Judgment.- The appellant has been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge of Ernakulam for an offence under section 436, Indian Penal Code, and has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years. The case against him was that he set fire to the dwelling house of P.W. 5 Kumaran. P.W. 5 lives there with his mother P.W. 1, his wife P.W. 6 and their two little children aged 6 and 4 respectively. The accused and his family reside in the adjoining compound. There was no fence separating the two compounds. The accused has an unmarried sister by name Mundi. She became pregnant and it was suspected that P.W. 5 was responsible for the pregnancy. After she gave birth to a child, Mundi came with her child and sat in the house of P.W. 5 and refused to get out. P.W. 5 forcibly removed her out of the compound. Shortly afterwards she returned with her brother one Kunhappan and there ensued an altercation and grappling between P.W. 5 and Kunhappan in the course of which Kunhappan fell down and sustained injuries. Thereafter it is stated the Kunhappan and him father left the house vowing vengeance. On 4th May, 1962, P.Ws. 5 and 6 had gone out to the grocery shop of P.W. 3 about a furlong and a half from their house. P.W. 1 and the children were alone in the house. The children had gone to the south-western portion of the compound for picking mangoes dropping down from the tree and P.W. 1 was attending to some work in the kitchen. At about 4-30 p.m. when P.W. 1 came out to see where the children were, she found the accused setting fire to the south-western corner of the thatched roof of their house with a lighted match stick. On seeing this, she cried out “Kunnumpurath people had set fire to the house” and the accused ran away to his house. On hearing the cry P.W. 2 Anna Poulose, who resides on the south and P.W. 4 Geevarghese residing on the north and some others came running. The house was burning and soma articles were removed from out of the house. P.Ws. 5 and 6 and the shop-keeper P.W. 3 on hearing the cries also came up but by that time the whole house was burnt down. The house was burning and soma articles were removed from out of the house. P.Ws. 5 and 6 and the shop-keeper P.W. 3 on hearing the cries also came up but by that time the whole house was burnt down. The same night P.W. 5 proceeded to the Kothamangalam police station and at 9-30 p.m. laid the complaint. P.W. 8 the Head Constable recorded a complaint Exhibit P-2 from him and registered a case. The next morning he visited the scene, prepared scene mahazar and questioned the witnesses. Enquiries were made of the accused, bat he was not available. On 1st June, 1962, he surrendered before P.W. 10 the Sab-Inspector of Police who arrested him. After completing the investigation the accused was charge-sheeted. The accused denied the offence and stated that he was falsely implicated in the case. He admitted that he had left his house out of fear. That the house of P.W. 5 was completely destroyed by fire admits of no doubt. Questions were asked in cross-examination whether they themselves had not set fire to thehouse, but there is not the slightest reason for their doing so and the suggestion can safely be ignored. Now the question is whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused who was responsible for setting lire to the house. The only witness who speaks to having seen the accused setting fire to the house is P.W. 1, and naturally her evidence was subjected to severe criticism bythe learned defence counsel. It was argued that it would be unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of this witness to find the accused guilty, particularly because it is not free from all blemish. The learned Sessions Judge has observed in his judgment: “Having seen and heard P.W. 1, a woman of 75 years, giving evidence, her testimony struck me as true and straightforward”. Nothing has been noted in her deposition about the demeanour of the witness and we have only her deposition to go upon to decide the credibility of the witness. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that it is not safe to convict the appellant on the testimony of a single witness without corroboration. Nothing has been noted in her deposition about the demeanour of the witness and we have only her deposition to go upon to decide the credibility of the witness. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that it is not safe to convict the appellant on the testimony of a single witness without corroboration. The learned counsel does not say that there is any such rule of law, but he puts it on the ground of prudence that ordinarily the Court should not, in a serious crime like this, convict the accused person on the testimony of a single witness. Reference was made to the observations of Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Mohamed Sugal Esa Mamasan Rer Alalah v. The King1. In that case, Their Lordships looked for corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a murder case. The evidence of the witness in that case suffered from two infirmities namely, that the witness was a girl of about 10 or 11 years at the time of occurrence; and she had not been administered oath because the Court did not consider that she was able to understand the nature of the oath though she was competent to testify. Their Lordships upheld the conviction and sentence of death holding that the evidence, such as it was, was admissible. Their Lordships observed: “It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming that the unsworn evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England where provision has been made for the reception of unsworn evidence from a child it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particular implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law.” Another decision brought to my notice is the case in Vemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy v. Slate of Hyderabad1. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law.” Another decision brought to my notice is the case in Vemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy v. Slate of Hyderabad1. In that case P.W-14 a dhobi boy was the only person who had witnessed the murder and his testimony was assailed on the; ground that he was an accomplice. Though the Supreme Court repelled the contention that he was an accomplice it held that his position was analagous to that of the’ accomplice, and the Court insisted on corroboration of the testimony of the single witness not on the ground that his was the evidence on which the conviction could be based, but on the ground that though he was not an accomplice his evidence was analogous to that of an accomplice in the peculiar circumstances of the case. As a general rule a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of doubtful veracity. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid down that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is left to the discretion of the learned Judge in each case to scan the evidence with great care and caution and find out whether it is wholly reliable. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. The Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. We have, therefore, to weigh the evidence of P.W.-1 carefully and see whether the evidence is wholly reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion. The Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. We have, therefore, to weigh the evidence of P.W.-1 carefully and see whether the evidence is wholly reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion. If after such rigorous test, it is found that the evidence is wholly reliable the Court can certainly accept the evidence and find the accused guilty. The evidence of P.W-1 is that she was in the kitchen attending to some work and at the psychological moment when she came out of the house she saw the accused actually setting fire to the house with a lighted match stick. As soon as the accused saw her he ran away from the place. It looks extremely strange that after having identified the appellant as the person who set fire to the house she should cry out that Kunnumpurath people set fire to the house. There is no case that the name of the accused is not known to this old woman. If therefore, she had been able to identify the accused it is inexplicable why she did not call out the name of the accused as the person who set fire to the house. She stated that at no time did she call out the name of the accused as the person who had set fire to the house. I have looked in vain through the entire deposition of this witness to see whether at least when the witness was examined she had mentioned to anybody that it was the accused who set fire to the house. She has stated that even when her son P.W-5 came to the scene she did nottell him that it was Kunharu who set fire to the house. This throws considerable doubt on the implication of the accused as the person who set fire to the house. None of the witnesses who readied the place immediately after the occurrence say that they had seen the accused running away from the scene. In Exhibit P-2 the complaint given by P.W-5 before the police it was stated that Kuttikkat Geevarghese and others had seen the accused running away from the compound after setting fire to the house, but not one of them has been examined. P.W-2 resides, just to the south of this house. In Exhibit P-2 the complaint given by P.W-5 before the police it was stated that Kuttikkat Geevarghese and others had seen the accused running away from the compound after setting fire to the house, but not one of them has been examined. P.W-2 resides, just to the south of this house. She heard the cry of P.W-1 and came up. Even she did not see the accused running away from the scene. A suggestion was made in cross-examination that she was aged 75 and that her eye sight was defective, but she stated that there was nothing wrong with her eye sight. But from her conduct in not crying out that Kunharu had set fire to the house we have to suspect that she would not have been able to identify the actual person who set fire to the house, that she would have only seen somebody running to the neighouring compound of the accused. In the accused’s compound admittedly accused’s father and his brother are also living. Therefore I find it extremely difficult to rely on the testimony of this witness alone to find the accused guilty. The gist of the learned Judge’s finding in the case is contained in the observation that there was really no explanation why anybody should have invented a false case against the appellant. The prosecution having failed completely to establish the guilt of the appellant by good and reliable evidence it was not for him to explain why his name had been mentioned in the complaint as the person who set fire to the house and why P.W-1 implicated him in her evidence in Court. The learned Judge has observed that the prosecution has established a motive for the accused to have committed this crime, and reference was made to the quarrel between the accused’s brother Kunhappan and P.W-5, a few days prior to the occurrence, Kunhappan sustaining serious injuries and leaving the place vowing vengeance. It is true that there was misunderstanding and unpleasantness between P.W-1’s family and the accused’s family, but there was no particular cause for enmity for the accused to have set fire to the house. If the incident afforded a motive it would equally be a motive for Kunhappan or his father to set fire to the house and not necessarily for the accused. If the incident afforded a motive it would equally be a motive for Kunhappan or his father to set fire to the house and not necessarily for the accused. The learned Sessions Judge has then relied on the fact that the accused had absconded from the place immediately after the occurrence and the accused has admitted that he had left the place out of fear. It must be remembered that the same night the name of the appellant has appeared in the first information report. It is not uncommon that even innocent persons behave strangely when they are charged or know that they are suspected of the crime. Different people react differently in the same circumstances and often does an innocent person behave in a strange manner absconding or creating false alibis, but this by itself may not be sufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused. It might, at the most, create suspicion but suspicion however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof. Anyway it is a border-line case and I feel that the benefit of doubt should go to the accused. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant are set aside and he is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. The appeal is allowed. M.C.M. ----- Appeal allowed.