Order.- The accused in C.C. No. 1228 of 1959 on the file of the Additional Sub-Magistrate, Ponkunnam, has filed this Revision Petition to quash the charge that is now pending against him. The Station House Officer, Kanjirappally, has filed a petty case charge sheet against him for an offence under section 290, Indian Penal Code. The offence alleged was that at a public meeting when ore Purushothaman Pillai was addressing the meeting the accused came near the platform and said two or three times, ‘that is not correct’. On receipt of the complaint the Magistrate proceeded to try the case under the summons case procedure and issued notice to the accused. The accused on receipt of the summons appeared and presented a petition that even if the allegations in the complaint are true, it does not disclose any offence and that the case should not be proceeded with. The Magistrate however dismissed the petition and proceeded to question him. The accused pleaded not guilty. The matter was taken up in revision to the Sessions Judge of Kottayam praying that a reference may be made to this Court under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code. The petition was dismissed and he has not come up in revision. Section 290, Indian Penal Code, deals with the punishment for public nuisance. It reads as follows: “Whoever commits a public nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees”. The offence of public nuisance as defined in section 268 consists in the doing of any act or illegal omission which causes any injury, danger or annoyance and the offence is complete when an act of the nature is committed or when there has been an illegal omission of the kind. There is no allegation that the accused by contradicting the speaker and by saying that what the speaker stated is not correct has caused any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public. It is not understandable how by merely interrupting at a meeting without anything more, and there is no other allegation here, it would amount to an offence under section 290, Indian Penal Code. Any way it is extremely doubtful whether mere interruption like this in a public meeting would amount to an offence. It is not understandable how by merely interrupting at a meeting without anything more, and there is no other allegation here, it would amount to an offence under section 290, Indian Penal Code. Any way it is extremely doubtful whether mere interruption like this in a public meeting would amount to an offence. But whatever that may be, section 95, Indian Penal Code, would be a complete answer to such a charge. In Philip Range v. Emperor1, a similar question came up for consideration. There was a meeting of the shareholders of the Central Telegraph Office Credit Co-operative Bank, Ltd. The accused along with some others had requisitioned for that special meeting. At the meeting it was proposed that the requisitionists should be expelled from the company. The accused was very angry at this and shouted that not even the Governor-General could expel members from the company. He then proceeded to leave the room and while leaving he is alleged to have muttered “You damn bloody bastards and toads”. The accused was prosecuted for an offence under section 504, and convicted. When the matter was taken up in revision a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a mere breach of good manners does not constitute an offence under section 504, Indian Penal Code, and that when the charge is of an insult by words, the words must amount to something more than what in English law is called “mere vulgar abuse”. Broomfield, J., further observed that even if it could be said that a technical offence under section 504, Indian Penal Code, has been made out, it is clearly not: a case in which the criminal Courts should have been approached and that the circumstances are covered by the provisions of section 95 of the Penal Code and that the accused has to be acquitted. Sadananda Jash v. Shibakali Nazra2 is another case. In that case there was a criminal complaint over a land dispute between the complaint’s brother and the accused. When the case was pending there was a compromise talk over this matter in the presence of the Headmaster of the school, the complainant being one of the teachers of the school. In the course of the talk the accused told the complainant that what he was telling is a lie. When the case was pending there was a compromise talk over this matter in the presence of the Headmaster of the school, the complainant being one of the teachers of the school. In the course of the talk the accused told the complainant that what he was telling is a lie. For this the school master rushed to the criminal Court and filed a complaint under section 504, Indian Penal Code. The accused was acquitted and on revision the order of acquittal was confirmed. The learned Judge observed as follows: "One of the first principles of law is ‘de minimis non cura lex’. This has found expression in section 95, Penal Code, which enacts that "nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it has intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm". "This is a complete justification for what the learned District Magistrate has done. Intercourse in civilised society will come to an end if for words uttered as in the present case, a person found himself exposed to all the trouble and worry of a criminal trial". It is not necessary to multiply decisions, but all the decisions show that in cases where the allegations in a complaint would at the most amount to some technical offence the matter would be covered by section 95, Indian Penal Code, barring cognizance by Courts in view of its triviality. The offence complained of in such cases is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. It therefore seems to me that this was not a case where in the interests of justice a prosecution ought to have been launched by the police, especially when they were said to have been present at the meeting for maintaining law and order and nothing untoward had happened. Ordinarily the High Court does not interfere at the interlocutory stage of criminal proceedings in a Subordinate Court. Ordinarily the High Court does not interfere at the interlocutory stage of criminal proceedings in a Subordinate Court. But if in a particular case the complaint or the police charge sheet discloses no offence and where even on the admitted facts there is no case against the accused and there is no chance of the case ending in a conviction and the High Court is clearly of opinion that a further prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment of the process of the Court, it is the duty of the High Court to interfere under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, and put an end to this abuse by directing the quashing of the prosecution. In a similar case in Raman Balan v. State1, where a charge-sheet filed by the police disclosed no offence, His Lordship Raman Nayar, J., observed: "It follows from what I have said that the charge-sheets against the petitioner and his fellow-accused disclose no offence whatsoever. That being so I think I should interfere whether under section 439 or under section 561-A of the Code, it does not much matter, and quash the proceedings against them. That this is the proper course to take has been laid down in a number of decisions of which it is necessary to refer only to Ramanathan v. S. Subramania2 Nripendra v. Gobind3, Gokul Prasad v. Debi Prasad4, Abdul Wali v. Emperor5 and Palaniswamy Naidu v. State6". For the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed and I direct that the proceedings in C.C. No. 1228 of 1959 on the file of the Additional Sub-Magistrate’s Court, Ponkunnam, against the petitioner be quashed and that the petitioner be discharged. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed.