Hegde, J.- These appeals can be conveniently dealt with in one Judgment. Identical or more or less identical questions of fact and law arise for determination in these appeals. Criminal Appeals Nos. 263 to 275 of 1961 are filed by one Puttaraju. Criminal Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1961 are filed by one Shivananda. Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 1961 is filed by the State against the acquittal of Rangiah and Prasannappa. Criminal Revision Petition No. 453 of 1961 is connected with Cr.A. No. 263 of 1961. By means of that petition, the state prays that the sentence imposed on Puttaraju in Sessions case No. 13 of 1960 on the file of the trial Court should be enhanced. In the trial Court, there were in all 13 cases relating to forgery of cement permits Rangiah, Prasannappa, Puttaraju and Shivananda were accused in Sessions Cases No. 13, 14, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of 1960. Puttaraju, Shivananda and Prasannappa were accused in Sessions Cases Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of 1960. Puttaraju and Prasannappa were accused in Sessions Cases Nos. 16 and 25 of 1960. Prasannappa and Rangiah were acquitted in all the cases. Shivananda was convicted under section 466 read with sections 471 and 109 Indian Penal Code only in S.C. Nos. 18 and 23 of 1960, but acquitted in the ovher cases, in each of those cases, he was sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 6 months. In each of the above cases, where he was convicted (he was convicted under section 466, Indian Penal Code) Puttaraju was sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 50 in default to undergo a further term of rigorous imprisonment for one month. The substantive "sentences awarded in all the 13 cases Were ordered to run concurrently. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that in the months of September, October and November of 1957, the Cement Rationing and Licencing Order, 1957 (to be referred to as the "Order" hereinafter) was inforce in the State of Mysore and cement could only be obtained on permits issued by the authorised Officers. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that in the months of September, October and November of 1957, the Cement Rationing and Licencing Order, 1957 (to be referred to as the "Order" hereinafter) was inforce in the State of Mysore and cement could only be obtained on permits issued by the authorised Officers. P.W. 1 (S. Obedulla) the Personal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur, was also in charge of Food. In his capacity as Food Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner he used to sign such permits for and on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner. In about the middle of November, 1957, it was found that forged permits were being used for acquiring cement. The investigation disclosed that Puttaraju was responsible for those forged permits and that he has been using the same through the other accused mentioned above. Prasannappa and Shivananda are brothers. At the relevant time Shivananda was studying. Rangiah was the servant of Prasannappa and Shivananda. Prasannappa was a Hardware Merchant at Tumkur. The prosecution has adduced evidence to show that all the concerned permits are in the handwriting of Puttaraju and the endorsements found on the back of some of those permits are also in the handwriting of Puttaraju; some of the permits also have thumb marks on their reverse. Those thumb marks were identified by the Hand writing Expert as that of the left thumb of Puttaraju. In the two cases wherein Shivananda was convicted, the endorsements found on the reverse of the permits were identified by the Handwriting Expert as that of Shivananda. The trial Court found that the evidence against Rangiah and Prasannappa was sufficient to bring home the guilt to them. We may first take up Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 1961. In this appeal, the State challenges the acquittal of Rangiah and Prasannappa in S.C. No. 23 of 1960. There is absolutely no evidence against Prasannappa, nor are there any circumstances to implicate him in the crime. The only thing pointed out against him is that he is the brother of Shivananda. The State was not justified in filing the appeal against his acquittal. Now coming to the case of Rangiah it is alleged that he used a forged permit to purchase cement and in that connection he signed the Bill Exhibit P-10. Rangiah has denied that the signature found on Exhibit P-10 is his. The State was not justified in filing the appeal against his acquittal. Now coming to the case of Rangiah it is alleged that he used a forged permit to purchase cement and in that connection he signed the Bill Exhibit P-10. Rangiah has denied that the signature found on Exhibit P-10 is his. To prove that that signature is that of Rangiah, the prosecution has examined the Handwriting Expert (P.W. 13 in that case). The trial Court came to the conclusion hat it is not the signature of Rangiah. The evidence of the Handwriting Expert without corroboration is insufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused Rangiah. Therefore, the State Appeal (Cr.A. No. 312 of 1961) fails and the same is dismissed. We may next take up Criminal Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1961. Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 1961 arises from the decision of the learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 18 of 1960. Therein Shivananda was the third accused. In that case, Shivananda was charged for abetting his brother Prasannappa (who was the first accused in that case) to use the forged permits ; but, actually he was convicted for the offence of using the forged permits. Shivananda is convicted mainly on the evidence of the Handwriting Expert. It is said that the handwriting on the reverse of the forged permit (marked as Exhibit A-III in that case) is that of Shivananda. The learned trial Judge had compared the disputed writing with the exemplar writing of Shivananda. Both the Handwriting Expert as well as the lower Court have been influenced by the similarities that existed between the exemplar handwriting and the handwriting on the permit in question. They c id not consider the dissimilarities. The evidence available against the appellant Shivananda is wholly insufficient to bring home the guilt to him. Similar is the case in Criminal Appeal No. 278 of 1961, which arises from the decision of the Court below in Sessions Case No. 23 of 1960. In that case also, the incriminating evidence against the appellant Shivananda (who was the fourth accused in that case) is only that of the Handwriting Expert. For the reasons mentioned in Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 1961 this appeal also has to be allowed and the appellant Shivananda in these two appeals acquitted. In the result, Criminal Appeals Nos. In that case also, the incriminating evidence against the appellant Shivananda (who was the fourth accused in that case) is only that of the Handwriting Expert. For the reasons mentioned in Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 1961 this appeal also has to be allowed and the appellant Shivananda in these two appeals acquitted. In the result, Criminal Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1961 are allowed and the appellant Shivananda is acquitted. He is on bail. His bail bonds do stand cancelled. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to him. This leaves us with the appeals filed by Puttaraju (to be referred to as the ‘accused’ hereafter). We shall first take up Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1961. In this case, the prosecution case is that the accused had forged Exhibit P-3, a cement permit. The prosecution tried to establish this fact on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Firstly, they have proved that the writing in Exhibit P-3 is that of the accused. On this point, we have not only the testimony of P.W 15 (K. Aswatha Reddy), the Handwriting Expert , but also that of P.W. 5 (M. Abdul Lathief) who claims to know the handwriting of the accused. Admittedly, the accused had worked under P.W. 5 for quite some time. Therefore, he had opportunity to know his handwriting. Neither the evidence of P.W. 5 nor that of the Handwriting Expert (P.W. 15) has been shaken in the course of their cross-examination. Their evidence also shows that the endorsement on the back of Exhibit P-3 is in the handwriting of the accused. It is next established by the evidence of the Finger Print Expert (P.W. 17 A. V. Konnur) that the thumb mark found on the back of Exhibit P-3 is that of the accused. From the suggestion made to P.W. 12 (Mohammad Pastagir) by the learned Counsel for the accused, it is clear that the accused was engaging himself in the business of creating false permits in the names of bogus persons. In the course of the cross-examination of P.W. 12, this is what was elicited: "It is not true that I and A-3 and some others were creating false permits in the sames of boguspersons, and that I recommended his applications Exhibits D-3 to D-7 knowing that he had no house and he was not in need of cement and for the use of some one else. I do not know if he has: 10 house or whether he has a house as stated in the applications. Cement permits were used to be signed by P.W. 1 (S. Obedulla), as mentioned earlier. P.W. 1 swears that the signature found on Exhibit P-3 is not his;. It is also proved that the handwriting found thereon is not that of any clerk who was required to deal with cement permits. From the foregoing it is clear that the accused was a party to the forging of Exhibit P-3. Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 1961 relates to the forging of permit marked as Exhibit P-1 in Sessions Case No. 14 of 1960. The evidence in that case is similar to the evidence in Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1961. In Sessions Case No. 17 of 1960, the accused was convicted for forging the cement permit marked as Exhibit P-1 in that case. In S.C. No. 24 of 1960, he was convicted for forging the cement permit marked as Exhibit P-1 in that case. The evidence against the accused in Sessions Case Nos. 17 and 24 of 1960, is the same as that in Sessions Cases Nos. 13 and 14 of 1960. Therefore, his conviction in those cases cannot be successfully challenged. In Sessions Cases Nos. 