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1999 DIGILAW 1984 (MAD)

Boya Thippaiah and two others v. State of Mysore

1999-11-30

M.AHMED ALI KHAN, M.SADASIVAYYA

body1999
Sadasivayya, J.- The three appellants in this case have been convicted for various offences (which will be referred to heareafter) by the learned Sessions Judge of Bellary in Sessions Case No. 6 of 1958 on the file of this Court. The facts and circumstances which led to the occurrence out of which the said Sessions Case arose, may briefly be stated as follows: The accused persons 1 and 2 and one Sanna Eranna, who were all the residents of K. Virapuram in Bellary Taluk, were given to the past-time of racing pigeons, against bets. From the prosecution case it would appear that about one year prior to the January of 1958, a pigeon race had taken place between the accused No. 1 and the said Sanna Eranna; in that case, it would appear that accused No. 1 was supported by the second accused while Sanna Eranna was supported by one Mahanandi (nephew of the said Sanna Eranna). In that race., Sanna Eranna’s pigeon won the race; but, accused No. 1 evaded payment of the stake money (which is stated to be a sum of Rs. 6.). Again, just about 15 days prior to the occurrence (the occurrence being on 9th January, 1958), there was another pigeon race and in that, the accused No. 1’s pigeon won the race; but, Sanna Eranna refused to pay the stake money on the ground that on the previous occasion accused No. 1 had evaded to pay the stake money. Consequently, there were misunderstandings between the parties, namely, between the accused Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and Sanna Eranna and Mahanandi on the other. It is also stated that there was one other ground for further misunderstanding between the parties. Just about 5 or 6 days prior to the date of the occurrence, the Police appear to have searched the houses of the accused 1 and 2 for illicitly distilled liquor; that search was not successful and nothing incriminating was found. But, the accused 1 and 2 suspected that Sanna Eranna and his people had given information to the Police which led to the search of the houses of the accused Nos. 1 and 2. But, the accused 1 and 2 suspected that Sanna Eranna and his people had given information to the Police which led to the search of the houses of the accused Nos. 1 and 2. On this account, there appears to have been some verbal abuse between the accused 1 and 2 on the one hand and P.W. 5 Lakshmappa (who also was related to Sanna Erann and Mahanandi), on the night previous to the date of the occurrence. On the afternoon of the date of the occurrence, namely 9th January, 1958 P.W. 5 Lakshmappa, Sanna Eranna, Mahanandi, P.W. 4 Naganna and P.W. 6 Hampiah were sitting, after taking meals. The prosecution case is that A-1, A-2 and A-3 came pelting stones towards the house of P.W. 5. P.W. 5 came out of his house and begen to pelt stones, towards the accused, who, thereupon began to run away. The accused persons were chased by P.W. 5, who was accompanied by P.Ws. 4, 6, Sanna Eranna and Mahanandi. When this pursuing party came near the houses of the accused 1 and 2, the prosecution case is, that the accused 1 and 2 came out of their houses with spears in their hands and that A-3 came out armed with a Bandi Kudugolu. A-1 thrust his spear into the left side of P.W. 5’s stomach; A-2 also made an attempt to pierce P.W. 5 with his spear; but, P.W. 5 held that spear in his left hand and escaped from the thrust of A-2. It is stated that P.W. 5’s brother’s son Mahanandi came forward asking the accused as to why they had injured P.W. 5; thereupon, A-2 thrust his spear into the chest of Mahanandi who fell down on the ground. Thereupon, Sanna Eranna is stated to have come forward asking as to why they were killing P.W. 5 and Mahanandi; then A-1 thrust his spear into the body of Sanna Eranna who thereupon went away staggering. It would appear that Mahanandi and Sanna Eranna died almost immediately, on the spot. P.W. 5 was taken away from the scene of the occurrence by his wife and son-in-law. It would appear that Mahanandi and Sanna Eranna died almost immediately, on the spot. P.W. 5 was taken away from the scene of the occurrence by his wife and son-in-law. He was taken by train to Bellary and was got admitted to the hospital there, at about 9-20 p.m. There, P.W. 2 who was the Assistant Surgeon on duty, made the necessary entries as per Exhibit P-2 (a) in the Accident Register Exhibit P-2 and admitted P.W. 5 as an inpatient, for receiving treatment. Thereafter, P.W. 2 sent a phone message as per Exhibit P-21 to the Sub-Inspector of Police at Brucepet Police Station. P.W. 16 the Police Sub-Inspector who, at that time was in Brucepet Police Station received the phone message, recorded it on a piece of paper as per Exhibit P-21 and there-after entered the same in Exhibit P-22 the General Diary of the Police Station. He then passed on this information to the Circle Inspector P.W. 18, who immediately proceeded to the hospital at Bellary and recorded Exhibit P-11 the statement of P.W. 5. This appears to have been at about 11 p.m. on 9th January, 1958. After investigation, charge-sheets were placed against the accused and the Magistrate committed all the three accused persons to take their trial before the