Judgment.- On the evening of the 26th April, 1959, at about 7 p.m., whilst one Narayana Reddy (P.W. 1) was seated on the ‘pial’ outside his house in Jutur village, a bomb was hurled at him and as a result of the explosion, although he escaped death, he was seriously wounded in the leg and disabled for life. In connection with this incident, the two appellants (who will be referred to as A-1 and A-2 respectively) were tried, convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge of Anantapur as under. A-1 was convicted under section 307, Indian Penal Code, and under section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years under each count. A-2 was convicted under section 307 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, and under section 3 read with section 6 of the Explosive Subtances Act and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years under each count. The sentences of both the appellants were ordered to run concurrently. For a number of years prior to this occurrence, the village of Jutur was rent by factions and the strained feelings manifested themselves in acts of violence and in civil and criminal cases. The leaders of the rival factions were one J. P. Ranga. Reddy on the one side and one Rajagopala Reddy (P.W. 13) on the other. P.W. 1, the victim of the outrage, P.W. 2 (Pedda Sunki Reddy), P.W. 4 (Madhava Reddy), P.W. 11 (Narayana Reddy) and P.W. 15 (Obi Reddy) belonged to P.W. 13’s group and are also related to one another while the two appellants were the adherents of J. P. Ranga Reddy. A-2 is also the step-brother of J. P. Ranga Reddy and A-1 is said to be a close friend and associate of the latter. On 4th April, 1959, a serious rioting with fire-arms took place in the village in which one Kesava Reddy was killed and some others belonging to P.W. 13’s faction were injured. In that case, J. P. Ranga Reddy, his sons and some others of his party were implicated as the accused and the case was pending investigation at the time of this occurrence. Just before this occurrence, the situation in the village was so tense that a special police party had been stationed in the village with a view toavert clashes between the rival groups and maintain public peace. Just before this occurrence, the situation in the village was so tense that a special police party had been stationed in the village with a view toavert clashes between the rival groups and maintain public peace. On the day of the occurrence the police party consisted of five Reserve Constables and two Head-Constables. P.W. 1, the victim, gives a graphic account of the incident. According to him, since the murdered man in the rioting which took place on 4th April, 1959 and the persons who were injured belonged to his party, he was taking keen interest in that case on the side of the prosecution. He claims to be an important person in his faction and that was the reason why an attempt was made to kill him. [* * * * * *] [His Lordship then proceeded to discuss the evidence in the case.] In an exhaustive and analytical judgment, the learned Sessions Judge, on a careful appraisal of the evidence in view of the fact that it is of a partisan nature, and after a close examination of the contentions advanced on behalf of the defence, had no hesitation in holding that the complicity of the two accused in the crime had been established beyond all reasonable doubt. He also found that all the ingredients of the offences with which the accused had been charged were made out and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as stated supra. The same contentions as were advanced before the learned Sessions Judge and repelled by him, have been repeated before me. Firstly it was contended that the trial of the accused for offences under the Explosive Substances Act is vitiated by reason of the contravention of the provisions of section 7 of that Act inasmuch as the consent in the present case was given not by the Central Government as required by section 7 but by the State Government. It is true that section 7 provides: “No Court shall proceed to the trial of any person for an offence against this Act except with the consent of the Central Government;” and it is also true that in this case the consent was given by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh and not by the Central Government. It is true that section 7 provides: “No Court shall proceed to the trial of any person for an offence against this Act except with the consent of the Central Government;” and it is also true that in this case the consent was given by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh and not by the Central Government. But, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution, the President has delegated to the State Governments the functions of the Central Government under section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act and by virtue of this delegation, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh has, by an order, dated 5th November, 1959 (Exhibit P-31), given his consent to the trial of the two accused in this case for offences under the Explosive Substances Act. The notification issued by the President is in the following terms: “No. 33/2/57-Police (IV) Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. No. 48303 New Delhi-2, the 4th May, 1957. NOTIFICATION. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution and in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject, the President hereby entrusts to all State Governments, with their consent, the functions of the Central Government under section 7 of the Explosive Sub-stances Act, 1908 (VI of 1908)”. Clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution provides: “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the Government of a State, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its. officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.” Now, Article 73 (1) of the Constitution provides inter alia that, “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend-(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws.” Article 246 (1) of the Constitution lays down that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule, which is known as the ‘Union List’. Item 5 in List I relates to ‘Arms, firearms, ammunition and explosives.” while Item 93 refers to, ”Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List “. Item 5 in List I relates to ‘Arms, firearms, ammunition and explosives.” while Item 93 refers to, ”Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List “. In my opinion, the conbined effect of the foregoing provisions is that the delegation of the functions of the Central Government under section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act is valid and the consent given in this case by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, is not open to challenge. In this connection, my attention was drawn to a decision of Desai, J., in Chaitanya Prakash v. State,1 where the learned Judge set aside the conviction of the accused in that case under section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act on the ground that the consent for the trial of the accused had been given by the Governor of the State and not by the Central Government. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge observes: ”There is no provision in the Act conferring any power upon the Central Government to delegate its powers and duties to any authority subordinate to it. Section 7 is very clear; it “bars a Court’s taking cognizance of the offence under the Act except with the consent of the Central Government.” Again, at page 377, the learned Judge observes: “I do not dunk any question of validity of delegation of power arises in the case. The Central Government has not delegated its power of giving consent to the Governor; what it has done is to give general consent to all prosecutions consented to by him.” It does not appear from the judgment that the learned Judge’s attention was drawn to clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution. There is no knowing how the learned Judge would have viewed the matter, had he considered the effect of that constitutional provision. * * * * * * [After examining the other contentions in the case, His Lordship concluded:] It follows, therefore, that the convictions of the two accused are correct. As regards the punishment, for a pre-planned and dastardly crime of this kind, the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Judge errs on the side of leniency. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Appeal dismissed.