Judgment.- These two appeals are against the Judgment of the Special Judge, S.P.E. Cases, at Secunderabad, in C.C. No. 19 of 1959 on his file. There were three accused in that case, namely, B.N. Murthy, the appellant in C.A. No. 394 of 1960, who was A-1, C. Narayana, the appellant in C.A. No. 397 of 1960, who was A-2, and D.K. Chandraiah, who was A-3. A-3 was acquitted by the lower Court and we are not concerned with A-3 in these proceedings since there is no appeal relating to him. Six charges were framed against the accused as follows: Charge No. Accused. Section. 1. A-1 to A-3 Under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, alleging that the three accused conspired together with the object of depriving the Central Government of its legitimate revenue by A-1 issuing bogus permits and making illegal transport of tobacco and with the object of cheating one Bhupathi Chetty of Madras by making him part with monies. 2. A-1 Under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d)of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Central Act II of 1947) for having issued permits (Exhibits P-3 and P-4) in T.P. 1 form to A-2 and thereby committing criminal misconduct. 3. A-1 Under section 109 read with section 420, Indian Penal Code, for abetment of the main offence which is concerned in charge No. 4. 4. A-2 For cheating Bhupathi Chetty of Madras, whose clerk is P.W. 13, by fraudulently selling to him non-duty paid tobacco under T.P. 1 permit (Exhibit P-3) and on the foot of it obtaining a fresh permit (Exhibit P-13) and transporting tobacco and making Bhupathi Chetty pay a sum of Rs. 1,017-9-6. 5. A-2 Under section 109 read with sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Central Act II of 1947), namely, abetment of the main offence which is concerned in charge No. 2. 6. A-3 Under section 420, Indian Penal Code, for cheating Bhupathi Chetty of Madras and selling to him non-duty paid tobacco by making false representation that it was duty paid tobacco and thereby obtaining from him a sum of Rs. 943-1-8. The learned Special Judge convicted A-1 of charge No. 2 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 50 and in default for rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. He convicted A-2 of charge No. 5 and awarded him a similar sentence. 943-1-8. The learned Special Judge convicted A-1 of charge No. 2 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 50 and in default for rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. He convicted A-2 of charge No. 5 and awarded him a similar sentence. He acquitted A-1 to A-3 of charge No. 3 relying on the decision of this Court in Kandimalla Subbiah, In re1: The correctness of that decision was doubted by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. in G.R. Macfarland, In re2. Subsequently, that decision was set aside by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra v. Kandimalla Subbiah and another3. The learned Special Judge, relying on the same decision of this Court in Kandimalla Subbiah, In re1, returned the complaint by an order in para. 50 of his Judgment as follows: “So far as it relates to charge No. 3 against A-1........charge No. 4 against A-2 and charge No. 6 against A-3........the complaint will be returned to the S.P.E., Hyderabad, who filed the charge-sheet in this case.” A-1 has filed G.A. No. 394 of 1960 and A-2 has filed C.A. No. 397 of 1960 against the respective conviction and sentence. At the outset, the learned Public Prosecutor raised a preliminary contention to the effect that the entire trial by the Special Judge, Secunderabad, was void and that his Judgment was illegal in view of the fact that the Special Judge, Secunderabad, based his judgment purely on the evidence which had been recorded by his predecessor, the Special Judge, Chittoor, which it was not competent for him to do so. He argues that the only course open to this Court is to order a retrial. In order to appreciate this contention, a few facts appear necessary to be mentioned In the present case, A-1 issued the permits (Exhibits P-3 and P-4) in the year 1952. The transport of the tobacco was also made in the year 1952 and the offences concerned are said to have been committed in 1952. The police filed the charge-sheet on 23rd September, 1956 before the Special Judge, Chittoor. On 18th October, 1957, the Special Judge, Chittoor, framed charges against the accused and recorded their plea ‘not guilty’. He adjourned the case for trial to December, 1957 and recorded the entire evidence. The police filed the charge-sheet on 23rd September, 1956 before the Special Judge, Chittoor. On 18th October, 1957, the Special Judge, Chittoor, framed charges against the accused and recorded their plea ‘not guilty’. He adjourned the case for trial to December, 1957 and recorded the entire evidence. On 15th April, 1959 the case was made over to the file of the Special Judge, Secunderabad, by Proceedings of the High Court dated 31st March, 1959. The case of both sides is that the entire evidence was recorded by the Special Judge, Chittoor and that, after the case came to the file of the Special Judge, Secunderabad, the latter asked the prosecution and the accused as to whether they wanted a de novo trial or whether he could proceed to decide the case on the evidence which had already been recorded by the Special Judge, Chittoor, and that both sides agreed to the case being decided on the evidence already on record and that accordingly, the Special Judge, Secunderabad, heard the arguments of both sides and pronounced judgment on 23rd June, 1960. The following dates are also important with reference to the law in force. By section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Central Act XLVI of 1952), Special Judges were created for trying corruption cases. On 27th February, 1958, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 (Central Act II of 1958), hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) came into force. Section 4 of that Act introduce a new sub-section 3-A in section 8 of Act XLVI of 1952-The new sub-section is in the following terms: “In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in subsection (3), the provisions of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far asmay be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge, and for the purpose of the said provisions, a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate”. Thus, sub-section 3-A of section 8 came into effect on a date which was during the the pendency of the trial of the case before the Special Judge, Chittoor, which had commenced on 18th October, 1957. Sub-section 3-A of the Act was not in existence when the Special Judge, Chittoor, recorded the plea of the accused and the evidence. Thus, sub-section 3-A of section 8 came into effect on a date which was during the the pendency of the trial of the case before the Special Judge, Chittoor, which had commenced on 18th October, 1957. Sub-section 3-A of the Act was not in existence when the Special Judge, Chittoor, recorded the plea of the accused and the evidence. But, that section had come into force even before the case was transferred to the Special Judge, Secunderabad, and was in operation during the proceedings held by the latter. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that sub-section 3-A of section 8 had no retrospective effect; that it did not apply to a pending case and was not available for use by the Special Judge, Secunderabad, in the trial of the case as the trial had already begun before that sub-section 3-A came into force. On the other hand, Sri A. Gangadhara Rao for A-1 contends that sub-section 3-A of section 8 could be availed of by the Special Judge, Secunderabad, as it was in force when the latter started his proceedings and that, therefore, the entire trial was not vitiated by that sub-section being made use of. In effect, the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is that sub-section 3-A of section 8 did not apply to pending cases that is, cases which were pending on the date on which it came into force and effect and that once the trial had started on 18th October, 1957, the law which had to be followed throughout the trial was the law in force on 18th October, 1957, the date on which the trial was commenced. In Payare Lal v. The State of Punjab1 the relevant facts were as follows. The trial of two accused, Payare Lal and Bishan Chand, were commenced before the Special Judge, Patiala, S. Narinder Singh. Before he could deliver judgment, he proceeded on transfer and was succeeded by S. Jagjit Singh. The latter did not recall the witnesses and hear the evidence over again but proceeded with the trial, without any objection from either side, from the stage at which S. Narinder Singh had left it. He heard the arguments and delivered the judgment convicting both the accused. The two accused appealed against their conviction. The High Court upheld the conviction of Payare Lal but reduced the sentence passed on him. He heard the arguments and delivered the judgment convicting both the accused. The two accused appealed against their conviction. The High Court upheld the conviction of Payare Lal but reduced the sentence passed on him. The High Court also acquitted the other accused, Bishan Chand. Payare Lal filed an appeal (C.A. No. 240 of 1960) before the Supreme Court. In that case, the entire trial had been held and the judgment had been delivered even before the new sub-section 3-A of section 8 of the Act came into force on 27th February, 1959. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations, which are relevant and useful for the decision of the present case: "There is no controversy that the general principle of law is that a Judge or a Magistrate can decide a case only on evidence taken by him. Section 350 of the Code is a statutory departure from this principle................It is only if this provision was available to S. Jagjit Singh that the course taken by him can be supported............" Their Lordships also stated thus: "There is no controversy that section 350 of the Code is applicable only to Magistrates and not to a Court of Session and cannot therefore be applied to a Special Judge under sub-section (3) as it makes only those provisions of the Code applicable to him which would apply to a Court of Session The only controversy is whether that section is applicable to a Special Judge under sub-section (1) of section 8 ofthe Act. If it is so applicable, it must be applied though under sub-section (3) it is not applicable, for this sub-section is to have effect ‘save as provided in sub-section (1)‘." " The real question is, what is meant by the words ‘ the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates’ in section 8(1) of the Act? Does section 350 of the Code prescribe one of the rules of such procedure? Does section 350 of the Code prescribe one of the rules of such procedure? " In Vaidyanatha Iyer, In re.2, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the Court of a Special Judge was not a Court of Session and that, by reason of section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, which procedure comprehended section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, as well, was applicable to the trials before a Special Judge. But this decision was overruled by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in T.A. Fernandez In re3, which held that section 350 of the Code was not applicable to a Special Judge. Subsequent to the above decision, the Criminal Law Amendment Act II of 1958 came into force on 21st February, 1958 introducing the new sub-section 3-A in section 8 of Act XLVI of 1952. Under the provisions of Act II of 1958 the Central Act XLVI of 1952 had been amended