Sessions Judge of Bellary. The first accused was charged with having committed the murder of Sanna Eranna by stabbing him with a spear on the right side of the chest; he was also charged for having committed an offence punishable under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that he had stabbed with spear and had caused hurt thereby to P.W. 5. The second accused was charged for having committed the murder of Mahanandi, by stabbing him with a spear on the right side of the chest; he was also charged for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code., for having attempted to stab P.W. 5 with a spear; he was further charged for an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code for having caused hurt to P.W. 6 Hampiah by stabbing him with a spear. A-3 was charged for an offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that at the time when the accused 1 and 2 committed the offences above-mentioned, A-3 was present on the spot in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused, holding a Bandi Kudagolu in his hand; A-3 was also charged for an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that he caused hurt to P.W. 6 Hampiah by beating him with a stone and a stick. All the accused persons had pleaded not guilty. The learned Sessions Judge convicted A-1 for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life; he also convicted A-1 for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. A-2 was convicted for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life; he was also convicted for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. A-2 was further convicted for an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years. A-3 was convicted for an offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life; he was also convicted for an offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years. All these sentences wore ordered to run concurrently. It is against these convictions and sentences that the present appeal has been preferred. M. Ramachandra Rao on behalf of the Legal Aid Society, has appeared for the appellants; B. A. Mahishi, High Court Government Pleader, has appeared for the State. The prosecution case rests mainly on the evidence of the eye-witnesses, who are P.Ws. 4 to 8. The learned Sessions Judge has accepted the evidence of these eyewitnesses and has reached the conclusion that all the accused persons have been guilty of the offences with which they have been charged. The prosecution case rests mainly on the evidence of the eye-witnesses, who are P.Ws. 4 to 8. The learned Sessions Judge has accepted the evidence of these eyewitnesses and has reached the conclusion that all the accused persons have been guilty of the offences with which they have been charged. Amongst the contentions which have been urged by Sri Ramachandra Rao on behalf of the appellants, the most improtant one is that the evidence of the eye-witnesses ought not to have been accepted by the learned Sessions Judge, as conclusively establishing the guilt of the accused persons. In attacking the evidence of the eye-witnesses, the learned Advocacate has advanced the following contentions, namely: — (1) that P.W. 4 is a child witness upon whose evidence it would be unsafe to place reliance; (2) that most of the eye-witnesses are near relations of the deceased persons and that the evidence is, therefore, interested, and (3) that certain parsons belonging to the neighbouring village Degulahal who were stated to have been present at the time of the occurrence, should have been examined by the prosecution and that in the absence of their evidence it is not possible to hold that the case against the accused has been sufficiently established. It appears to be convenient to deal with the contentions advanced against the evidence of the eye-witnesses, before proceeding to consider the other contentions urged by the learned Advocate. P.W. 4 is a boy of the age of about 11 years and is the son of the deceased Sanna Eranna. Before recording his evidence, the learned Sessions Judge appears to have administered oath to P.W. 4. It is also noted by the learned Sessions Judge, in the deposition sheet itself, that this witnesss was capable of understanding questions and was giving relevant answers. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the learned Sessions Judge had taken the necessary safeguards, before proceeding to record the evidence of P.W. 4. It is argued by Sri Ramachandra Rao that P.W. 4 is a child of comparatively tender years and that it is easy for a child like him to be tutored and that it would be dangerous to place reliance on his evidence. He has also cited some decisions, in support of his contention. It is argued by Sri Ramachandra Rao that P.W. 4 is a child of comparatively tender years and that it is easy for a child like him to be tutored and that it would be dangerous to place reliance on his evidence. He has also cited some decisions, in support of his contention. But, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan1, it appears to us to be unnecessary to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts, on this question. It has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in that case, that unless the Court considers otherwise, every witness will be competent to give