Brijesh Kumar, C. J. — The precise question which arises for consideration in this writ appeal is about the relative scope of the provisions contained under section 33 and section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A case, where approval to proposed punishment has been granted by the Industrial Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, it would or not, create bar by applying principles of res judicata to examine the order of punishment on merits in adjudication proceedings initiated and referred to at the instance of the employee, under section 10 of the Act. 2. The brief facts are that the respondent No.3, namely, Sri Achyut Talukdar was working as Sectional Assistant in Civil Department in the Associated Industries (Assam) Spinning Unit, Chandrapur belonging to the National Textile Corporation (WBABO) Ltd. Certain charges seem to have been levelled against the respondent No.3 and one of his co-workers. It appears that some other proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act were already pending, relating to conditions of service of employees of the appellant before the Industrial Tribunal.Hence the employer moved a petition under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, for approval of order of dismissal of respondent from service. The case was registered as Case No. 15 of 1984 and the other one related to Sri Sundar Kurmi, a co-worker of the respondent as Case No. 16 of 1984. In the proceeding under section 33(2) (b) of the Act, parties adduced evidence before the Tribunal and ultimately by order dated October 4,1985 the Industrial Tribunal accorded approval for dismissal of the service of the respondent. The Tribunal observed to the following effect: ”… I am very much constrained to hold that there was a strong prima facie case against the employees concerned.” It was also observed that according to the employer they approached the Tribunal for approval by way of abundant caution though no such approval was required under the law. Ultimately the Tribunal made the following observations: “… Now in view of the above discussion I am quite unable to refuse the approval sought. The charges against the employees are quite independently proved before this Tribunal and as a result the petitions for approval are hereby allowed.” It appears that after the approval was granted by the Tribunal the employer dismissed the respondent from the services. The charges against the employees are quite independently proved before this Tribunal and as a result the petitions for approval are hereby allowed.” It appears that after the approval was granted by the Tribunal the employer dismissed the respondent from the services. The employee approached the Govt. and a notification dated May 20, 1987 was issued by the Govt. referring the industrial disputes for adjudication before the Labour Court. The two questions referred for adjudication are quoted below : ”1. (a) Whether the management of M/s Associated Industries (Assam) Spinning Unit, Chandrapur, Guwahati are justified in dismissing Sri Achyut Talukdar from service with effect from 26.11.84. 1. (b) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement with back wages or any other relief in lieu thereof.” It was registered as Reference No.23 of 1987 by the Labour Court. The parties exchanged their written statements. It appears that one additional issue was framed as Issue No. I (a) as raised by the employer regarding maintainability of the reference under section 10 of the Act. The plea seems to have been raised in view of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal dated 4.10.85 giving approval for passing the order of dismissal of the services. That issue seems to have been decided as preliminary issue by order dated 22.6.89. The Labour Court held that the reference proceedings were maintainable and thereafter proceeded to hear the case on merits. It further transpires that in the proceedings before the Labour Court, both the parties desired to rely upon the evidence adduced before the Industrial Tribunal and a request was made that the same may be treated as evidence adduced by the parties in the reference case. The workman, however, in addition examined himself before the Labour Court with its permission. After considering the material on record including the evidence, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court by order dated February 27,1991 held that the dismissal was unjustified and also granted the relief of reinstatement with all back wages. The said order of the Labour Court was impugned by the appellant before the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.3352 of 1991. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 29.1.96. The present appeal arises out of the said order passed by the learned Single Judge in the civil rule. 3. The said order of the Labour Court was impugned by the appellant before the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.3352 of 1991. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 29.1.96. The present appeal arises out of the said order passed by the learned Single Judge in the civil rule. 3. Sri NN Saikia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that once the Industrial Tribunal had recorded the finding about the guilt of the workman, namely, respondent No.3 after the Tribunal had permitted the parties to adduce evidence, such finding would have the effect of constructive res judicata in the proceedings on reference by the Govt. under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon a decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 1803 (Workmen of the Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd vs. The Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd). Our attention has more particularly been drawn to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment. It has been held that where an employer failed to hold an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman, it is open to the employer to lead evidence before the Tribunal to justify the action. Thus the