Narasimha Iyengar v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore
1999-11-30
A.R.SOMNATH IYER
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
Order.- The petitioners in this Revision Petition who are the Branch Manager and the Secretary respectively of a Co-operative Society, were prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and convicted of that offence. They appealed from those convictions to the Sessions Judge, Bangalore, and that appeal was dismissed. Now, in this Revision Petition Mr. Mahendra appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that it was not possible for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence stated to have been committed by the accused since the prosecution for that offence was not instituted with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in that behalf by the State Government or local authority- as required by section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. That section reads: “20. Cognizance and trial of offences.-(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority. * * * * The written consent envisaged by this Section was, in this case, given by the Commissioner of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore and the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution in both the Courts below was that he was a local authority within the meaning of that expression occurring in the above section. Now, the expression”local authority“occurring in section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, is defined by section 2 (viii) of that Act, and that definition reads: ” 2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- * * * * * (viii) “local authority” means in the case of- (i) a local area which is- (a) a municipality, the municipal board or municipal corporation; (b) a cantonment, the cantonment authority; (c) a notified area, the notified area committee; (2) any other local area, such authority as may be prescribed by the State Government under this Act; * * * * * It is not the case for the prosecution that the prosecution was preceded by the written consent of the State Government or of a person authorised in that behalf by the State Government or local authority.
The case for the prosecution was that the Commissioner of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore was himself a local authority and that therefore his wirtten consent was the written consent of a local authority The short question, therefore is whether the Commissioner of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore, is a local authority for the purpose of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The determination of that question mustdepend entirely upon the definition of alocal authority, contained in section 2 (viii) of that Act. Since the load area to which this case relates is a municipality, the local authority for that area as provided by the definition contained in this clause is the Municipal Corporation of the municipality. That being so the local authority in this case was the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bangalore and not the Commissioner of that Corporation as contended by Mr. Sathyanarayana Rao appearing on behalf of the prosecution,- I am not impressed by the argument addressed by Mr. Sathyanarayana Rao. that there is anything in either section 4 or section 9 or section 423 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act which can assist his argument. Section 4 on which Mr. Sathyanarayana Rao first relies enumerates the authorities changed with the carrying out of the provisions of the Corporation Act and one of those authorities is the Commissioner. If the Commissioner is one of the authorities charged by that section with the duty of carrying out the provisions of the Corporation Act, he does not and cannot become a substitute for the Corporation. Section 9 on which reliance is next placed merely states that the executive power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Corporation Act shall vest in the Commissioner. Section 423 on which also reliance was placed empowers the Commissioner to commence proceedings againstany person who is charged with an offence against the Corporation Act or to withdraw from them. It is clear that the duties assigned to:he Commissioner under each of these three sections are duties which may be performed under the Corporation Act and the fact that the Commissioner can do so cannot make him a substitute for the Corporation for the purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
It is clear that the duties assigned to:he Commissioner under each of these three sections are duties which may be performed under the Corporation Act and the fact that the Commissioner can do so cannot make him a substitute for the Corporation for the purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. For the purpose of that Act the local authority in the present case was the statutory body constituted by the City of Bangalore Municipal Coporation Act and not the Commissioner who was charged with the duty of carrying out the provisions of that Act or in whom was vested the executive power of the Corporation for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of that Act. Even the power residing in the Commissioner under section 423 of the Act is the power to commence proceedings in respect of the offences committed under the Corporation Act and not the power to commence a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which resides exclusively in the local authority which is the Corporation in this case. It is not in my opinion permissible for Mr. Satyanarayana Rao to ask me to look into the provisions of the Corporation Act for the purpose of deciding whether the Commissioner is a local authority for the purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. For the purpose of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act no one but the Corporation is the local authority in this case and So long as the prosecution in the present case was not preceded by the written consent of the local authority it cannot be considered as one validly commenced. This Revision Petition must, therefore, succeed. The conviction of the petitioners and the sentence passed on them have to be and are set aside. They are acquitted of the offence with which they are charged. The fines, if paid, shall be refunded. S.V.S. ----- Petition allowed.