evidence; it is also pointed out that it would be desirable that Judges and Magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth,, and that otherwise the credibility of the witness may be seriously affected. At the same time, it is also stated by their Lordships that whether the Magistrate or Judge was really of the opinion that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth,, could also be gathered from the circumstances, even when there is no formal certificate by the Judge. In the present case, the learned Sessions Judge has not only administered oath to P.W. 4 but has also made a note to the effect that the witness, is capable of understanding questions and giving relevant answers. The evidence of this witness has been read out to us and we are satisfied from the way in which he has given answers, that he was quite capable of understanding the questions which had been put to him. From what is stated by the learned Sessions Judge in the course of his Judgment, it is quite clear that the learned Sessions Judge was strongly impressed by the way in which evidence was given by this child witness. Towards, the end of paragraph 8 of his judgment, this is what the learned Sessions Judge has stated: — “In the course of cross-examination, hardly any material contradiction or inconsistency is elicited by the defence Advocate. Barring certain minor discrepancies, the evidence of this child witness remains unchallenged by the defence. I am very much impressed by the evidence given by this child. Barring certain minor discrepancies, the evidence of this child witness remains unchallenged by the defence. I am very much impressed by the evidence given by this child. He has given picturesque description of the occurrence of the scene of offence which could by no means be characterised as tutored evidence. The child was bold and brave and unfaultering when he gave the evidence in the box. Therefore, I find there is ring of truth in what the child has stated before this Court.” Such is the impression that has been created on the mind of the learned Sessions Judge who had the advantage of seeing the demeanour of this witness when he was in the witness box. Nothing has been elicited in the course of the cross-examination of this witness or of the Investigating Officer to justify any suspicion to the effect that P.W. 4 had been tutored to give evidence against the accused persons. Under these circumstances, we are not satisfied that the evidence of P.W. 4 is open to any objection or suspicion. The next objection is on the ground that, most of the eye-witnesses are related to the deceased persons. It is true that most of the eye-witnesses are related to the deceased. As already stated, P.W. 4 is the son of the deceased Sanna Eranna. P.W. 5 is the elder brother of Sanna Eranna. P.W. 8 is the widow of Sanna Eranna. But, the mere fact that these witnesses are close relations of the deceased, does not necessarily give rise to any inference to the effect that these witnesses are interested in giving false evidence against the accused persons. Nothing has been elicited in the course of the cross-examination of these witnesses, to show that they were inimically disposed towards the accused persons. There is no reason to suspect that these relations of the deceased are trying to shield the real offenders and falsely implicate the accused persons. Vide the observations of the Supreme Court in Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab2 and Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab.3 We are not satisfied that in the present case there are any good grounds to reject the evidence of these witnesses merely because they happen to be the near relations of the deceased persons. Vide the observations of the Supreme Court in Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab2 and Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab.3 We are not satisfied that in the present case there are any good grounds to reject the evidence of these witnesses merely because they happen to be the near relations of the deceased persons. The next contention is, that some persons from the neighbouring village of Degalahal who are stated to have been present at the time of the occurrence, ought to have been examined by the prosecution. One person who is of Degalahal, has actually been examined, in the case, as a prosecution witness; he is P.W. 7. As against him, it has been argued by Sri Ramachandra Rao that he is not a person of good antecedents; it is pointed out that he had been involved in a murder case and had also been convicted in an arson case; but, it is clear from the answers given by this witness in the course of his cross-examination, that in both these cases he was acquitted by the appellate Court. Under these circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the learned Advocate’s contention that P.W. 7 is a person whose antecedents are not good. It has not been elicited in the course of the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer, that the other Degalahal people who are stated to have been seen at the time of the occurrence, did really witness any of the incidents material for the purposes of this case. Further, the non-examination of those persons would not really be a good ground to refuse to accept the evidence of the eye-witnesses