Hegde, J.- All these petitions were filed by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Hubli. They raise common questions of law and as such they can be conveniently dealt with in one order. The material facts are undisputed. All the respondents are hotel-keepers at Hubli. It is alleged that in contravention of rule 65 (1) of the Rules framed under the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (which shall be hereinafter called the “Act”) they had purchased ‘agricultural produce’ within the Hubli Market area without obtaining necessary licences and hence they are liable to be punished under rule 65 (7). The respondents admit that they did make the purchases in question. But they contend that neither under the “Act” nor under the Rules framed thereunder, they were required to take out any licence before making the purchases in question. The trial Court accepted their contentions and acquitted them. The correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court is challenged in this Court. The arguments of Sri S.C. Javali, the learned Counsel for the petitioners covered a large ground. He dwelt at length on the object of the “Act” as can be deduced from the Preamble thereto, the beneficial purposes of the “Act”, the true principles to be borne in mind in construing statutory provisions, the imperativeness of the rule of harmonious construption, so on and so forth. Most of these arguments have lib relevancy to the points that arise for decision in this case. Therefore we have hot thought it necessary to dwell on them. Dealing with the point at issue, Sri Javali, advanced three separate contentions. Most of these arguments have lib relevancy to the points that arise for decision in this case. Therefore we have hot thought it necessary to dwell on them. Dealing with the point at issue, Sri Javali, advanced three separate contentions. They are: (i) section 4 (2) of the “Act” requires that every seller and every buyer should obtain a licence from the Market Committee unless he is exempted under subsection (2-A); the impugned transactions having not been covered by the provisions of that sub-section, the respondents‘failure to obtain the required licences entails penal consequences; (ii) section 5-A requires every trader to obtain a licence; the respondents are traders as denned in rule 2 (16); hence by their failure to take licences, they have contravened section 5-A; and lastly rule 65 lays down that no person shall do business as a trader except under a licence granted by the Market Committee; the respondents who are “traders” within the meaning of that expression as found in rule 2 (16), are liable to be punished under rule 65 (7). We shall now proceed to consider the correctness of each one of these contentions. Section 4 relates to the declaration of market areas. It has nothing to do with sellers or buyers as such, though incidentally they may come into the picture. Section 3 deals with notification of intention of exercising control over purchase and sale of agricultural produce in specified area. Section 4 (1) says: “After the expiry of the period specified in the notification, issued under section 3 and, after considering such objections and suggestions as may be received before such expiry and after holding such inquiry as may be necessary, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the area specified in the notification under section 3 or any portion thereof to be a market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the said notification. A notification under this section may also be published in the regional languages of the area in a newspaper circulated in the said area and may also be published in such other manner as the State Government may deem fit.” This sub-section deals with the mode of declaring a particular area as “market area”. It does not deal with the grant of any licence. It does not deal with the grant of any licence. Now we come to subsection (2) which says: “On and after the date on which any area is declared to be a market area under sub-section (1) no place in the said area shall, subject to the provisions of section 5-A, be used for the purchase or sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification issued thereunder; Provided that pending the establishment of a market in such area under section 5, the State Government may grant a licence to any person to use any place in the said area for the purchase or sale of any such agricultural produce.” From the plain language of this sub-section, it is obvious that its focus is on the situs where the transactions of sales and purchases should take place, and not on the sellers or the buyers. The language of section 4 (2) makes this conclusion obvious. The same idea is carried further in the Proviso annexed to that sub-section. The licence contemplated under that Proviso is “to use any place in the said area for the purchase or sale of any such agricultural produce” and not a licence authorising to buy or sell. We must read sub-section (2-A) of section 4 bearing in mind the scope of sections 4 (1) and 4 (2) as that sub-section is only an exception to section 4 (2). It (section 4 (2-A)) reads: “Nothing in sub-section (2) shall apply to the purchase or sale of such agricultural produce if the producer of such produce is himself its seller and the purchaser is a person who purchases such produce for his own private use or if such agricultural produce is sold to such person by way of a retail sale.” What this sub-section lays down is that the restrictions contained in section 4 (2) is riot applicable if the “agricultural produce” in question is sold by its producer to a purchaser who purchases it for “his own private use” or is sold to such person by way of a retail sale. In other words transactions included in sub-section (2-A) can be effected in the “market area” even though the buyer or the seller has not obtained licences under section 5-A. On this question the lower Court completely misdirected itself. In other words transactions included in sub-section (2-A) can be effected in the “market area” even though the buyer or the seller has not obtained licences under section 5-A. On this question the lower Court completely misdirected itself. It wrongly thought that section 4 (2) dealt with licences to be granted to buyers and sellers and but for sub-section (2-A) the respondents require