JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---Heard learned Counsel for the parties. This is an application for bail by Modaram J. Purohit, Original Accused No. 2, who was tried along with six others by the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, in N.D.P.S. Special Case No. 7/95 and 2/96 and convicted and sentenced in the manner stated hereinafter: (i) under section 8(c) read with section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, N.D.P.S. Act) to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- in default to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment (for being found in possession of 1.500 Kg. of Mandrex tablets on 12-11-1994 at 4.40 p.m.); and (ii) under section 8(c) read with section 22 of the N.D.P.S. Act to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment (for being found in possession of 86 Kgs. and 250 Gramas of Mandrex tablets in pursuance of conspiracy with Original Accused No. 6). 2. According to the prosecution, on 12-11-1994 at 10.00 a.m. D.C.P., Narcotics Branch, received information from an informer that a gang of drug traffickers, of which the applicant and one Ashok Kumar Jain (Original Accused No. 1) were also members, was indulging in drug trafficking and was likely to deliver Mandrex tablets to its customers near Abhudaya Bank Building, Jungal-Mangal Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai, between 3.45 to 4.15 p.m. the same day. On the said information the police party, in three vehicles, reached the Junction of the Jungal-Mangal Road. At about 3.55 P.M., two persons came on foot and stood near the Abhudaya Bank Building. They were carrying plastic bags in their hands. The informer pointed them out as the applicant and Ashok Kumar Jain. On being searched, from the possession of both of them, two Polyethylene bags, each containing 750 Grams of Mandrex tablets were recovered. Subsequently, the applicant and Ashok Kumar Jain were interrogated. The applicant led the Police to Shop No. 3 in Jagruti Bharat Darshan Building, Jungal-Mangal Road, Bhandup (West), Mumbai. He opened the shutter of the shop with keys and on his pointing out, 5 gunny bags, each containing 23 bags of Mandrex tablets and weighing 750 Grams were recovered. Thus the total quantity of the Mandrex tablets recovered was 86 Kgs. and 250 Grams. He opened the shutter of the shop with keys and on his pointing out, 5 gunny bags, each containing 23 bags of Mandrex tablets and weighing 750 Grams were recovered. Thus the total quantity of the Mandrex tablets recovered was 86 Kgs. and 250 Grams. It is said that some incriminating documents were also recovered from the applicant. The said recoveries are the basis of conviction of the applicant on the twin counts mentioned above. 3. The applicant and Ashok Kumar Jain were put up for trial along with 5-6 others. While the applicant and Ashok Kumar Jain were convicted, the five others, were acquitted. 4. Mr. C. K. Dave, learned Counsel for the applicant, strenuously claimed bail for the applicant, on the solitary ground that since on the date of the incident, the applicant was below 18 years of age, in view of the provisions contained in section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act, there was a mandatory obligation on the part of the learned trial Judge to have granted him the benefit of the provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Mr. Dave urged that the xerox copy of the School Certificate filed by the applicant in the trial Court shows that he was born on 25th February, 1977 and since the incident took place on 12th November, 1994, he was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. Mr. Dave also urged that the learned trial Judge erred in observing that the applicant, in his statement under section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure had not stated that he was below 18 years of age. Mr. Dave urged that the learned trial Judge erred in not holding that the applicant was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident and in not giving him the benefit of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. To lend weight to his submission, Mr. Dave placed reliance on four decisions of the Supreme Court , a Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court and the Criminal Manual. To lend weight to his submission, Mr. Dave placed reliance on four decisions of the Supreme Court , a Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court and the Criminal Manual. The said decisions are: (i) A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 444, (Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab)1, (ii) A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2566 (Musakhan v. State of Maharashtra)2 (iii) A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 964 (Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal)3 (iv) (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 720 (Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar)4 and (v) 1996 Criminal Law Journal 1263 (Rakesh alias Dure Thakkar v. State of Gujarat)5. Some decisions were also cited by Mrs. J. S. Pawar learned Additional Public Prosecutor, who urged that the trial Judge has given valid reasons for refusing probation. 5. Before we advert to the authorities cited by learned Counsel for the parties, it would be pertinent to peruse the provisions of section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act and section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act reads thus: "33. Application of section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.--Nothing contained in section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless such person is under eighteen years of age or that the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under section 26 or section 27." Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 reads thus: "6. Restriction on imprisonment of offenders under twenty one years of age. --(1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life) the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so. ...... ...." 6. ...... ...." 6. A perusal of section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act, would show that the provisions contained in section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure and Probation of Offenders Act, would only apply to a person convicted under the N.D.P.S. Act, if (i) such person is under 18 years of age, or (ii) the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under section 26 or section 27 of the N.D.P.S. Act. In our view, the provisions contained in section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act cannot be construed to mean, as was urged by Mr. Dave, that persons falling in (i) and (ii) have mandatorily to be given the benefit of this provision. In our judgment, the provisions contained in section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, do not provide, as was sought to be urged by Mr. Dave, that if a person is below 21 years of age and has not committed an offence punishable with imprisonment for life, he shall be extended the benefit of probation. We feel that a perusal of the said provision shows that if a person is below 21 years of age, and is not found guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life, the Court would ordinarily extend to him the benefit of probation, unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and his character, that it would not be desirable to extend to him the benefit of probation. In other words, the considerations that a person is below 21 years of age at the time of the incident, and the offence committed by him is not punishable with life imprisonment, are not alone relevant for considering the question whether the benefit of probation should be given or not. The relevant considerations, apart from them, would include the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. 