who have actually been examined in the case. There is no reason to suspect that the prosecution has either withheld or suppressed any material evidence which the Degulahal people could have given. Under these circumstances, we do not find any force in this contention advanced on behalf of the appellants. We will now proceed to consider the evidence of the eye-witnesses. We think it would be more convenient to deal, in the first instance , with the evidence of these eye-witnesses as against the accused 1 and 2. The evidence of P.W. 4 shows that A-1 came forward and stabbed P.W. 5 on the left side of the stomach with a spear. We think it would be more convenient to deal, in the first instance , with the evidence of these eye-witnesses as against the accused 1 and 2. The evidence of P.W. 4 shows that A-1 came forward and stabbed P.W. 5 on the left side of the stomach with a spear. When P.W. 5 was about to fall, A-2 also attempted to stab P.W. 5 with a spear; but P.W. 5 evaded this blow. Then Mahanandi came forward questioning as to why P.W. 5 was being attacked. Then, A-2 stabbed Mahanandi with the spear on the right side of the chest in consequence of which Mahanandi staggered and fell down. Thereafter, A-1 ran towards Sanna Eranna and stabbed Sanna Eranna in the chest. Then, A-2 caused injury with the spear on the forehead of P.W. 6 Hampiah. This evidence of P.W. 4 has been substantially corroborated, in all material particulars, by the evidence of P.Ws. 5, 6 and 7. So far as P.W. 8 is concerned, she speaks mainly about the attack on Sanna Eranna by A-1. After her husband was stabbed by A-1 with the spear, she took her husband away from the scene of the occurrence and very shortly thereafter her husband expired. All these injuries which had been sustained by the two deceased persons and by P.Ws. 5 and 6 have been spoken to by the three doctors who have been examined in the case, namely, P.Ws. 2,3 and 10. There is really no reason as to why the evidence of those eye-witnesses should not be accepted. The evidence of the eye-witnesses clearly establishes that it was A-1 that inflicted the fatal injury which resulted in the death of Sanna Eranna and that A-2 inflicted the fatal injury which resulted in the death of Mahanandi. The evidence of the eye-witnesses also establishes that A-1 inflicted a stab injury on P.W. 5 which made it necessary for the latter to stay in the hospital as an inpatient and undergo treatment for more than 25 days; the said evidence further establishes that A-2 inflicted an injury on P.W. 6 Hampiah with a spear. There is, however, one point which requires to be noticed in this connection. The second accused has also been convicted for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that he tried to stab P.W. 5 with a spear. There is, however, one point which requires to be noticed in this connection. The second accused has also been convicted for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that he tried to stab P.W. 5 with a spear. According to the prosecution evidence, no injury to P.W. 5 resulted from this attempt, as P.W. 5 managed to evade the blow. It is urged by Sri Ramachandra Rao that the evidence adduced by the prosecution in regard to this attempt by A-2 is not such as would justify a conviction under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. After a scrutiny of the relevant evidence, we find that there is considerable force in this contention. The prosecution evidence does not indicate which portion of P.W. 5’s body it was, that A-2 had attempted to stab; therefore, it cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that if A-2 had succeeded in his attempt of stabbing, death may have resulted. When that is so, we do not think that a conviction for an offence under section 307 can be sustained against A-2, in the circumstances of the case. So far as the remaining offences against A-1 and A-2 are concerned, we are satisfied that the evidence adduced by the prosecution fully establishes the same. So far as A-3 is concerned, we are of the opinion, after a scrutiny of the relevant evidence, that the prosecution has not satisfactorily established the case as against him. A-3 is of a different village. In the course of his examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, A-3 has stated that he had not at all come to K. Virapuram village, on the date of the occurrence. Except that he happened to be related to A-1, there was no illwill between himself and the deceased persons. There is no evidence to show that A-3 had been in any way connected with the incident arising out of the pigeon races. Though an attempt has been made in the course of the evidence, to show that he had been armed with a Bandi Kudagolu at the time of the occurrence, there are discrepancies in the evidence in regard to his having been so armed and his participation in the incident. Though an attempt has been made in the course of the evidence, to show that he had been armed with a Bandi Kudagolu at the time of the occurrence, there are discrepancies in the evidence in regard to his having been so armed and his participation in the incident. In Exhibit P-2 (b) which is entered in the Hospital Accident Register pertaining to the injuries on P.W. 6 Hampiah, it is seen that there is no mention of A-3 having participated