was applicable the landlord was still required to prove his bona fide need and after assessing the evidence on the said question the Prescribed Authority recorded a specific finding that since the landlord has come in occupation of more accommodation than as was asked for in the release application on account of cessation of occupation by J. M. Ghosh, the alleged need of the landlord of the accommodation in question stood satisfied. THE Prescribed Authority further recorded a finding that there was no direct and clinching evidence that the landlord's father and mother were also living with him. THE Prescribed Authority further recorded a finding that there was no direct and clinching evidence that the landlord's father and mother were also living with him. It further held that assuming 'he said assertion to be correct, the accommodation which was presently in occupation of the landlord was sufficient to cater his requirement. 4. THE appellate authority affirmed the finding of the Prescribed Authority regarding the applicability of Explanation 1 merely on the basis that the said finding of the Prescribed Authority has not been challenged by the tenant by way of appeal. THE lower appellate authority has how ever, reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question of bond fide need holding that the trial Court has not considered the requirement of the landlord's father, mother and grand mother who are proved to be living with the landlord, and if their need was taken into account, the claim of the landlord for additional accommodation was not exhausted despite release of accommodation in his favour, which was hitherto in occupation of J. M. Ghosh. In other words, the lower Appellate Court came lo the conclusion that even after corning into occupation of the two rooms vacated by J. M. Ghosh the need of the landlord for additional accommodation did not stand satisfied and his need for accommodation in question was bona fide. With these findings the release application of the landlord has been allowed by the impugned order which has been challenged in this writ petition before this Court by the tenant. I have heard Sri Pramod Jain learned Counsel for the tenant- petitioner and Sri VK. Goel, learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent at length. Record has also been perused. 5. DURING the pendency of this writ-petition an application has been moved on behalf of the tenant- petitioner to take on record a subsequent event that Smt. Parvati Devi the grand-mother of the landlord has died and therefore the need of the landlord has minimized. Another application has also been moved to take on record an alleged subsequent event that during the pendency of the writ petition, the landlord has come in occupation of two more rooms in the first floor in the same house vacated by Durga Mistri and Manju Gupta. Another application has also been moved to take on record an alleged subsequent event that during the pendency of the writ petition, the landlord has come in occupation of two more rooms in the first floor in the same house vacated by Durga Mistri and Manju Gupta. The landlord has not denied the factum of death of Smt. Parvati Devi Hut alleged that with the passage of time the children of the landlord have grown up and the need of the landlord has not been minimized on account of the death of Smt. Parvati Devi. As regards the other application it is contended by Sri VK. Goel that as per the landlord's case those two rooms have not been released in favour of the landlord and they are not suitable for habitation inasmuch as they are in a dilapidated condition. Relying upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, 1997 (30) ALR 307 (SC) and of this Court in Abdul Aziz Khan v. District Judge, Etah, 1998 (34) ALR 546 (HC), it is argued by Sri. Goel that subsequent events occurring after the decision of appellate authority cannot be taken into consideration during the pendency of writ petition as under the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1992 a finality has been attached to the orders made in appeal under Section 22 of the Act. 6. SRI Pramod Jain learned Counsel for the tenant-petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned order of the appellate authority is vitiated in law as neither any discussion has been made nor any finding recorded by the appellate authority on the question of comparative hardship of the parties. This submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner carries weight. A bare perusal of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court leaves no room of doubt that the learned Judge did not go into the said question himself as according to the learned Judge the finding of the Prescribed Authority regarding the applicability of Explanation I had become final as no appeal by the tenant was preferred against the said finding. It has been rightly pointed out by SRI Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner that under Section 22 of the Act, appeal has been prescribed only against final order made under Section 21 of the Act and appeal could be filed only by the per son aggrieved by the said order. When in the present case application of release made under Section 21 of! he Act had been dismissed by the Prescribed Authority and the order had been made in favour of the tenant, there was neither any occasion nor there was any provision which could permit the tenant to file an appeal under Section 22 of the Act only against that particular finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority while making final order in his favour. SRI Goel on the other hand however, argued that since the finding of the Prescribed Authority recorded on the question of applicability or other wise of Explanation 1 was also not challenged before the appellate authority on behalf of the tenant during the course of arguments, the lower appellate authority has not committed any error in endorsing the finding of the Prescribed Authority. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned Counsel inasmuch as a bare perusal of the order of the appellate Authority indicates that (he appellate authority did not think it necessary to go into the said question merely on the ground that the finding recoded by the Prescribed Authority on the question of applicability of Explanation 1 has not been challenged by the tenant by way of appeal. The argument of the learned Counsel for the landlord is further negatives if we go through the judgment of the Appellate Court minutely. A perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate authority further shows that the appellate authority was fully aware of the contention of the tenant that the constructions raised in village Nagala Kasampur Karhi standing in his wife's name were not in Meerut Municipal limits and were not available in a vacant state. Once the said contention was before the appellate authority it was the bounden duty of this Court to have recorded clear cut finding on the question of applicability of Explanation 1. Once the said contention was before the appellate authority it was the bounden duty of this Court to have recorded clear cut finding on the question of applicability of