scope will not be confined only to the question as to whether the enquiry was properly held or not, but the Tribunal would record its finding on the basis of the evidence which may be led to justify the order. It has further been observed that in principle no difference was observed whether the matter was before the Tribunal for approval under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act or in reference under section 10 of the Act. In either of the cases if the enquiry is defective or no enquiry was held, it would be open for the employer to justify the order of dismissal or discharge. It was further held that it has been so provided with the object of avoiding delay in disposal of industrial disputes. What has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted decision is that the Tribunal either in proceedings under section 33 or Labour Court under section 10 of the Act may allow the employer to justify the order of punishment, by adducing evidence in support thereof. 4. What has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted decision is that the Tribunal either in proceedings under section 33 or Labour Court under section 10 of the Act may allow the employer to justify the order of punishment, by adducing evidence in support thereof. 4. Yet another decision which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is reported in 1978 LLJ (Vol II) 161 (The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust vs. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust & another). In this decision the question of res judicata was considered about the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings. We further find that the said decision ^ is in a different context. In that case a special leave petition filed by the employer before the Supreme Court was dismissed. No reasons whatsoever were indicated. Thereafter the employer invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The workmen went to the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court invoking the doctrine of res judicata in view of dismissal of the earlier SLP filed by the employer saying that it was thereafter not open to the employer to approach the High court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the principles of constructive res judicata are applicable when any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made and would bar the trial in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. As observed by us earlier the whole matter was considered in a different context. We are, in this case, not concerned with such a situation. 5. As a matter of fact, so as to appreciate the point raised in its proper perspective, it would be necessary to consider the scope of enquiry under section 33 of the Act and the adjudication under section 10 of the Act. Section 33 only puts an embargo that during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before the Tribunal, conditions of service of the employees shall remain unchanged and alteration is permissible only with regard to the matter not connected with the dispute, with the approval of the Tribunal. Section 33 only puts an embargo that during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before the Tribunal, conditions of service of the employees shall remain unchanged and alteration is permissible only with regard to the matter not connected with the dispute, with the approval of the Tribunal. It is thus only with a view to lift the ban or restriction placed on the employer to change the condition of service of the workmen during pendency of proceeding before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal has to examine the matter under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. The purpose, prima facie, is to find out that the action which is proposed to be taken is not to victimise the workmen. In case, prima facie case in favour of the employer is found, then proposed punishment may be approved by the Tribunal. So far the scope of enquiry in a matter of adjudication of dispute under Section 10 is concerned, it is when the appropriate Govt. is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists, it refers the dispute for adjudication to a Court. The powers are vested in the Labour Court, Tribunals and National Tribunals under section 11A of the Act to grant appropriate relief in the case of discharge or dismissal of the workmen. It will be appropriate to route section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It reads as under: “11A. The powers are vested in the Labour Court, Tribunals and National Tribunals under section 11A of the Act to grant appropriate relief in the case of discharge or dismissal of the workmen. It will be appropriate to route section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It reads as under: “11A. Powers of Labour Court, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen-Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may beyond Satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it- may; by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require : Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the ease may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.” A perusal of the above provisions clearly indicates that it is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to Consider the question of award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal of the workmen as the circumstances of the case may require. It has also the power to grant any other relief. Therefore, in any case the contention which is sought to be raised by the appellant is accepted, it will only curtail the jurisdiction which is vested in the Labour Court on a reference made by the Govt under section 10 of the Act. An order of approval of punishment passed on the basis of proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act would not be the end of the matter. The real adjudicatory powers are vested in the Labour Court and the Tribunal under section 10 read with section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. A