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1999 DIGILAW 1955 (MAD)

Narayana Shetty v. The State of Mysore

1999-11-30

T.K.TUKOL

body1999
Order: This is a petition by the accused who stands charge-sheeted in C.C.M. No. 582 of 1962 before the Additional District Munsif-cum-Magistrate, Coondapur, under section 12 (g) read with section 59 (b) of the Mysore Prohibition Act, 1961, for having consumed illicit liquor on 18th May, 1962 at 8-45 P.M. The main contention raised in the Revision Petition is that in the Mangalore District which formerly formed part of the Madras State, it was Madras Act X of 1937 that was in force and not the Mysore Prohibition Act, 1961, at the date of the offence complained of. In order to appreciate the force of this contention, it is necessary to refer to a few undisputed facts. By section 7(1) of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 the new State of Mysore comprising the territories mentioned therein came to be formed with effect from 1st November, 1956. Clause (d) mentions that the South Kanara District except Kasergod Taluka and the Amindivi Islands and Kollegal Taluka of Coimbatore District in the State of Madras came to be included in the territories of the new Mysore State. Section 119 of that Act provided that the provisions of Part II of the Act which provided for territorial changes and formation of new States “shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies and territorial references in any such law in an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day.” It cannot, therefore, be disputed that the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, continued to be in operation in the South Kanara District until a competent Legislature provided otherwise in the matter. The Mysore Legislature passed the Mysore Prohibition Act, 1961 (Mysore Act XVII of 1962) which received the assent of the President on the 12th day of April, 1962. Section 1 (2) of the Mysore Act provides that that Act shall “extend to the whole of the State of Mysore”. Section 1 (3) provides that it shall come into force at once in the areas in which any of the enactments mentioned in Schedule A is in force immediately prior to the commencement of this Act. Section 1 (2) of the Mysore Act provides that that Act shall “extend to the whole of the State of Mysore”. Section 1 (3) provides that it shall come into force at once in the areas in which any of the enactments mentioned in Schedule A is in force immediately prior to the commencement of this Act. Schedule A mentions four enactments which were repealed by section 129 of the Act. Those Acts are (1) The Mysore Prohibition Act, 1948, (2) The Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, (3) The Madras Prohibition Act, 1938 (Madras Act X of 1938) and (4) Coorg Prohibition Act, 1956. It cannot be disputed that except the Madras Prohibition Act, 1938, as mentioned in the Schedule the other three enactments had been in force in the different territories which now comprise the new Mysore State and have been wholly repealed since the date of enactment of Act XVII of 1962. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the enactment that was repealed by section 129 of the Mysore Act was the Madras Prohibition Act, 1938 and not the Act of 1937 which is the law on prohibition that prevailed in the entire State of Madras prior to the Re-organisation of States. It has been contended on behalf of the State that mention of the Madras Prohibition Act, 1938 (Madras Act X of 1938) was merely a clerical error and that the correct title of the Act that was repealed ought to have been Madras Prohibition Act, 1937 (Madras Act X of 1937). According to the contention of the learned Advocate, mention of the year 1938 in item No. 3 of the Schedule was a mistake and that the correct year should have been 1937. So it is necessary to determine whether it is Madras Act X of 1938 that was repealed by the Mysore Prohibition Act, 1961 (which is hereinafter called the Mysore Act) or whether in reality it was Madras Act X of 1937. Act X of 1938 was an Amending Act. So it is necessary to determine whether it is Madras Act X of 1938 that was repealed by the Mysore Prohibition Act, 1961 (which is hereinafter called the Mysore Act) or whether in reality it was Madras Act X of 1937. Act X of 1938 was an Amending Act. It only provided for omission of the words and figures “or specially approved as of medicinal value by the Medical Council established by the Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914” in the first paragraph of section 6 of Act X of 1937 and provided further for the insertion of clause (b) as it now stands and for consequent re-lettering of old clauses (b) and (c) as clauses (c) and (d) in the said section. With the incorporation of those provisions in the parent Act, Act X of 1938 exhausted itself. Reference may be made to the principle laid down in Shamrao v. Parulekar and others v. District Magistrate, Thana.1 It laid down that when an Act has been amended in such a way as to incorporate itself or a part of itself into the earlier Act, then the rule of construction is that the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed ‘except where that would lead to repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity ‘as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. In view of this legal position, there was no need for the Legislature to include Act X of 1938 in the Schedule. Even otherwise Act X of 1938 was formally repealed by Madras Act XIV of 1951. The Preamble to the Mysore Act reads that it is an act “to amend and consolidate the law relating to the promotion and enforcement of and carrying out the policy of prohibition in the State of Mysore .” So it is obvious that the Mysore Act is intended to amend and consolidate the different enactments relating to the enforcement of the policy of prohibition in force in the different areas of the Mysore State. If the Preamble is read with section 1 (2) of the Act which extends the new enactment to the whole of the State of Mysore, there should be little doubt in holding that since 12th April, 1962 the Mysore Act is the only law on prohibition in force in the entire State of Mysore. As observed above, section 119 of the States Re-organisation Act continued the different enactments in the different areas “until otherwise provided by competent Legislature or other competent authority”. Now that the Legislature has enacted one common enactment on prohibition, it would not