in the occurrence or having been armed with a Bandi Kudagolu. P.W. 4 states in the course of his evidence, that A-3 gave a blow with the blunt side of the Kudagolu, M.O. 2, on the back side of Hampiah’s head. But, P.W. 6 Hampiah does not himself state in the course of his evidence that it was A-3 that gave him a blow with the Kudagolu. If really A-3 had given a blow to Hampiah with the Kudagolu, it is not likely that P.W. 6 would have omitted to make specific mention of the same at the time when entries, were made in the Accident Register as per Exhibit P-2 (b) P.Ws. 4 and 6 have no doubt stated that A-3 took a stone and hurled it at P.W. 6. But, from the evidence given by the Investigating Officer, it is seen that both these witnesses had failed to mention this incident at the time of the investigation. P.Ws. 12 and 13 who, after an application made by the prosecution at a late stage of the trial were permitted to be examined, have sought to make it appear that immediately prior to the incident, A-3 also was sitting talking with A-1 and A-2 and that he had also joined A-1 and A-2 in pelting stones. From the answers given during the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer, it is seen that neither of these witnesses has. stated during the course of the investigation that A-3 had been so sitting there talking with A-1 and A-2 or that he had joined A-1 and A-2 in pelting stones. It may also be stated that the Bandi Kudagolu M.O. 2, according to the prosecution, was recovered not from the house of A-3 but from the house of A-1. stated during the course of the investigation that A-3 had been so sitting there talking with A-1 and A-2 or that he had joined A-1 and A-2 in pelting stones. It may also be stated that the Bandi Kudagolu M.O. 2, according to the prosecution, was recovered not from the house of A-3 but from the house of A-1. Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the evidence which has been adduced by the prosecution as against A-3 is not sufficient or satisfactory enough as to establish the offences with, which he has been charged, beyond all reasonable doubt. A-3 should, therefore, be acquitted. We will now refer to some of the other contentions advanced by Sri Ramachandra Rao in the course of his arguments. As already stated above, the Police first came to know of this incident through the phone message which was sent to the doctor P.W. 2 . It is argued by Sri Ramachandra Rao that Exhibit P-21 which is a record made by P.W. 16 of this phone message, ought to be treated as the first information report and that the subsequent statement of P.W. 5 as per Exhibit P-11 should be viewed as a statement made to the Police in the course of the investigation. It is contended by him that Exhibit P-11 is, therefore inadmissible in evidence. In support of his argument, that a telephone message received by the Police can be treated as a first information, he has cited a decision of the Rangoon High Court reported in Shwe Pru v. The King1. In the present case, the telephone message sent by the doctor has not been signed by him. It was no doubt entered in the General Diary of the Police Station House, by P.W. 16. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the information relating to the cognizable offence, if given orally should be reduced to writing by the officer-in-charge of the Police Station and be read over to the informant and that every such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the person giving it. In view of the fact that the telephone message in the present case has not been signed by P.W. 2, we find it difficult to accept the contention that this information is such as would fall under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In view of the fact that the telephone message in the present case has not been signed by P.W. 2, we find it difficult to accept the contention that this information is such as would fall under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It also appears from the facts of the case, that no investigation was really started after receipt of this phone message. On the other hand, as soon as this phone message was communicated to him, the Circle Inspector P.W. 18 hurried to the hospital at Bellary and proceeded to record the statement of P.W. 5. It is only in P.W. 5’s statement as per Exhibit P-11 that the details of these offences have been disclosed, and to this statement of P.W.5, his thumb impression has been affixed. There is also one other aspect of the question to be considered. Even if the phone message as per Exhibit P-21 is to be viewed as the first information, it relates only to those offences which are stated to have been committed by the accused as against P.W. 5. So far as the offences against Sanna Eranna, Mahanandi and Hampiah P.W. 6 are concerned, there is no mention of the same in this telephone message and there is really to impediment to P.W. 5’s statement as per Exhibit P-11 being considered as the first information so far as these offences are concerned. In this view of the matter, we do not think that the learned Sessions Judge committed any error in having admitted Exhibit P-11, in evidence. It may also be further stated that the learned Sessions Judge has not treated Exhibit P-11 as substantive evidence; nor has be placed any reliance on the