Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein challenges the detention of his son C. Rajendran ordered by the District Collector and District Magistrate, Dindigul by his order dated 7-4-1998 dubbing him as a Goonda under the provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-Grabbers Act, 1982, hereinafter called as Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. The Detaining Authority has relied upon six adverse cases and one ground case, the incident in which has occurred on 29-3-1998. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the representation sent by the petitioner was not expeditiously considered and the delay in consideration has remained unexplained. The learned Counsel pointed out that the representation dated nil was sent somewhere before 20th May, 1998, while the detenu for the first time came to know about the fate of the detention only on 26-6-1998. The Public Prosecutor, however, sought to explain this period as below- According to him, the representation was received by the State Government on 20th May, 1998. The comments were received by the Detaining Authority and were dispatched to the State Government and the State Government received the same on with May, 1998. The State Government then considered this representation as the Under Secretary and the Joint Secretary worked on this representation on 21-5-1998, 22-5-1998 and 23-5-1998 and ultimately the representation was rejected by the Honourable Minister on 30th May, 1998 and the intimation of the rejection was however: sent on 26-6-1998. According to the Public Prosecutor, these dates would suggest that the representation was expeditiously considered. According to the public Prosecutor, there is no unexplained delay. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even after the rejection of the representation, there is no expeditious communication of the same to the detenu and the detenu came to know about the rejection only after several days. According to the learned counsel, the communication in hopelessly delayed. ( 3 ) THERE can be no doubt from the above factual panorama that though the representation was tried to be considered expeditiously, yet for some unknown reasons, it remained in the cold storage and the result thereof was not communicated to the detenu for a considerable period. According to the learned counsel, the communication in hopelessly delayed. ( 3 ) THERE can be no doubt from the above factual panorama that though the representation was tried to be considered expeditiously, yet for some unknown reasons, it remained in the cold storage and the result thereof was not communicated to the detenu for a considerable period. There is absolutely no explanation in so far as this delay is concerned. The law is settled that Article 22 (5) of the Constitution guarantees the detenu an earliest opportunity of making representation against the order. The said guarantee would also include the expeditious consideration. However the question is as to whether the said guarantee would also include expeditious communication of the result of the representation of the detenu. In our opinion the representation should not only be considered expeditiously but the result thereof has also to be intimated to the detenu. If the representation is decided upon and the detenu is not informed about the same, he would be in a state of suspended animation and would obviously not be able to decide upon the further course to be taken like making a fresh representation on the fresh grounds the guarantee given by Article 22 (5) of the expeditious consideration of the representation would remain an empty formality if the State Government is not required to intimate the-result of the rejection of the representation in a reasonable time, although what would be the reasonable time may differ from case to case depending upon the factual circumstances. The Apex Court has taken a view in its celebrated case reported in Harish Pahwa v. State of Uttar Pradesh that a representation made by the detenu has to be considered without are delay and the administrative delay in calling comments from the other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation without being attended to cannot be brooked. In the same strength, the Apex Court says in paragraph 3 as follows: We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representation of the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it. is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. T It would be, therefore, clear that the stage of communication is also an integral and unseparable stage in consideration of the representation. ( 4 ) THIS Court has also taken the view that non-explanation for the delay in intimating the fact of disposal to the detenu would also result in rendering the further detention invalid in Chinnasamy Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another. The learned Public Prosecutor relied upon the reported decision in D. S. Roy v. State of West Bengal, where the Apex Court was considering the question of delay in communication of the fact of confirmation of the detention by opinion of the Advisory Board. The learned Public Prosecutor particularly invited our attention to the observations made in paragraph 12 to the following effect: While the decision of the Government to confirm the opinion of the Board which according to the decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar, ( AIR 1952 SC 181 ) has the effect of extending the period of detention beyond three months is in consonance with the tenor of the Act as well as the provisions of the Constitution there is nothing to warrant the submission that the order of confirmation and extension of the period of his detention should also be within three months from the date of detention. Nonetheless the communication must be within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case. The effect of non-communication however may be an irregularity which does not make the detention otherwise legal illegal. (emphasis supplied) The learned Public Prosecutor very heavily relies on the last sentence viz, the effect of non- communication is an irregularity which does not make the detention otherwise legal illegal. We are afraid that these observations are being read without context. It will be seen that in the reported decision the question was relating to the stage of confirmation of the detention after the Advisory Board had given its opinion. The question did not pertain to the constitutional guarantee given by Article 22 (5) of the expeditious opportunity to make the representations and its expeditious consideration. The learned Public Prosecutor argues that what applies to the confirmation must also apply to the representation. The question did not pertain to the constitutional guarantee given by Article 22 (5) of the expeditious opportunity to make the representations and its expeditious consideration. The learned Public Prosecutor argues that what applies to the confirmation must also apply to the representation. In our opinion the argument is incorrect. While confirmation is a, power under the provisions of the Act of the State the consideration of the representation expeditiously is its duty as against the right guaranteed to the detenu. Section 12 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 gives that power to the State Government. The language suggests that the State Government after the report of the Advisory Board supporting the detention may, confirm the detention order meaning thereby that the State Government even in cases where the Advisory Board has nodded the detention may choose not to confirm the detention. Thus the act of confirmation and the act of consideration of the representation are distinct stages by themselves. The argument to the effect that what applies to the confirmation should also apply to the consideration must necessarily fail on this logic. It cannot be forgotten that earlier in this very paragraph 12 the Apex Court observed thus: Though there is no provision in the Act an order of confirmation which has the effect of extending the period of detention beyond the mandatory period of three months must be made known to the detenu. In our view there is no warrant or justification for an order confirming the detention on the opinion of the Board which has the effect of extending the period of detention remaining in the files of the executive without the same being communicated to the person most concerned the detenu - whose freedom has been subjected to jeopardy. He is entitled to know that the Board had considered his representation as well as his personal submissions if he has chose to appear before-it and that it had been found that there was sufficient cause for his detention and that the State Government had agreed with it. Though these observations suggest the importance of confirmation order they sufficiently highlight the necessity of the orders being made known to the detenu. The ruling and the emphasised phraseology should apply only to the communication of confirmation of detention and not to the result of the representation. Though these observations suggest the importance of confirmation order they sufficiently highlight the necessity of the orders being made known to the detenu. The ruling and the emphasised phraseology should apply only to the communication of confirmation of detention and not to the result of the representation. ( 5 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor also referred to the decision reported in Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B. B. Gujral and others. However, we find that the factual panorama in this ruling is entirely different. This case is, therefore of no assistance to the learned Public Prosecutor. ( 6 ) IN the result it must be held that there was a totally unreasonable delay in communicating the result of the representation. There is even no explanation as to why the matter remained with the Honourable Minister between 25th May, 1998 and 30th May, 1998. However even if that delay is considered to be trivial yet the delay in communicating the order is huge and, remains unexplained with the result the detention would itself become invalid. The petition therefore succeeds and the detenu shall be released forthwith unless otherwise he is required in any other matter. Petition allowed.