D. B. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) -THIS application under section 115 CPC is directed against an order passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd court on 15. 9. 94 in J. Misc. Case 10 of 1993 restoring J. Misc. Case 12 of 1991. ( 2 ) THE opposite party filed the J. Misc. case 12 of 1991 claiming pre-emption under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The said Misc. case was fixed for final hearing on 18. 3. 93. On that date, the Misc. case was dismissed for default by order No. 18 dated 18. 3. 93 which reads as under:"both parties file hajira. Today is fixed for P. H. Learned lawyer for the plaintiff stated before me in open court that he has no instruction from his client except it. Plaintiff is absent on repeated calls. So the case is liable to be dismissed. It is now 11-00 a. m. Hence, it is ordered that the misc. case be and the same is dismissed for default. " ( 3 ) THE opposite party filed on 20. 3. 93 an application supported by affidavit under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC praying for setting aside of the aforesaid order of dismissal of the application for pre-emption and for the restoration thereof and the said application was registered as J. Misc. Case No. 10 of 1993. ( 4 ) THE opposite party's case made out in the application may be stated as follows. The pre-emptor after filing hazira before the court was ready for hearing of the misc. case. He was waiting for the call but the court did not make any call in connexion with the hearing of the case upto 4 p. m. and when he approached his moharaj to know the next date of the case, he came to learn that the said misc. case was already dismissed. He then brought it to the notice of his advocate who pleaded his ignorance about such dismissal. His advocate through whom he filed the hazira in court had full instructions from him and did not make any submission before the court that he had no instructions as recorded in the order of dismissal. Such submission regarding want of instructions might have been made by some other lawyer and not by the lawyer who was at the material point time conducting the case on behalf of the pre-emptor. Such submission regarding want of instructions might have been made by some other lawyer and not by the lawyer who was at the material point time conducting the case on behalf of the pre-emptor. The pre-emptor was waiting outside the court room for call on that particular day from 10-30 a. m. to 4 p. m. Had it been called, the pre-emptor would have called his advocate and got ready for hearing. The misc. case was dismissed not for any latches or negligence on the part of the pre-emptor opposite party. ( 5 ) THE pre-emptee petitioner opposed this application for setting aside the dismissal order on filing a written objection contending, inter alia, that the allegations are directed against the court which are totally false and baseless and as such the application is not liable to be restored. It has been contended, inter alia, that the pre-emptor's advocate was Hrisikesh Giri who is the President of Pleaders' Bar Association and his law clerk was Sital Chandra Samanta. Although the Pre-emptor, O. P's hazira was there, he was not found present in court by the present petitioner till 11-30 a. m. on 18. 3. 93. After 11-30 a. m, this petitioner left for his home knowing that the Misc. case was dismissed. The case was repeatedly called on from 10. 30 a. m. through court peon but in spite of such calls the pre-emptor was not present nor did he respond to the call whereupon the court through its peon sent for the pre-emptor's advocate who appeared and in open court submitted that he had no instructions from the pre-emptor and it was under these circumstances that the order of dismissal was passed. The pre-emptor has not come with clean hands and the application is liable to be rejected with costs. ( 6 ) BOTH parties examined themselves as witnesses for and against their respective cases. The pre-emptor asserted that on the date fixed for hearing he filed his hazira and was present. He claims that he was waiting outside the court room and did not hear any call. After the court hours, he came to know that his case had been dismissed for default. According to him, he apprised his lawyer about the dismissal. His further evidence is that he did not file any hazira through Hrisikesh Giri. He claims that he was waiting outside the court room and did not hear any call. After the court hours, he came to know that his case had been dismissed for default. According to him, he apprised his lawyer about the dismissal. His further evidence is that he did not file any hazira through Hrisikesh Giri. During his cross-examination it transpired that Hrisikesh Giri was his appointed lawyer and that he did not take any permission of the court before cancelling the engagement of Mr. Giri. During cross-examination it also transpired that he changed his mohorars thrice. The pre-emptee petitioner deposed to the effect that the pre-emptor filed the case for pre-emption through Advocate Hrisikesh Giri. He claims that he did not see the pre-emptor in court on the date of hearing. He wanted to say that on being sent for by the court through its peon Mr. Hrisikesh Giri, the advocate came and submitted before the court that he had no communication with his client and that on the basis of such statement by Mr. Girl, the case was dismissed for default. During cross-examination, the pre-emptee could not name the lawyer through whom the pre-emptor prayed for adjournment on the previous occasion. He pleaded his ignorance as to whether any other lawyer was engaged by the pre-emptor besides Mr. Girl. He also pleaded his ignorance as to whether the pre-emptor filed hazira on 18. 3. 93. ( 7 ) UPON consideration of the materials on record, the learned court by its impugned order dated 15. 9. 