JUDGMENT Vishnu Sahai, J. - Since both Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998 and Criminal Suo Motu Application No. 3 of 1998 arise out of same set off acts and a common impugned judgment, we are disposing them off by one judgment. Through Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998, the appellant Munir Ahmed Sheikh has challenged the Judgment and order dated 20th June, 1998, passed by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad Alibag, in Sessions Case No. 38 of 1997, convicting and sentencing him to undergo five years RI. and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to undergo 3 months RI. for the offence under Section 307 IPC. While admitting Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998, one of us (Vishnu Sahai, J ) issued a notice to the appellant as to why his sentence be not enhanced and Criminal Suo motu application No 3 of 1998 arises from the said notice. 2. In short, the prosecution case runs as under: The informant-victim Shipra Babasaheb Dahake PW 8 was the original resident of village Bodegaon Taluka Darvha District Yawatmal. She came to Pune for completing her Diploma in Horticulture Garden Education in about 1991 and started staying with her maternal uncle Dilip Valse Patil an M.L.A and his wife Kiran. The appellant Muneer Shaikh was attached as a P.A. to 1 Dilip Valse Patil. An affair between the appellant and Shipra Dahake commenced in the year 1991. But inspite of that, the appellant married a Muslim in the year 1995 on the pressure of his parents. He told her that he would give divorce to his Muslim wife and thereafter, marry her. After completing, her Diploma in Horticulture Education, Shipra left for Bodegaon but, at the instance of the appellant came to Mumbai sometimes in January, 1996 and the two of them started living as husband and wife in a rented room on Curry Road. They lived there till 26-5-1996. During this period, Shipra Dahake was pressurising the appellant to marry her but the appellant initially avoided giving the date of marriage but, later on told her that it had been fixed in the last week of May and suggested that they should visit Pune for marketing. Consequently, on 26-5-1996 at, about 11.45 p.m., the "two of them proceeded for Pune in a Maruti van belonging to one Nivrutti Shinde a friend of the appellant. Consequently, on 26-5-1996 at, about 11.45 p.m., the "two of them proceeded for Pune in a Maruti van belonging to one Nivrutti Shinde a friend of the appellant. At about 12.45 p.m. when they reached near a dhaba, just ahead of Panvel, the appellant offered her chips and asked her whether she would like to take pepsi-drink and on her consenting to take it, he brought a glass containing the said drink. On sipping the drink, she smelt baygon and chided him for bringing the said drink. She told him to take the vehicle back to the owner of the dhaba from where he had brought the drink and to ascertain as to what was mixed in the drink. She also asked him to take a sip from the drink but he threw the same. Thereafter, the appellant took the Mafuti van towards Karjat side and after driving the same for 15 minutes, stopped it on the ground that he had missed the road. However, instead of taking the Maruti van back, the appellant tried to kiss her and pressed her neck, - whereupon, she raised cries and tried to escape. He then closed the windows of the car; kept her legs on the door of the car; put his legs over her legs: and then took out a rope and tried to strangulate her with it. She tried to take out the rope from around her neck and forcibly tried to come out from the Maruti van. The appellant tried to foil this bid of hers with one hand but, she succeeded in coming out from the Maruti van. The appellant also came out; caught hold of her head; and forcibly banged it on the ground. Thereafter, he pressed her neck. She told him to release her and said that she was prepared to go anywhere. But, he kept on insisting that they should go to Pune. She was not ready to go with him. Again, the appellant dragged her to the Maruti van; took out a knife which was kept in the vani and when he was about to inflict a blow on her abdomen with the same, she caught hold of it. She took the other hand of the appellant in her mouth. On account of catching the knife, she received injuries on her palm and right hand. She thereafter, fell down. She took the other hand of the appellant in her mouth. On account of catching the knife, she received injuries on her palm and right hand. She thereafter, fell down. The appellant then, inflicted knife blows on left cheek, below chin, left waist and over her chest and below the chest. As a consequence of the knife assault, she became un-conscious and blood oozed out, from her injuries. Thinking her to be dead, the appellant dragged her aside and threw her in the bushes after removing the ornaments from her person. He then went towards the Maruti van. After sometime, he returned. Meanwhile, she had regained consciousness and in order to escape from the clutches of the appellant, decided to go behind the bushes. Crawling some distance, she went behind the bushes and went towards the Railway track. The- appellant tried to find her in torch light but, failed. Near the railway track, one Thakursing Pratapsing Rajput PW 7 noticed her lying. Mter sometime, a train driven by Madhukar Rane PW 4 came the gangman signalled to stop the train and in the said train, she was taken to Karjat Railway Station which she reached sometimes on the morning of 27-5-1996. 