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25 of 1960, the accused was convicted for forging cement permits which are the subject-matter of these cases (the concerned cement permit was marked as Exhibit P-1 in each one of those cases) In all these cases also, there is evidence to show that writing in the concerned permits is that of the accused ; the signature thereon is not that of P.W. 1 and the accused was interesting himself in the matter of forging similar permits. It is true, in these cases, the permits concerned did not have thumb marks of the accused; but that circumstance by itself is not sufficient to tilt the balance in favour of the accused. During the course of the hearing, some legal contentions have been raised by the learned Counsel for the accused. At one stage, it was contended that the trial of the case is vitiated because of the fact that the evidence of witnesses examined in S.C. No. 13 of 1960 was treated as evidence in the other cases. This it is said vitiates all the proceedings. At one stage, it was contended that the trial of the case is vitiated because of the fact that the evidence of witnesses examined in S.C. No. 13 of 1960 was treated as evidence in the other cases. This it is said vitiates all the proceedings. In the trial Court the parties had filed a joint memo praying that the evidence of witnesses examined in one case be read as evidence in another case, if the same is affimed by the concerned witness again. It was agreed that a copy of his prior deposition be marked as his deposition and the learned Counsel for the defence be permitted to further cross-examination the witness if he thought it necessary. In this case, it may be noted that most of the witnesses could only have parrot like repeated their evidence in each and every one of the cases. The evidence adduced in S.C. No. 13 of 1960 was necessary in each one of these cases. If it is a question of prejudice, we have no doubt that no prejudice has been caused to the accused. But, a question may arise whether the Court had adopted a mode of trial, not provided for by law, in which case, the question of consent or even prejudice becomes immaterial. See V. M. Abdul Rahman v. King Emperor1. The procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge has been approved by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Krishnayya Naidu v. Emperor2. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sukarai Ahir and others v. Emperor3 thought that the procedure is question is merely a technical breach of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and unless prejudice has been caused to the accused, the same is cured by section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. For the opposite view , we have the decision in John Thomas Lynn v. The Crown4 and in Mang Pa v. Emperor.5 Both these decisions were rendered by single Judges. As the learned Counsel for the accused, for good reasons, has not pressed for a decision on:he point of law above noticed, we have not thought it necessary to pronounce on the same. In the course of his arguments, the learned Counsel for the appellant, realised the futility of pressing that contention. The material evidence against the accused has been completely recorded in S.C. No. 13 of 1960. In the course of his arguments, the learned Counsel for the appellant, realised the futility of pressing that contention. The material evidence against the accused has been completely recorded in S.C. No. 13 of 1960. Therefore, his conviction in that case cannot be successfully assailed. In each one of the above mentioned 13 cases, the accused has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 50 the substantive sentences in all the 13 cases went ordered to run concurrent!/. Even if we come to the conclusion that the procedure adopted by the learned trial Judge is not in accordance with law in the circumstances of these cases we would have only set aside the convictions in cases other than S.C. No. 13 of 1960. Even in the other cases, re-trial may have to be ordered. This course is bound to prejudice the accused. For the reasons mentioned above, we have merely noticed the contention advanced, but have refrained from pronouncing on the same. The next contention advanced by Sri. H.R. Venkataramaniah, the learned Counsel for the appellant, was that even if we accept the evidence laid by the prosecution in full, the same does not make out a case of forgery. He urged that all that has been proved against the accused is that the handwriting found in the impugned documents are his. But signatures found on these documents are not proved to be that of his. Therefore, he cannot be said to have ‘made ‘those document. This contention does not appear to us to be sound. The circumstances established against the accused are (1) he engaged himself in getting up forged permits ; (2) the writing on the impugned permits are that of his; (3) the signature found on those documents are not that of P.W. 1 and (4) thumb marks found on the reverse of some of those permits are that of the accused. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that we should not consider those circumstances cumulatively but we should isolate them and examine them separately. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that we should not consider those circumstances cumulatively but we should isolate them and examine them separately. He urged that the accused is not charged for forging the endorsements on the impugned permits ; therefore, the fact that his thumb marks were found on some of the permits is an irrelevant circumstance ; he is also not charged for conspiracy for forging the documents and hence the evidence showing that he was a party to the forging of other documents is an inadmissible piece of evidence. We do not think that there is any justification to isolate the several incriminating circumstances. The evidence relating to the activities of the accused was brought on record by the accused himself. He cannot have both ways. The circumstance that the accused’s thumb marks were found on the reverse of some of the forged permits goes clearly to indicate that he was a parly to forging those permits. That is certainly a circumstance that can and ought to be taken into account in assessing the guilt of the accused. Sri H.R. Venkataramaniah, the learned Counsel for the appellant, placed considerable reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Pramatha Nath v. The State1 wherein it was laid down that what constitutes a false document or part of a document, is not the writing of any number of words which in themselves are innocent, but the affixing the seal or signature of some person to the document or part of a document knowing that the seal or signature is not his, and that he gave no authority to affix it ; in other words falsity consists in the document or part of a document being signed or sealed with the name or seal of a person who d d not in fact sign or seal it; until a false document is made either in whole or in part there cannot be any forgery ; mere preparation for the commission of a possible crime of forgery without making a false document in part or in whole cannot itself be either forgery or abetment of forgery. In the aforementioned case the document which was alleged to have been forged was a petition for withdrawal of an appeal filed before the Appellate Officer Uluberia under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. In the aforementioned case the document which was alleged to have been forged was a petition for withdrawal of an appeal filed before the Appellate Officer Uluberia under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. So far as the body of the petition was concerned, no part of it was written out by the accused Pramatha. The petiton also did not purport to have been executed by the accused or signed by him as the executant of that document. There was an endorsement on the petition which was in the handwriting of the accused Pramatha. The endorsement was to the effect that Pramatha had authority to file that petition and he was handing over that petition to the lawyer. That portion of the endorsement was signed by Pramatha and it bore his signature. The prosecution case was that that document was written out under the advice of Pramatha. It was contended on behalf of the accused that before he could be held guilty of forgery, it must be proved that he had written either whole or part of the document in question or that he had signed or sealed or executed it. The Court following the decision in the Empress v. Riasat Ali1 held that the accused could not be held to have made any false document or a part of a false document. We fail to see how this decision is of any assistance to the accused in this case. The case against him is that he wrote not merely the endorsements found on the back of some of the permits but that he filled in the permits themselves. Section 466, Indian Penal Code, applies not only to cases where a document in its entirety Was made but also to cases where parts of a document were made. The case against him is that he wrote not merely the endorsements found on the back of some of the permits but that he filled in the permits themselves. Section 466, Indian Penal Code, applies not only to cases where a document in its entirety Was made but also to cases where parts of a document were made. Section 463, Indian Penal Code, which defines forgery says: "Whoever makes any false document or part of a document, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." A person is said to make a false document who dishonestly or frudulently signs, seals or executes a document or a part of a document or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document with the intention mentioned in section 464, Indian Penal Code. ‘Document’ is defined under section 29, I.P.C. The next decision cited on behalf of the accused in Panchanan Maity v. The State and another2. Therein a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a person to be guilty of forgery under the first clause of section 464 must make a false document or part of a false document and not merely cause it to be made. This decision again is of no assistance in deciding thepoint under controversy. In the course of the arguments Sri Venkataramaniah pressed for our acceptance some of the observations made by Garth, C.J., in Riasat Ali’s case1. This is what the learned Chief Justice said in that case: "I consider that the ‘making’ of a document or a part of a document does not mean "anting" or " printing " it but signing or otherwise executing it ; as in a legal phrase we speak of making an indenture or ‘ making a promissory note ‘ by which is not meant the writing out of the form of the instrument, but the sealing or signing it as a deed or a note. The fact that the word "makes "is used in the section in conjunction with the words "signs", "seals" of "executes" or makes any mark denoting execution etc., seems to me to be very clearly to denote that this is its true meaning. What constitutes a false document or part of a document is not the writing of any number of words which in themselves are innocent, but the affixing the seal or signature of some person to the document or part of a document knowing that the seal or signature is not his, and that he gave no authority to affix it. In other words, the falsity consists in the