94 allowed the application for restoration and restored the earlier Misc. Case to its original filed and number awarding an amount of Rs. 100/- as costs against the pre-emptor. The court found it be an admitted fact that the hazira was filed for the pre-emptor on the date of hearing. The court also observed that it has not been established beyond doubt that the learned lawyer for the petitioner in the pre-emption case consulted the pre-empter prior to that date. Only on these two grounds, the learned court below jumped to the conclusion that the pre-emptor's non-appearance before the court in spite of calls could be condoned and accordingly, allowed the application for restoration. ( 8 ) BEING aggrieved by this order of restoration, the pre-emptee party has come up in revision. Only on these two grounds, the learned court below jumped to the conclusion that the pre-emptor's non-appearance before the court in spite of calls could be condoned and accordingly, allowed the application for restoration. ( 8 ) BEING aggrieved by this order of restoration, the pre-emptee party has come up in revision. The impugned order has been characterised as illegal, improper and perverse and it has been alleged that no sufficient cause was made out in the application for restoration. ( 9 ) MR. Pratik Prakash Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party here made the following submissions. The instant revisional application is not maintainable in as much as under section 9 (6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, and appeal lay before the District Judge against the order of dismissal of the pre-emption case and as such, no revision under section 115 CPC lies. On merits, Mr. Banerjee contended that no exception should be taken to the impugned order whereby the pre-emptor's application for preemption was restored and the pre-emptor was given an opportunity of hearing. Mr. Banerjee submits that the order of dismissal of the application for pre-emption ex parte entails mis-carriage of justice and the impugned order could not prejudicially affect the pre-emptee petitioner. After all, by restoring the pre-emption case, the pre-emption case was not being allowed. The pre-emptor was thereby given opportunity to address the court on merits and the pre-emptor would succeed or fail as the merits of the pre-emption case warranted. Mr. Banerjee even referred to two vakalatnamas appearing at pages 23 and 44 of the lower court record wherefrom it would appear that initially Mr. Hrishikesh Giri was engaged by the pre-emptor as his lawyer to conduct the pre-emption case and that subsequently one Sukumar Panda was appointed his advocate on 19. 12. 92. Mr. Banerjee referred to Rule 371 of High Court Civil Rules and Orders and argued that it makes the presiding Judge of a court responsible for the correctness of the entries in the order sheet. The order of dismissal of the pre-emption case records the fact that hazira was filed also on behalf of the pre-emptor on that date. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the said hazira was, however, not traceable from the lower court record; but then, Mr. The order of dismissal of the pre-emption case records the fact that hazira was filed also on behalf of the pre-emptor on that date. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the said hazira was, however, not traceable from the lower court record; but then, Mr. Banerjee submits that even in the absence of the hazira it must be presumed that the hazira was actually filed on behalf of the pre-emptor on that date as the court has recorded it in the said order of dismissal. He also argued that if it be a fact that the hazira was filed, the pre-emptor's authorised advocate must have had the instructions from the pre-emptor and the fact that the learned lawyer for the pre-emptor submitted before the court that he had no instructions from his client as recorded in the order was not reconcilable with the fact that hazira was filed. Mr. Banerjee also referred to two decisions reported in AIR 1995 Cal 69 : Ajoy Kumar Rit v. Iswar Dharma Thakur and 1997 Lab I C 69 : Akhilesh Gupta v. Jamalpur Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society Limited. Finally, Mr. Banerjee submitted that this is not a case which warrants interference with the impugned order of restoration of the pre-emption case. ( 10 ) MR. Pradip Kr. Chakraborty, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, cited a decision reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 299 : Samarendra Jana v. Basanta Kumar Shit and submitted that the Munsiff dealing with an application for pre-emption under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is a civil court having all the powers of a civil court and not a forum designata. He submitted that under order 43 Rule 1 (c), an appeal lies against an order under Order 9 Rule 9 rejecting an application for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit and that there is no appeal against an order allowing the restoration of a suit dismissed for default and as such, the present revision is maintainable. He submits that the order of dismissal of the pre-emption case recording the submission of the pre-emptor's advocate that he had no instructions must be presumed to be correct and the allegations to the contrary at the instance of the pre-emptor are not entertainable. He submits that the order of dismissal of the pre-emption case recording the submission of the pre-emptor's advocate that he had no instructions must be presumed to be correct and the allegations to the contrary at the instance of the pre-emptor are not entertainable. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even if the hazira were filed on behalf of the pre-emptor, it does not necessarily give rise to a presumption that the pre-emptor was physically present in court. