JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J. 1. Appellants Indra Bahadur Singh and Shobhnath Singh have been convicted under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 2. Deceased Seema was married to appellant Indra Bahadur Singh in the year 1987. She sustained burn injuries on 27.2.1990 and died on 3.3.1990. 3. The prosecution case is that on 27.2.1990 Seema poured kerosene oil on her and set her ablaze. She was taken to the hospital. She lodged report Ex. P21 while she was in the hospital. Her dying declaration was recorded by Shri Emil Lakda (PW 10), Dy Collector and Executive Magistrate on 27.2.1990. That is Ex. P19. Her dying declaration was again recorded on 28.2.1990 by Shri R.R. Meshram (PW 11) who was Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate. That dying declaration is Ex. P20. Deceased Seema had written three letters; Ex. P2, Ex. P7 and Ex. P8 to her father complaining about the demand of dowry and harassment which was being caused to her by the appellants. 4. The accused persons pleaded not guilty. Their defence was that Seema died on account of accidental fire. 5. The Trial Court after appreciation of evidence on record held that the charge against the appellants is proved. 6. In this appeal it is argued that the two dying declarations of the deceased are not reliable as no certificate was obtained from the Doctor on duty that Seema was in a fit mental condition to make her statement. It is also argued that there is no sufficient evidence to connect the appellant No. 2 Shobhnath Singh with this crime. 7. The evidence on record has been carefully scrutinized by this Court. Ex. P 19 is the first dying declaration made by the deceased before the Execution Magistrate. It is reproduced as under : "xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx" 8. Shri Emil Lakda (PW10) has deposed that on 27.2.1990 he was Dy. Collector and Executive Magistrate at Ambikapur. He was on election duty in village Khargawan. There was no Executive Magistrate of that area available on that day as he was on election duty elsewhere. He was requested by C.S.P. Chirmiri to record the dying declaration of Seema. Therefore, he went to the hospital. He enquired from the Doctor whether she is in a fit condition to give her statement. There was no Executive Magistrate of that area available on that day as he was on election duty elsewhere. He was requested by C.S.P. Chirmiri to record the dying declaration of Seema. Therefore, he went to the hospital. He enquired from the Doctor whether she is in a fit condition to give her statement. He was told by the Doctor that she can give her statement. She was on the bed. He talked to her and he found that she was able to give satisfactory replies to his questions. Thereafter he recorded her dying declaration. He has admitted that he did not take the certificate of the Doctor on duty on the paper on which he recorded the dying declaration. The statement given by the deceased marked as Ex. P19 shows that it is coherent and consistent. It furnishes an inbuilt assurance that the declarant was fully conscious and was not suffering from any confusion or hallucination. The absence of the certificate of the Doctor on Ex. P19 is not fatal. The requirement of law is that the Magistrate recording the dying declaration should be satisfied that the person making the statement is understanding the implications of the words being used by her. In the present case there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Emil Lakda (PW 10) on the point that he had satisfied himself after consulting the Doctor and after enquiry from the declarant that she was in a fit and sound state of body and mind to make the declaration. The dying declaration Ex. PI9 is fully reliable : 9. Shri R.R. Meshram (PW 11) is Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate. He has deposed that on 28.2.1990 he had recorded the statement of Seema as per Ex. P20. That is also reproduced as under : "xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx" 10. Shri R.R. Meshram (PW 11) has also stated that he did not take the certificate of the Doctor on the statement Ex. P20. 11. The two dying declarations made by Seema as per Ex. P19 and Ex. P20 go to show that Seema was being subjected to cruelty by her husband. There was quarrel between the two shortly before the incident. He was dissatisfied with the tilings given by his father-in-law and he used to beat her. This is the reason that drove her to commit suicide. P19 and Ex. P20 go to show that Seema was being subjected to cruelty by her husband. There was quarrel between the two shortly before the incident. He was dissatisfied with the tilings given by his father-in-law and he used to beat her. This is the reason that drove her to commit suicide. In the first dying declaration Seema has not said anything against appellant Shobhnath Singh. It is only in the second dying declaration Ex. P20 she has stated that appellant Shobhnath Singh who was her uncle-in-law used to say that she has brought less dowry. 12. The report Ex. P21 lodged by deceased Seema and recorded by Jayant Verma (PW 12), Sub-Inspector of Police, subtantially incorporates the statement which she has made in her formal dying declaration. 