Order The petitioner which used to be a consumer of electricity under H.T. Agreement seeks to challenge a bill raised by the Bihar State Electricity Board on 25.6.1997 (at Annexure 1) in so far as charges are levied for the period beyond 8.12.1996. From the impugned bill it is evident that it includes charges upto August 1997 on the basis that it was then that the agreement for the supply of electricity entered between the Board and the petitioner was determined. According to the case of the petitioner the determination of the agreement took place on 8.12.1996 on expiry of one year from the date of the notice dated 9.12.1995 and any levy of charges beyond that date, therefore, would be wholly unsustainable. 2. The provision concerning determination of Agreement is contained in clause 9 of the Agreement which is as follows : "9. The consumer shall not be at liberty to determine this Agreement, before the expiration of three years from the date of commencement of the supply of energy. The consumer may determine this agreement at any time after the said period on giving to the Board not less than twelve calendar month previous notice in writing in that behalf and upon the expiration of the period of such notice this agreement shall cease and determine without prejudice to any right which may then have accrued to the Board hereunder provided always that the consumer may at any time with the previous consent of the Board transfer and assign this Agreement to any other person and upon subscription of such transfer this Agreement shall be binding on the transferor and Board and. take effect in all respect as if the transferor had originally been a party hereto in place of the consumer who shall thenceforth be discharged from all liability under or in respect thereof.” (emphasis added) 3. It is not in dispute that the Agreement had remained subsisting for more than three years and, therefore, in order to determine it the consumer was only required to give to the Board twelve months prior notice in writing. 4. It may now be noted that on 9.12.1995 the petitioner wrote a letter to the Electrical Executive Engineer (Urban), Bihar Shariff. A copy of this letter is at Annexure 3. In this letter, the petitioner strongly protested against the interruptions of electrical power supplied to him. 4. It may now be noted that on 9.12.1995 the petitioner wrote a letter to the Electrical Executive Engineer (Urban), Bihar Shariff. A copy of this letter is at Annexure 3. In this letter, the petitioner strongly protested against the interruptions of electrical power supplied to him. It was stated that on account of interruptions in supply the production in the petitioner unit suffered in many ways and the petitioner's losses were becoming unbearable. It was thereafter requested to make arrangement for uninterrupted supply of electricity to the petitioner unit on a planned basis and to apprise the petitioner in that regard. It was further stated that if for any reason the Board was not in a position to do so, then that letter might itself be treated as twelve months notice for determination of the agreement. 5. It appears that about nine months thereafter the Board wrote to the petitioner a letter dated 19.9.1996. In that letter figures were quoted to say that on average 15 hours of power supply was maintained on each day and that it should have been adequate and sufficient for the purpose of the petitioner. Having stated thus, it was said that in that view the petitioner's letter dated 9.12.1995 could not be taken as twelve months notice for determination of the Agreement and in case the petitioner still wanted to determine the agreement, it should give a fresh 12 months notice under registered post. 6. There is nothing to indicate that the petitioner accepted the statements made in that letter that 15 hours supply of electricity was sufficient for its purpose or it was satisfied with the assurances given to it and was, therefore, recalling the notice given under a letter dated 9.12.1995. 7. I fail to see why the letter dated 9.12.1995 may not be treated as 12 months notice as stipulated under clause 9 of the Agreement. 8. Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the Board submitted that the letter dated 9.12.1995 was at best a conditional notice. The main emphasis was on improving the supply of electricity failing which it was stated that the letter should be treated as 12 months for determination of the contract. On a plain reading of clause 9 it does not debar giving a conditional notice. The main emphasis was on improving the supply of electricity failing which it was stated that the letter should be treated as 12 months for determination of the contract. On a plain reading of clause 9 it does not debar giving a conditional notice. There is nothing to indicate that the respondent authorities even tried to fulfill the condition that might had led the consumer to revoke or recall the notice. In response to the letter dated 9.12.1995 they unilaterally took the stand that the petitioner was being given supply of electricity that should be sufficient for its needs. What are his needs can be best judged by the consumer himself and it is not for the Board to dictate as to what would be sufficient for the consumer's needs. Taking an extreme position I am prepared to say that even if the consumer makes unreasonable demands and makes it a condition that their non-fulfilment may be treated as twelve months notice for determination of the agreement, I do not see why such a conditional notice should not take effect on expiry of 12 calendar months. 9. I am, therefore, plainly of the view that the letter, dated 9.12.1995 was a sufficient notice in terms of clause 9 of the Agreement and on expiry of the 12 months period on 8.12.1996, the Agreement between the Board and the petitioner stood determined. The Board can, therefore, realise from the petitioner only' its legal dues upto 8.12.96 and not for any period beyond that date. The impugned bill dated 25.6.1997 is accordingly quashed to that extent. It will be open to the Board to make a fresh demand against the petitioner in the light of this judgment and realise its dues in accordance with law. 10. In the result, this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.