and section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was made applicable to Special Judges. In view of this amendment the opinion of the Full Bench in Fernanadez’s case3, had been superseded by legislation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Payare Lal v. The State of Punjab (supra)1 referred to the above decisions of the Madras High Court and observed as follows: "It is true that section 350 of the Code is a provision applying to all Magistrates and, therefore also to a Magistrate trying a warrant case. That however does not in our opinion decide the question ...........it is the right of an accused person that his case should be decided by a Judge who has heard the whole of it agree with the view expressed in Fernandez’s case3, that very clear words would be necessary to take away such an important and well-established right. We find no such clear words here." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, referring to the words used in sub-section (1) of section 8, observed thus: "..............When sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act talks of a procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, it is reasonable to think that it has the provisions and the language of the Code in view........... The Code, therefore, expressly refers to sections 251-259 as containing the procedure specified for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates; this then, is the procedure it prescribes for the trial of such cases. It would be legitimate, therefore to think that the Act in using the words ‘ procedure prescribed by the Code............for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates’ also meant only these sections of the Code and did not contemplate section 350 of the Code as a procedure so prescribed, though that section is applicable to the proceedings before a Magistrate trying a warrant case. It does not seem to us that the words ‘the procedure prescribed by the Code......for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates’ meant a procedure which may be followed by Magistrates in all cases. Furthermore, section 350 occurs in a chapter of the Code which deals with general provisions relating to enquiries and trials and is not a provision which has been specifically prescribed by the Code for application to the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, as are sections 251 to 259................Again, section 350 of the Code cannot............be applied to the proceedings before a Special Judge............Now the section can be applied only when one Magistrate succeeds another." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after stating that a predecessor Special Judge is not a Magistrate for the purpose of the Act, observed as follows: "............the Act could not, in our view, have intended that section 350 of the Code would be available to a Special Judge as a rule of procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases.........we think that under the Act, as it stood before its amendment.........section 350 of the Code was not available when one Special Judge succeeded another. We hold that S. Jagjit Singh had no authority under the law to proceed with the trial of the case from the stage at which S. Narinder Singh left it. The conviction by S. Jagjit Singh of the appellant cannot be supported as he had not heard the evidence in the case himself. The proceedings before him were clearly incompetent." Their Lordships lastly dealt with the amendment of the Act expressly making section 350 of the Code applicable to the proceedings before a Special Judge and observed thus: "That amendment came long after the decision of the case by S.Jagjit Singh and had not expressly been made retrospective. The proceedings before him were clearly incompetent." Their Lordships lastly dealt with the amendment of the Act expressly making section 350 of the Code applicable to the proceedings before a Special Judge and observed thus: "That amendment came long after the decision of the case by S.Jagjit Singh and had not expressly been made retrospective. It was said on behalf of the respondent, the Prosecutor, that the amendment being in a procedural provision was necessarily retrospective, and, therefore, no exception can now be taken to the action taken by S.Jagjit Singh. Assuming that the rule contained in section 350 of the Code is only a rule of procedure, all that would follow would be that it would be presumed- to apply to all actions pending as well as future: Kimbray v. Draper1. Nor do we think it an argument against sending the case back for re-trial that the Special Judge now hearing the case would be entitled to proceed on the evidence recorded by S. Narinder Singh in view of the amendment. Whether he would be entitled to do so or not would depend on whether the amended Act would apply to proceedings commenced before the amendment. It has to be noted that the impugned part of the proceedings was concluded before the amendment. On this question, we do not propose to express any opinion. In any event, under section 350 as it now stands, a succeeding Magistrate has power to re-summon and examine a witness further. We cannot speculate what the Special Judge who tries the case afresh will think fit to do if section 350 of the Code is now applicable to the proceedings before him." Their Lordships left open the question as to whether the new sub-section 3-A to section 8 of the Act would apply to a case like the present one which was pending and part-heard on the day on which that sub-section 3-A of the Act came into force; for, in that case, the entire proceedings had been concluded before the amendment. But, their Lordships have indicated that the answer to this question would depend on whether section 350 was a rule of procedure and that, if it was a rule of procedure, it would be presumed to apply to a