same to reach his conclusions as against the accused persons. Under these circumstances, we are further satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the accused persons by admitting Exhibit P-11 in evidence. Sri Ramachandra Rao pointed out one or two circumstances relating to the recovery of the articles M.O.s. 1 and 2, namely the spear and the Bandi Kudagolu. It is pointed out by him that the prosecution evidence does not show that after the recovery of these articles, they were packed and sealed in the presence of the panchayatdars. Sri Ramachandra Rao pointed out one or two circumstances relating to the recovery of the articles M.O.s. 1 and 2, namely the spear and the Bandi Kudagolu. It is pointed out by him that the prosecution evidence does not show that after the recovery of these articles, they were packed and sealed in the presence of the panchayatdars. It is urged by him that in view of this infirmity in the evidence adduced by the prosecution, no reliance should be placed on the recovery of these articles. As pointed out by Sri Mahishi, the learned Sessions Judge has not placed any reliance on the recovery of these articles. We also think that in view of the convincing nature of the evidence of the eye-witnesses as against A-1 and A-2,it is unnecessary to place any reliance on the recovery of these articles. At the same time, we wish to point out that Investigating Officers ought to be more, careful and should follow the correct procedure while seizing such articles. It is very necessary that they should, in the presence of panchayatdars, properly pack the articles and seal the same so that there cannot be any ground for the suspicion that such articles could have been tampered with subsequently. It was also argued by Sri Ramachandra Rao that no spear is shown to have been recovered on the information furnished by the second accused and that, therefore, the prosecution case to the effect that he had been armed with a spear, ought not to be believed. We cannot agree with this contention of the learned Advocate. There is material in the prosecution evidence to show that attempts had been made to trace the spear with which A-2 had been armed; but, the same was not successful. Merely because the weapon with which A-2 had been armed at the time of the incident has not been recovered, it does not follow that the eye-witnesses should be disbelieved. It is quite clear from the evidence of the eye-witnesses already referred to, that it is as a result of spear-stab by A-2. that Mahanandi died and that A-2 also inflicted a spear injury on the person of P.W.6 Hampiah. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the Police were unable to trace the spear with which A-2 had been armed, does not in any way weaken the prosecution case against him. that Mahanandi died and that A-2 also inflicted a spear injury on the person of P.W.6 Hampiah. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that the Police were unable to trace the spear with which A-2 had been armed, does not in any way weaken the prosecution case against him. It was lastly urged by Sri Ramachandra Rao that according to the evidence of P.W. 4 the deceased and the accused 1 and 2 were on talking terms with each other even subsequent to the incident of the second pigeon race and that therefore there was really no illwill between them. It is therefore urged that there was no motive for the accused 1 and 2 to have attacked the two deceased persons. Motive is really not very important when there is convincing evidence to show that it is only the accused 1 and 2 that are responsible for these offences.. Further, from the mere fact that the accused 1 and 2 and the two deceased persons had been talking with each other, it does not necessarily follow that there was no illwill between them. Even apart from the incident of the pigeon race, there was the further circumstance that the accused 1 and 2 suspected the deceased persons and the members of their party of having given information to the Police which led to the raid of the houses of A-1 and A-2 by the Police. The prosecution evidence also shows that after the two accused persons had thrown stones at the house of P.W. 5, they were actually chased by P.W. 5 who was accompanied, amongst others, by the two deceased persons also; it was in consequence of this pursuit, that the accused 1 and 2 came out armed with spears and attacked the two deceased persons and P.Ws. 5 and 6. Under these circumstances, we are unable to accept this contention also. In the result, A-3 is acquitted and he shall be released forthwith. So far as A-1 and A-2 are concerned, we are satisfied about the correctness of the convictions and the sentences, except as ragards the conviction of A-2 for the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. A-2 is acquitted if the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and his conviction and sentence therefore are set aside. The remaining convictions and sentences as against A-1 and A-2 are confirmed. A-2 is acquitted if the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and his conviction and sentence therefore are set aside. The remaining convictions and sentences as against A-1 and A-2 are confirmed. S.V.S. ----- Accused 3 acquitted and convictions and sentences against accused 1 and 2 confirmed.