Judgment R.A.Sharm, J. 1. urga Prasad, who was driver of the vehicle WBQ 9491, was murdered on 6.5.1982 by some antisocial elements while he was transporting diesel from Dhanbad to Bokaro. The dependants of the deceased driver filed application under the Workmens Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Compensation Act) seeking compensation from both the owner and the insurer of the vehicle which was registered as W.C.C. No. 24 of 1982. The Labour Court, vide order dated 22.11.1985, upheld their claim and awarded them Rs. 27,000/- as compensation holding both the owner and the insurer of the vehicle jointly liable for payment of compensation. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Labour Court, the Insurance Company filed a writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 1073 of 1986R, which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 24th September, 1997. Still not satisfied, the Insurance Company has filed this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenging the judgment of the Teamed Single Judge. 2. The sole submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the insurer of the vehicle is not liable to pay compensation for the death of the driver in the course of his employment caused by some criminals because there is neither any relationship of master and servant between the insurer and the deceased, nor was the deceased driver a party to the contract of insurance and it is the sole responsibility of the employer to pay compensation to the deceaseds heirs and legal representatives. In this support, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment dated 15.7.1997 of a learned Single Judge of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors., C.W.J.C. No. 10687/1986(R). In this connection, the learned counsel further submitted that if the learned Single Judge, in the instant case, wanted to take a view different from that taken in the said writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 1068/86R, he was duty bound to refer the matter to the larger Bench and it was not open to him to decide it himself ignoring the judgment of the Bench of a co-rdinate jurisdiction. 3. 3. It is true that in C.W.J.C. No. 1068/86R (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a workman is killed while on duty by anti-social elements, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation in terms of the policy of insurance. It is also true that the question raised in the writ petition, which has given rise to this appeal, was also the same. We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that under the circumstances the matter should have been referred to the larger Bench by the learned Single Judge instead of deciding it himself taking a view contrary to that taken in C.W.J.C. No. 1068/86R. 4. But it is not necessary for us to remand this case to the larned Single Judge for making reference to the larger Bench because we sitting in Division Bench jurisdiction can resolve the controversy. Had the learned Single Judge referred the matter to larger Bench, it would have come up before the Division Bench only. 5. On merit the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Section 95 of the Old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, has laid down requirements of insurance policies and limits of liability. Sub-section (1) of the said section 95 along with its proviso, which are reproduced below, have provided for compulsory coverage of liability incurred under the Compensation Act by the employer vis-a-vis his employees in the event of their death or bodily injury by the use of motor vehicles in the course of their employment : 95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society allowed under section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets in the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or ..." Provisions of sub-section (1) of section 147 along with proviso of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , are in pari materia with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 95 and the proviso appended thereto of the old Act. 6. The Apex Court in Ved Prakash Garg vs. Premi Devi & ors. [ (1997) 8 SCC 1 ], while considering the provisions of section 147 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, has laid down that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation along with interest under the Compensation Act in the event of death or bodily njury to the workman in the course of his smployment. [ (1997) 8 SCC 1 ], while considering the provisions of section 147 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, has laid down that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation along with interest under the Compensation Act in the event of death or bodily njury to the workman in the course of his smployment. The relevant extracts from he decision of the Apex Court are eproduced below : "12. ... Sub-clause (b) of Section 147(1) read with the proviso lays down a statutory scheme of compulsory coverage of liability incurred by the employer vis-a-vis his employees when they sustain injuries by the use of motor vehicles during their employment and on account of motor accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. But the statutory coverage for such liability would be limited to the extent of liability of the insured employer arising under the Workmens Compensation Act in respect of death or bodily injury to such employees. ..." xxx "14. ... On the aforesaid interpretation of these two statutory schemes, therefore, the conclusion becomes inevitable that when an employee suffers from a motor accident injury while on duty on the motor vehicle belonging to the insured employer, the claim for compensation payable under the Compensation Act along with interest thereon, if any, as imposed by the Commissioner, Sections 3 and 4-A (3) (a) of the Compensation Act will have to be made good by the insurance company jointly with the insured employer. But so far as the amount of penalty imposed on the insured employer under contingencies contemplated by Section 4-A(3)(b) is concerned as that is on account of personal fault of the insured not backed up any justifiable cause, the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse that part of the penalty amount imposed on the employer. The latter because of his own fault and negligence will have to bear the entire burden of the said penalty amount with proportionate interest thereon if imposed by the Workmens Commissioner." xxx "19.... In other words the insurance company will be liable to meet the claim for compenation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmens Commissioner under the Compensation Act on the conjoint operation of Section 3 and Section 4-A sub-section (3) (a) of the Compensation Act. In other words the insurance company will be liable to meet the claim for compenation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmens Commissioner under the Compensation Act on the conjoint operation of Section 3 and Section 4-A sub-section (3) (a) of the Compensation Act. ..." As regards charging of interest the Apex Court has laid down that it is automatic which ipso facto follows if the employer has failed to pay compensation within due time. But so far as penalty on account of non-payment of compensation within time is concerned, the Apex Court has held that it is liable to be paid by the employer and not by the insurance company. 