Govinda Menon, J.- The appellant stands convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Tellichery for the offence of murder for having caused the death of his two children aged 4 and one and half years respectively. The accused had married P.W. 1 Narayani about six years ago and they were living together in the accused’s house. Two children were born to them. After some time the accused started ill-treating his wife. He used to come drunk and beat her. Matters reached a crisis when one day he kicked her out of the house. P.W, 1 started to go away to her house with the children, but at the intervention of some of the neighbours she remained in the house for the night. Next day she decided to leave and informed the accused about it, but he made no reply. So she left with her children to her own house in Edhom amsom. Thereafter she was permanently residing there. After a few days the accused came over there and told his mother-in-law P.W. 3 that he had come to take his wife and children, but P.W. 3 informed him that P.W. 1 was unwilling to go back with him. Relationship between the husband and wife were thus strained. Even after this the accused used to come off and on to see the children. He used to take them out to the tea shop or bring them sweets and play with them. After some time he stopped coming and staying in the house, but he used to come to the neighbour Thazhath Veettil Paru’s house and send her daughter P.W. 4 Kamala to fetch the children. The children used to be brought and the accused after spending some time with them used to send them back. On the day previous to the date of occurrence, namely 20th April, 1962 the accused came to Paru’s house and had the children brought to him. In the evening P.W. 4 took back the children to P.W. 1. That night the accused stayed in Paru’s house. The next morning also the children were brought and at about noon were sent back. At 2 p.m., the children were again taken by the accused. Thereafter the children were never returned to P.W. 1. In the evening P.W. 4 took back the children to P.W. 1. That night the accused stayed in Paru’s house. The next morning also the children were brought and at about noon were sent back. At 2 p.m., the children were again taken by the accused. Thereafter the children were never returned to P.W. 1. In the afternoon when P.W. 1 and her sister were going out tor coile;tmg firewood the children were seen playing with the accused near the local temple. When P.W. 1 returned home at 6 p.m. she enquired about the children. P.W. 4. told her that she had seen the children playing with the accused in front of one Narayanan Nair’s shop. P.W. 3 the mother, therefore, went to the shop to fetch the children, but they were not seen there. She was informed that the accused was seen going north with the children. When P.W. 1’s brothers came at night the matter was reported, but since the children were taken by the father they counselled patience and decided to wait. Next morning, i.e. on 22nd April, 1962 P.W. 1 and her mother started to go to the accused’s house at Kadannappalli. On the way they made enquiries of several persons and finally came to know that the accused was seen going alone without the children and that the accused had even attended the ‘Thira ‘festival the previous night. P.W. 1 and her mother therefore came back and told the brother P.W. 2. the result of their enquiries. P.W. 2 went in search of the accused. On he way he got into the house of one Kalliani a relation of the accused. The accused was there. He was taken aside and P.W. 2 asked him where the children were. Accused retorted by saying that the children were after all his and that he had no business to question him. When asked again he did not give any reply and P.W. 2 told him that he was going to report the matter to the police and wanted the accused to go with him to the Police Station. The accused then suddenly took to his heels. While running he tripped and fell down. When asked again he did not give any reply and P.W. 2 told him that he was going to report the matter to the police and wanted the accused to go with him to the Police Station. The accused then suddenly took to his heels. While running he tripped and fell down. P.W. 2 and others chased and brought him back, but some people who were there told P.W. 2 that he had no right to compel the accused to accompany him and that if he wanted he could go and make itcomplaint at the Police Station. The next morning at 8-15 P.W. 2 went to the Pazhayangadi Police Station and gave written complaint Exhibit P-1 to P.W. 18 the Sub-Inspector of Police. He registered a case and started investigation. By about noon on that day he accused appeared at the Police Station and made a complaint about P.W. 2 and others, of assaulting him. As the allegations disclosed only a non-cognizable offence an entry was made in the General Diary and the accused was sent with a Police Constable tothe hospital. After returning from the hospital on suspicion he accused was arrested by the Sub-Inspector of Police and questioned. In pursuance of information furnished by him the Sub-Inspector accompanied the accused to Kallakkan thodu. The accused pointed out a place where some hair marked as M.O. 1 and a black thread M.O. 2 were seen. The dead bodies were not seen there. They made a search and in a vacant paramba to the south-west of the thodu they found two skulls answering the description of the two children. The Sub-Inspector posted two Constables and returned to the Police Station. As the scene of occurrence was within the limits of Payyannur Police Station the case was transferred. P.W. 21 the Sub-Inspector of Payyannur on