Order.- The Sub-Inspector of Police, Simhadripuram, filed a charge-sheet against twelve accused for offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 324, 325, 326 367 and 149, Indian Penal Code, in the Court of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Pulivendla. The latter took it on file as P.R.C. No. 5 of 1961, framed charges under sections 147, 324, 325, 326 read with 149 and 367 against A-1, A-3, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10 and A-11, and, under sections 148, 324, 325, 326 read with 149 and 367 against A-2, A-5, A-8 and A-12, and committed them to take their trial in the Court of Session, Cuddapah Division. Thereupon, the twelve accused felt aggrieved with that order and filed this petition under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash the order of committal. In the present case, the charge under section 367, Indian Penal Code, against the accused is that they dragged the complainant from one place to another so that he may be subject to grievous hurt. It is also the case of the prosecution that the accused caused grievous hurt which is the subject of charges under sections 325 and 326, Indian Penal Code. It is beyond doubt or dispute that, of all the charges framed against the accused, the only charge which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session is the charge under section 367, Indian Penal Code, and that all the other charges including the charges under sections 325 and 326, Indian Penal Code, are triable by a First Class Magistrate. The contention of Sri A. Bhujanga Rao for the petitioners is that, in view of the fact that the accused are alleged to have committed offences under sections 325 and 326, Indian Penal Code, none of them can be charged with offence under section 367, Indian Penal Code. The reason he urges is that section 367, Indian Penal Code, is only an offence of being kidnapped or abducted for the purpose of causing grievous hurt, so far as this case is concerned, and that grievous hurt has actually been caused according to the prosecution. The reason he urges is that section 367, Indian Penal Code, is only an offence of being kidnapped or abducted for the purpose of causing grievous hurt, so far as this case is concerned, and that grievous hurt has actually been caused according to the prosecution. Section 367, Indian Penal Code, runs thus: “Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” For purposes of convenience, I shall hereafter refer to in this judgment, the act of dragging concerned in section 367, Indian Penal Code, as an auxiliary act and offence in relation to the act and offence of causing grievous hurt under sections 325 and 326, Indian Penal Code, which I shall refer to as the main act and the main offence. I am also referring to an offence like section 367, Indian Penal Code, (which is triable only by a Court of Session as the lowest Court which can try the offence) as an offence of higher level in relation to the offence of section 326, Indian Penal Code (regarding Which the lowest Court that can try is a Magistrate of the First Class, a Court lower in level than the Court of Session) as an offence of lower level. In Upendranath v. Emperor1, the Calcutta High Court observed as follows: “When the case for the prosecution is that the person abducted has been murdered by the abductor, there can be no scope for a charge under this section (section 364, Indian Penal Code). In Upendranath v. Emperor1, the Calcutta High Court observed as follows: “When the case for the prosecution is that the person abducted has been murdered by the abductor, there can be no scope for a charge under this section (section 364, Indian Penal Code). The abductor should be charged with murder pure and simple.” But, the learned Judges also observed as follows: “We have noticed, however, in such cases, where the evidence to establish the charge of murder is weak or inconclusive, the prosecution is prone to adopt this device of adding or preferring a charge under section 364, Penal Code, in the hope that a Jury which may hesitate to find the accused guilty of murder on such slender evidence may be induced to find against him on the lesser charge.” In that case, the offence under section 364, Indian Penal Code, which is punishable with imprisonment for life or ten years, was treated as lesser charge in relation to the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code, which was certainly a greater charge, being offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The offence under section 364, Indian Penal Code, was triable by a Court of Session just like the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. In this case, the main offence under section 326 is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years, but, all the same, it is triable by the Court of Session or Magistrate of the First Class, whereas, the offence under section 367, Indian Penal Code, though it is punishable with imprisonment for ten years, a maximum sentence which is less than the maximum sentence that can be inflicted under section 326, Indian Penal Code, is still triable only by a Court of Session and not by a Magistrate of the First Class. In Akram Sheik v. Emperor2, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that where the prosecution case was that the accused murdered the deceased or abetted his murder and that the murder was committed in consequence of abduction of the deceased by the accused, charge could be framed only under section 302 or under section 302 read with section 109 but could not be dealt with under section 364. In that particular case, the offence under section 364 was tried by an Assistant Sessions Judge but the learned Judges observed thus: “The offences are triable only by a Sessions Judge. This jurisdiction cannot be avoided nor can jurisdiction be given to an Assistant Sessions Judge by dealing with the case as one under section 364, Penal Code, as we have had frequent occasions to point out, section 364 is mainly a special case of enhanced punishment for a particular type of abetment of murder. The enhanced punishment will be applicable even though the murder is not committed in consequence of the abduction.