Order.- The Petitioner in this case is being prosecuted for an offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Mr. Ullal appearing for him, contends that his prosecution was not preceded by the written consent of the authorities specified in section 20 of the Act. That section reads: " 20. Cognizance and trial of offences.-(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority. * * * * * * It is admitted that before the petitioner was prosecuted, the written consent of the State Government or a local authority which, in this case is the Municipal Corporation of Bangalore was not obtained. It appears that the prosecution was instituted by a Food Inspector appointed under section 9 of the Act. Mr. Subramanyam appearing on behalf of the prosecution contends that since the Food Inspector who instituted the prosecution was appointed by theState Government under section 9 of the Act, as Food Inspector for the purposts of the Act, even if the prosecution was not preceded by the Written consent required by section 20 there was substantial compliance with the provisions of that section. It has been pointed out by Mr. Ullal that the written consent in this ease was that given by the Commissioner of the Corporation. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 298 of 19611, this Court has held that since the Commissioner is, not alocal authority referred to in section 20, his written consent is not the written consent of a local authority, and that therefore a prosecution which was instituted with the written consent of the Commissioner was a defective prosecution. That being so it should be held even in this case that the Commissioner who gave the written consent had no authority to give it. The question which remains next to be considered is whether the fact that the Food Inspector started the prosecution can be of any assistance to Mr. Subramanyam. That being so it should be held even in this case that the Commissioner who gave the written consent had no authority to give it. The question which remains next to be considered is whether the fact that the Food Inspector started the prosecution can be of any assistance to Mr. Subramanyam. In my opinion, if the petitioner’s prosecution should have been commenced only with the written consent of the anthority specified in section 20, the fact that the food Inspector started the prosecution can hardly have any relevance, since the prosecution was not commenced with the required written consent of the authority competent to give such consent. But according to Mr. Subramanyam a notification was published by the State Government under section 9 on 26th August, 1958, appointing the person who started the prosecution in this case as a Food Inspector and that such appointment clothed the Food Inspector with the power to prosecute the petitioner even without the written consent specified in section 20 of the Act. I am unable to understand how the fact that some one was appointed as a Food Inspector under section 9 of the Act: can confer on him power to dispense with the written consent required by section 20 of the Act. In my opinion, the Food Inspector in this case did not have the authority to prosecute the petitioner without the previous written consent of the authority referred to in section 20 of the Act. I, therefore, allow this Revision Petition and quash the proceedings commenced against the petitioner in the Court below. S.V.S. ------ Petition allowed.