case like the one which was pending and part-heard. But, their Lordships have indicated that the answer to this question would depend on whether section 350 was a rule of procedure and that, if it was a rule of procedure, it would be presumed to apply to a case like the one which was pending and part-heard. In this case, the procedure followed by the learned Special Judge, Secunderabad, would be valid only if sub-section 3-A of section 8 of the Act had retrospective effect. That sub-section would have retrospective effect only if the rule contained in section 350 is a rule of procedure. Therefore, the crucial question is as to whether section 350 is only a section regulating procedure. In the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Payare Lal v. State of Punjab (supra)2, a distinction had been drawn between procedure prescribed by the Code for trial of warrant cases and procedure to be followed by Magistrates in all cases. It is indicated that whereas sections 251 to 259, Criminal Procedure Code, come in Chapter XXI, Criminal Procedure Code, which gives only the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, section 350 comes in another Chapter, namely, Chapter XXIV which contains general provisions as to trials and enquiries and as to the procedure to be followed by Magistrates in all cases. Obviously, their Lordships construed section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, as relating to the procedure to be followed by Magistrates, though they treated it as procedure to be followed in all cases and not merely in the trial of warrant cases. In Craies on Statute Law (1952 Edition), it has been observed as follows at pages 370-371: "............there is no vested right in procedure or costs. Enactments dealing with these subjects apply to pending actions, unless a contrary intention is expressed or clearly implied........A statute cannot be said to have a retrospective operation because it applies a new mode of procedure to suits commenced before its passing’. Enactments dealing with these subjects apply to pending actions, unless a contrary intention is expressed or clearly implied........A statute cannot be said to have a retrospective operation because it applies a new mode of procedure to suits commenced before its passing’. In other words, if a statute deals merely with procedure in an action, and does not affect the rights of the parties, it will be held to apply prima facie to all actions pending as well as future’." The same view has been expressed in Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edition, as follows: At page 221.-" In general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." At page 226.-"The general principle, however, seems to be that alterations in procedure are retrospective, unless there be some good reasons against it." At page 227.-"But a new procedure would be presumably inapplicable where its application would prejudice rights established under the old." At page 228.-"Where rights and procedure are dealt with together, the intention of the Legislature may well be that the old rights are to be determined by the old procedure, and that only the new rights under the substituted section are to be dealt with by the new procedure." In Salmond on Jurisprudence (1957 Edition), it is mentioned as follows: At page 503.-"............The law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation. It is the law of action........Jus Quod ad actiones pertinet-using the term ‘ action in a wide sense to include all legal proceedings ‘civil or criminal’........" At page 504.-"Procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends (of the administration of justice) are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself........" At page 506.-"The normal elements of judicial procedure are five in number, namely, summons, pleading, proof, judgment, and execution............Proof is the process by which the parties supply the Court with the data necessary for the decision of those questions......" It is obvious that section 350 is concerned with the question of proof and the question as to evidence on which the judgment in the case is to be based. Section 350 indicates as to how the Magistrate is to proceed further, when he receives a case which has been heard by another Magistrate and is part-heard and how he is to proceed to deal with and utilise the data consisting of the evidence which had been recorded by his predecessor. Thus, section 350 is essentially a rule of procedure. In Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay1, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "The question that arises for division is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the Case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, page 255 Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Arving2. In other words, a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective." In The King v. Chandra Dharma3, Lord Alverstone, C.J., observed as follows: "The rule is clearly established that apart from any special circumstances appearing on the face of the statute in question, statutes which make alterations in procedure are retrospective. In that case, Channell, J., also observed thus (at page 339): “I wish to say that in my view a statute dealing only with procedure applies to past events as well as to future events, and to hold this is not to make the statute retrospective. The object of the statute is only to affect the procedure, and it matters not whether the events in respect of which the proceedings are taken happened before or after the passing of the Act.” In Gardener v. Lucas1 it was observed as follows: “It is perfectly settled that if the Legislature intended to frame a new procedure, that, instead of proceeding in this form or that you should proceed in another and a different way, clearly there by-gone transactions