‘‘The learned Judges decided that case on the basis that the offence concerned really amounted to offences under section 302 or section 302 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, the maximum punishment for which could be capital sentence. In Kalaporla Saidulu v. Hyderabad Government3, a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court, consisting of Manohar Pershad and Siadat Ali Khan, JJ., approved the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Upendranath v. Emperor1, Ijjatulla Akanda v. Emperor4, and Akram Sheik v. Emperor2, and referred to them as follows: ”.....wherein it has been held that when the case of the prosecution is that the person abducted has been murdered by the abductor, there is no scope for the charge under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code. We respectfully agree with the above proposition of law.....“ Subsequently, in Vadla Kistiah v. State of Hyderabad5, a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court, consisting of Mohammed Ahmed Ansari, J. (as he then was) and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., considered all the above decisions, individually discussed each of them, and observed thus: ”In our view the authorities do not support the submission of the learned Advocate for the appellants that where an accused is charged under sections 302 and 364, Indian Penal Code (or under the corresponding provisions of the Hyderabad Penal Code) and has been acquitted on a charge of murder, he cannot be convicted under section 364, notwithstanding the fact that it is proved that the accused kidnapped or abducted the deceased in order that the said person may be murdered or so disposed of as to put him in danger of being murdered. An examination of the above cases would clearly show that this was not what was decided therein." In effect, they held that there could be a charge under section 364, Indian Penal Code, also against an accused when there was a charge against him under section 302, Indian Penal Code, regarding the murder which was the main offence in relation to section 364, Indian Penal Code, which was an auxiliary offence. The learned Judges confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused under section 301, Hyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section 364, Indian Penal Code) read with section 125, Hyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section 149, Indian Penal Code). I respectfully follow the decision in Vadla Kistiah v. State of Hyderabad1, wherein the previous decisions have been discussed and explained; The five decisions mentioned above dealt with section 364, Indian Penal Code (section 301, Hyderabad Penal Code) as auxiliary offence and section 302, Indian Penal Code (or corresponding provisions under the Hyderabad Penal Code) as the main offence. In those cases, the auxiliary offence was a lesser offence and also an offence of lower level as compared to the greater and main offence. In the present case, the auxiliary offence is lesser than the main offence under section 326, Indian Penal Code, but is an offence of higher level as compared to section 326, Indian Penal Code. As the charge under section 367, Indian Penal Code, can stand when there is a charge under section 326 and also under section 325, the case can be tried only by a Court of Session because section 367, Indian Penal Code, is triable exclusively by a Court of Session. Sri A. Bhujanga Rao relies on the following passage in Dr. Sir Hari Singh Gour’s "The Penal Law of India", 6th Edition, 1958 , Volume 2, at page 1648: "This section (section 367) is in a sense supplementary to the last; in other respects it differs; It is supplementary in so far as it punishes kidnapping for the illegal gratification of lust; it differs in so far as it mentions two other circumstances as aggravating the crime. These are the causing of grievous hurt and slavery. In so far as it punishes kidnapping for the purpose of causing grievous hurt, the section is of a piece with section 364 which punishes the same offence committed with the object of committing murder. These are the causing of grievous hurt and slavery. In so far as it punishes kidnapping for the purpose of causing grievous hurt, the section is of a piece with section 364 which punishes the same offence committed with the object of committing murder. The language of the two is similar, and they must both be understood in the same sense. But in one respect this section differs, as it punishes not only the intention but also other knowledge of likelihood." This passage is not helpful in any way to support the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that there cannot be a charge under section 367, Indian Penal Code, when there is a charge under section 325 or 326, Indian Penal Code. Section 364, Indian Penal Code, is similar in certain respects to section 367, Indian Penal Code, and not in all. There is clear indication in the Code of Criminal Procedure that a person can be charged with an auxiliary offence when he stands charged with the main offence itself. For example, Illustration (c) to section 235, Criminal Procedure Code, reads: "A entices B, the wife of C, away from C, with intent to commit adultery with B, and then commits adultery with her. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 498 and 497 of the Indian Penal Code." The offence of enticing under section 498, Indian Penal Code, is an auxiliary offence in relation to the offence of adultery under section 497, Indian Penal Code, winch is the main offence. Column 8 in Schedule II to the Code of Criminal Procedure shows against each offence the various Courts which can try that offence. Ordinarily, the Court of lowest level which is mentioned against the section tries the offence. In some exceptional cases, e.g., section 397, Indian Penal Code, which provides for a minimum sentence of seven years, Courts (Magistrates) whose powers fall short of that minimum obviously cannot try them. Provision for trial of that offence is only by Court of Session. Ordinarily, the Court of lowest level which is mentioned against the section tries the offence. In some exceptional cases, e.g., section 397, Indian Penal Code, which provides for a minimum sentence of seven years, Courts (Magistrates) whose powers fall short of that minimum obviously cannot try them. Provision for trial of that offence is only by Court of Session. If the auxiliary offence is an offence of a higher level than the main offence in the sense that the minimum level of Court which can try the auxiliary offence is higher than the minimum level of Court which can try the main offence, the case becomes triable only by the higher Court which can try the auxiliary offence. Even otherwise, an offence need not necessarily be always tried by the Court of the lowest level (as shown in the Code) which can try it. But, any Court of higher level specified against the offence can also try the offence. If the Court of the lowest level (or other competent Court) mentioned against any particular offence, considers that it cannot impose sentence which the seriousness of the particular offence, based on the facts of the case, require then, it is open for that Court itself to hold and act on the basis that the case should be tried by a Court of higher level. It follows that the Magistrate can commit to Sessions even cases in which the minimum level of Court which can try an offence is lower than the Court of Session and is a Court of Magistrate. Such committal can be proper and even necessary in certain circumstances, i.e., offence appearing from the facts to be so serious as to indicate prima facie that it requires punishment which can be given only by a Sessions Court. There may be various other considerations which may require a case to be tried by a Court of higher level than the lowest level that can try the case as seen from the entries mentioned against the various sections in the Schedule. Even regarding institution, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that "every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it". Even regarding institution, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure corresponding to section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that "every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it". It is obvious that under certain justifiable circumstances, dependent on the facts of the case, the trial by a Court of higher level than the lowest level prescribed in the Schedule to the Code may be desirable in addition to being technically lawful. In this case, charge under section 367, Indian Penal Code, can be framed along with sections 325 and 326, Indian Penal Code. Offence under section 367, Indian Penal Code, is triable only by a Court of Session and it cannot be tried by a Magistrate. An offence like section 326, Indian Penal Code, which is triable by a First Class Magistrate, can be tried by Sessions Court if committed to it by competent Magistrate. Consequently, the committal by the learned Magistrate is justified and is not liable to be quashed. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed about the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under prosection 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, thus: "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper ease either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. (a) There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. (a) There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or the continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (b) Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. (c) A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be success fully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of lie case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made, and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question." For convenience, I numbered the various categories of cases. This case does not contain any features which call for interference by this Court at this stage under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. In the result, I dismiss this petition. A.S.R. ----- Petition dismissed.