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the learned Munsif was not justified in restoring the pre-emption case. ( 11 ) IN view of the decision reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 299 , the learned Munsif entertaining a pre-emption case under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act cannot be called a persona designata. It is now settled that the Munsif entertaining a pre-emption application and disposing of that application under section 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act does not act as a persona designata and acts as a civil court. If a Munsif can set aside the order of pre-emption passed ex parte by invoking the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, there is no reason why he cannot invoke the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 in order to set aside an order whereby he dismissed the application for pre-emption for default in appearance. It is true that sections 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act do not specifically prescribe the procedure to be adopted by a Munsif when he finds either of the parties to a pre-emption case under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act or both the parties absent on the date or at the time when he takes up the pre-emption case for hearing. It is also true that the said sections of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act do not also prescribe the procedure to be adopted when he dismisses the pre-emption case only for default in appearance of the pre-emptor and not on merits. It is also true that the said sections of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act do not also prescribe the procedure to be adopted when he dismisses the pre-emption case only for default in appearance of the pre-emptor and not on merits. A Munsif having territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application for pre-emption under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act is, in my view, for all practical purposes a civil court with all the power to be exercised by a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code unless the West Bengal Land Reforms Act prescribes a particular procedure to the contrary to be followed by the Munsif and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is silent as to what a Munsif is to do when he finds the pre-emptor absent at the time of hearing of the pre-emption case. Certainly, he is to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Order 9 Rule 8 CPC and for the instant case, the learned Munsif while dismissing the pre-emption case for default in appearance on the part of the pre-emptor dismissed it virtually under Order 9 Rule 8 and the pre-emptor accordingly prayed for setting aside the order of dismissal and for restoration of the pre-emption case by filling and application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. Under order 43 Rule 1, an order allowing an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is not available. As such, the objection that no revision lies under section 115 CPC against the impugned order is not sustainable. It is true that sub-section (6) of section 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act confers a right of appeal upon a party aggrieved by an order of the Munsiff under section 9. A reading of section 9 makes it clear that the order contemplated under sub-section (6) of section 9 is an order disposing of an application under section 8 of the Land Reforms Act on merits and not one dismissing the application for default. In such view of the matter, it cannot be said that an appeal lay to the District Judge under sub section (6) of section 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act against the order dated 18. 3. 93 dismissing the pre-emption case for default. The fact remains that the pre-emptor did appoint two learned advocates at two different points of time. 3. 93 dismissing the pre-emption case for default. The fact remains that the pre-emptor did appoint two learned advocates at two different points of time. From the two vakalatnamas available from the lower court record it would appear that Mr. Hrishikesh Giri was his erstwhile lawyer for the pre-emption case but subsequently in 1992, that is to say, long before the date of hearing of the pre-emption case, Mr. Sukumar Panda was engaged by him as his lawyer. Had it been the case that both Mr. Sukumar Panda and Mr. Hrisikesh Giri were engaged to be his lawyers at the time when be engaged Mr. S. Panda as his lawyer, the earlier vakalatnama executed in favour of Mr. H. Giri should have been accepted by Mr. S. Panda instead of accepting a fresh Vakalatnama being executed in his favour. It is true that there is nothing on record to suggest that the pre-emptor engaged the subsequent lawyer with the leave or consent of his previous lawyer. It seems that on 18. 3. 93 Mr. S. Panda was representing the pre-emptor. It is the positive case of the pre-emptee petitioner that Mr. Hrisikesh Giri was sent for by the court through peon and he appeared before the court on 18. 3. 93 to make the submission to the effect that he had no instructions from his client. Such submission does fit in with the circumstance that the pre-emptor was no longer communicating to his erstwhile lawyer Mr. Hrisikesh Giri because of the fact that he had since engaged another lawyer Mr. S. Panda to conduct his case. After all, it is not the case of the pre-emptee that Mr S. Panda came before the court to submit that he had no instructions from his client. ( 12 ) IN AIR 1995 Calcutta 370, the counsel for the petitioner in a revisional application under section 115 CPC was engaged in another court and accordingly it was not possible for him to attend the court at the time of hearing of the application and the court heard only the counsel for the opposite party and disposed of the application on merits. It was held that the revisional application could be recalled to avoid substantial injustice to the said party. It was held that the revisional application could be recalled to avoid substantial injustice to the said party. ( 13 ) IN 1997 Lab IC 69, it has been held that the courts have a procedural power of review apart from the substantive power and that if a person could not appear before the court as a result hereof principles of natural justice have been violated, there cannot be any doubt that the court may recall its order. ( 14 ) THUS, having regard to the factual metrix involved in this case as also the provisions of law discussed above. I am of the view that the order of restoration of the Misc. case for pre-emption was calculated to subserve the ends of justice and to avoid mis-carriage of justice. As such, there is no scope for interference with the impugned order of restoration of the pre-emption case. The application is thus allowed on contest but in the circumstances without any cost. Let the lower court records be sent down forthwith. Xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given expeditiously. Application allowed.