7. In the instant case, in paragraph 15 of the judgment the learned Single Judge has recorded the following findings, while dealing with the liability of the insurance company : "15. Mr. Jha, learned counsel, very fairly submitted that the vehicle was insured with the petitioner-insurance company and the liability of the driver and the cleaner was covered on payment of additional premium by the owner of the vehicle. The learned counsel also produced before me a copy of the insurance policy from perusal of which it is evident that the petitioner-insurance company under took the risk of the driver and the cleaner as provided under the Workmens Compensation Act. In that view of the matter, I am of the definite opinion that whatever compensation was awarded by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, the employer and/or the insurance company are liable to pay the same to the claimants." No exception can be taken to the said finding of the learned Single Judge. 8 In view of the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ved Prakash Garg (supra), the judgment dated 15.7.97 of the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 1068/86R does not lay down the correct law and is accordingly overruled. The law laid down by the learned Single Judge in the instant case represents the correct legal position and is accordingly approved. 9. The labour court on 22.11.85, while allowing the claim petition of the dependants of the deceased-driver, has directed that the payment of compensation amounting to Rs. The law laid down by the learned Single Judge in the instant case represents the correct legal position and is accordingly approved. 9. The labour court on 22.11.85, while allowing the claim petition of the dependants of the deceased-driver, has directed that the payment of compensation amounting to Rs. 27,000/- shall be made to them "within two months from the date of this order failing which the learned Workmens Compensation Commissioner may impose an interest on the principal amount as per law with effect from the date of this order till the payment is made." 10. Neither the employer, nor the insurance company paid the said amount of compensation to the claimants within the time specified by the labour court. Instead the Insurance Company filed the writ petition on 11.8.86 challenging the said order of the labour court. On 14.8.86 the learned counsel for the insurance company made a statement before this Court saying that the amount decreed by the labour court shall be deposited in this Court on 21st. August, 1986. The order dated 14.8.86 is reproduced below : "2/14.8.86 Learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri B. K. Dey states that the total decreetal amount as granted by the Labour Court would be deposited in this Court by 21st of August, 1986. Let the money be deposited on 21.8.86 and the application be listed again for admission on 22nd August, 1986, as prayed by the learned Counsel." The Insurance Company deposited the said amount in this Court on 25.8.86 and it has remained in deposit during the pendency of the writ petition. After the writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment on 24th. September, 1997, an order was passed by this Court on 4.3.98 permitting the claimants to withdraw the said amount deposited by the Insurance Company in this Court. The record shows that on 11.3.98 a sum of Rs. 27,000/- has been refunded. 11. The fact remains that the amount as awarded by the labour court was never paid by the employer or the Insurance Company to the claimants within time. The deposit of the amount awarded as compensation in this Court or in some Bank will not absolve the employer and the Insurance Company from paying the interest in view of the mandatory provisions of section 4-A of the Act. The deposit of the amount awarded as compensation in this Court or in some Bank will not absolve the employer and the Insurance Company from paying the interest in view of the mandatory provisions of section 4-A of the Act. Interest is a statutory consequence which follows automatically once the compensation awarded is not paid within due time and such a consequence cannot be avoided by depositing the amount of compensation in the court. 12. In this connection, it may also be mentioned that this Court on 14.8.86 recorded the statement of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company regarding deposit of the amount awarded in this Court. It was, in fact, not a stay order, staying the operation of the order of the labour court. But presuming thai there was a stay order, on account of which the employer or the insurance company did not pay the amount of compensation awarded by the labour court to the claimants, once the writ petition was dismissed, the stay order becomes nonesl and the liability of the Insurance Company to pay interest has to be enforced with retrospective effect. In this regard, reference may be made to Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. [ (1997) 5 SCC 772 ] wherein the Apex Court has laid down as under : "It is equally well settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the court. Any other view would result in the act or order of the court prejudicing a party (Board in this case) for no fault of its and would also mean rewarding a writ petitioner inspite of his failure. We do not think that any such unjust consequence can be countenanced by the courts. ..." 13. It is, therefore, our duty "to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the Court". We do not think that any such unjust consequence can be countenanced by the courts. ..." 13. It is, therefore, our duty "to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the Court". The Insurance Company has to pay interest to the claimants in terms of the section 4-A at the rate specified therein for the period from the date the compensation amount became due till the date it was paid to the claimants. 14. We, therefore, direct the lnsurnace Company (appellant) to file the certified copy of this judgment before the Compensation Commissioner for calculating the interest in terms of section 4-A (3) for the aforementioned period who will determine the same within two months from the date of production of the certified copy of the judgment. The amount so determined shall be deposited by the Insurance Company (appellant) within a month with the said Commissioner who will pay the same to the claimants on proper verification within another month. 15. We also direct the Registry to send forthwith the copy of this judgment to the Compensation Commissioner for compliance. 16. It is unfortunate that although the bread-earner of the claimants died in 1982 and the labour court awarded compensation on 22.11.85 but the same has not been paid to the claimants during all these years. We do not know whether it has now been paid to them. We, therefore, direct the Compensation Commissioner to find out from the claimants whether they have received the compensation and if so, on what date. We also give liberty to the Compensation Commissioner to initiate penalty proceedings against the employer. 17. With the above observations/directions, this appeal is dismissed. A.K.Prasad, J. 18 I agree.