3. At Karjat Railway Police Station, PSI Mainuddin Jamadar PW 13 of the said police station, immediately referred her to the Rural Hospital, Karjat, where she was medically examined by Medical officer at 11.10 a.m. who found on her person three incised wounds-and two contused lacerated wound, vide Exhibit 37. Two of the incised wounds were situated on the chest region and one on the left side of cheek. The contused lacerated wounds were situated on the right palm and right middle finger. Since the genuineness of Exhibit 37 was admitted to the defence, the prosecution has not examined the concerned doctor. 4. After her medical examination, the victim Shipra came back to Karjat Railway Police Station where PSI Mainuddin Jamadar PW 13 lodged her FIR Exhibit 43. The said FIR was thereafter, sent to Karjat Police Station and the victim Shipra was sent to Sasoon Hospital Pune for further treatment. On the basis of the FIR, PSI Harish Chandra Dome PW 14 registered C.R. No. 98 of 1996 under Section 307, IPC at Karjat Police-Station. 5. The victim Shipra was medically examined in Sasoon Hospital, Pune, same day (27-5-1996) by Dr. Manjusha Litake PW 9. On the basis of the FIR, PSI Harish Chandra Dome PW 14 registered C.R. No. 98 of 1996 under Section 307, IPC at Karjat Police-Station. 5. The victim Shipra was medically examined in Sasoon Hospital, Pune, same day (27-5-1996) by Dr. Manjusha Litake PW 9. She found the following injuries on her person: 1. Sutured stab wound in anterior axillary line left 6th inter coast a space- 3 x 1 cm. 2. Stab wound in left lumbar region, (superficial) 4 cm x 1/2 cm. 3. Stab wound over right palm in hypotherma eminence skin deep 4 cm x 1 c.m. 4. Stab wound on right palm, second, third and 4th finger middle phalanx skin deep 1 cm x 1/2 cm. 5. Left hand stab wound 3rd and 4th finger distal phalanx. 6. Left cheek sutured stab wound 2 cm x 1/2 cm. 7. Left chin sutured stab wound 1 cm x 1/2 cm. 8. Multiple abrasion over neck and back. 9. Stab wound chest right 3rd ICS superficial 1/2cm x 1/3 cm. 10. Left forearm stab 1/2 cm x ½ cm. In the opinion of Dr. Litake PW 9, the injury Nos. 1 and 9 were grievous in nature and the remaining were simple. They were attributable to a sharp pointed object and could be caused by the knife shown to her. (Knife recovered on the pointing out of the appellant). Dr. Litake also stated that the abrasions on the neck of Shipra (injury No.8) could be caused if the rope shown to her, article No. 9, (rope recovered on the pointing out of the appellant) was tied around her neck. 6. The investigation was conducted in the usual manner by PSI. Harish Chandra Dome PW 14. On 29-5-1996, the appellant who was arrested by PS 1 Kulkarni of Pune Railway Station was taken into custody. Since PSI Dome noticed some injuries on his person he referred him for medical examination to Rural Hospital Karjat where he was medically examined by Dr. Sophia D Souza PW 12 who found on his person the following injuries: 1. Circular abrasion over right forearm 2 cms x 2 cms antero lateral 4 cm above Wrist joint circular/ sharp margins. Age of the injury was within 2 to 3 days. The probable weapon used like teeth marks. It was simple in nature. 2. Linear wound on the right thumb below the nail Sharp margin. Circular abrasion over right forearm 2 cms x 2 cms antero lateral 4 cm above Wrist joint circular/ sharp margins. Age of the injury was within 2 to 3 days. The probable weapon used like teeth marks. It was simple in nature. 2. Linear wound on the right thumb below the nail Sharp margin. Size 1/2 cm long. Age of the injury was 2 to 3 days. Caused by sharp edged object, Simple in nature. 3. Abrasion tip of right thumb 9.2 cms linear wound with sharp margin. Age was 2 to 3 days. Caused by sharp edged object. Simple in nature. 4. Lacerated wound on the left ring finger on lateral aspect around 1 cm from the tip of the finger 0.5 cm linear wound with sharp margin. Age within 2 to 3 clays. Caused by sharp edged object. Simple in nature. 