receipt of the F.I.R. registered a case under section 302 and sent express report to the concerned officers. P.W. 20 the Circle Inspector of Police on receipt of express report proceeded to the village and held the inquest. He took into custody M.Os. 1 and 2 and the two skulls with some bones found near it. P.W. 1 was sent for and she came and identified the skulls and M.Os. 1 and 2 as that of her children. After the inquest the skulls were sent to P.W. 13 for conducting the post-mortem. He took into custody M.Os. 1 and 2 and the two skulls with some bones found near it. P.W. 1 was sent for and she came and identified the skulls and M.Os. 1 and 2 as that of her children. After the inquest the skulls were sent to P.W. 13 for conducting the post-mortem. The post-mortem certificates are Exhibits P-2 and P-3 respectively. On information furnished by the accused P.W. 21 the Sub-Inspector of Payyannur Police Station accompanied the accused to the house of P.W. 8 and recovered a silver waist cord M.O. 3 which was later identified as the one worn by the youngest child. The accused was sent to the Magistrate who remanded the accused to judicial custody. On 4th May, 1962 the accused made a confessional statement before the Second Class Magistrate of Cannanore. Exhibit P-9 is the confessional statement. After completing the investigation the accused was charge-sheeted. When questioned at the preliminary enquiry about the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the accused admitted that their evidence was true. Exhibit P-13 is the statement. At the Sessions Court he admitted that Exhibit P-13 was his statement. When questioned about each item of evidence he denied having gone to his wife’s house after she had deserted him. He denied having anything to do with the children and denied the truth of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the children were last seen with him. He denied having pledged M.O. 3 with P.W. 8. He stated that Exhibit P-9 the confessional statement was not true and voluntary. There are no eye-witnesses to the murder and the guilt of the accused depends solely on circumstantial evidence. We will take up each item of evidence. P.W. 13 is the Assistant Surgeon of the Government dispensary at Payyannur who conducted the autopsy. Exhibit P-2 is the post-mortem certificate of the child Rugmini. Only a portion of the decomposed skull was available for post-mortem. The skin and the muscles were decomposed and eaten by maggots. The upper jaw contained ten teeth. The doctor gave his opinion that the skull was that of a child aged about four years. Post-mortem certificate conducted on the other skull is Exhibit P-3. According to the doctor it was a skull of a child aged about 1½years. There also four small teeth on the upper jaw were available. The upper jaw contained ten teeth. The doctor gave his opinion that the skull was that of a child aged about four years. Post-mortem certificate conducted on the other skull is Exhibit P-3. According to the doctor it was a skull of a child aged about 1½years. There also four small teeth on the upper jaw were available. The doctor was unable to give the cause of death in either of the cases for want of sufficient data. In the face of this evidence learned counsel for the appellant contended with much force that identification is not possible, that there is no evidence that the skulls recovered were those of P.Ws. 1’s children and there is no evidence as to how death had been caused. The Supreme Court has laid down in more than one case that in law a conviction for an offence does not necessarily depend upon the corpus delicti being found. There may be reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of the murder though the corpus delicti are not traceable. Failure on the part of the prosecution to recover the dead bodies will not indicate that there was no murder if the other evidence is convincing enough to establish the crime of murder. In the case in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The Slate of Bombay1, His Lordship Hidayatullah, J., delivering the majority judgment has discussed this question referring to various decided cases and held that if circumstantial evidence unerringly pointed to the conclusion that death must have been the result of administration of poison (though not detected) and that it must have been administered by the accused a conviction can be rested on such circumstantial evidence. Reference has been made by the learned Judge to the case in E. v. Onufrejczyk2 where the body of the victim was not found at all and indeed there was no evidence that he had died, much less was murdered. The accused’s conduct in the case was held decisive, in spite of the fact that the dead body was not recovered. The accused’s conduct in the case was held decisive, in spite of the fact that the dead body was not recovered. Lord Chief Justice Goddard stated the law to be that in a trial for murder, the fact of death could be proved by circumstantial evidence alone, provided the jury were warned that the evidence must lead to one conclusion only, and that even though there was no body or even trace of a body or any direct evidence as to the manner of death of the victim, the corpus delicti could be held to be proved by a number of facts which rendered the commission of the crime certain. Lord Goddard referred to a case from New Zealand where the body of the victim was never found, The King v. Horry3. The statement of the law as to proof of corpus delicti laid down by Gresson, J. (concurred in by Fair, A.C.J., Stanton, J., and Hay, J.) was approved by Lord Goddard with one slight change. The statement of the law as stated in the Head Note was: "At the trial of a person charged with murder the fact of death is provable by circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding that neither the body nor any trace of the body has been found, and that the accused has made no confession of any participation in the crime. Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt; the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for." Lord Goddard did not agree with the words "morally certain" , and stated that he would have preferred to say "such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain". Another case referred to in the Supreme Court case was the case of Mary Ann Nash1. That case is illustrative of the proposition that even though the cause of death may not appear to be established by direct evidence the circumstances of the case may be sufficient to infer that a murder has been committed. In that case, the prisoner had an illegitimate son, five years old. There was evidence to show that the mother desired to put the child out of her way. In that case, the prisoner had an illegitimate son, five years old. There was evidence to show that the mother desired to put the child out of her way. One day in June, 1907 the mother left the house and returned without the child. She made several statements as to what had happened to the child, which were found to be untrue. As late as April, 1908 the body of a child was discovered in a well. Decomposition had so far advanced that even the sex of the child could not be determined. There was nothing, therefore, to show whether death was natural or violent, or whether it had occurred before or after the body was put into the well. The case was left to the jury. On appeal, it was contended that there being no proof how death took place, the Judge should not have left the case to the jury but ought to have with drawn it. Lord Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to the untrue statements of the prisoner about the whereabouts of the child and observed as follows: "All these statements were untrue. She had an object in getting rid of the child, and if it had been lost or met with an accidental death, she had every interest in saying so at once. It is said there is no evidence of violent death, but we cannot accept that Mr. Goddard cannot have meant that there must be proof from the body itself of a violent death............In view of the facts that the child left home well and was afterwards found dead, that the appellant was last seen with it and made untrue statements about it, this is not a case which could have been withdrawn from the jury." There is, therefore, no doubt that even though the dead body is not triced and the cause of death is not known murder can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Whether there is sufficient proof to arrive at the finding would depend upon the facts of each case. In this case there is abundant evidence that the skulls that were recovered were those of P.W. 1’s children. It may be that from merely seeing the skulls or from the black cord or the hair it may not be possible to assert that they were of P.W. 1 ‘s children. In this case there is abundant evidence that the skulls that were recovered were those of P.W. 1’s children. It may be that from merely seeing the skulls or from the black cord or the hair it may not be possible to assert that they were of P.W. 1 ‘s children. But the entire circumstances have to be considered in coming to a decision on this question. There is first the circumstance that after 21st April, 1962 these children of such tender age were not seen. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 show that in spite of a very vigorous and thorough search the children were not traceable. The suggestion that the children must have been secreted somewhere by P.W. 1 or her relations to foist a false case on the accused is too puerile and cannot stand a moment’s scrutiny. It is important to note that no questions were asked of any one of these witnesses suggesting that the children were alive and had been hidden somewhere. The accused in his statement before the Court had no such case. And where could this suckling child and the other child of only four years be kept hidden unnoticed by any one ? The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 to 7 leave no room for doubt that the children were with the accused till the evening of 21st April, 1962. At noon P.W. 1 saw the children in the company of the accused when she was going to collect firewood. P.W. 3 later saw the children with the accused. P.W. 4 saw the accused playing with the children in front of Narayanan Nair’s shop. P.W. 5 saw the accused and the children proceeding towards north at about 3 p.m. P.W. 6 had seen the accused going towards the hill with the children. P.W. 7 Chindan Nambiar who lives still further north has sworn that the accused came to his house with the children at about 5-30 p.m. and asked for some water to drink. His wife gave them water. He was cutting a jack-fruit and he gave one fruit to each one of the two children. We have carefully scrutinised the evidence of all these witnesses and feel no hesitation in accepting them. They are all witnesses who have no axes to grind against the accused and no reason to perjure. His wife gave them water. He was cutting a jack-fruit and he gave one fruit to each one of the two children. We have carefully scrutinised the evidence of all these witnesses and feel no hesitation in accepting them. They are all witnesses who have no axes to grind against the accused and no reason to perjure. The accused had denied that he was with the children. He has