JUDGMENT M. R. Verma, J.:- Feeling aggrieved by the judgment dated October 31, 1994 passed by die learned Judicial Magistrate, l-Class (II), Nurpur whereby the respondent/accused (hereafter referred to as the accused)) has been acquitted of the charge under Section 61(l)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 as applicable to the State of H.P., the State has preferred the present appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on March 1, 1988 at about 4.50 p.m. PW-1 Surinder Singh alongwith other police officials was on patrol duty at Chaki-Khad when they found the accused coming carrying a plastic Cany in his hand. He was chased by the police party and was apprehended. On search, the Cany which the accused was carrying, was found containing five litres of illicit liquor, which was taken in possession vide memo. Ext. PA. Rooka Ext. PB was set for registration of the case against the accused whereupon F.I.R. Ext, PC came into being in Police Station, Indora. The sample of the liquor separated at the time of its seizure, was sent to the Chemical Examiner who vide his report Ext. PX opined that the sample was of liquor of illicit origim. On being satisfied of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 6I(l)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (hereafter referred to as the Act), the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station, Indora submitted the charge-sheet against the accused who came to be tried by the learned Judicial Magistrate, I-Class (II), Nurpur on a charge under Section 61(1)(a) of the Act, 3. To prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution examined PW-1 Surinder Singh, Investigating Officer, and PW-2 Laxmi Singh. 4. The accused in his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code denied the prosecution case as a whole and claimed to be innocent 5. By the impunged judgment, the learned trial Magistrate held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the illicit liquor was recovered from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused and accordingly acquitted the accused of the charge, hence this appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant but could not have the advantage of hearing any one for the accused as none put in appearance for him despite due notice. 7. 6. I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant but could not have the advantage of hearing any one for the accused as none put in appearance for him despite due notice. 7. The learned trial Magistrate has acquitted the accused on the ground that, (i) no independent witness was joined in the investigation; and (ii) that the case property produced in the Court could not be identified as it did not bear any chit or identification. However, a perusal of the record reveals that the aforesaid grounds of acquittal are not sustainable as the conclusions arrived at in this regard by the trial Magistrate are not based on evidence. 8. I have carefully gone through the statement of PW-1 Surinder Singh, A.S.I, the Investigation Officer in the case. In his statement he has nowhere stated "that he has called the independent witness to join the investigation but they refused". Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Magistrate that such fact had not been incorporated by the investigating officer anywhere is illogical and not based on evidence. It may also be stated here that as per Ruqua Ext. PB the accused was seen crossing the khad while he was allegedly carrying a Cany in his hand by the police party which was standing near a Crusher and immediately thereafter the police party followed the accused. In such an eventuality it cannot be expected that the police will make attempts to secure the presence of the independent witnesses. Thus, even otherwise in the facts and circumstances of the case there was no time and opportunity for the police to join independent witnesses in the investigation when they had to immediately follow the accused who was crossing the Khad when noticed by the police. To expect the police to join independent witnesses in such situation appears to be illogical and also not probable otherwise by the time the police will - find out witnesses and join them the accused may abscond and get out of the reach of the police or throw away the contraband, if any, in his possession. 9. To expect the police to join independent witnesses in such situation appears to be illogical and also not probable otherwise by the time the police will - find out witnesses and join them the accused may abscond and get out of the reach of the police or throw away the contraband, if any, in his possession. 9. The learned trial Magistrate in his judgment observes that "this witness has also admitted that the case property produced in the court could not Be identified as it did not bear any chit or identification therefore it would be un-safe to conclude that the Cany Ex.P-1 produced in the Court is the same which was allegedly recovered from the accused." Again a perusal of the statements of the only two witnesses examined by the prosecution, namely, PW-1 Surinder Singh and PW-2 Laxmi Singh reveals that none of them has stated that the case property could not be identified as it did not bear any chit or identification. Hence, the conclusion that it would be unsafe to conclude that the Cany Ex.P-1 produced in the Court is the same which was allegedly recovered from the accused is un-founded and not based on evidence in view of the fact that both these witnesses have identified the case property Ex.P-1 without any reservation. Thus, the grounds for acquittal as relied upon by the learned trial Magistrate are unfounded and not supported by any evidence on the record rather it is a case of reading in evidence what has not been stated by the witnesses. 10. However, on re-apparaisal of the evidence on record I find that there are certain other reasons which entitle the accused for acquittal. 11. To prove the charge against the accused the prosecution had relied on the statements of as many as six witnesses. However, only two of them, namely, PW-I Surinder Singh and PW-2 Laxmi Singh, both police officials, have been produced and examined. An affidavit of PW-Bihari Lai Ex-PE has been tendered in evidence. Thus, the witnesses examined being police officials their statements have to be read with caution for the reason that being members of the party which allegedly apprehended the accused alongwith the liquor they are by necessary inference interested in the success of the case. Thus, to convict the accused these witnesses can be relied upon only if their statements are found cogent, reliable and above suspicion. Thus, to convict the accused these witnesses can be relied upon only if their statements are found cogent, reliable and above suspicion. As per the contents of Ruqua Ex. PB prepared by PW-1 Surinder Singh when he alongwith the other police constables including PW-2 Laxmi Singh reached near Gagan Crusher they saw a person who was carrying a Cany in his hand and was crossing the khad. The police party followed the accused and apprehended him on the eastern bank of "chaki khad. However, none of the two witnesses, namely, PW-1 Surinder Singh and PW-2 Laxmi Singh have supported the version that the accused when noticed by them was crossing chaki khad or that he was followed by them and thereafter apprehended, PW-1 Surinder Singh has stated that when he alongwith the other two police constable was present near Gagan Crusher the accused carrying a Cany in his hand a bruptly met them. PW-2 Laxmi Singh has also made almost a similar statement. Chance meeting with the accused when the police is standing at a particular place is not the same as the apprehension of an accused who is noticed by the police while crossing a khad and is then followed and thereafter apprehended. Thus, the variance in the contents of Ruqua Ex. PB and the statements of the witnesses render the prosecution version suspicious as to the circumstances under which the accused was apprehended. 12. In a case where the case property is handled by different persons on different stages the prosecution is duty bound to prove that there was no tampering with the case property at any stage. In this case, there is no evidence on the record to show that the sample of the case property after haying been handed over to Constable Dalip Singh for being taken to Kandaghat was not tampered with in any manner by anyone during the period the sample remained in his possession nor there is evidence that when such sample was handed-over to him its seal etc. were not tampered with in any manner. 13. The seal used for sending the case property and the sample has not been produced to show that the case property which was produced in the Court was not tampered with during the period between its alleged seizure and production in the Court. 14. were not tampered with in any manner. 13. The seal used for sending the case property and the sample has not been produced to show that the case property which was produced in the Court was not tampered with during the period between its alleged seizure and production in the Court. 14. The benefit of these lapses in my view entitles the accused for benefit of doubt and hence for acquittal. 15. In view of the above though not agreeing with the reasons recorded by the trial Magistrate for acquittal of the accused, for the reasons stated hereinabove which otherwise entitle the accused for acquittal, the acquittal order is not interfered with. 16. As a result the appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds furnished by the accuse are discharged. Appeal dismissed.