5. Linear contusion over the left arm anterior aspect over the biceps 6 to 7 cms from the elbow joint stage 5 cms x 1 cm. Age was within 2 to 3 days. Probable weapon long blunt object. Nature of the injury was simple. In her statement in the trial Court, Dr. D Souza stated that injury No. 1 could be caused if the woman resisted by biting with her teeth and injury Nos. 2 to 4 could be caused if during strangulation blows with knife were given. The appellant was interrogated same day and next day, his police remand was obtained till 3-6-1996, on which date in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by him, in the presence of public Panch as Vasudeo Kumbhore PW 11 and Shivaji Karnik PW 6, on his pointing out, the Investigating Officer PSI Dome PW 14, under a Panchanama, recovered a plastic bag which was concealed in the bushes near the place of the incident. Inside the plastic bag, were the shirt and pant of the appellant, a tin of baygon spray, a rope and a button knife. It is pertinent to point out that the shirt, pant and knife and the clothes of the victim, namely, kurta and salwar which were also seized during investigation were sent to the Chemical Analyst who found on all the articles human blood. After completing the investigation, PSI Dhome PW 14, on 22-8-1996, submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. 7. It is pertinent to point out that the shirt, pant and knife and the clothes of the victim, namely, kurta and salwar which were also seized during investigation were sent to the Chemical Analyst who found on all the articles human blood. After completing the investigation, PSI Dhome PW 14, on 22-8-1996, submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. 7. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner, where a charge under Section 307, IPC was framed against the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During trial, in all the prosecution examined 14 witnesses, out of whom, only one namely the victim Shipra Dahake was examined as an eye-witness. The learned trial Judge believed her evidence as also that pf the Investigating Officer PSI Dome PW 14 and public Panch Vasudeo Kumbhore PW 11 of the latter two in respect of the recovery on the pointing out of the appellant and convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated above. Hence this appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998). 8. As mentioned earlier, while admitting Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998, one of us (Vishnu Sabai, J) on 167-1998 issued a suo motu notice to the appellant to show cause as to why the sentence of the appellant be not enhanced and Criminal suo motu application No.3 of 1998 arises out of the said notice. 9. We have heard Mr. S.V. Marwadi for the appellant, Ms. Usha Kejriwal Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Mabarashtra - respondent No. 1 and Mr. PB Shah for respondent No. 2 in Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998, and Ms. Usha Kejriwal Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Maharashtra appellant and Mr. S.V. Marwadi for the respondent in Criminal Suo motu Application No.3 of 1998. We have also perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses; the material exhibits tendered and proved by the prosecution; statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313, Cr. P.C.; and impugned Judgment. After our utmost circumspection, we have reached the conclusion that Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998 deserves to be dismissed and Criminal Suo motu Application No.3 of 1998 warrants to be allowed. 10. The crucial evidence in the instant case is that of the informant Shipra Dahake PW 8. P.C.; and impugned Judgment. After our utmost circumspection, we have reached the conclusion that Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998 deserves to be dismissed and Criminal Suo motu Application No.3 of 1998 warrants to be allowed. 10. The crucial evidence in the instant case is that of the informant Shipra Dahake PW 8. We have set out the prosecution story in the earlier part of our Judgment on the basis of the recitals contained in her examination-in-chief. Since the conviction of the appellant is primarily based on her evidence, we propose enumerating the details contained therein extensively. She stated that she was a resident of Bodhegaon and in the year 1991, had gone to Pune to do her Diploma in Education in Horticulture Garden. She stayed there with her maternal uncle Dilip Valse Patil, M.L.A. and her maternal aunt Kiran. At that time, the appellant was employed as a P.A. of Dilip Valse Patil. She had an affair with him. In 1995, the appellant at the instance of his parents, married a muslim girl and told her that he would divorce her and thereafter, marry her. In January, 1996, at the behest of the appellant; she came to Mumbai and started living in a room an Curry Road. She and the appellant lived as husband and wife in the said room till 26-5-1998. During this period, she was insisting to the appellant that the date of marriage be fixed and on her insistence, the appellant told her that the marriage would take place in the last week of May, and they should proceed to Pune for shopping. On 26-5-1996, at about 11.45 p.m., the appellant in a maruti van belonging to his friend Nivrutti Shinde proceeded along with her for Pune. At about 12.45, a.m. on 27-5-1996, the appellant stopped the maruti van near a dhaba which was ahead of Pan velicle and asked her whether she would like pepsi drink and on her consenting to, have it, brought a glass of