are to be used for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be”. In re Joseph Suche & Co., Ltd.2, it was observed as follows: “It is a general rule that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions do not affect them. It is said that there is one exception to that rule, namely, that where enactments merely affect procedure, and do not extend to rights of action, they have been held to apply to existing rights.” In Nataraja v. Rangaswamy3, an application was made to grant sanction under section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, which had been amended by Act XVIII of 1923. The old section allowed an application to be made by a private party. This had been abolished by the amended section. No appeal was provided for in the Code under section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, as amended. It was hold by Odgers and Wallace, JJ. that the application to grant sanction under section 195, clause (6), was not in the nature of an appeal to the appellate Court against the order of the lower Court but was an application for the exercise of a special power conferred on the appellate Court and was part of the procedural law and that such an application could not, after the Amending Act of 1923, be entertained or heard as it was in its nature an application for grant of sanction for prosecution by a private party and that the Amending Act XVIII of 1923 made amendments affecting procedure only. In R. Lochan Dhar v. J. Chandra Das4, the question arose whether an offence under section 477-A which was exclusively triable by a Sessions Court at the Commencement of the trial, could be tried only by the Court of Sessions or by the Magistrate of the First Class. By virtue of an amendment in Criminal Procedure Code, Schedule II, regarding the trial of an offence under section 477-A, coming into force (after the trial had commenced) the concerned offence under section 477-A was triable by a First-class Magistrate. By virtue of an amendment in Criminal Procedure Code, Schedule II, regarding the trial of an offence under section 477-A, coming into force (after the trial had commenced) the concerned offence under section 477-A was triable by a First-class Magistrate. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the case could be tried by a First-class Magistrate and that the amendment to the Procedure Code in the matter had retrospective effect as it related to procedure only. In Natesan Servai v. State5 the relevant facts were as follows: When the proceedings had reached the stage of inquiry or trial, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mayuram, began trial of a case by warrant procedure, framed charges against the accused and then transferred the case for trial to the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Sirkali, under section 192(1), Criminal Procedure Code, as the trial of those charges could be held by a Second-class Magistrate. The latter continued the trial and convicted the accused. In appeal, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate confirmed the conviction and the sentence. The appellant filed a revision before the High Court, Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. had taken the view that the conviction was illegal since it was based on the evidence partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly by another Magistrate to whom the case had been transferred, which transfer was illegal. They referred to the fact that section 192(1) and section 528 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, contemplated transfer ‘for inquiry or trial’and held that, when once the proceedings had reached the stage of inquiry or trial, section 192(1), Criminal Procedure Code, could not be availed of. They observed that if a transfer was effected under the provisions of section 528 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate to whom it was transferred must examine the witnesses de novo. They followed the ruling in Tota Venkanna and others, In re1, wherein it was held that a Magistrate who had taken cognizance of a case having tried it partly, found that an offence which a subordinate Magistrate was competent to try had been committed, he had no power to transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate but he himself must dispose of it. They also observed that the provision in sub-section (3) to section 350 did not make any difference in the law relating to transfer under section 192(1), Criminal Procedure Code. They also observed that the provision in sub-section (3) to section 350 did not make any difference in the law relating to transfer under section 192(1), Criminal Procedure Code. The above decision was followed by Somasundaram, J., in Ganesa Pillai,ln re2, wherein the learned Judge held that when a case was transferred for trial or inquiry, whether it be under section 192(1), Criminal Procedure Code, or under section 528(2), Criminal Procedure Code, if some of the witnesses had already been examined by the Special First class Magistrate, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to whom it was transferred must examine the witnesses afresh and dispose of the case and not proceed to examine the remaining witnesses and record a conviction. The learned Judge held that there must be a fresh trial when a case was transferred as the expression used for ‘for inquiry or trial‘meant full trial and not a partial trial based on the evidence partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly by the other Magistrate from whose file the case was transferred. The above two decisions do not apply to the present case. For, in this case, the transfer was made by the High Court under section 526, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 526(1)(e)(ii) runs as follows: “526(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court- (e) that such an order (under