document or part of a document being signed or sealed with the name or seal of a person who did not in fact sign or seal it." With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, We are unable to accept these observations as layirg down the law correctly. The view expressed in Raisat Ali’s case1 has been dissentend in Emperor v. Krishnappa Khandappa3. The Judgment of the Bench in that case was delivered by Macleod, C.J. This is what the learned Chief Justice said dealing with Riasat Ali’s case1. "It seems to us that the learned Chief Justice for the purposes of that particular decision did not consider the provisions of section 29, Indian Penal Code. The question here is whether a document must necessarily be something which is signed, sealed or executed. Section 29 says "the word", "document" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters figures or marks, or by more than one of these means, intended to be used as evidence of that matter.‘‘ Explanation 2 says: "Whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such letters, figures or marks within the meaning of this section although the same may not be actually expressed." The correctness of the decision in Riasat Ali’s case1 again came up for consideration before a Bench of the Patna High Court in The Province of Bihar v. Surendrat Prasad Ojha2. The judgment of the Bench was delivered by Ramaswami, J. (as he then was) The learned Judge referring to Riasat Ali’s case1, observed: "But the authority of this case is weak. The judgment of the Bench was delivered by Ramaswami, J. (as he then was) The learned Judge referring to Riasat Ali’s case1, observed: "But the authority of this case is weak. It has been dissented from in Emperor v. Krishtappa Khandappa3 in which a reference was made by the learned Chief Justice to the definition of a document in section 29 of the Code which has not been considered in the Calcutta case. In my opinion the word "makes" in section 464 does not mean anything other than "makes", that is to say, creates or brings into existence. This opinion is consistent with illustration (c) to section 464 which is to the following effect: "A picks up a cheque on a banker signed by B, payable to bearer but without any sun: having been inserted in the cheque. A fraudulently fills up the cheque by inserting the sum of ten thousand rupees. A commits forgery. " Reference may also be made to the English Case Queen v. Batmar1, in which a party received a blank cheque signed with directions to fill in a certain amount and to appropriate the instrument to a certain purpose but the party fraudulently filled in a different amount, and devoted the cheque to other purposes. It was held that forgery was committed . Erle, J., stated: " If a cheque is given to a person with a certain authority, the agent is confined strictly within the limits of that authority and if he chooses to alter it, the crime of forgery is committed. If the blank cheque was delivered to him with a limited authority to complete it and be filled it up with an amount different from the one he was directed to insert and if, after the authority was at an end he filled it up with any amount whatever, that too would be clearly forgery. " We think the law is correctly laid down in Surendra Prasad Ojha’s Case2. It was lastly contended that P.W. 1 had no authority to issue cement permits; therefore the fact that forged permits were brought into existence as having been issued by him does not amount to forgery. " We think the law is correctly laid down in Surendra Prasad Ojha’s Case2. It was lastly contended that P.W. 1 had no authority to issue cement permits; therefore the fact that forged permits were brought into existence as having been issued by him does not amount to forgery. We have not thought it necessary to examine the correctness of the submission that P.W. 1 was not authorised to issue cement permit as in our opinion that aspect of the matter is wholly irrelevant for our present purpose. Whoever forges a document purporting to have been made by a public servant in his official capacity, is guilty of an offence under section 466, Indian Penal Code. A document is a document purporting to be made by a public servant notwithstanding the fact that in its genuine form the public servant in question is not empowered to issue the same. The permits with which we are concerned in these cases were purported to have been issued by P.W. 1 who is a public servant and he is purported to have issued them in his official capacity. That much is sufficient to bring the case within section 466, Indian Penal Code. For the reasons mentioned above the several contentions advanced on behalf of the accused have no merit in them. The result being that these appeals (Criminal Appeals Nos. 263 to 275 of 1961) fail and they are dismissed. In Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1961 the State has filed an application for enhancing the sentence imposed on the accused. Though we are of the opinion that the sentence imposed is not sufficiently adequate We do not think it is so inadequate as to call for our interference in a matter which was essentially within the discret on of the trial Court. Hence we dismiss Criminal Revision Petition No. 453 of 1961. The accused is said to be on bail. He shall surrender forthwith to his bail and undergo the remaining portion of the sentences imposed on him by the trial Court. S.V.S. -------- Crl. Appeals and revision dismissed.