Judgment :- The impugned order dated 18-8-1998 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 158 of 1998 in C.C. No. 227 of 1997 on the file of learned Principal Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner/accused in the case for the offences under sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, requesting for summoning of the documents under section 91, Cr.P.C. is under the challenge before this Court in this Revision. 2. The short facts, which are relevant for the disposal of this Revision, are summarised as follows :- "The petitioner was working as Junior Telecom Officer, Flower Bazaar External IV Exchange, Madras Telephones. He was arrested in the above case for having allegedly received a bribe of Rs. 500/-. The C.B.I., the respondent after finishing investigation and on obtaining sanction, filed the case before the trial Court, which was taken on file in C.C. No. 227/97 for the offences under sections 7 and 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. P.W. 1, Mrs. Kalavathy, the Deputy General Manager, who granted sanction for prosecution, was examined on 6-7-1998 before the trial Court. Through her Ex. P1 sanction order was marked. During the course of cross examination, it was pointed out to the witness that the sanction order does not contain the date on which the said order was passed. After the cross-examination was over, on the same day, with the permission of the Court she was examined further in chief, through whom Ex. P2, which is a covering letter dated 7-11-1996 sent by P.W. 1 to the Director of Vigilance along with the sanction (order) Ex. P1, was marked. On 10-7-1998 the petitioner/accused filed an application under section 91, Cr.P.C. stating that in Ex. P2, the covering letter sent by P.W. 1, the sanctioning authority to the Director of Vigilance, there is a reference about the letter of Director of Vigilance and that copy must be summoned to the Court. In the same petition, he also sought to summon the Advice Note Register for the months of June and July, 1996 in order to recall again P.W. 1 to effectively cross-examine her. This petition was resisted by the respondent through Public Prosecutor by filing a counter. It is stated in the counter that Ex. In the same petition, he also sought to summon the Advice Note Register for the months of June and July, 1996 in order to recall again P.W. 1 to effectively cross-examine her. This petition was resisted by the respondent through Public Prosecutor by filing a counter. It is stated in the counter that Ex. P2, the covering letter sent by P.W. 1 to the Director of Vigilance along with the sanction order was marked only to show the date of sanction and that, therefore, the letter written by the Director to P.W. 1 does not have any relevance so as to cross-examine P.W. 1, further. It is also sated in the counter that these documents are only official communication between the Officers of different sections and the petitioner is not the author or receiver of these documents and as such, the petition was filed by the accused in order to protract the proceedings of the case. After considering the submissions made by the respective counsel appearing on either side, the trial Court dismissed the application mainly on the ground that those documents referred to in the petition are not relevant and as such, the summoning of those documents is not called for." 3. While attacking the said order, the counsel for the petitioner reiterating the submissions made before the trial Court, would state that in order to give a fair and free opportunity to the accused to defend the case, the trial Court ought to have summoned those documents which are of vital and inescapable requirement for the defence in order to disprove the case of prosecution. 4. The counsel for the respondent, while referring the reasonings in the impugned order, also would contend that these documents sought to be summoned are all official communication between the officers concerned and they shall not be compelled to disclose the communication, as it is covered under section 124 of the Evidence Act. 5. I have carefully considered the contentions urged on either side. 6. P.W. 1, who granted the sanction, was examined on 6-7-1998. When the question was put to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination, she would admit that the sanction order did not contain the date on which she signed the sanction. Therefore, in order to show the date of the sanction, with permission of the Court, P.W. 1 was examined further in chief and a covering letter Ex. When the question was put to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination, she would admit that the sanction order did not contain the date on which she signed the sanction. Therefore, in order to show the date of the sanction, with permission of the Court, P.W. 1 was examined further in chief and a covering letter Ex. P2, dated 7-11-1996 was marked, that too, with the consent of the counsel for the defence. Ex. P2 is a letter addressed to the Director of Vigilance intimating to the Director the enclosure of sanction. Though this covering letter is not necessary document, it was allowed to be filed in order to show the date on which the sanction was granted. On 10-7-1998 the petitioner filed an application under S. 91, Cr.P.C. requesting for summoning of two documents, one is the letter by Director of Vigilance to the sanctioning authority which is referred to in Ex. P2 and Advice Note Register to be summoned from the Sub-Divisional Engineer, Flower Bazaar External-IV, Flower Bazaar Telephone Exchange in order to cross-examine P.W. 1 who granted sanction. 