Govinda Menon, J.- This is a sad case where a small child aged 1½ years was murdered by the child’s own father on the evening of 24th September, 1959. On that day the accused went to P.W. 1 Abdul Rahman’s shop at Moolankavu Bazaar in Sultan’s Battery to have his children’s hair cut. P. Ws. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are other shop-keepers nearby in the bazaar. After leaving the boys in the shop of P.W. 1, the accused left for his house. He came back soon after with the deceased child and sat on the verandah of the shop with the child. He started abusing the neighbouring shop-keepers. P.W. 3, a Police Constable in uniform was then passing on the road. When the accused saw him, he called him and told him that he was drunk. P.W. 3 came near the accused and questioned him and was told that he had taken arrack. P.W. 3 then asked the accused to accompany him to the Police Station. The accused refused to go. P.W. 3. asked him to give the child to his son P.W. 10. who had by then finished his hair-cutting. The accused scolded the boy and sent him away. P.W. 3 then sent P.W. 10 to fetch the accused’s wife, As soon as P.W. 10 left the place, the accused went inside the shop of P.W. 1 and looked into the mirror to see whether it was time for him to have a shave. After that he got into the verandah with the child. Then he caught hold of the child by its legs and violently hit the child on the floor and threw the child on the read telling P.W. 3 “here is the child, you take it” . The accused again attempted to go and take the child, but P.W. 3 prevented and arrested him with the assistance of P.W. 10. By that time P.W. 11, the wife of the accused also came there. P.Ws. 1 to 7 and 10 witnessed the incident. P.W. 7 went to the Police Station and gave a report Exhibit P-1. The child was unconscious. P.W. 3 took the accused and his wife with the child to the hospital. P.W. 8 examined the child and issued a wound certificate Exhibit P-3. The same night the child succumbed to the injuries. 1 to 7 and 10 witnessed the incident. P.W. 7 went to the Police Station and gave a report Exhibit P-1. The child was unconscious. P.W. 3 took the accused and his wife with the child to the hospital. P.W. 8 examined the child and issued a wound certificate Exhibit P-3. The same night the child succumbed to the injuries. I.W. 14 the Circle Inspector on getting information reached the scene at 7 p.m. The next morning he held the inquest when most of the witnesses were examined. P.W. 9, the Medical Officer of the Government Hospital, Vythiri, conducted the autopsy. Exhibit P-5 is the post mortem certificate. The accused was later kept under medical observation and after the doctor certified that the accused was not showing any signs of insanity he was charge-sheeted. The accused when questioned denied knowledge of what had taken place. There is no dispute that the child died as a result of the injuries. Exhibit P-5 the post mortem certificate reveals the internal injuries sustained by the child. On opening the head the skull bone was found broken into 8 bits with a linear fracture on either side of the frontal bone extending into the parietal bone. The doctor also found multiple linear fractures of the parietal bones with the bones broken into bits extending into the occipital and temporal bones. The brain matter at the seat of these fractures is smashed, soft and pulpy. Doctor says that the inquries were necessarily fatal, and could have been caused by the assailant striking the head of the child on the floor violently holding both its legs. The cause of death is therefore clearly established. It is also amply proved by the disinterested testimony of the eye-witnesses that it was the accused who caused the injuries. As stated already besides the evidence of P.W. 1 in whose shop the incident took place there was the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 6 who had seen the entire incident. Then there is the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 10 who saw a part of the incident. All these witnesses except P.Ws. 3 and 10 are traders carrying on business in the shops very near to the scene of occurrence. The incident took place at about 2-30 p.m. and the evidence shows that the accused was using vulgar language against the shop-keepers. 7 and 10 who saw a part of the incident. All these witnesses except P.Ws. 3 and 10 are traders carrying on business in the shops very near to the scene of occurrence. The incident took place at about 2-30 p.m. and the evidence shows that the accused was using vulgar language against the shop-keepers. This must have afforded an additional reason for the witnesses to direct their attention to the place of the incident. Before the accused actually hit the child there was also the talk between the accused and P.W. 3. So all the people would have closely watched what was transpiring in P.W. 1‘s shop. No attempt has been made to challenge the evidence of any of these witnesses and the only attempt in cross-examination was to make out that he accused was insane. The learned counsel on behalf of the appellant also conceded that he was unable to suggest that the evidence of all these witnesses could in any way be attacked or disputed. There is nothing which shows that these witnesses were unreliable or their evidence is unacceptable. It is therefore clear that it was the appellant who caused the death of the innocent child by striking her against the cement flooring of the verandah of P.W. 1’s shop. The appellant’s plea both in the Sessions Court and in this Court is one based on section 84 of the Penal Code. The burden of proving insanity is cast upon the accused by section 105 of the Evidence Act. The question for determination is whether the appellant has succeeded in proving that when he killed the child he was incapable by reason of unsoundness of mind of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The learned counsel first drew out attention to the fact that there was no motive for the accused to commit the crime. It is well settled that a mere lack of apparent motive for the deed does not necessarily or always lead to an inference of intellectual aberration or insanity. That there was lack of