this section) is expedient for the ends of justice......................it may order: (ii) that any particular case or appeal, or class of cases or appeals be transfer red from a criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction.” In this provision, it is not mentioned that transfer is to be made for ‘inquiry or trial’. In Balmakund v. Pirthiraj Ganesh Das3, the Patna High Court observed that in enacting sub-rule (3) in Order 21, rule 22, Civil Procedure Code, the Legislature contemplated to explain their intention with regard to the provisions contained in Order 21, rule 22, which had been the subject-matter of interpretation in various cases decided by the High Courts and also by the Judicial Committee and consequently the sub-rule was retrospective. They referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd., v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi4, wherein it was held that the provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them. In Shiv Bhagwan v. Onkarmal5, the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal at the time when the appeal was filed but had such jurisdiction when the appeal came on for hearing. A single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that the District Judge could hear the appeal. That view was confirmed by the learned Judges in the Letters Patent Appeal filed against that decision. The learned Judges observed as follows: “.......defendants have no vested right in any particular forum. This Court was bound to take notice of the change in the law and was bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came on for hearing. Therefore, if the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit when it came on for disposal, it could not refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted.” The learned Judges held that all procedural laws were retrospective unless the Legislature expressly stated to the contrary and that procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when a suit or proceeding came on for trial or disposal. In Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay6, the facts were as follows: A Special Magistrate commenced recording of evidence on 4th July, 1955. On 2nd January, 1956, the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (Central Act XXVI of 1955) came into force. By this amendment, a new section, viz., section 342-A Criminal Procedure Code, was inserted in the Code under which a person, who was an accused in a case, was competent to give evidence on oath as a defence witness in the same case. On 14th January, 1956, the accused put in an application to the Special Magistrate seeking the benefit of section 342-A of the amended Code to depose as a defence witness ‘in disproof of the charges made against him‘. He claimed this right on the ground that, the Amending Act having come into force during the pendency of the case, he was entitled to take advantage of it. He claimed this right on the ground that, the Amending Act having come into force during the pendency of the case, he was entitled to take advantage of it. This application was dismissed by the trial Court as well as by the Sessions Judge and the High Court of Bombay. The view taken was that, in view of section 116 of the Amending Act, no advantage of section 342-A could be available to the accused in that case and that the Special Magistrate had to conduct proceedings according to the procedure laid down in the unamended Code and that the accused could not, therefore, appear as a witness under section 342-A of the amended Code. The accused took the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, disagreeing with the decision of the High Court, laid down that the correct interpretation of section 116 of the Amending Act was that all the provisions of the amended Criminal Procedure Code were applicable to all cases which were pending on the date on which the Amending Act came into force except those referred to in clause (c) and those specifically mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (d) of section 116. They held that the accused could take advantage of section 342-A in spite of the fact that his case was pending from before the date of the commencement of the Amending Act and some evidence too had been recorded in it. Their Lordships held that section 61 of the Amending Act XXVI of 1955, which introduced the new section 342-A, having retrospective effect, was in accordance with the general principles applicable to amendments in procedural law. Section 64 of Act XXVI of 1955 introduced an amendment in section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, by adding a new Proviso which runs as follows: “Provided that if the succeeding Magistrate is of opinion that further examination on any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interests of justice, he may re-summon any such witness and after such further examination, cross-examination and re-examination, if any, as he may permit, the witness shall be discharged”. Section 64 of the Amending Act is similar to section 61 of that Act in that it comes under the Proviso at the end ofsection 116 of Central Act XXVI of 1955. Section 64 of the Amending Act is similar to section 61 of that Act in that it comes under the Proviso at the end ofsection 116 of Central Act XXVI of 1955. The observations of the Supreme Court regarding section 61 of the Amending Act, that it would have application to pending proceedings and that it was also in accord with the general principles relating to procedural law amendments, would equally apply to section 64 which relates to an amendment of section 350, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 350 comes in the same Chapter of the Criminal Procedure Code as does section 342-A, viz., Chapter XXIV, which is the chapter containing general provisions as to enquiries and trials to be