pepsi. After sipping it, she smelt baygon and asked the appellant to take the vehicle back to the dhaba from where he had purchased it to verify what was mixed in it. The appellant refused and also refused to take a sip of the pepsi drink and instead threw it away. After sipping it, she smelt baygon and asked the appellant to take the vehicle back to the dhaba from where he had purchased it to verify what was mixed in it. The appellant refused and also refused to take a sip of the pepsi drink and instead threw it away. Thereafter, the appellant took the maruti van towards Karjat side and stopped the same after 15 minutes on the ground that they had missed the road. However, instead of taking the vehicle back, he tried to kiss her and strangulated her. He closed the glass windows of the car; kept her legs on the door; put his legs upon her legs; and then took a rope and tried to strangulate her neck with it. She tried to save herself from being strangulated. She also tried to come out of the vehicle but the appellant tried to foil this bid of hers. Eventually, she came out. The appellant caught hold of her head and forcibly threw her twice on the ground and thereafter, tried to press her neck and caught hold of her hair She implored the appellant to release her and promised to go anywhere but, the appellant insisted to take her to Pune. He dragged her to the van; took out the knife which was kept in the van; when he was about to give a blow of knife on the abdomen, she caught hold of the knife; and caught hold of the other hand of the appellant by taking it in her mouth. On account of holding the knife, she received injuries on her palm and right arm. She fell down again and thereafter, the appellant assaulted her with the knife on left cheek, below chin, left waist over the chest and below the chest. Pursuant to the assault, blood started oozing out from her injuries and she fell down unconscious. Thereafter, the appellant thinking that she was dead, threw her in the bushes after removing her ornaments from her person. Sometimes after, she regained consciousness and saw the appellant coming towards her, crawling, from behind the bushes, she came near the railway track. The appellant tried to search her in torch-light, but failed to find her. Thereafter, the appellant thinking that she was dead, threw her in the bushes after removing her ornaments from her person. Sometimes after, she regained consciousness and saw the appellant coming towards her, crawling, from behind the bushes, she came near the railway track. The appellant tried to search her in torch-light, but failed to find her. It was here near the railway track that Thakur Rajput PW 7 found her and from here, the driver of the passenger train Madhukar Rane PW 4 took her in the train to Kaljat Railway Station where PSI Mainuddin Jamadar PW 13 sent her for medical examination and thereafter, recorded her FIR. 11. We have examined the said statement of the victim Shipra and in our view, it inspires implicit confidence. The manner of assault as given out by Shipra is corroborated both by the medical evidence and the probabilities. It is pertinent to point out that according to her the appellant a little ahead of pannel, gave her a pepsi drink mixed with baygon spray and this claim of hers is corroborated by the circumstance that on the pointing out of the appellant, under a panchanama, a plastic bag was recovered from near the place of the incident inside which, was a tin of baygon spray. Again the circumstance that inspite of her asking the appellant to enquire from the owner of the dhaba as to what was mixed in the pepsi drink the appellant did not accede to her request and also did not himself sip the pepsi drink as desired by her but threw the same away shows that this part of her statement is implicitly reliable. The manner of assault as deposed to by her namely, the appellant tying a rope around her neck, assaulting her, with a knife, on her palm, left cheek, below chin left waist over the chest and below the chest. is corroborated by the evidence of Dr. Litike PW 9 who examined her in Sasoon Hospital. In the earlier part of our judgment, we have verbatim reproduced the injuries found on her person by Dr. Litike. A perusal of those injuries would demonstrate the correctness of her statement that she was assaulted on the said parts of the body by a knife. As mentioned earlier, Dr. Litike PW 9 who examined her in Sasoon Hospital. In the earlier part of our judgment, we have verbatim reproduced the injuries found on her person by Dr. Litike. A perusal of those injuries would demonstrate the correctness of her statement that she was assaulted on the said parts of the body by a knife. As mentioned earlier, Dr. Litike stated that her injuries were attributable to the Article No. 3 (knife recovered on the pointing out of the appellant). Again, we find that Dr. Litike found injuries attributable to tying of a rope on her neck. She stated in her examination-in-chief that multiple abrasions on the neck could be caused if a rope was tied around her neck. It is true that in her cross - examination, she stated that she saw no marks of tying of a rope on her neck and if the neck is pressed by a rope, there would be bruising but, we are not inclined to accept this statement of hers and prefer to believe her statement in the examination-in-chief. It is common knowledge that abrasions on neck can be caused by tying a rope. In our view, it is only if the pressure with which rope is encircled around the neck is intense bruises would result. If not only multiple abrasions would. It should also be borne in mind that on the pointing out of the appellant, a rope was recovered during investigation under a panchanama. 