gone to the extent of saying that ever since P.W. 1 left him he had not gone to P.W. 1’s house or seen the children. The accused’s total denial that the children were with him on that day is a conduct inconsistent with his innocence. The denial was made in order to disclaim any connection with the children. The Court would, therefore, be justified in drawing adverse inference from this against the accused in the circumstances of the case. P.W. 9 Chandukutty Nair is the next witness to be considered. He saw the accused at about dusk going alone. They exchanged a few words and the accused went away. We have then the evidence of P.W. 8. The accused wen! to his house at about 8 p.m. There was nobody else with him. The accused wanted to take a bath and have food. He was then wearing a shirt and while going to take his bath the accused took out a silver waist cord from his pocket and handed it over to the witness. The next morning when the accused started to go P.W. 8 wanted to return the waist cord but the accused asked him for a loan of a rupee and when that was given be left the place leaving the waist cord with PAY. 8. The accused, no doubt denies this evidence but nothing has been brought out in the evidence to compel disbelief of this testimony. P.W. 18 the Sub-Inspector of Police, Pazhayangadi arrested and questioned the accused and he took the Sub-Inspector to Kallakkan thodu and pointed out a certain place where the hair M.O. 1 and a black cord M.O. 2 were seen. A search was made at that place and two skulls were found in a vacant paramba not far away. P.W. 18 the Sub-Inspector of Police, Pazhayangadi arrested and questioned the accused and he took the Sub-Inspector to Kallakkan thodu and pointed out a certain place where the hair M.O. 1 and a black cord M.O. 2 were seen. A search was made at that place and two skulls were found in a vacant paramba not far away. The two skulls recovered were, according to the doctor who conducted the autopsy, of two children one aged four years and the other 1½ years which fit in well with the age of P.W. 1’s two children. The doctor’s evidence has not been doubted. The pointing out of the place wherefrom the skulls were recovered is an important circumstance against the accused. We have then the evidence of P.W. 10 Narayana Poduval. He has sworn that on 9th Medom corresponding to 22nd April, 1962 at about 9 a.m., he had gone to Kallakkan thodu for cutting thorny shrubs for making fence. He felt some bad odour emanating from there and saw the corpse of two children, one a girl aged four years and the other a boy aged about 1½ years. When he looked closely he identified them as the children of the accused. He stated that after that when he went to the temple festival he mentioned about what he had seen to P.W. 14 and others and when they went to the place to see the dead bodies they were not seen there. P.W. 10 has further deposed that the black cord which the female child had was seen lying there. When he saw the male child there was nothing on its body. It is true that P.W. 10 did not immediately inform about it to the police or to P.W. 1 or to the accused, but that by itself is no reason to reject his evidence, especially when his evidence is corroborated by P.W. .14, who has not even been cross-examined. Both of them bear no enmity with the accused. This piece of evidence goes a long way in proving that the skulls which were later found were those of P.W. 1’s children. As to how the skulls happened to be away from the place where P.W. 10 had first seen them is explained by the evidence of P.W. 11, Parvathi Amma. She was returning at about 11 a.m. from Kallakkan thodu where she had gone to gather cow-dung. As to how the skulls happened to be away from the place where P.W. 10 had first seen them is explained by the evidence of P.W. 11, Parvathi Amma. She was returning at about 11 a.m. from Kallakkan thodu where she had gone to gather cow-dung. She saw a jackal running across her path and saw the dead body of a female child near the Kallipala tree. She too was not cross-examined. Another clinching piece of evidence is the recovery of M.O. 3 the silver waist cord on information furnished by the accused. P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 7 have categorically stated that the boy had a silver waist cord when the child was last seen with the accused. P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 7 have clearly identified M.O. 3 as the identical waist cord worn by the child. The only point of criticism advanced by the learned counsel is that M.O. 3 is an article of common use and bears no particular identifying marks and consequently no reliance could be placed on the testimony of the witnesses who identified it as the very same jewel worn by the child. As observed by Ramaswamy, J., in the case in Public Prosecutor v. China Lingiah1: "In advancing this criticism it is forgotten that small and even nice points of difference distinguishing one thing from others of the same kind may merely by the frequent sight of them and without any special attention to them make an impression on the mind. They are component parts of the thing and go to make the whole of which the mind receives an impression. This sort of impression is exceedingly common ; a workman has it of his tools and most people have it of their dress, jewellery and other things they are frequently seeing, handling or using. It occurs every day that by remembrance of their general appearance a carpenter, mason, or other workman recognises his tools ; and dress, jewellery or other property is known by its owner. Undoubtedly animals and thins may be identified by those familiar with