7. So far as the circumstances of the present case and the nature of the offence are concerned, they are reprehensible. The quantity of the Mandrex tablets recovered from the possession of the applicant and those on his pointing out shows that the applicant, in an organised way was committing offences under the N.D.P.S. Act. 7. So far as the circumstances of the present case and the nature of the offence are concerned, they are reprehensible. The quantity of the Mandrex tablets recovered from the possession of the applicant and those on his pointing out shows that the applicant, in an organised way was committing offences under the N.D.P.S. Act. In such a situation, even assuming that the applicant was below 21 years of age at the time of commission of offence and the offence committed by him is not punishable with imprisonment for life, he would not be entitled for the benefit of the provisions of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Laymen, invariably, and men of law often, presume that if an offence is not punishable with life imprisonment and the person found guilty is below 21 years of age, extending him the benefit of probation is a mandatory legal requirement. It is not so, in view of the other considerations mentioned in section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to which we have referred to above. In this connection, it would be necessary to refer to a Division Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, reported in 1981 Criminal Law Journal 260 (Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana)6, cited by Mrs. Pawar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, wherein the question of granting benefit of the provisions of section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, was in issue in a case under the Indian Opium Act, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed in paragraph 8 that the large scale recovery of opium raises an irresistible inference that the offender is a part and parcel of an organised racket." In para 16 of the said decision, the Court held that the large recovery of opium from a convicted accused person would be a special reason within the meaning of section 361 of the Code for declining the benefit of probation to him under section 360, Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Probation of Offenders Act. 8. We would be failing in fairness if we do not advert to the authorities cited by the applicant's Counsel. 8. We would be failing in fairness if we do not advert to the authorities cited by the applicant's Counsel. We would begin with A.I.R 1965 Supreme Court 444 Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, which in the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant mandatorily lays down that if an accused person is held guilty of an offence which is not punishable with life imprisonment or death, and is below 21 years of age, he has to be granted probation. We have gone through the said authority and are constrained to observe that this is not the ratio laid down in the said authority. In paragraph I.K. Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) has observed that in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment, unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under sections 3 and 4 of the Act." A perusal of the said passage would show that it is not the age factor alone, but the circumstances of the given case and the nature of the offence, which are also relevant to decide whether in a given case the benefit of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should be extended to an accused. We now take up the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2566, Musakhan v. State of Mahrashtra, and A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 964 Bishnu Deo Shaw v. State of West Bengal. A perusal of para 7 of the former authority would show that the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the accused for the offence under sections 395/149 of the Indian Penal Code and found that only an offence under section 425 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, was made out against the accused. In that background, bearing in mind that the accused was aged about 20 years, the Supreme Court granted him the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act. In the latter authority Bishnu Deo Shah v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 964, the issue before the Supreme Court was not the one which is before us in this case. In the latter authority Bishnu Deo Shah v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 964, the issue before the Supreme Court was not the one which is before us in this case. In the said authority, the accused had murdered his own son and was sentenced to death. His death sentence had been confirmed by the High Court. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the death sentence was the proper sentence or one of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court converted the sentence of death to one of life imprisonment. Coming to 1997(8) Supreme Court Cases Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, we find that this authority only lays down that the estimate of age given by the accused in the trial Court should not be disturbed in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary. So far as the Division Bench authority of Gujarat High Court, reported in 1996 Criminal Law Journal 1263 Rakesh alias Dure Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, is concerned, the Gujarat High Court has not expressly held, as was sought to be urged by Mr. Dave, that under section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the Court is bound to grant the benefit of probation to a person who was below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. At any rate, if this appears to be the implied ratio of the authority, as urged by Mr. Dave, we are not in agreement with it. Finally, the learned Counsel for the applicant showed us the Criminal Manual regarding the manner in which the age of a person is to be ascertained for deciding the question whether he is entitled to the benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act. We have proceeded on the premise that even if the applicant is below 18 years of age, it would make no difference. Therefore, the Manual hardly advances his case any further. 9. No other point was canvassed before us by the learned Counsel for the applicant. 10. On a totality of the circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that even if the applicant is assumed to be below 18 years of age, he had no mandatory right under section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act and section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, for being granted probation. Consequently, we reject this application. 10. On a totality of the circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that even if the applicant is assumed to be below 18 years of age, he had no mandatory right under section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act and section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, for being granted probation. Consequently, we reject this application. The observations made in this Order are only limited to the disposal of this application. In case, an application for a certified copy of this Order is made by Counsel for the parties, it shall be issued on expedited basis. Application rejected. *****