12. The existence of a strong motive also lends tremendous assurance to the statement of the victim Shipra. Her statement shows that she was pressurising the appellant to marry her and the appellant who had already married a muslim girl was dilly-dallying and when pressure from her side became unbearable for the appellant, he decided to kill her. 13. The injuries of the appellant also partly lend assurance to Shipra's statement. She stated that while the appellant was in the act of assaulting her, she kept his hand in her mouth and a perusal of para 6 wherein we have extracted the injuries of the appellant would show that the first injury sustained by the appellant in the opinion of Dr. D' Souza was attributable to teeth bite. Mrs Kejriwal urged that the evidence of Shipra discloses that she was carrying a pen-knife which was attached to the key chain she was carrying and since Dr. D' Souza was attributable to teeth bite. Mrs Kejriwal urged that the evidence of Shipra discloses that she was carrying a pen-knife which was attached to the key chain she was carrying and since Dr. O' Souza stated that the other injuries could be caused by pen-knife, they were in all probability caused by Shipra in trying to rescue herself from the assault by the appellant. Mrs. Kejriwal may be right but, in the absence of Shipra's statement to the effect that she assaulted the appellant by pen-knife, it would not be fair for us to hold so. 14. It is pertinent to point out that the victim Shipra had no rancouror animosity against the appellant and unless the appellant had not really attempted to murder her in the manner given out above, she would not have falsely deposed about it. 15. In our view, the evidence of Shipra inspires implicit confidence and the learned trial Judge acted correctly in accepting it and convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 307, IPC. 15 A. Apart from the ocular testimony of Shipra, there is other evidence connecting the appellant with the instant crime. That evidence is recovery of a plastic bag on the pointing out of the appellant in the presence of public Panch Vasudo Kumbhore PW 11 and Shivaji Karnik PW 6, and the Investigating Officer PSI Dome PW 14. As mentioned earlier, inside the said bag, were found a shirt and pant of the appellant, a button knife, a rope and a tin of baygon spray. It is significant to point out that the said articles were sent to the Chemical Analyst who, excepting the tin of baygon spray, found human blood on them. It is true that the public panchas of recovery became hostile but, in our view there is no rule of thumb having universal application that uncorroborated testimony of the Investigating Officer, cannot be believed in respect of recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Corroboration is only a rule of prudence and may be necessary on the facts of a case and not an inflexible requirement of law. Our view is founded on the provisions of Section 134 of the Evidence Act which read that "No particular number of witnesses, shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact". Corroboration is only a rule of prudence and may be necessary on the facts of a case and not an inflexible requirement of law. Our view is founded on the provisions of Section 134 of the Evidence Act which read that "No particular number of witnesses, shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact". We have gone through the evidence of the Investigating Officer PSI Dome in respect recovery and we find that it has not U shaken during cross - examination. It should be borne in mind that he bore no animosity or grudge against the appellant and in the absence of the same, we are not inclined to believe that he would have foisted a false recovery on the appellant. In this connection, it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Aher Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashtra1, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the presumption that a person acts honestly equally applies to a police officer and the evidence of a police officer cannot be merely discredited on the ground of his being a police officer. In our view, the evidence of PSI Dome is reliable and proves the recoveries on the pointing out of the appellant. 