7. Section 91(1), Cr.P.C. reads as follows :- "Whenever any Court or any officer-in-charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court, or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order." 8. A perusal of the provisions of Section 91 of Cr.P.C. discloses that this section confers power on the Court to summon any document, if the Court finds that the summoning of such a document is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. The word "whenever" with which Section 91 begins indicates that the Court is empowered to do so whenever the Court finds it necessary or desirable to act upon that provision irrespective of the stage. 9. It is settled law that summoning of document is purely a matter concerned with the discretion of the trial Court. But, the discretion shall be exercised properly and judicially. 9. It is settled law that summoning of document is purely a matter concerned with the discretion of the trial Court. But, the discretion shall be exercised properly and judicially. In other words, the trial Court must satisfy itself whether the document on which the accused seeks to rely has a bearing upon or is irrelevant to the case. If, upon satisfying itself that the document has no bearing, the trial Court is well within its powers to decline the prayer and the same can be deemed that it has exercised its discretion judicially. It is also held that while exercising this power, the trial Court should not indulge in fishing or roving enquiry. 10. In the light of the above principle, this Court is constrained to go into the reasonings of the impugned order. 11. It is the definite finding by the trial Court that the covering letter Ex. P2 was marked only for showing the date on which the sanction was sent, since the sanction order does not contain the date of sanction. The letter by the Director of Vigilance addressed to the sanctioning authority mentioned in the covering letter Ex. P2 will have no bearing so as to summon the said documents. 12. In fact, the said letter by the Director of Vigilance, which is referred to in Ex. P2, has been produced before this Court. This letter is only a requisition to grant sanction on the basis of various documents sent along with that to the sanctioning authority for perusal and granting sanction. The very same details have been given by P.W. 1 in the chief examination itself. P.W. 1 would state about what are all the documents which were referred to her for perusal and to take a decision, as to whether to grant sanction or not. 13. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the first document, the letter sent by the Director of Vigilance sought to be summoned by the petitioner has no relevance and it is not desirable for the trial Court to summon the same. 14. The next document is Advice Note Register for the months of June and July, 1996 which is in the custody of the Sub-divisional Engineer, Flower Bazaar External IV, Flower Bazaar Telephone Exchange. 14. The next document is Advice Note Register for the months of June and July, 1996 which is in the custody of the Sub-divisional Engineer, Flower Bazaar External IV, Flower Bazaar Telephone Exchange. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that though there is a reasoning in the impugned order with reference to the rejection of first document, the trial Court did not refer anything about the second document, namely Advice Note Register. 15. Though this document has not been specifically referred to in the impugned order, it is observed by the trial Court that both the documents referred to in the petition have no bearing to cross-examine P.W. 1 with respect to Ex. P2. Furthermore, there is no reason mentioned in the petition itself filed before the trial Court by the petitioner as to why the said second document should be summoned from the Telephone Exchange to cross-examine P.W. 1. 16. It is pointed out by the Counsel for the petitioner that under Section 162 of the Evidence Act, the witnesses can be summoned to produce those documents before the Court notwithstanding any objection with reference to their production and validity of the said objection can be decided by the Court. 17. Since the objection was raised by the prosecution in the light of Section 124 of the Evidence Act, the said documents were produced before this Court. On a perusal, it is found that those documents are confidential document communicated by one public officer to another public officer. Therefore, in may view, the objection raised by the prosecution could be upheld. 18. Though on the strength of the decision in Dr. Raghotham, In Re, (1963) 1 Andh WR 85 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 253) the counsel for the petitioner would submit that the revisional powers of this Court could be exercised as against the impugned order refusing to summon the documents, I am not inclined to exercise the same, as, in my view, the petitioner has not established that those documents are necessary and desirable to summon, more particularly when in the impugned order a finding has been given that those documents have no bearing to the point in issue in the present case. 19. In that view of the matter, this revision fails, as I do not find any infirmity in the order challenged. Hence, the revision is dismissed. 19. In that view of the matter, this revision fails, as I do not find any infirmity in the order challenged. Hence, the revision is dismissed. Consequently, Crl.M.P. No. 8094 of 1998 is also dismissed. Revision dismissed.