decision on the point is reported in AIR 1959 SC 389 (M/s G. Mckenzie & Co Ltd vs. Its Workmen & others). The real adjudicatory powers are vested in the Labour Court and the Tribunal under section 10 read with section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. A decision on the point is reported in AIR 1959 SC 389 (M/s G. Mckenzie & Co Ltd vs. Its Workmen & others). Relevant discussion is to be found in paragraphs 16 and 18 of the judgment and it has been observed that section 33 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to give or with hold per mission to the employer, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, to discharge or punish a workman concerned. It is further observed that in such a case the Tribunal has only to see the prima facie case and the object is to protect the workman during a pending industrial dispute, against intimidation or victimisation. It would be to ensure that the employer is not acting malafide or resorting to any unfair labour practice. It is further observed as follows : “… Therefore when the Tribunal gives or refuses permission it is not adjudicating an industrial dispute, its function is to prevent victimization of a workman for having raised an industrial dispute. The nature and scope of proceedings under section 33 shows that removing or refusing to remove the behalf on punishment or dismissal of workmen does not bar the raising of an industrial dispute when as a result of the permission of the Industrial Tribunal the employer dismisses or punishes the workmen. As the purpose of section 33 of the Act is merely ;to give or withhold permission and not-to adjudicate upon an industrial dispute, any finding under section 33 would not operate as res judicata and bar the raising of an industrial dispute.” For coming to the above conclusion the H0n%le Justice Supreme Court placed reliance on its several earlier decisions. Yet another decision of the supreme Court on the point is reported in 1978 SCC (L & S) 165 (M/s Punjab Beverages Pvt Ltd. Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & another). The relevant discussion is to be found in paragraph 6 of the judgment. Yet another decision of the supreme Court on the point is reported in 1978 SCC (L & S) 165 (M/s Punjab Beverages Pvt Ltd. Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & another). The relevant discussion is to be found in paragraph 6 of the judgment. It has been held : “It will be seen that the only scope of the inquiry before me Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under section 33 is to decide whether the ban imposed on the employer by this section should be lifted or maintained by granting or refusing the permission or approval asked for by the employer. If the permission or approval is refused by the Tribunal, the employer would be precluded from discharging or punishing the workman by way of dismissal and the action of discharge or dismissal already taken would be void. But the reverse is not true even if the permission or approval is granted that would not validate the action of discharge or punishment by way of dismissal taken by the employer. The permission or approval would merely remove the ban so as to enable the employer to make an order of discharge or dismissal and thus avoid incurring the penalty under section 31(1), but the validity of the order of discharge or dismissal would still reliable to be tested in a reference at the instance of the workmen under section 10 (Vide Atherton West & Co's case and the Punjab & National Bank case.) The workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispute in regard to the order of discharge or dismissal and have it referred for adjudication Under section 10 and the Tribunal in such reference would be entitled to interfere with the order of discharge or dismissal within the limits laid down by this Court in several decisions commencing from Indian Iron & Steel Co Ltd vs. Their workmen.” From perusal of die above decision it is quite clear that lifting of ban or approving c the order of punishment to be passed by the employer, does not create a bar nor operates as constructive res judicata to consider the validity or grant of any appropriate relief in proceeding under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The nature and purpose of the two proceedings are different. The nature and purpose of the two proceedings are different. Merely the fact that the Industrial Tribunal permitted the parties to adduce evidence to justify its action would not divest the workman of his right to challenge the order of punishment passed after lifting of the ban, under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In one of the decisions of this Court reported in (1988) 2 GLR (NOC) 8 (Md Anwar Azim Borah vs. The State of Assam & others) (1988 (1) GLJ 432) it was observed that a decision on an application under section 33 (2) (b) even if rendered on merit would not, ipso facto, be res judicata in a reference under section 10 of the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to make a distinction by submitting that in case where the approval is granted to pass the order of punishment without permitting the parties to adduce evidence, in that case it will be open for the workman to agitate the validity of the order of punishment under section 10 of the Act But in case the Tribunal while dealing with the matter under section 33(2) (b) allows the parties to adduce evidence, it will not be permissible for the workman to raise such question before the Labour Court. We do not feel persuaded by this submission. As noted earlier, the Labour Court in exercise of powers under section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act, on reference under section 10 of the Act, can make and award and the Labour Court has jurisdiction even to consider the quantum of punishment required to be awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case. It also has jurisdiction to grant any relief as may be thought appropriate. In case the finality is attached to the order passed by the Tribunal under section 3.3 (2) (b) of the Act, the provision of reference and adjudication would be rendered nugatory. The Labour Court under its adjudicatory power will not even be able to consider the question of quantum of punishment or any other relief to which the parties may be entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case since the quantum of punishment, namely, discharge or dismissal from service will also be considered and decided by the Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. 