16. For the said reasons. in our view the learned trial Judge was every inch right in finding the appellant guilty for an offence under Section 307, IPC. A perusal of the said section would show that the offence would be made out thereunder if a person does an act "with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act, caused death he would be guilty of murder" .............. In the instant case the manner in which appellant attempted to kill the victim Shipra shows that he clearly intended to commit her murder. First, he mixed baygon spray in her pepsi drink and made an endeavour to make her drink it. Having failed in this endeavour he tried to strangulate her with the means of a rope inside the maruti van. In this, he also failed. First, he mixed baygon spray in her pepsi drink and made an endeavour to make her drink it. Having failed in this endeavour he tried to strangulate her with the means of a rope inside the maruti van. In this, he also failed. When she came out from the maruti van, and tried to run away he again caught hold of her near the van; took out a knife from the van; threw her twice on the ground; and thereafter, inflicted blows on her with the knife on various parts of her body including chest. Thereafter thinking her to be dead he took her ornaments, pushed her towards the bushes and went away. Again, to make doubly sure that she was dead, he came back flashed his torch but, could not find her because crawling she had reached near the railway track. These facts unequivocally demonstrate that the appellant intended to commit the murder of Shipra. 16A. It is true as Mr. Marwadi learned counsel for the appellant canvassed that Dr. Litike did not state that the injuries of Shipra were dangerous to life but merely on this Score the offence would not come out from the dragnet of Section 307. IPC. The crucial requirement for an offence under Section 307. IPC is that there should be an intention to commit murder and not nature of injuries simplicitor and here it is established that the irresistible intention on the part of the appellant was to commit Shipra's murder. In this connection it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case reported in. Sci1ju Prasad v. State of Bihar2. wherein para 7. Mudholkar. J. held that in order to bring an offence within the ambit of Section 307. IPC the prosecution has to establish that the intention of the accused in causing a particular injury was of any of three kinds referred to in Section 300. IPC. It is pertinent to mention that clause firstly of Section 300, IPC provides that culpable homicide is murder if an act is committed with the intention to cause death. In the instant case the facts demonstrate that there was a clear cut intention on the part of the appellant to commit the murder of Shipra within the terms of clause firstly of Section 300. IPC. In the instant case the facts demonstrate that there was a clear cut intention on the part of the appellant to commit the murder of Shipra within the terms of clause firstly of Section 300. IPC. It would also be useful to refer to para 6 of A.I.R. 1965 S.C. page 843 (supral, where Mudholkar. dispelled, the fallacy that damage to a vital organ was essential to bring the offence within the ambit of Section 307. IPC. His Lordship in this connection observed thus: "Therefore, the mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the appellant did not cut any vital organ of Shankar Prasad is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307." 17. We would be failing in our fairness if we do not refer to the other submissions canvassed by Mr. Marwadi. He firstly urged that the statement of the victim Shipra PW 8 is extremely improbable. In this contention, he urged that when she became convinced that baygon had been mixed in her pepsi drink, she would not have continued traveling in the Maruti van with the appellant but, would have run away. We do not find any merit in this submission. The evidence of Shipra shows that the time was over mid-night, and she was at a lonely place. In such a situation, in the presence of the appellant who was in a menacing mood, it was impossible for her to run away. Apart from it, perhaps she did not comprehend that the appellant would be so mean as to attempt to commit her murder in the deprave unscrupulous, cool, calculated sordid and heartless manner in which he ultimately did. Secondly, Mr. Marwadi contended that the specific statement of the victim is to the effect that the rope was tied around her neck and the medical evidence does not reveal any bruises on her neck. In the earlier part of our Judgment, we have referred to the examination-in-chief of Dr. Litike PW 9 who stated therein that the multiple abrasions on her neck could be caused by a rope. We are not inclined to accept her admission in the cross-examination that as a result of tying a rope around her neck, bruises were inevitable. It is common knowledge that multiple abrasions can also be caused. Litike PW 9 who stated therein that the multiple abrasions on her neck could be caused by a rope. We are not inclined to accept her admission in the cross-examination that as a result of tying a rope around her neck, bruises were inevitable. It is common knowledge that multiple abrasions can also be caused. In our view, if the pressure with which rope was encircled around the neck was intense bruises would result, if not only multiple abrasions would Mr. Marwadi thirdly contended that there is discrepancy in the number of injuries found on the person of the victim by the Medical Officer of Primary Health Centre, Raigad and Dr. Litike. He contended that whereas the former found three incised wounds and two contused lacerated wounds, the latter found 9 injuries. He also contended that whereas the former found, excepting the contused lacerated wound, on the right palm for which he had advised X-ray, all the injuries to be simple, the latter found two of them namely sutured wound in ante-axillary left 6th inter-costal space and injury No.9 stab wound on right side of chest to be grievous. So far as the discrepancy in the number of injuries is concerned, it appears that as the FIR of the victim had not been lodged and she had been straight away sent for medical examination, the Medical Officer of Primary Health Centre, Raigad, who first examined her, examined her in a hurry and the second doctor who was a doctor of the Sasoon Hospital, Pune, a very big Hospital, examined her thoroughly. At any rate, the second doctor Dr. Litike had no reason to inflate the number of injuries. So far as the circumstance that the doctor of Primary Health Centre, Raigad, found the injuries to be simple in nature, whereas Dr. Litike found two of, the injuries, to be grievous in nature, is concerned, it may be that the examination by the latter doctor' was thorough and consequently, she noticed injuries to be grievous in nature whereas the first doctor did not. Even assuming for arguments sake, that all the injuries of the victim were simple in nature, it would still make no difference. As observed by us earlier, the crucial thing for determining whether an offence under Section 307, IPC is made out is intention to commit murder and not the nature of the injuries. Even assuming for arguments sake, that all the injuries of the victim were simple in nature, it would still make no difference. As observed by us earlier, the crucial thing for determining whether an offence under Section 307, IPC is made out is intention to commit murder and not the nature of the injuries. If there was intention to commit murder and we find that such an intention was in this case, it is immaterial if the injuries were simple in nature. Lastly, Mr. Marwadi invited our attention to some omissions in the FIR, which have come out during cross - examination in para 13, of the statement, of the victim Shipra Dahake. In the FIR there is no mention of the following facts: (i) The appellant caught hold of her hand, while trying to come out from the van and also followed her while coming out from the van by holding her hand; (ii)  Of banging her head twice and pulling her hair; (iii) When she was semi conscious, the appellant removed the ornaments from her person; and (iv) She had asked the appellant to take a sip from her pepsi drink in which baygon spray was mixed. In our view, nothing turns on these omissions. They were perfectly natural and understandable. One should imagine the plight of Shipra when she lodged her FIR the next morning at about 11 a.m., hardly 10 hours of the incident. She must have been absolutely stunned, shattered and traumatised as a result of the callous manner in which the appellant made consistent efforts to kill her. In such a situation, it was perfectly understandable if in the FIR, there were some omissions. In our view, if the FIR contained all the meticulous details, it would have been reflective its being a tutored document and not one which was lodged by Shipra Dahake on her own volition. The omissions in our judgment, are an in-built guarantee of the truth fullness of the averments contained in it. No other point was pressed by Mr. Marwadi before us. 18. This leaves us with the question of sentence. Mr. Marwadi learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that since the injuries of the victim were not dangerous to life and the appellant has been in jail for nearly three years, his sentence be reduced to the period already undergone by him. Marwadi before us. 18. This leaves us with the question of sentence. Mr. Marwadi learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that since the injuries of the victim were not dangerous to life and the appellant has been in jail for nearly three years, his sentence be reduced to the period already undergone by him. He contended that in case, we were not inclined to accept this request, the appellant's sentence be confirmed but, not enhanced, for there is an express provision in Criminal Procedure Code, namely, Section 377 which provides that in case of inadequacy of sentence, the State Government may file an appeal for enhancement of sentence and the State Government has not resorted to this provision. We