be correct to contend that the Madras Act X of 1937 still continues to be in operation. The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that if it was the intention of the Legislature to repeal Act X of 1937, the Schedule would not have referred to Act X of 1938 and that even if it were held that there was an error, the Court had no power to effect a correction. He cited a number of authorities which deal with Court’s power to supply omissions in enactments and not with the power to correct apparent errors. The decision in C. Mallaappa & Sons v. The State of Mysore2 dealt with the scope of section 7 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act of 1957 as amended by Act XXXII of 1958 and the question urged before the High Court was that the expression ‘sales’ included ‘purchases’ as well. Their Lordships held that since the word ‘sales’ in the second para, of section 7 did not include ‘purchases’ and since the amendment of 1958 was not retrospective in operation, they could not accept the contention of the State that the expression ‘sales’ included ‘purchases as well. Their Lordships held that since the word ‘sales’ in the second para, of section 7 did not include ‘purchases’ and since the amendment of 1958 was not retrospective in operation, they could not accept the contention of the State that the expression ‘sales’ included ‘purchases as well. Reliance was also placed on a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ajit Kumar Roy v. Surendra Nath Ghose3 where the Court laid down that “The canons of construction of Statutes do not permit the Court to take the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the consequence of interpretation as a factor for deciding on the correct interpretation.” and that “If a statute contains a gap it is not for the Court to fill in but for the Legislature or else it will be mere speculation or guess work which the Court should avoid.” In Punjab Distilling Industries, Ltd., Khasa v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Simla4 the Punjab High Court dealt with the Court’s power of supplying an omission in an enactment and affirmed that “A casus omissus cannot be supplied by a Court, for that would amount to making laws. It is not the function of the Court to re-write a section or to amend a statutory provision with a view to translate the supposedly real intention of the framers of the Act, or on grounds of any inadvertance of the Legislature. It is not permissible to a Court to insert by implication any matter thought to be erroneoulsy left out by the Legislature as that would not be construing an Act, but altering or amending it.” In my opinion, none of these decisions is applicable to the facts of this case. As observed above, both the Madras Acts of 1937 and 1938 bore the same number viz., “X”. Madras Act X of 1938 was an amending Act and was repealed by the Madras Repealing and Amending Act of 1951 (Madras Act XIV of 1931). In construing any enactment, one of the principles to be borne in mind is that the Legislature is presumed not to have made a mistake and should be credited with the knowledge of law existing at the date of the new enactment on the same subject. It would be, therefore, too much to presume that the Legislature would include in Schedule A an enatment which had been repealed by competent Legislature as early as in 1951. It would be, therefore, too much to presume that the Legislature would include in Schedule A an enatment which had been repealed by competent Legislature as early as in 1951. I have noted above that the Mysore Act XVII of 1962 is a consolidating legislation. As observed by Craies, “consolidation is reduction into a systematic form of the whole of the statute law relating to a given subject.” At page 494 of “Craies on Statute Law” we find the following principle in dealing with mistake in Statutes: “But if there is an obvious misprint in an Act of Parliament the Courts will not be bound by the letter of the Act, but will take care that its plain meaning is carried out. ‘It is our duty’ said Tindal, C.J., in Everett v. Wells ‘neither to add to nor to take away from a statute, unless we see good grounds for thinking that the Legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to express.’” On the same page an instance is cited where an obvious mistake committed by the Legislature was rectified in construing the enactment. The same principle has been enunciated in ‘Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes ‘at page 243: “Clerical errors may be read as amended, as where, for instance, an Act refers to another by title and date, and mistakes the latter.” Here is a case where there is a mistake of the year in describing the relevant enactment. The legal position has been succinctly summerised by N.S. Bindra in ‘The Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Acts’ at page 138, 1951 Edition, as follows: “A Court of law is no doubt not authorised to supply a casus omissus or to alter the language of a statute for the purpose of supplying a meaning, even though they may be of opinion that a mistake has occurred in drawing up the Act, but it is an equally recognised principle of interpretation that where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftmens’ unskillfulness or ignorance of the law except in a case of necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used. When there is an error either of law or fact contained in a statute, their Lordships of the Pricy Council unequivocally affirmed the discretion which is reserved to the Judge in such a case......” For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that Madras Act X of 1938 having been repealed in 1951, it would be illogical to hold that the Mysore Legislature repealed it again in 1962, instead of repealing Madras Act X of 1937 which it was necessary to repeal for the purpose of promulgating in the entire Stat; as amended and consolidated uniform enactment on the subject of prohibition. The error in item No. 3 of Schedule A is a clerical error and the Court has got every power to rectify such an error. In the view I have taken , it is not necessary to consider the other arguments advanced by the learned Government Pleader with regard to simultaneous operation of two enactments on the same subject and the liberty of the State to prosecute an accused under the earlier or the later enactment. In my opinion, there is no substance in this Revision Petition and it is, therefore, rejected. S.V.S. ------ Petition dismissed.