them. Observation teaches that such identification may be safely relied upon. But at the same time witness would not be able to formulate his reason for he identification since it is based upon general untranslateable impressions of the mind. Undoubtedly animals and thins may be identified by those familiar with them. Observation teaches that such identification may be safely relied upon. But at the same time witness would not be able to formulate his reason for he identification since it is based upon general untranslateable impressions of the mind. We may readily recognise our cloth, our cow, our wife’s jewels or friend’s handwriting in the midst of a multitude of other things in most respects like them. But if questioned we may not be able to formulate any cogent or intelligent reason for the identification. It would be fatuous to discredit such identification on the ground that reasons are not being formulated for them. " There is no case for the accused that the silver zone M.O. 3 belonged to him. On the other hand he denies having pledged it with P.W. 8 and having given any information leading to the discovery from P.W. 8 and the recovery of the waist cord from him. There is no reason as to why these witnesses should falsely identify the article as belonging to the child and we cannot easily reject their testimony, on the ground that identification parades for these articles were not held and that reasons have not been formulated by these witnesses to specifically" identify them. It may, therefore, be taken as sufficiently established that M.O. 2 belonged to the deceased child of P.W. 1 and that the child was wearing it when it was last seen with the accused. When P.W. 10 saw the dead body of the child there was no waist cord. That particular waist cord M.O. 3 is seen to have been pledged by the accused to P.W. 8. On information furnished by the accused P.W. 8 was traced and he produced a silver waist cord, the one which the accused had haded over to him when he took the loan of a rupee. Besides the Sub-Inspector P.W. 18, P.W. 16 the Village Assistant was also present at the time the silver waist cord was recovered from P.W. 8. The mahazar is Exhibit P-7. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the truth of the evidence of these two responsible officers. No circumstances are elicited in their evidence to discredit them. P.W. 8 has spoken to the circumstances under which he came into possession of the article. The mahazar is Exhibit P-7. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the truth of the evidence of these two responsible officers. No circumstances are elicited in their evidence to discredit them. P.W. 8 has spoken to the circumstances under which he came into possession of the article. As stated already there is absolutely no enmity between him and the accused. The learned Sessions Judge has rejected the evidence of P.W. 8 for no understandable reasons. The learned Judge does not say that the evidence of P.Ws. 16 and 18 are untrustworthy. There is nothing inherently improbable in the story spoken to by P.W. 8. If M.O. 3 belonged to the accused’s children P.W. 8 must have got it only from the accused. This is a strong link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has also relied on the conduct of the accused when he was met and questioned by P.W. 2 and others about the whereabouts of the children. P.W. 2 has given evidence that when he met and questioned the accused, the accused retorted by saying "The children are after all mine, what is there for you to ask." This evidence of P.W. 2 is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 15. Nothing has been suggested against the evidence of P.W. 15. Normally we would expect the accused to show some anxiety if enquiries are made about them and when he learns that the children are missing. He would have been the first to go about searching for them, if he had nothing to do with their disappearance. When P.W. 2 insisted that he should accompany them to the Police Station, the accused started running. This conduct is very significant. Beyond merely denying the truth of this evidence, the accused had offered no explanation for this strange behaviour. Along with all this evidence there is the statement of the accused Exhibit P-13 recorded at the preliminary enquiry and duly proved in the Sessions Court under section 287, Criminal Procedure Code, which lends further assurance that the accused must really have murdered the children. When he was questioned about the evidence of the witnesses that the children were playing with him and that they were not returned as usual to P.W. 1, he admitted that the evidence was true. When he was questioned about the evidence of the witnesses that the children were playing with him and that they were not returned as usual to P.W. 1, he admitted that the evidence was true. He admitted as correct the evidence of P.W. 8 that he had gone to his house and handed over the silver zone M.O. 3 and took a loan of one rupee. When questioned about the evidence of P.W. 10 that on the morning of 22nd April , 1962 when he had gone to collect thorns near Kallakkan thodu he smelt some foul smell and when he looked saw the dead bodies of two children and that on looking closely he identified them as the accused’s children and that the girl had a black cord in its waist, he stated that he had nothing to say about the evidence. In the Sessions Court when he was questioned he admitted that he had made such a statement, but made no explanation as to why he made the statement. Learned counsel for the accused argued that the statement must have been inspired by the police. But mere allegation of police