Order.- The main point urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the offence with which the petitioner was charged being one falling under section 498, Indian Penal Code, the cognizance of it could have been taken only on a complaint made to a Court by the husband P.W.2 under section 199, Criminal Procedure Code and that since no such complaint was made in this case the conviction of the petitioner is bad in law. The facts of the case shortly are: P.W. 1 Muthulakshmi was married to P.W.2 Kumaravelu and they lived with P.W. 1’s parents P.Ws.3 and 4 and her brother in one of the houses of the accused situate in a compound in the Scott Road, Madurai. The accused lived in the same compound in another house with his wife. But the wife is said to have left him due to quarrels some six months prior to the occurrence. The prosecution case is that one day in March, 1962 at about 9-30 a.m., the accused called P.W. 1 to his house when her husband was in the Veterinary Hospital where he was employed, her mother was away from the house and her brother’s wife was in the kitchen and induced her to go with him on a short trip to Vaigai Dam and Rameswaram and on his inducement and threats she removed her jewels, left them in the house and met his near the river where the accused was waiting for her. Then he took her to a hotel in Palanganatham from there to a friend’s house in Andalpuram and thence to Thiruppurankundram where they stayed in a Mandapam for the night and the next day and left Thiruppurankundram by the night bus on 30th March, 1962 and went to Madurai. As they were proceeding to East Madurai Railway Station late that night avoiding light and keeping to the dark side, P.W.8 the Sub-Inspector of Police on patrol duty in the Station on suspicion, arrested them at 2-30 a.m. on 31st March, 1962, took them to B-2 Police Station and after registering a case under section 54, Criminal Procedure Code contacted P.W. 10 the Sub-Inspector of Police, B-4 Police Station. Meanwhile, P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, and others who were on search for P.W. 1 came to know that the accused too was not in his house. Meanwhile, P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, and others who were on search for P.W. 1 came to know that the accused too was not in his house. P.W. 2 therefore made a complaint as per Exhibit P-1 on 30th March, 1962 at about 5 p.m. and on the communication received from B-2 Police Station regarding the arrest of the accused, P.W. 10 investigated the case and charge-sheeted the accused under section 363, Indian Penal Code. Both the trial Magistrate and the appellate Court have found that the accused is culpable for an offence under section 363, Indian Penal Code. It has been found on medical evidence that P.W. 1 is a woman below 18 years of age As a married woman she was under the legal guardianship of P.W. 2 and action in this case, as I have already indicated, was taken on a complaint made to the police by P.W. 2. The offence of kidnapping punishable under section 363, Indian Penal Code is defined in section 361, Indian Penal Code. Whoever takes or entices a minor under 18 years of age, if a female out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor without the consent of such guardian is said to kidnap such minor from lawful guardianship. The facts proved thus bring the case under the ambit of section 361, Indian Penal Code punishable under section 363, Indian Penal Code. P.W. 1 being a married woman the offence could also be legitimately brought under section 498, Indian Penal Code which defines the offence under the said section thus: “Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that man, or from any person having the care of her on behalf of that man with intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person or conceals or detains with that intent any such woman, shall be punished......................” This is a lesser offence and by virtue of section 199, Criminal Procedure Code no Court can take cognizance of it except on a complaint made by the husband of the woman. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that on the facts of this case, section 199, Criminal Procedure Code being a bar to the proceedings, the whole proceeding and the conviction under section 363 are illegal. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that on the facts of this case, section 199, Criminal Procedure Code being a bar to the proceedings, the whole proceeding and the conviction under section 363 are illegal. I am afraid that the stand taken by the learned trial Magistrate having taken cognizance of the case under section 363, Indian Penal Code nothing precluded him from proceeding with it according to law; so that if the evidence justified a conviction of the offence as charged it was not open to him to avoid a conviction because the offence as made out before him fell under another section of the Code which required a complaint before a Court. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) justify such conviction. The case in In re Ravannappa Reddi1, does not apply to the facts as in that case the Court took cognizance of the case for offence mentioned in the complaint which however did not include any offence under section 476 but ultimately convicted the accused under sections 467 and 109, Indian Penal Code for which there was no legal complaint at all. The learned Judges held that this was much more than an irregularity and could not be cured under section 537, Indian Penal Code. There is nothing in law to bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and this principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal2. The matter has been placid beyond all doubt by the Supreme Court in Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar3. In that case there was obstruction offered to the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes by snatching from his hands a book of account which he was inspecting. This was an offence punishable under section 26 (1) (h)of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and a prosecution could be launched only with the previous sanction of the Court. The appellant was however prosecuted under section 353, Indian Penal Code. It was contended that the only offence which the appellant had committed was under section 26 (1) (h) of the Act and that as no previous sanction was obtained for launching the prosecution the Magistrate was precluded by the provisions of sub-section. (2) of section 26 from taking cognizance of the alleged offence. It was contended that the only offence which the appellant had committed was under section 26 (1) (h) of the Act and that as no previous sanction was obtained for launching the prosecution the Magistrate was precluded by the provisions of sub-section. (2) of section 26 from taking cognizance of the alleged offence. The contention was over-ruled by the Supreme Court for the reason that appellant was not being proceeded against under section 26 (1) (h)but for an offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code and dealing with the contention that the object of the prosecution was, to get round provisions of sub-section (2) of the section 26 His Lordship Mudholkar, J., who spoke for the Bench observed: The suggestion apparently is that the prosecution of the appellant for the offence under section 353 is merely colourable. Whether Mr. Singh was obstructed while making an inspection of the account books or while he was intending to seize them the Court’s sanction would certainly have been required under sub-section (2) if in fact the appellant was prosecuted specifically for obstructing Mr. Singh. He could have been prosecuted for these offences even without proof of the fact that he had used criminal force. From the facts it would no doubt appear that the appellant has committed an offence under section 26(1)(h) of the Act as also under section 353, Indian Penal Code, because he had used criminal force. He could be prosecuted for either or both the offences and the prosecution was restricted to the offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code only to obviate the necessity of obtaining the Court’s sanction. Even so the prosecution cannot be said to have done something which is unwarranted by law. In choosing toprosecute the appellant for a grave offence under the general law the prosecution cannot be regarded as having acted colourably". With great respect the principle behind the above reasoning applied to the present case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then relied on Chinnayya Goundan v. Emperor1. In choosing toprosecute the appellant for a grave offence under the general law the prosecution cannot be regarded as having acted colourably". With great respect the principle behind the above reasoning applied to the present case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then relied on Chinnayya Goundan v. Emperor1. Govinda Menon, J., has laid down in this case, that the Court is not entitled to disregard some of the facts in a complaint and try an accused person for an offence which the remaining facts disclose and that considering the facts as a whole if they disclose an offence for which a special complaint is necessary under section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, a Court cannot take cognizance of the case. The present however is a case where the Court had already taken cognizance of the case under section 363, Indian Penal Code. The question to be considered is not whether taking cognizance of the case itself was wrong but whether when the facts disclose an offence under two sections of the Penal Code, conviction under one of the sections is tenable. On that point I have no hesitation to give an answer in the affirmative on the authorities already noticed by me. There is therefore no substance in the contention raised for the petitioner. This petition has accordingly to fail ; nor am I satisfied that the sentence imposed on the petitioner calls for interference. This petition is therefore dismissed. V.S. ------ Petition dismissed.