followed by Magistrates in all cases. In effect, from the above decision of the Supreme Court, it follows that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, is only an item of procedural law. In Raghunath Prasad v. State1, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had to deal with the specific question whether section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, as amended by Central Act (XXVI of 1955) was applicable to a case which was pending. The learned Judges, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anand Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay2, held that the amended section 350 was applicable to the case and that the accused’s contention that the unamended section applied was not tenable. This decision is directly applicable to the present case. In Chari v. State3, the trial of the appellants by the Additional Sessions Judge had already proceeded’ far beyond the stage of commencement by the time it could possibly be taken up by a Special Judge, so that the possibility of a retrospective application of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 had been irretrievably lost. In that case, a vested right was created in favour of the accused to be tried in accordance with the procedure in force at the commencement of that trial and in such circumstances it was held that the creation of that vested right would prevent the applicability of section 7(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 and was a bar to the accused being tried by a Special Judge in accordance with the Special Procedure prescribed in the Act. That decision relates to creation of a substantive right and does not deal with a rule of procedure like section 350, Criminal Procedure Code. In Ajit Kumar v. The State1, it has been explained as to how an amendment to procedure operates retrospectively. Therein, it was observed as follows (at page 566): "The law therefore is not in doubt, that amended law relating to procedure operates retrospectively, but it is a very misunderstood branch of the law. It is necessary, therefore, to emphasise that it only means that pending cases, although instituted under the old Act but still pending, are governed by the new procedure under the amended law, but it does not mean that the part of the old procedure already applied and concluded before the amendement came into force, e.g., in this case cognizance taken in the manner permissible under the old Act, becomes bad or can be reopened under the new procedure after the amendment. The amendment of the procedural law will apply from and after the 1st February, 1961, when the amendment came into force and is retrospective only in the sense that even pending cases will be governed for future stages of the procedure by the amended procedure under the amended law’‘. Reference has been made to the decision in Sethuraman v. Union of India2. That decision has no application to the present case because therein it was held that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was not applicable to the proceedings before a Special Judge since the entire trial including the conviction was over by 19th October, 1957, even before sub-section (3-A) of section 8 came into force on 27th February, 1958. Even in matters of procedure, parties can have rights. As already seen, by virtue of the Amending Act (XXVI of 1955), section 342-A was introduced which provides that a person accused of an offence before a criminal Court shall be a competent witness for the defence. Before that amendment came into effect, the accused has no right to be a competent witness for his defence. Thus, under section 342-A the accused gets a right which he did not have before that section was introduced. Before that amendment came into effect, the accused has no right to be a competent witness for his defence. Thus, under section 342-A the accused gets a right which he did not have before that section was introduced. He continues to have a right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself; for, Article 20 (3) of the Constitution says that ‘no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Thus, in the matter of procedure of the accused letting in evidence by himself deposing as a witness, he has a right which was the subject-matter of amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right under section 342-A can be given up by an accused. On the other hand, there can be some rights which neither the accused nor the prosecution can give up. Before sub-section (3-A) came into force, the accused had a right which is mentioned by the Supreme Court in Payare Lal v. The State of Punjab3, as follows: "The trial offends the cardinal principle of law (i.e., that a Judge or a Magistrate can decide a case only on evidence taken by him) earlier stated, the acceptance of which by the Code is clearly manifest from the fact that the Code embodies an exception to that principle in section 350." The fact that section 350 affects the right of an accused which he would otherwise have had but for the section, namely, that a case should be decided by a Judge or a Magistrate only on the evidence taken by him, docs not mean that section 350 is not merely a rule of procedure but also a substantive law of a non-procedural type. In Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes, it has been observed as follows (at page 225): " In both of the above cases, the construction, though fatal to the enforcement of a vested right............seems to fall with the general principle that the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts, even where the alteration which the statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of the parties. It matters not that the effect of a procedural alteration is to make a prosecution under a penal Act possible where formerly it had been impossible." Thus, the position of law is as follows: Under the Criminal Procedure Code, as it stood before the Amending Act II of 1958, which introduced new sub-section (3-A) by section 4 of that Act on 21st February, 1958, section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was not available to one Special Judge when he succeeded another Special Judge. The question as to whether section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was available to a Special Judge after sub-section (3-A) of the Act came into force depended upon the fact whether section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was only a rule of procedure and, therefore, had retrospective effect. It is clear from all the decisions referred to supra, that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, contains only a rule of procedure and this is unaffected by the fact that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, affects valuable rights of an accused in the matter of the evidence recorded by one Special Judge being utilised by a succeeding Special Judge, for deciding the case of the accused. In consequence, section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was applicable to the stages of the trial which came after the amendment came into force on 21st February, 1958. In this case, it follows that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, was available to the learned Special Judge, Secunderabad, and that his action in having acted on the evidence recorded by the Special Judge, Chittoor, was valid in law and is not vitiated by any illegality or irregularity. I, therefore, overrule the preliminary contention urged by the learned Public Prosecutor. I proceed to deal with the case on the merits. [After dealing with the prosecution case and the evidence , His Lordship concluded:] Thus, on the whole, the account-books (Exhibits P-20 and P-27) are not very reliable. As these account-books are not reliable, it does not appear safe to rely on the oral evidence of P.W. 14 and P.W. 12 to hold that Exhibits P-3 and P-4 were not genuine permits obtained by these witnesses and that no transport of tobacco under those permits was done by P.W. 14 and P.W. 12 to A-2. Consequently, it is not possible to hold that the accused must have committed the offences of which they have been convicted. Consequently, it is not possible to hold that the accused must have committed the offences of which they have been convicted. The guilt of A-1 on charge No. 2 and the guilt of A-2 on charge No. 5 is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Shri A. Gangadhara Rao for A-1 contends that the conviction of A-1 on charge No. 2 is also untenable as the prosecution was barred by limitation. Charge No. 2 reads: “Secondly, that in pursuance of the said conspiracy, you first accused, being a public servant. to wit, an Inspector of Central Excise, Kalahasti Range, during 1952, and in discharge of your duties as public servant, fraudulently and dishonestly issued T.P. 1 No. 159933, dated 8th January, 1952 for 1925 lbs., and 159957, dated 8th February, 1952, for 1228 lbs., and gave them to second accused of you (G. Narayana) by corrupt and illegal means or otherwise abused your position as a public servant and thereby committed criminal misconduct punishable under section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) and within my cognizance”. The gist of the charge is that he did the act in the discharge of his duties as a public servant by issuing T.P. 1 permits and giving them to A-2 though they were in favour of other persons. The charge itself shows that the alleged acts of issuing of the permits committed by A-1 were in 1952. The charge-sheet was filed on 23rd Sept ember 1956, which means, many years after the alleged acts. Section 40(2) of the Central Excise and Salt Act (Central Act II of 1944) runs as follows: “No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted for anything done or ordered to be done under this Act after the expiration of six months from the accrual of the cause of action or from the date of the act or order complained of”. In this case, the prosecution was institute much more than six months alter the thing alleged to have been done by A-1. On substantially similar facts, I have held in The Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Hameed Khan and others1, that the prosecution of an Inspector of Central Excise was barred on a similar charge. In this case, the prosecution was institute much more than six months alter the thing alleged to have been done by A-1. On substantially similar facts, I have held in The Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Hameed Khan and others1, that the prosecution of an Inspector of Central Excise was barred on a similar charge. Therein, I observed as follows: “In each of the present cases, as the act concerned in the first object of the conspiracy is only by way of issue of permit, it would come under the category of offences regarding which the sole act of the public servant concerned which constitutes the offence and every act which is necessary to constitute the offence cannot but be done by him in his official capacity or in discharge of his duties. Consequently, section 40(2) would be applicable.” The same view was followed by me in C.A. No. 335 of 1957, dated 17th July, 1961, in C.A. Nos. 86 and 96 of 1958, dated 21st July, 1961, and C.A. No. 97 of 1958, dated 21st July, 1961. I, therefore, find that the prosecution of A-1 on charge No. 2 is barred by limitation. On this ground also, the conviction of A-1 on charge No. 2 is bad and untenable. In the result, I allow both the appeals, set aside the conviction and sentence of A-1 on charge No. 2 and of A-2 on charge No. 5 and acquit each of them of the offences with which they were charged. The amounts of fine, if paid, will be refunded to each of A-1 and A-2. C.V.N. ------ Appeals allowed; Convictions set aside.