adequate motive in this case is clear . In fact the evidence shows that the deceased was a pet child of the accused. It is well settled that a mere lack of apparent motive for the deed does not necessarily or always lead to an inference of intellectual aberration or insanity. That there was lack of adequate motive in this case is clear . In fact the evidence shows that the deceased was a pet child of the accused. But it is not uncommon to find that the commission of crimes of violence including murder are sometimes committed as a result of the most trivial quarrels. It is stated that if he had any intention to kill the child, he could have achieved his purpose with a lesser degree of violence, but here again experience shows that once an offender has lost control of his temper he gives way unrestrainedly to his passion without any thought for what may or may not be precisely necessary to carry out his intention. No doubt total lack of an apparent motive may in some cases taken along with other facts legitimately give rise to an inference that the act was done under an insane impulse. But no general rule can be applied and the only proper course to adopt is to decide each case on its own peculiar facts bearing in mind that the point for determination is whether the evidence before the Court is sufficient to establish that the person charged with the offence was not conscious of the nature of the act he was doing or that he was doing what was wrong or contrary to law. The learned counsel then referred us to the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses. The gist of their evidence is that the accused was in the habit of talking too much and abusing people whom he did not like. Some of the witnesses say that he was a little eccentric or as they say he was behaving like a crack. Even the evidence of P.W. 11, the accused’s wife only shows that the accused was talking unnecessarily that on some occasions he used to get fits. Even accepting as true all this evidence will not amount to legal insanity. There is distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity. Section 84, Indian Penal Code governs only those cases where cognitive faculties of the accused are completely impaired. Even accepting as true all this evidence will not amount to legal insanity. There is distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity. Section 84, Indian Penal Code governs only those cases where cognitive faculties of the accused are completely impaired. There is no evidence in this case that the accused was of unsound mind at any time prior to the incident. Mere abnormality of the mind is not an excuse for the commissionof crimes. Nor can a crime be excused by its own atrocity. The subsequent conduct of the accused immediately after committing the c rime also does not show that he was insane. The evidence of P.W. 3 shows that the conduct of he accused after he was arrested was quite normal. He accompanied the Constable walking for some distance and then he got into the car brought from the Police Station as instructed by the Police. When produced at the hospital he was standing quietly with the other Police Constable in whose custody he was. There is also the evidence afforded by Exhibit P-10 certificate of the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital, Kozhikode which shows that the accused had not shown any signs of insanity during the period of his observation. It was unfortunate that the appellant was not placed under medical observation immediately after the occurrence. It was delayed by a month and therefore we have no expert medical evidence regarding the condition of his mind immediately following the occurrence. Much reliance, therefore, cannot be placed on his certificate. Magistrates would do well to remember that forwarding the accused for medical examination immediately after the incident is an important part of their duty. On a consideration of the evidence and the facts and circumstances including the absence of any apparent motive, we are of opinion that it is not established that the accused did not understand the nature and quality of the act. Although his behaviour may have been unusual and strange, he was not suffering from any unsoundness of mind so as to make him incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law when he killed his child. The defence under section 84 should, therefore fail and the offence which he has committed is certainly one of murder. The defence under section 84 should, therefore fail and the offence which he has committed is certainly one of murder. Regarding the conviction of the accused under section 4(1)(j) of the Madras Prohibition Act, we do not think that the joint trial of the accused for the offence of murder and for offence under the Prohibition Act was quite legal. The two offences cannot be said to form part of the same transaction. Further there is no direct proof that he consumed the liquor in any area in which the Act is in force. From the evidence of P.W. 8, the doctor who examined the accused and the certificate Exhibit P-2 it could be said that he was smelling alcohol and that probably he had consumed liquor. What the witnesses say is also that he was smelling liquor, but there is no evidence on record, that having regard to the distance between the place where he was found and the nearest place in a non-prohibited area, the accused must have consumed the liquor within the prohibited area itself. In the absence of such evidence, we do not think it proper that the accused should be convicted for the offence under section 4(1)(j). His conviction under that section is, therefore, set aside. The absence of an apparent motive is material when the question of sentence is considered. The offence which the appellant committed was not in any way premeditated and must have been the result of an impulse and temper. Although the assault was a violent one, the learned Sessions Judge was right in awarding only the lesser sentence. We would therefore affirm the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code. With the modification that the conviction and sentence under section 4(1)(j) is set aside, the appeal is dismissed. M.C.M. ------- Appeal dismissed in the main.