13. Dr. Sunil Singh (PW 13) has deposed that he had examined Seema on 27.2.1990 and found that there were 89% burns on her body. His report is Ex. P23. He did not record the statement of Seema. She was semi-conscious. He avoided to reply the question whether in his opinion she was in a fit condition to make the statement. 14. Lavkush Prasad Mishra (DW 1) is a neighbour of the appellants. He has stated that Seema had told him before she was taken to the hospital that she has caught fire while cooking food. 15. After considering trie entire material relating to the dying declarations made by Seema, this Court is of the opinion that this piece of evidence is fully reliable. 16. It is now firmly well settled from a series of the decisions of the Supreme Court commencing trom Khushalrao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 , to Najjam v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1998 SC 683=IV (1997) CCR 105 (SC), that dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable. While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. It is this premise which is considered strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and be cross-examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and it is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by other an i the Court on strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like any other piece of evidence-neither extra strong nor weak-and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable. The maxim is : "A man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth". A dying declaration made by the victim in a fit mental condition and on the verge of death has a special sanctity; at the solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make an untrue statement; the shadow of impending death is itself the guarantee of the truth of his declaration as to the cause of circumstances leading to his death; a dying declaration is almost sacrosanct. 17. As already stated, in the present case the dying declarations made by Seema to Shri Emil Lakda (PW 10), Executive Magistrate is voluntary and true. It has been properly recorded. 18. Chandra Shekhar Singh (PW 1) is father of the deceased. He has deposed that the letters Ex. P2, Ex. P7 and Ex. P8 were written to him by Seema. He has deposed that there was a demand of motor-cycle, colour TV. and cash. It has been properly recorded. 18. Chandra Shekhar Singh (PW 1) is father of the deceased. He has deposed that the letters Ex. P2, Ex. P7 and Ex. P8 were written to him by Seema. He has deposed that there was a demand of motor-cycle, colour TV. and cash. He has denied the suggestion that the letter Ex. P2 has been forged by adding certain words. The Trial Court has compared this letter with other letters of the deceased and has held that the whole of the letter Ex. P2 is in the hand-writing of Seema. The Trial Court h&s rightly rejected the evidence of M.R. Deshpande (DW 2) on this point. He is said to be a hand-writing expert. The direct evidence of the father of the deceased is preferable to the opinion evidence of the said expert. Ram Kumar Gupta (PW 3) has been declared hostile. Santosh Singh (PW 4) is the mother of the deceased. She has corroborated the testimony of her husband. 19. From the evidence discussed above, it is found that the conviction of appellant Indra Bahadur Singh for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is well founded. His wife Seema committed suicide within seven years of her marriage. She was subjected to cruelty by him soon before her death. She was being harassed for bringing less dowry. The ingredients of offence of "dowry death" are fulfilled. 20. So far as appellant Shobhnath Singh is concerned he is uncle-in-law of the deceased. The prosecution evidence against him is not of clinching character. In the first dying declaration Ex. P 19 made by the deceased to the Executive Magistrate, there is no allegation against him. The evidence of the father of the deceased against appellant Shobhnath Singh is not satisfactory. In case the deceased had been harassed or treated with cruelty by the appellant Shobhnath Singh she would not have spared him in the first dying declaration. It is true that she has made a statement against him in the second dying declaration-Ex. P20. In such a situation appellant Shobhnath Singh deserves the benefit of reasonable doubt. The charge against him is not established beyond reasonable doubt. 21. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of appellant Shobhnath Singh are set aside. It is true that she has made a statement against him in the second dying declaration-Ex. P20. In such a situation appellant Shobhnath Singh deserves the benefit of reasonable doubt. The charge against him is not established beyond reasonable doubt. 21. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of appellant Shobhnath Singh are set aside. The conviction of appellant Indra Bahadur Singh under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case his sentence is reduced from rigorous imprisonment of 10 years to 7 years.