P. K. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANT has filed the appeal against a reversing decision in a suit for specific performance of contract. ( 2 ) THE disputed property including a house belongs to the defendant. He had received some advance from one Padmabati pahdi under a registered deed of agreement dated 15. 3. 1977 to sell the property to said padmabati Padhi. He had also received some money from one Trinath Sahoo under an agreement dated 23. 6. 1977. In order to repay the amounts received from Padmabati padhi and Trinath Sahoo, defendant took a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the plaintiff on 9. 9. 1977 with the understanding that after repaying the dues of the other persons and getting khas possession of the house from trinath Sahoo, two rooms shall be let out to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff continued as a tenant under the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/- and it was stipulated that rent shall be adjusted out of the advance of Rs. 5,000/ -. Subsequently, on 2. 1. 1979, the defendant contracted to sell the disputed property to plaintiff for Rs. 20,000/ -. It was agreed that a sum of Rs. 3,850/- after adjustment of rs. 1,150/- towards house rent, shall be considered as advance towards the sale price. Subsequently, the defendant took further sum of Rs. 10,000/- from the plaintiff on different dates as per the receipts indicated in schedule-B of the plaint. Defendants, however, did not complete the transaction even though plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and ultimately the plaintiff sent notice on 9. 7. 1980. However, defendant disowned the agreement by his reply dated 16. 7. 1980 and the plaintiff was forced to file the suit for specific performance of contract. ( 3 ) THE defendant in his written statement denied the allegation regarding the alleged contract for sale of the disputed property to the plaintiff for Rs. 20,000/ -. It was specifically pleaded by the defendant that he was a telugu person and knew only to sign in Oriya. It was further stated that the husband of padmabati Padhi approached the defendant to take the house on rent and accordingly paid an advance of Rs. 20,000/ -. It was specifically pleaded by the defendant that he was a telugu person and knew only to sign in Oriya. It was further stated that the husband of padmabati Padhi approached the defendant to take the house on rent and accordingly paid an advance of Rs. 5,000/-, but subsequently it transpired that he had played fraud upon the defendant and managed to obtain a deed of agreement to sell the property to Padmabati padhi. Subsequently at the instance of the brother-in-law of the present plaintiff, the dispute with padmabati Padhi was settled by taking a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the present plaintiff. Defendant had never entered into an agreement in any manner whatsoever with the plaintiff to sell the house to him and had not given possession of the house in pursuance of the alleged agreement. The money received from the plaintiff was taken as loan with assurance to adjust the same towards the house rent and no amount had been received towards consideration of the alleged agreement for sale of the property. It was pleaded that the defendant had put his signature on a receipt written by the plaintiff without going through the contents. It was further stated that he had taken a sum of Rs. 7. 000/- and not Rs. 10,000/- as alleged. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court dismissed the suit on the findings that there was no valid contract for sale of the disputed house and specific performance of contract embodied in Ext. 1 would cause hardship to the defendant as he would be deprived of his only house and source of income through house rent. It was further found that though the defendant had taken money from the plaintiff on different occasions, the same had not been paid towards consideration for sale of the house. ( 5 ) THE lower Appellate Court reversed the decree of the Trial Court and granted a decree for specific performance of contract on the findings that the plea of the defendant that he was defrauded by the plaintiff while Ext. 1 was being executed, cannot be accepted and that the defendant had taken advance on various occasions for execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Against the aforesaid reversing decree of the lower Appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed. 1 was being executed, cannot be accepted and that the defendant had taken advance on various occasions for execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Against the aforesaid reversing decree of the lower Appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed. ( 6 ) THE appeal was admitted on the ground as to whether specific performance of contract embodied in Ext. 1 would cause hardship to the defendant so that a decree for specific performance should not be passed. However, in course of hearing of the appeal, in addition to the said point, the appellant has also pressed into service certain other points. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has first contended that the defendant had merely signed in Oriya and had signed the document in good faith without knowing the contents thereof as he was under the impression that he was executing an agreement for rent. It has been contended that there was no certificate in the agreement (Ext. 1) to the effect that the same had been read over and explained to the executant. In addition to the above, the Counsel for the appellant has also referred to the evidence in detail and pointed out certain discrepancies and contended that the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the deed of agreement (Ext. 1) was binding, should not be accepted. He has further contended that the various receipts indicating payment of money to the defendant from time to time had not been read over and explained to the defendant and those receipts had been granted thinking that money was being paid as advance towards rent of the disputed house, in short, he has submitted that the decision of the lower Appellate Court ought to be reversed and the decision of the Trial Court should be accepted. ( 8 ) THE question as to whether the deed of agreement was genuine or not is essentially a question of fact. The defendant had taken the plea that he had been defrauded and made to sign the agreement on the plea that the same was an agreement relating to lease of the disputed property. Apart from the fact that particulars of alleged fraud had not been specifically pleaded, it appears that the lower appellate Court has considered the relevant evidence on record and come to a finding that the alleged fraud had not been established. Apart from the fact that particulars of alleged fraud had not been specifically pleaded, it appears that the lower appellate Court has considered the relevant evidence on record and come to a finding that the alleged fraud had not been established. The plea of the defendant that he knew only to sign in Oriya, but did not know how to read and write Oriya has been disbelieved keeping in view the evidence on record including that of defendant himself. There was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant relating to lease of the house and subsequently the agreement relating to sale of the house was executed. The lower Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that if an agreement relating to lease of the house was already in existence, there was no occasion for the parties to enter into a subsequent agreement. The rent for the house was Rs. 75/- as per the plaintiff's case and Rs. 150/- as per the case of the defendant. Even assuming that the rent was Rs. 150/- per month, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- had admittedly been paid in the beginning and there was no occasion to pay further sum of Rs. 10,000/-on different occasions as advanced towards rent. The scribe of the document has proved about the due execution of the document. Keeping in view the various facts and circumstances of the case as noticed by the lower Appellate Court, it cannot be said that the reasonings given by it are perverse so as to warrant interference in a second appeal. The Trial Court had given a finding disbelieving the document without discussing the relevant evidence on record and more on the basis of surmises and conjectures. For the aforesaid reasons, the first contention raised by the counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant had contended that the plaintiff had failed to plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract as contemplated in Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act: such a plea was not taken by the defendant in any of the Courts below. It is, of course, true that plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of. It is, of course, true that plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of. contract has to plead that he was and is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and if such assertion is traversed, the plaintiff is also required to prove his continued readiness and willingness. In the present case, the plaintiff had stated about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Earlier to filing of the suit he had issued a notice to the defendant. The plea of the plaintiff regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract has not been specifically denied. That apart/the plaintiff himself has stated about his readiness and willingness. Since the question had not been raised in the Courts below and since there is some material to indicate that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, this contention raised by the Counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant then contended that if the agreement is specifically enforced, it would cause hardship to the defendant as he will be deprived of his only house which was also a source of income to him. In this context it is also contended that the valuation of the house would have been much more than Rs. 20. 000/- and this by itself is sufficient to refuse the prayer for specific performance of contract. ( 11 ) THE defendant has nowhere pleaded about the alleged hardship to be caused to him in case the agreement is specifically enforced. The alleged hardship cannot be said to be not in contemplation of the parties, particularly of defendant, when the agreement was executed. Mere inadequacy of consideration cannot be considered to be a ground to deny specific performance of contract. Section 20 (2) (b) of the Specific Relief Act takes into account only unforeseen hardship to be caused to the party defendant had nowhere pleaded that some unforeseen hardship would be caused. In the absence of any pleading or evidence in that regard, it would not be proper to permit the appellant to raise such question for the first time in second appeal. Even though the question had not been specifically pleaded, the Trial court had observed that the enforcement of the contract may cause undue hardship to the defendant. In the absence of any pleading or evidence in that regard, it would not be proper to permit the appellant to raise such question for the first time in second appeal. Even though the question had not been specifically pleaded, the Trial court had observed that the enforcement of the contract may cause undue hardship to the defendant. This finding of the Trial Court, however, was not based on any material on record. It is apparent that defendant had entered into the agreement with his eyes open and he wants to wriggle out of the contract subsequently in some pretext or the other. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not consider it a fit case where specific performance of contract should be refused on the gorund of alleged hardship to the defendant. In this context, the decision reported in Alifan bibi and Ors. v. Amina Bibi and Ors. , may be seen. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.