ORDER These two petitions (Cr.M.M.O. Nos. 17 and 18 of 1999) arise out of a common order dated 16.02.1999 passed by the Sessions Judge, Solan, whereby two Revision Petitions No.14-S/10 of 1998 and 15-S/10 of 1998 were dismissed and the order dated 24.08.1998 of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Solan summoning the petitioners in the said Revision petitions as accused in a criminal complaint filed by the respondent was affirmed. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Solan by his order dated 24.08.1998 had summoned the petitioners, except petitioner No.6, in Cr.M.M.O. No.17 of 1999 under Ss. 107, 109, 143, 149,441, 503 and 506, IPC and petitioner No.6 Bagga Ram under S.109, IPC only and the petitioners in Cr.M.M.O No. 18 of 1999 under Ss. 109, 120, 143, 149 109 and 506, IPC. Having failed in their Revision Petitions by filing these petitions have invoked the inherent powers of this Court under S.482, Cr. P.C. for quashing the complaint of the respondent as a consequence of which the summoning order dated 24.08.1998 of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and the order of the Sessions Judge dated 19.02.1999 passed in the Revision Petitions will stand upset. 2. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The first question to be answered is whether the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under S.482, Cr.P.C. in a case in which the Sessions Judge has already refused to interfere in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction in the context of S.397(1) read with S.397(3) Cr.P.C? This point is no longer res integra and came up for consideration directly or indirectly in a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court. 3. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977 Cri LJ 1891) in the context of S.397(2) Cr.P.C. which prohibits Revision petition against interlocutory order. It was held in para 3 of the judgment: "3....A harmonious construction of Ss.397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under S.397 (2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of S.482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provisional, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers." 4. In Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978 Cri LJ 165), the learned Judges explained in para 10 of the Judgment: "....On a plain reading of S.482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code," which include sub-sec. (2) of S.397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. ."But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out ? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-sec.(2) of S. 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing can affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly." 5. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly." 5. In the earlier portion of the above judgment in Para 8, the learned Judges have laid down the following principles which may be noticed in relation to exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: "(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." 6. In the above two judgments, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were examining the scope of inherent powers and jurisdiction under S.482, Cr.P.C. in the context of sub-sec. (2) OF S. 397. In Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh, 1979 Cri LJ 318 : (AIR 1979 SC 381), while interpreting the bar of another Revision Petition by the same person who had already filed Revision Petition before the Sessions Judge or the High Court, as provided under sub-sec. (3) of S.397, the learned Judges have held in para 4 that : "...The object of S.397(3) is clear. It is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. The language of S.397(3) is clear and peremptory and it does not admit of any other interpretation." 7. In V.C.Shukla v. State Through CBI, 1980 Supp SCC92: (1980 Cri LJ690), in the majority judgment a very important observation has been made in para 6 while answering the question whether an interlocutory order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge, can be further revised under S.482, Cr.P.C. by the High Court because S.3.97(3) permitted the power of revision to be exercised only by the High Court or the Sessions Judge but not by both of them. Referring to the limitation contained in sub-sec.(3) of S.397,. Cr.P.C. it was observed as under :- "..Sub-sec.(3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in S.482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under S.397(1) of the Code. 8. In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 605 : (1992 Cri LJ 527), in para 108, the learned Judges have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Art.226 or the inherent power under S.482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, stating that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:- "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under S. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for working vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 9. In Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S.Bangarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41: (1995 Cri LJ 2935), the learned Judges categorically stated that availing of remedy of revision to the Sessions Judge under S.399, Cr.P.C. does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under S.482, Cr.P.C. but the High Court should not act as second revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers and should be conscious of the fact that the Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory powers in the matter and should interfere only where it is satisfied that if complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of the process of the Court or that the interest of justice otherwise calls for quashing of the charges. Referring to the earlier judgment on the scope of S.482, Cr.P.C. it was observed in para 17:- "..In our opinion, while acting under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that too after the learned Sessions Judge had declined to interfere in the matter, the High Court ought not to have entered the arena of appreciation of evidence nor should it have recorded a finding that the complaint was the result of political differences or that it was more a matter of prestige than genuine proceeding." 10. In Krishan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 : (1997 Cri.LJ 1519) it is categorically recorded in Para 8:- The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 with Sec.401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Sec. 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its juridical process or illegality of sentence or order." "In view of the above discussions, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Sec.397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of theHigh Court under Section 483 the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the Courts below." 11. In the above judgment, the learned Judges have explained their earlier judgment in Rajan Kumar Manchanda V. State of Karnataka, 1990 Supp. SCC 132: Dharampal Ramshri (SMT), (1993) 1 SCC 435: (1993 Cri LJ 1049) and Deepti Alias Arati Rai Akhil Rai, (1995) 5 SCC 751 stating that on the facts of these cases the learned Judges were justified in holding that the impugned orders were not revisable because of prohibition under Sub-section (2) of Sec.397, Cr.P.C. but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no powers under Section 482, Cri.P.C. were not approved in view of the ratio of Madhu Limayes case, (1978 Cri LJ 165) (SC) (supra) as upheld in V.C. Shuklas case (1980 Cri LJ 690) (SC). Further in Rajan Kumar Manchandas case (supra), the order was interlocutory in respect of release of truck from attachment wheras in Dharampals case (supra), the order impugned was in respect of attachment under Sec. 146, Cr.P.C, in Diptis case (supra) holding that the High Court had exercised powers under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. without applying its mind and had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to miscarriage of justice, the Supreme (Court) had interfered. 12. In the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajesh Bajaj v.State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259, it is held that." If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. "The learned Judges have further reiterated the following observations in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lai, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : (1992 Cri LJ 527). "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases: that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. 13. From the catena of case law cited hereinabove, it is very clear that the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. are still available to a person despite his availing remedy of revision either before the Sessions Judge or the High Court but these must be exercised sparingly in a case in which the High Court is satisfied that if it does not interfere, there will be abuse of the process of the Court or failure of justice. Further, Men in a case in which the Sessions Judge has declined to interfere in the matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction,, the High Court is not supposed to enter the arena of appreciation of evidence and pronounce upon the truth and correctness of the complaint or defence to set aside the order of the Sessions Judge. 14. Applying these tests to the case in hand, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case to interfere in exercise of the inherent powers under Sec.482, Cr.P.C. The trial Court has passed a reasoned summoning order after discussing the complainants evidence in detail and coming to the conclusion that the legredients of the offences for which they were summoned were made out from the averments made in the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded in support thereof. Similarly, the Sessions Judge while affirming the order of the trial Court has examined the matter from all possible angles and met all the arguments raised before him. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated all those arguments before this Court which cannot be entertained in exercise of the inherent powers under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. in view of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited judgments for the purpose of exercise of inherent powers. 15. In the result, there is no merit in these Revision petitions and these are rejected. Petition dismissed.