7. 7. The scope of enquiry in proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is certainly limited. The Tribunal is required to examine as to whether there is any prima facie case made out for the punishment proposed to be awarded to the employee. This is required to be done with a view to ensure that the employer is not victimising or using unfair labour practices against the employee or employees by reason of the fact that they had already initiated certain proceedings which at the relevant time are pending before the Tribunal or any Labour court. To test the bonafides of the employer the Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act would obviously like to see whether there is substance in the allegations and charges said to be made out by the employer against the employee or not. It has also to examine as to whether the charges and the subject matter are other than and unrelated to the proceedings already pending before the Labour Court or the Tribunal. In our view, for finding out such things as indicated above, it is permissible for the Tribunal in proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act to permit the parties to adduce evidence as held in the case of Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd (supra), it was only for the purpose of permitting the parties to adduce evidence that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted decision observed that no difference was to be found for that purpose, namely, adducing of evidence, between the proceedings under section 10 and under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. While considering the prima facie case for the purpose of awarding punishment to the employee, to ensure that it was not a case of victimisation due to pendency of the previous proceedings, the Industrial Tribunal under the law is not required to go into the regular enquiry into the charges and proof, thereof as that would be the domain of the Labour Court or the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under section 10 read with section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act when referred by the appropriate Govt for adjudication. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal while dealing with proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is entitled to permit the employer to adduce evidence only with a view to establish prima facie case and to prove that it was not a case of victimisation, nor the misconduct related to the subject matter involved in the previous proceedings already pending. Anything beyond that would be out of the purview of the proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. It appears for the said reason that in the case of Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd (supra) relied upon by the appellant it has nowhere been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that proceedings under section 10 of the Act are barred by constructive res judicata in cases where the Tribunal accorded approval under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act to award punishment to the employee after permitting the employer to adduce evidence. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above noted case, it was with a view to avoid delay that Industrial Tribunal may permit the employer to adduce evidence in proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act as permissible in adjudication case under section 10 of the Act and on this point, namely, on the question of adducing evidence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find any distinction. It is difficult to accept that merely because the Tribunal permitted the employer to adduce evidence in proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act the proceedings are to be taken as substitute for adjudicator proceedings under section 10 of, the( Act so as to be hit by bar pf constructive res judicata. The powers vested in the Labour Court and the Tribunal under section 10 of the Act cannot b? divested nor the employee can be deprived of that adjudicator remedy on the ground that the Tribunal while proceeding under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act had permitted the employer to adduce evidence to substantiate the charges. The scope of such proceedings as under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is limited to prima facie case alone. The Labour Court or the Tribunal gets the jurisdiction to enter into the question of validity of the order of punishment only on reference of such a dispute made to it for adjudication under Section 10 of the Act and not otherwise. The Labour Court or the Tribunal gets the jurisdiction to enter into the question of validity of the order of punishment only on reference of such a dispute made to it for adjudication under Section 10 of the Act and not otherwise. Industrial Tribunal exercising power under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act cannot assume the powers pf the Labour Court which vests in after reference of the dispute. The scope of enquiry under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is to protect the employee from victimisation due to pendency of a previous proceeding. 8. In view of the discussions held above, in our view, the; scope of two proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) and under section 10 of the Acids different; and one is neither substitute nor is controlled by the other. 9. No other point has been pressed before us. 10. We find no merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.