JUDGMENT A.K. GANGULY, J :- This writ petition has been heard at length at the admission stage itself and with the consent of the parties is finally decided. 2. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 18-3-1998 passed by the Registrar of Lalit Narain Mithila University, Darbhanga (hereinafter called the said University). By the said order the appointment of the petitioners have been held to be illegal. The petitioners have further challenged the order of the Chancellor, Universities of Bihar, Patna dated 8-1-1998. The Chancellor passed its order dated 8-1-1998 as the matter was remanded to the Chancellor by an order of this Court dated 28-4-1997 rendered in C.W.J.C. Nos. 647 of 1988 with C.W.J.C No. 841 of 1989. 3. The facts of this case are that on 2110-1986 an advertisement was published in the daily newspaper 'Aryavarta' for appointment of one post of Typist and five vacant posts of Class IV employees in the D.B.K.N. College, Narhan. Pursuant to the said advertisement the petitioners applied. Thereafter they received letters of interview and appeared in the interview. Thereafter appointment letters dated 13-1-1988 were sent to the petitioners under the signature of the Registrar on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor of the University appointing petitioner No.1 on the post of Typist and petitioner No.2 on one of the post of Class IV employee of the said College and thereafter the petitioners joined pursuant to the said appointment. Thereafter two Writ petitions were filed before this Court bearing C.W.J.C. No. 647 of 1988 and C.W.J.C. No. 841 of 1989 challenging the appointment of the petitioners. The said writ petitions were heard by a learned Judge of this Court and by order dated 28-4-1997 the said writ petitions were disposed of. 4. While hearing the said writ petition, this Court heard the allegation that the appointment of the petitioners are vitiated on account of bias. It was stated before the Court that the sole basis of appointment was interview and there was no written test. It was urged before this Court in those proceedings which were disposed of by this Court. on 28-4-1997 that the Professor Incharge of the said College (respondent No. 4 in those proceeding) was a relation of the petitioners. It was stated before the Court that the sole basis of appointment was interview and there was no written test. It was urged before this Court in those proceedings which were disposed of by this Court. on 28-4-1997 that the Professor Incharge of the said College (respondent No. 4 in those proceeding) was a relation of the petitioners. In fact the petitioners are his son-in-law and brother respectively and the said Professor Incharge being a member of the Selection Committee, it was stated that the appointment of the petitioners have not been fair but have been influenced by the said Professor Incharge. Therefore, a prayer was made to quash the appointment. In the context of the said allegation the Court held that merely because the son-in law and brother of the Professor Incharge have been selected, it cannot be said that by itself vitiates the selection process, but the Court was conscious of the fact that such allegations create doubt in the mind of the people and also in the mind of the Court about the legality of the selection. Therefore, the matter has to be examined factually and the Court thereafter gave liberty to the writ petitioners In those cases to make proper representation before the Chancellor and the Chancellor was requested to consider the matter upon notices to the concerned parties and examine the facts and then pass an order. Those writ petitions were disposed of in those terms. 5. It is not in dispute that thereafter notices were given by the Chancellor to all the parties including the said Professor Incharge and the matter was decided by the Chancellor on the basis of the written statements filed by most of the parties including the said Professor Incharge. 6. The Court did not make any direction to the Chancellor to hear the parties in person. As such the Chancellor did the right thing by deciding the matter on the basis of the written statement filed by the parties and without asking them to appear for personal hearing. 7. The Chancellor in his order dated 8-11998 discussed the matter thread bare and also considered the stand taken by the parties including the said Professor Incharge in their written statements. 8. When the matter was being urged before me, it was not disputed that the petitioners are relation of the said Professor Incharge. 7. The Chancellor in his order dated 8-11998 discussed the matter thread bare and also considered the stand taken by the parties including the said Professor Incharge in their written statements. 8. When the matter was being urged before me, it was not disputed that the petitioners are relation of the said Professor Incharge. What is disputed by the petitioners is that the said Professor Incharge did not participate in the selection process when the candidature of the petitioners was considered. Of course there is no affidavit filed by the Professor Incharge in the previous proceeding and in the present proceeding the said Professor Incharge has not been made a party. In the background of these facts, the assertion made in the writ petition has been considered by this Court but this Court finds it difficult to rely on the same in view of the clear finding in the order of the Chancellor that the said Professor Incharge filed his written statement and in his written statement it is not denied that he did not participate in the selection. On the other hand the positive case made out in the written statement of the said Professor Incharge, namely, Sri Jagdish Rai, is that he was a member of the Selection Committee but in the written statement which has been filed by Sri Jagdish Rai it has been stated that he was the junior most member of the said Committee and as such he cannot impose his views on the senior members of the said Committee of the University. This very stand taken by the Professor Incharge shows that he must have participated in the deliberation of the Selection Committee when the cases of the petitioners were considered. 9. It stands to reason that the question of influencing the decision arises only when the person participates in the discussion on the basis of which the decision takes place. If a person does not participate in the discussion and withdraws himself from any discussion relating to the candidature of the petitioners, there is no question of either succeeding or not succeeding in influencing the decision. So from the stand of the said Professor Incharge, namely Jagdish Rai, it is clear that he participated in the selection process of the petitioners who were his very close relation, one being son-in-law and another being his own brother. So from the stand of the said Professor Incharge, namely Jagdish Rai, it is clear that he participated in the selection process of the petitioners who were his very close relation, one being son-in-law and another being his own brother. The stand that the said Professor Incharge being a junior member of the Selection Committee could not influence the decision is a stand which this Court cannot take into consideration. 10. In a case of bias, the test is always one of reasonable likelihood of bias. In the facts of this case which are admitted, namely, that Sri Jagdish Rai was a member of the Selection Committee participated in a selection proceeding which chose his son-in-law and brother for appointment to the post, a reasonable likelihood of bias is very much palpable. 11. In a situation like this, the test of bias has been very aptly summarised in the words of Lord Esher in Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration reported in (1894)1 Queens Bench page 750. At page 758 of the report the learned Judge said thus: "The question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biased. The Court cannot inquire into that ... In the administration of justice, whether by a recognised legal court or by persons who, although not a legal public court, are acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that, in order that there should be no doubt about the purity of the administration any person who is to take part in should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being biased." (emphasis added) 12. In a similar vein Lord Denning M.R. observed in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon reported in (1969) 1 Q.B. page 577. At page 599 Lord Denning observed as follows: "........In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the Chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be nevertheless if right minded persons would think that in the circumstances there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit...." 13. Following the aforesaid principles, Justice Venkatachaliah as His Lordship then was, also summed up the rule of bias in the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1987 SC page 2386 as follows: "As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party." 14. Going by the aforesaid test, as I must, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appointment of the petitioners is vitiated by a clear personal bias of the said Sri Jagdish Rai, who was a very close relation of the petitioners and who was a member of the Selection Committee. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that on a proper consideration of the facts and the circumstances of the case, the Chancellor came to a correct conclusion and sitting in writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot upset the same, even if the Court is of the view that a different conclusion is possible. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court thinks that it is not possible that a different conclusion can be reasonably arrived at. 15. Therefore, this Court upholds the order of the Chancellor as the challenge to the same fails. This writ petition is thus dismissed. No order as to cost. Petition dismissed.