licences. In its view the purchases in question having been made by the respondents for their own private use, they are exempted from taking licences. The expression "for his own private use" is a very inartistic expression. It is not easy to find out its true import. But for our present purpose we are spared of that trouble, as in our view none of the sub-sections of section 4 deal with grant of licences to either buyers or sellers, except under the Proviso to section 4(2). We may now proceed to consider the scope of section 5-A. We have earlier seen that sub-section (2) of section 4 is subject to the provisions contained in section 5-A. In other words the persons licensed under section 5-A are not affected by the prohibition contained in section 4(2). Section 5-A reads: "Where a market is established under Section 5, the Market Committee may issue licences in accordance with the rules to traders, commission agents, brokers, weighmen, measurers surveyors, warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market." To put it differently traders, commission agents, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and others, who have obtained licences under section 5-A can operate in the market in spite of the prohibition contained in section 4 (2). We think the words "other persons" used in section 5-A are used as ejusdem generis to the words traders, commission agents, etc. But the more important aspect is that the licence in question is for purpose of "operating" in the market. The words "to operate in the market" connote something more than mere buying and selling. The contention of Sri Javali is that the respondents are "traders" as denned in rule 2 (16) which says that "trader" means a person buying or selling agricultural produce as principal or as duly authorized agent of one or more firms. The words "to operate in the market" connote something more than mere buying and selling. The contention of Sri Javali is that the respondents are "traders" as denned in rule 2 (16) which says that "trader" means a person buying or selling agricultural produce as principal or as duly authorized agent of one or more firms. Assuming, without deciding, that this contention is correct, for the application of section 5-A, it is not sufficient if the buyer or seller is merely a "trader" he must also operate in the market area as a "trader". The words "operate in the market" implies a profession of buying or selling or to put it differently it means the business of buying, or selling and not mere buying or selling. The word " operate " is not a term of law. Its dictionary meaning relevant for our present discussion is "to carry on business." The Rule making authority also appears to have interpreted that word in the same manner as could be gathered from section 65 which says that " no person shall do business as a trader.........." Therefore what is hit by section 5-A is carrying on business as a trader which is the same thing as saying operating as a trader, in the market area. It is no body’s case that the respondents are doing business as traders in agricultural produce. Admittedly they are hotel-keepers. Their profession is one of hoteliering. The purchases made by them were for the purpose of catering. Hence it cannot be said that they were operating as traders in the market area. Before leaving this topic we should like to mention that no provision in the "Act" was brought to our notice requiring an ordinary buyer or seller to obtain a licence from the Market Committee. The last contention based on rule 65 (1) is equally untenable. Hence it cannot be said that they were operating as traders in the market area. Before leaving this topic we should like to mention that no provision in the "Act" was brought to our notice requiring an ordinary buyer or seller to obtain a licence from the Market Committee. The last contention based on rule 65 (1) is equally untenable. Rule 65 (1) says: No person shall do business as a trader or a general commission agent in agricultural produce in any market area except under a licence granted by the market committee under this rule." The crux of the matter is "doing business as a trader in agricultural produce." To repeat ourselves, mere buying or selling of agricultural produce is not the same thing as "doing business as a trader in agricultural produce." To attract the mischief of rule 65 (1) the person concerned must engage himself in the business of buying or selling agricultural produce. The Market Committee in its enthusiasm to expand its jurisdiction has missed the significance of the words "do business as a trader." In our judgment the cases under review do not come within the scope of rule 65 (1) and therefore there is no question of imposing any penalty under sub-rule (7) of rule 65. Before closing this judgment, it is necessary to notice yet another contention. Our attention was invited to a bye-law framed by the Market Committee under section 27 of the "Act" laying down that "a hotel or tea shop-keeper (including boarding and inn-keeper) means a trader purchasing regulated commodities such as foodgrains, cereals, onions, oil-seeds, potatoes, etc., and converting them to eatables for selling the same to the public for profit hereinafter referred to as trader. It is unnecessary to go into the validity or even the true scope of this bye-law as in these cases the respondents were not prosecuted under section 27 (2) for the contravention of any bye-laws. The accusation against them is that they contravened rule 65 (1). The bye-law in question cannot enlarge the scope of rule 65 (1) and therefore its place in the scheme of things can remain to be decided on some future occasion. However viewed, the prosecutions which have given rise to these petitions were wholly misconceived. They have resulted in the harassment of the respondents. The bye-law in question cannot enlarge the scope of rule 65 (1) and therefore its place in the scheme of things can remain to be decided on some future occasion. However viewed, the prosecutions which have given rise to these petitions were wholly misconceived. They have resulted in the harassment of the respondents. Therefore we will not be justified in granting the leave prayed for under section (3) of section 417, Criminal Procedure Code. In the result, all these petitions are dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petitions dismissed.