pressure is not sufficient to get rid of the admission made by him. There must be some circumstances brought out from which it could be inferred that the statement must have been made under threats and duress by the police. No such case has been put forward by the accused and no such suggestions were made to any of the Police Officers. We cannot, therefore, accede to the contention of the learned counsel that Exhibit P-13 cannot be taken into consideration. Section 287, Criminal Procedure Code lays down that the examination of the accused recorded before the Committing Magistrate shall be tendered by the prosecutor and read as evidence. We believe that the statement made by the accused has been made voluntarily without any external influence and that statement to a very great extent proves the truthfulness of the prosecution case. Finally there is the confessional statement of the accused Exhibit P-9 recorded by P.W. 17 the Sub-Magistrate. Learned counsel for the appellant has objected to the admissibility of Exhibit P-9 on the ground that the Sub-Magistrate had not strictly conformed to the provisions of section 364, Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Rules of Practice. Finally there is the confessional statement of the accused Exhibit P-9 recorded by P.W. 17 the Sub-Magistrate. Learned counsel for the appellant has objected to the admissibility of Exhibit P-9 on the ground that the Sub-Magistrate had not strictly conformed to the provisions of section 364, Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Rules of Practice. It is no doubt, true that Exhibit P-9 does not contain the questions which the Magistrate had put to the accused and the answers given by him in direct form, but the failure to record the questions and answers under section 364, Criminal Procedure Code is a defect which is curable under section 533, Criminal Procedure Code, provided there is oral evidence of the Magistrate that, in fact, all the relevant questions were put to the accused and from the answers he was satisfied that the confessional statement is voluntary. Then: is nothing in section 164, Criminal Procedure Code or the Criminal Rules of Practice which require that the warning should be on record. It is the duty of the Magistrate to make every effort to satisfy himself that the confession is voluntarily and truly made. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the act of recording confessions under section 164 Criminal Procedure Code, is a very solemn act and in discharging his duties under the said section, the Magistrate must take care to see that the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 164 are fully satisfied. That sub-section contemplates questioning the accused and satisfying himself that it is voluntarily made. It is desirable that the questions and answers are recorded so that the appellate Court may be in a position to decide whether a real effort had been made to find out whether the confession is made voluntarily. Subsection (3) also requires that the Magistrate should explain to the person about to make the statement that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him. The questions intended to be put should not be allowed to become a matter of mere mechanical enquiry. No element of casualness should be allowed to creep in and the Magistrate should be fully satisfied that the confessional statement which the accused wants to make is in fact and in substance voluntary. The questions intended to be put should not be allowed to become a matter of mere mechanical enquiry. No element of casualness should be allowed to creep in and the Magistrate should be fully satisfied that the confessional statement which the accused wants to make is in fact and in substance voluntary. In this case when examined the learned Magistrate has not given evidence as to what were the questions that he put and what were the answers given by him or what exactly was the warning that he administered. The examination-in-chief has not been properly conducted and the only thing that the learned Magistrate has stated is that it was a true and voluntary statement and it was recorded after due warning given to the accused. To a question in cross-examination the learned Magistrate also added that he impressed upon the accused about the serious consequences that will follow any statement that he may make. This we feel is not a sufficient compliance with the section and we agree with the learned counsel that no weight need be attached to this confessional statement. The confession has also been retracted. But even without Exhibit P-9 there is abundant material on record from which it could be inferred that the accused had committed the murder of the children. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised the question of motive and he contended that there is no conceivable motive for the accused to put anend to his children, especially when the evidence showed that he was very loving and affectionate towards them. Motive being a mental attitude is often difficult of proof. People do often commit grave crimes from the most inadequate of motives. What one man might ignore or suffer might impel another to murder. So absence of proof of motive or adequate motive is not fatal to the prosecution even in a case depending solely on circumstantial evidence. If the circumstances otherwise establish guilt, inability to prove motive or an adequate motive is not an impediment to a conviction. Here in this case there is evidence that the relationship between the accused and P.W. 1 was very much strained. In spite of the best efforts on the part of the accused to effect a rapprochement P.W. 1 persisted in not going back to live with the accused. Here in this case there is evidence that the relationship between the accused and P.W. 1 was very much strained. In spite of the best efforts on the part of the accused to effect a rapprochement P.W. 1 persisted in not going back to live with the accused. He showed his love to the children by going and playing with them every day. Yet P.W. 1 was adamant. The accused, therefore would have got wild with her and probably wanted to take revenge on her. It is difficult to conceive as to what more effective revenge he could have taken against P.W. 1 than to kill her two little ones. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was no motive at all for the murder. The mode of evaluating circumstantial evidence has been stated by the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State of M.P.1, and it is as follows: "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that with in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." This view has been followed in later decisions of the Supreme Court. In the recent case in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State of Bombay2, His Lordship Hidayathullah, J., has quoted the following words of Baron Parke in Towell’s case3: "Circumstantial evidence is the only evidence which can in cases of this kind lead to discovery. In the recent case in Anant Chintaman Lagu v. The State of Bombay2, His Lordship Hidayathullah, J., has quoted the following words of Baron Parke in Towell’s case3: "Circumstantial evidence is the only evidence which can in cases of this kind lead to discovery. There is no way of investigating them except by the use of circumstantial evidence but it most frequently happens that great crimes committed in secret leave behind them some traces, or are accompanied by some circumstances which lead to the discovery and punishment of the offender ......Direct evidence of persons who saw the fact, if that proof is offered upon the testimony of men whose veracity you have no reason to doubt is the best proof; but on the other hand, it is equally true with regard to circumstantial evidence, that the circumstances may often be so clearly proved, so closely connected with it, or leading to one result in conclusion, that the mind may be so well convinced as if it were proved by eye witnesses." We may also refer to the following observations of Lord Coleridge, J., quoted at pages 46-47 of the Wills’ Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 7th Edition: "Now circumstantial evidence varies infinitely in its strength in proportion to the character, the variety, the cogency, the independence one of another, of the circumstances. I think one might describe it as a net-work offacts cast around the accused man. That net-work may be a mere gossamer thread, as light and as unsubstantial as the air itself. It may vanish at a touch. It may be that, strong as it is in part, it leaves great gaps and rents through which the accused is entitled to pass in safety. It may be so close, so stringent, so coherent in its texture, that no efforts on the part of the accused can break through. It may vanish at a touch. It may be that, strong as it is in part, it leaves great gaps and rents through which the accused is entitled to pass in safety. It may be so close, so stringent, so coherent in its texture, that no efforts on the part of the accused can break through. It may come to nothing — on the other hand it may be absolutely convincing......The law does not demand that you should act upon certainties alone......In cur lives, in our acts, in our thoughts we do not deal with certainties ; we ought to act upon just and reasonable convictions founded upon just and reasonable grounds......The law asks for no more and the law demands no less." The learned author referred to the case of Hawkins v. Powells Tellery Steam Coal Company, Ltd.1, where Fletcher Moulton, L.J., said: "‘Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to the conclusion ‘(in question) as a fact’ ; and Buckley, L.J., (at page 996), ‘When it is said that a person must prove his case, it is never meant that he must prove it with absolute certainty. All that can be done is to adduce such evidence as that, the mind of the tribunal is satisfied that the fact is so. This may be done by direct evidence or by inference from facts, but the matter must not be left to rest in surmise, conjecture, or guess.‘" We have bestowed careful and anxious thought to the circumstantial evidence adduced in the case and we are of opinion that they have been fully established and the circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and they do not leave any reasonable ground for concluding that they may be also consistent with the innocence of the accused. The chain of circumstantial evidence is so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for escape to the accused. The accused has, therefore, been rightly convicted. The murder was cruel and revolting. Though we are not impressed with the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for not awarding the capital sentence, as the State has not chosen to apply for enhancement of the sentence, we do not propose to interfere. The accused has, therefore, been rightly convicted. The murder was cruel and revolting. Though we are not impressed with the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for not awarding the capital sentence, as the State has not chosen to apply for enhancement of the sentence, we do not propose to interfere. In the result, the conviction and sentence are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. M.C.M. ------ Appeal dismissed.