Explanation 1. Explanation 1 provides that where the tenant or any member of his family who is normally Testing with him or, is wholly dependent on him has built or otherwise acquired in a vacant stale or has got vacated after acquisition, a residential building in the same city, etc., no objection by the tenant against an application under sub-section (l) (a) shall be entertained. The landlord of the present case was. therefore, required to establish that the tenant's wile has built a residential building in the same city of Meerut, after the enforcement of the Act. In the present case, it was the specific case of the tenant that seeing the economic conditions of his daughter, the father of his wife has constructed three small rooms in the name of his wife which were not vacant. It was also asserted that those rooms have no amenity of latrine and bathroom nor they had any electric connection and were entirely unsuitable to be used as a residential building. The tenant further alleged that Nagala Karhi Kasampur is not a Mohalla of Meerut city but is a village. In view of these objections of the tenant it was incumbent upon the appellant authority to have recorded specific findings, on the following facts:- (1) that the alleged constructions have been built after the enforcement of the Act, (2) that the constructions have been built by the tenant or any member of his family who was normally residing with him or was wholly dependent upon him, (3) that the constructions raised formed a residential building, and (4) that the constructions have been raised in the same city, Municipality, Notified Area or Town Area where the tenanted accommodation lies. In the present case the lower appellate authority has not applied its mind to the above questions presumably for the reason that the authority concerned proceeded on the assumption that the finding of the Prescribed Authority with regard to the applicability of Explanation 1 recorded in favour of the landlord was not open to challenge as the same became final on account of no appeal having been filed by the tenant against the said finding. The approach of the learned Judge was wholly erroneous and against law. The appellate authority, on account of affirmation of finding with regard to the applicability of the Explanation has made no comparison of the hardship of the parties. In case the Explanation was held not to be applicable it was necessary for the Courts below to have compared the respective hardships of the parties. 7. LEARNED Counsel for the respondents Sri V. K. Goel vehemently argued that where the Explanation 1 aforesaid applies the tenant cannot contest the application of the landlord. . He placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Kama Devi Jain v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1984 (2) ARC 245, which approved the view taken in Kailash Chandra and others v. IIIrd Additional District Judge and others, 1997 U. P. R. C. C. 211 : 1997 (2) JCLR 244 (All ). The same view has now been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Sudha Agarwal v. Xth A. DJ. , Varanasi, 1999 (37) ALR 110 (SC) and Full Bench Rent Cases 400. In the said decision it has been observed: "a perusal of Section 21 (l) (a) shows that a landlord can succeed in his application for eviction of a tenant if he establishes-before the Prescribed Authority that his need for the premises is bona fide. Fourth proviso of Section 21 (1) provides that the Prescribed Authority, while considering the bona fide requirement of, the landlord has also lo take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application excepting in case provided for in Explanation (i). Explanation (i) provides that where the tenant or any member of his family who is normally residing with him or wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant stale or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained. The aforesaid provisions extracted above show that in cases where Explanation (i) is applicable no presumption can be raised with regard to the need of the landlord as bona fide. The aforesaid provisions extracted above show that in cases where Explanation (i) is applicable no presumption can be raised with regard to the need of the landlord as bona fide. The only effect of application of Explanation (i) is that the tenant is not entitled to contest the application filed by the landlord and the Prescribed Authority is not required to compare the hardship of the landlord with that of the tenant which he otherwise required to do under fourth proviso of Section 21 (1) of the Act. We have noticed earlier that the landlord can get an order of release in his favour only when he proves his need as bona fide before the Prescribed Authority. It is no doubt true that the application of landlord is uncontested as the tenant is out of field, still the landlord has to establish his bona fide need. In fact the landlord is required to stand on his own legs and he cannot derive any advantage of absence of defence of the tenant. The proceedings before the Prescribed Authority is like a uncontested suit, where there is no defence of the defendant. In such a suit plaintiff in order to get decree must prove his case to the satisfaction of the Court. Applying the said principle to the present case, we have no doubt in our mind that, by application of Explanation (i) the landlord is not discharged from the burden of proving his need as bona fide. Further, we also do not find any provision in the Act creating any presumption in favour of the landlord as regard his need as bona fide. " 8. FOR the reasons assigned above, the order of the appellate authority dated 27-7-1994 is set aside and the case is remanded to the appellate authority for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in light of observations made above. It is however, made clear that if on examination of record the appellate authority comes to the conclusion that Explanation I to Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act is applicable, the finding already recorded on the question of bona fide need, in favour of the landlord shall not be touched by the Appellate Court. It is however, made clear that if on examination of record the appellate authority comes to the conclusion that Explanation I to Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act is applicable, the finding already recorded on the question of bona fide need, in favour of the landlord shall not be touched by the Appellate Court. If on the other hand the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that Explanation aforesaid is not applicable to the facts of the present case, the appellate authority shall examine afresh both the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardship in the light of the evidence adduced by the parties including subsequent events, if any. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the appellate authority dated 27-7-1994 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Appellate Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above in the body of this judgment. Since the matter has already become old the appellate authority is directed to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.