regret that we do not find any merit in Mr. Marwadi's contention. Merely because the State Government has been sleeping, is no reason why this Court should also sleep. It was on account of the gross facts of this case, that at the time of admission of the Appeal this Court had issued a suo motu notice for enhancement of sentence to the appellant to show cause as to why his sentence be not enhanced. That this Court can do this, even in the absence of an appeal from the State Government for enhancement of sentence, is borne out from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. page 1177: 1977 Cr. L.J. 9643 wherein para 6, the Supreme Court observed thus: "6. We should at once remove the misgiving that the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has abolished the High Court's power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction suo motu. The provision for appeal against inadequacy of sentence by the State Government or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion. High Court's power of enhancement of sentence, in an appropriate case, by exercising suo motu P9wer of revision is still existant under Section 397 read with Section 401. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 inasmuch as the High Court can by itself, call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal Court under its jurisdiction. The provision of Section 401 (4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 inasmuch as the High Court can by itself, call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal Court under its jurisdiction. The provision of Section 401 (4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Such a legal bar under Section 401 (4) does not stand in the way of the High Court's exercise of power of revision, suo motu, which continues as before in the new Code. 19. We are alive to the ratio laid down in para 15 of Bed Raj v. State of Uttar Pradesh4, in terms: "15. A question of sentence is a matter of discretion and it is 4. well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an Appellate Court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the Judgment; see for example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 at pp.367 –368 (A) and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 457 at pp. 458459 (8). In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called. For when it is manifestly inadequate. 19A.In our view, in the instant case the learned trial Judge has capriciously exercised his discretion in only awarding a substantive sentence of five years R.I for an offence under Section 307; IPC for which offence, maximum sentence is imprisonment for life. On the facts of this case, a sentence of five years R.I is manifestly inadequate. The cool, calculated unscrupulous, depraved and heartless manner in which the appellant attempted to commit the murder of Shipra warrants that exemplary punishment, should be meted out to him so that others like him may be deterred from committing such sordid crimes. Bearing in mind all this, we have reflected as to what would be the appropriate sentence. In our view, the appropriate sentence would be seven years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 12,000/- which amount shall include the fine of Rs. 2,000/- imposed on the appellant by the trial Court. 20. Bearing in mind all this, we have reflected as to what would be the appropriate sentence. In our view, the appropriate sentence would be seven years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 12,000/- which amount shall include the fine of Rs. 2,000/- imposed on the appellant by the trial Court. 20. In the result: Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998 and Criminal Suo Motu Application No.3 of 1998 are decided in the following manner: The conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section - 307. IPC is confined but the substantive sentence is enhanced from five years R.I. to seven years R.I. and the fine from Rs. 2,000/- and three months R.I. in default is enhanced to Rs. 12,000/- and one year R.I. in default. The said fine should be deposited "within one year from today in the trial Court. The additional fine of Rs. 10,000/- imposed on the appellant by us would be paid as compensation to the victim Shipra Babasaheb Dahake PW 8. As soon as the amount is deposited by the appellant, the trial Court shall inform Shipra Babasaheb Dahake about this compensation and shall pay the same at the earliest to her. In case, she is not alive, the said compensation would be paid to her legal heirs. Hence, Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1998 is dismissed and Criminal Suo Motu Application No.3 of 1998 is allowed. The appellant is in jail and shall remain therein till he serves out his sentence. Appeal dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 217. 2. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 843. 3. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1177: 1977 Cr. L.J. 964. 4. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 778.