JUDGMENT Om Prakash, C.J. 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. These are the two appeals filed by the workman against the common judgment dated 2nd July, 1998. 3. The workman was appointed as a Sub Inspector of Police in the State Police Service. For some reasons, he resigned from that service and accepted five years' service on contract basis with the management. 4. While working under the contractual service, the workman was served with a charge sheet by the management and eventually he was dismissed from service. Aggrieved, the workman approached the Labour Court, who, by award published in Kerala Gazette dated 2-9-1997, set aside the dismissal order and ordered his reinstatement with 50% backwages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. 5. Both the management as well as the workman felt aggrieved by the award and, therefore, both filed separate original petition in this court impugning the award. The learned Judge took the view that the award made by the Labour Court reinstating the workman was contrary to the canons of service jurisprudence and, therefore, the learned Judge restored the punishment of dismissal and set aside the award reinstating the workman. 6. Aggrieved, the workman filed these two appeals against the common judgment of the learned Judge, which, involving common issues, are being disposed of by a common judgment. 7. The first question for consideration is whether the learned Judge was right in reversing the order of the Labour Court, who reinstated the workman with 50% backwages. S.11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (briefly, the Act) clearly provides that where an industrial dispute relating to the dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court for adjudication, the Labour Court, if satisfied that the order of dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of dismiss and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman, including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. S.11A amply empowers the Labour Court to set aside the order of dismissal and order reinstatement instead. 8. S.11A amply empowers the Labour Court to set aside the order of dismissal and order reinstatement instead. 8. The jurisdiction of the court under Art.227 of the Constitution is well specified by the Supreme Court in Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. ( 1984 (3) SCC 5 ), in which the court held that under S.11A, wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior court, it is vested with the right of superintendence. It is entitled to scrutinise the orders of subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it can, in appropriate case, quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions if any. The Supreme Court further held: " …. But it is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute one finding for another and similarly one punishment for another, as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it". (emphasis supplied) 9. It is clear from the dictum of the Supreme Court that this court under Art.227 of the Constitution can neither exercise powers of an appellate court over the decision of the Labour Court nor can this court exercise the powers vested in the Labour Court. The Supreme Court in Harbans Lal v. Jagmohan Saran ( AIR 1986 SC 302 ) held as follows: "The limitations on the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution are well settled and it is well known that a writ in the nature of. Certiorari may be issued only if the order of the inferior tribunal or subordinate court suffers from an error of jurisdiction, or from a breach of the principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. There is no sanction enabling the High Court to reappraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by inferior court or subordinate court. When High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its jurisdiction." The powers of the Labour Court and of this court under Art.226 and 227 are well demarcated. When High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its jurisdiction." The powers of the Labour Court and of this court under Art.226 and 227 are well demarcated. The Supreme Court in the Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre (Pvt.) Ltd. V. The Management and others ( 1973 (1) LLJ 278 ) held that after introduction of S.11A the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals have power to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and to direct reinstatement with or without backwages or to any other suitable relief including compensation according to the circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court held as follows: " …. In the course of adjudication, the Tribunal has to be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified. If it comes to such a conclusion, the Tribunal has to set aside the order and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms as it thinks fit. The Tribunal has also power to give any other relief to the workman including the imposing of a lesser punishment having due regard to the circumstances." (para.31) 10. Here, the Labour Court found that the order of dismissal was not justified on the facts and circumstances of the case for the reasons stated in the award. The decision of the Labour Court can be interfered with by this Court only when the Labour Court exceeds its authority or usurps power not vested in it or when a decision is rendered by the Labour Court in violation of the principles of natural justice or if the labour court acts with mala fide or arbitrarily. Undoubtedly, power is vested in the Labour Court by virtue of S.11A to set aside the order of dismissal and substitute the same by order of reinstatement or granting any other relief or compensation as the case may be. It is not a case where the labour court can be said to have passed its order in violation of the principles of natural justice nor can the order of the Labour Court be said to have been passed with mala fide or in arbitrary manner. Therefore, there was no justification for the learned Judge to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court that dismissal was excessive and relief has to be granted to the petitioner. Therefore, there was no justification for the learned Judge to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court that dismissal was excessive and relief has to be granted to the petitioner. The submission of learned counsel for the management before us is that the Labour Court is supposed to act judicially. He submits that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it was not open to the Labour Court to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the management. To elaborate his view point, counsel for the management submits that the workman was charged with gross disobedience of the orders of the higher authorities and that posed a great danger to the lives of the authorities and the property of the management. It is submitted that disobedience on the part of the workman warranted nothing but dismissal and any other view taken on the facts and in the circumstances of the case would be nothing but perverse and thus the view taken by the Labour Court that the punishment of removal from service has to be set aside and the punishment has to be limited to two months suspension and withholding of some backwages is wholly unsustainable. We do not see any force in this submission. At the most it may be argued that the view taken by the learned Judge was plausible, but it cannot be said that the view taken by the Labour Court was not at all plausible. When two views on a given fact situation are plausible and if one is chosen by the Labour Court, it cannot be said that the Labour Court acted illegally or perversely. Even if the view taken by the learned Judge is considered to be more plausible, it would not entitle this court under Art.226 or 227 to interfere with the order of the Labour Court. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Judge surely exceeded the powers vested in this court under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the submission made by the workman has to be accepted. The impugned judgment restoring the order of dismissal passed by the management, cannot be sustained in any way. 11. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Judge surely exceeded the powers vested in this court under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the submission made by the workman has to be accepted. The impugned judgment restoring the order of dismissal passed by the management, cannot be sustained in any way. 11. However, counsel for the management submits before us that the order of the Labour Court reinstating the workman for the period beyond five years notwithstanding his contractual service being limited to a period of five years, is patently erroneous. It is not disputed that the workman was appointed by the management only for a period of five years under the contract. This plea was specifically raised by the management in the O. P. and the Labour Court took cognizance of this plea in the award, but overlooked such contention of the management in these words: " ….. There is a contention for the management that he was appointed on a contract basis and the period of contract has expired. I do not propose to go into that question since that is not covered by the issued referred. The labour court cannot travel beyond the scope of reference. The findings of the Labour Court and adjudication have to be confined to the four corners of the issue referred." The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the Labour Court was right in reinstating the workman beyond the period of five years, for which he was employed by the management. No reason, whatsoever, has been given by the Labour Court to order reinstatement of the workman beyond the contractual period of five years. The Labour Court simply rejected such contention of the management on the ground that no such dispute was referred to it. When this fact is not under dispute, it is meaningless to say that no such dispute was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court has assigned no reasons in its award to order reinstatement of the workman beyond the contractual period of five years. If on the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court thinks that the workman is entitled to be reinstated beyond the contractual period then the reasons should have been assigned therefor. The Labour Court has assigned no reasons in its award to order reinstatement of the workman beyond the contractual period of five years. If on the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court thinks that the workman is entitled to be reinstated beyond the contractual period then the reasons should have been assigned therefor. In the absence of the reasons, the reinstatement beyond the contractual period cannot be sustained merely on the specious ground that no such dispute was referred to it. 12. The workman, who has appeared in person before us, however, submits that his future prospects to get employment are completely marred because of dismissal. He submits that due to the dismissal, which was illegally done by the management, he could not get any suitable employment for himself and, therefore, he is entitled to adequate compensation for the loss illegally caused to him by the management. 13. We find force in the submission of learned counsel for the management that at any rate, the Labour Court could not have made any award reinstating the workman beyond the period of five years without assigning cogent reasons, therefor. To this extent, the award is patently erroneous. The matter has, therefore, to be remitted to the Labour Court to pass a fresh award for moulding relief in accordance with law, considering the contention of the management that the workman was appointed only for a period of five years and also the submission of the workman that he is entitled to adequate compensation as his prospects to get employment were marred due to dismissal. 14. It is now well settled that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is well competent to mould relief in the interest of justice taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in entirety (see Punjab National Bank Ltd. V. Their Workmen ( 1959 (II) LLJ 666 ); Assam Oil Co. v. Its Workmen 1960 (I) LLJ 587 ; Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal ( 1981 (I) LLJ 386 ) and Samnuggur Jute Factory Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1964 (I) LLJ 634). 15. No reason whatsoever, has been given by the Labour Court to reinstate the workman beyond the contractual period of five years. If the Labour Court reinstated the workman consciously and not inadvertently beyond the contractual period, then the reasons for doing so will be assigned thereby. 15. No reason whatsoever, has been given by the Labour Court to reinstate the workman beyond the contractual period of five years. If the Labour Court reinstated the workman consciously and not inadvertently beyond the contractual period, then the reasons for doing so will be assigned thereby. In the result, both the appeals are disposed of finally. The impugned judgment dated 2-7-98 is set aside and the case is remitted to the Labour Court to consider the question as to which appropriate relief can be granted to the workman on his submissions and on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. If the Labour Court is of the view that the reinstatement deserves to be continued beyond the contractual period, then it will record reasons in that behalf, failing which the reinstatement of the workman will be coterminous to his service contract. Looking to the urgency reflected by the peculiar facts of this case, we direct the labour court to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity of being heard to the parties within two months from the date a certified copy of this judgment is produced before it by the appellant.