Narayana Pai, J.- The four respondents before us were prosecuted before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at Honavar, for the alleged offences punishable under sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. the third respondent before us Ganapati Vithoba Shet was the first accused and he was charged with having committed the offence of keeping a common gaming house, punishable under section 4 of the Act. The rest of the accused were charged with the offence of having been present at that place for the purpose of gaming, punishable under section 5 of the Act. The place where the gaming house is said, to have been kept is the tea-shop of the first accused in Honavar. The first witness for the prosecution, a Sub-Inspector of Police, obtained from the District Superintendence of Police, North Kanara, a warrant under the provivisions of section 6 of the Act to conduct a search in the aforesaid premises. Exhibit 13 is said to be a complaint laid by him before the District Superintendent of Police praying for the issue of such a warrant. This is dated June, 12, 1957. The evidence is that this complaint was placed before the District Superintendent of Police while he was camping at a place called Gokarn. Exhibit 14 bearing the same date is the warrant issued by the District Superintendent of Police empowering P.W. 1 to conduct a search. Thereafter, P.W. 1 in the company of two panchas who have been examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3 belonging to a place called Ramathirtha, proceeded to the tea-shop of the first accused and raided that place with a view to secure the instruments of gaming, if any. Certain slips of papers, note books and cash were seized not only in the possession of the first accused in his till or box but also from the person of the second, third and the fourth accused. Accepting the evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution and relying upon the presumption available under section 7 of the Act, the learned trial Magistrate found the accused persons guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. He sentenced the first accused to rigorous imprisonment for 3 months and a fine of Rs. 200 and sentenced each of the other accused to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine of Rs. 200. He sentenced the first accused to rigorous imprisonment for 3 months and a fine of Rs. 200 and sentenced each of the other accused to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine of Rs. 200. Upon appeal to the Court of Session, North Kanara, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. He accepted the argument placed before him on behalf of the accused that the warrant issued under section 6 of the Act was not valid for the reason that it had not been proved that the statutory requirements touching the issue of such warrants had been observed by the District Superintendent of Police before issuing the warrant. Holding therefore that the presumption under section 7 of the Act was no longer available to the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge examined the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that it was inconclusive and insufficient to hold that any one of the accused was guilty of the offence with which he had been charged. This appeal is by the State against that order of acquittal and the principal point argued before us is that there was no justification, either in law or in fact, to come to the conclusion that the warrant was in any manner defective. Briefly stated, the argument is that what is described as the unchallenged evidence of the first witness for the prosecution taken along with the presumption available under section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, was sufficient to support an inference that all the statutory requirements have been duly complied with and that the reasons actually stated by the learned Judge are unsound. The Proviso to section 6 which lays down the conditions governing the issue of warrants, reads as follows: “Provided that no Officer shall be authorised by special warrant unless the Commissioner of Police, the Magistrate, the District or Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police concerned is satisfied, upon any complaint made before him on oath and upon making such inquiry as he may think necessary, that there are good grounds to suspect the said house, room or place to be used as a common gaming-house.” Section 7 of the Act, which also has a bearing on the question now before us, may also be set out in full. That section reads as follows: “When any instrument of gaming has been seized in any house, room or place entered under section 6 or about the person of any one found therein, and in the case of any other thing so seized if the Court is satisfied that the Police Officer who entered such house, room or place had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the thing so seized was an instrument of gaming, the seizure of such instrument or thing shall be evidence, until the contrary is proved, that such house, room or place is used as a common gaming-house and the persons found therein were then present for the purpose of gaming, although no gaming was actually seen by the Magistrate or the Police Officer or by any person acting under the authority of either of them”. It should be observed, at the outset, that the provisions of section 7 are a departure from the ordinary rule according to which every accused in a criminal Court is entitled to a presumption of innocence in his favour. It will be further seen that the very foundation for drawing such a presumption in favour of the prosecution is that any instrument of gaming should have been seized in any house, room or place entered under section 6. An entry under section 6 is possible under the power conferred by a warrant issued under that section. It is therefore obvious that because of the far-reaching consequences of the issue of such a warrant, Legislature in its wisdom has thought fit to impose stringent conditions which must be satisfied by any Officer before such a warrant is issued. Those conditions are that the Authority issuing the warrant is required by the statute to satisfy himself that there are good grounds for suspecting a particular place to be a common gaming-house and that satisfaction must flow as a result of two things, (i) a complaint made before him upon an oath and (2) an enquiry made by him. The first requisite, viz., the existence of a complaint before him on oath admits of no doubt. The first requisite, viz., the existence of a complaint before him on oath admits of no doubt. It may be, as suggested on behalf of the State, that the complaint need not necessarily be in writing although, having regard to the serious consequences, one would expect an Officer to reduce to writing an information placed before him by an informant with a view to fix the responsibility on the informant for the truth of the statement made by him. The necessity of administering oath to the informant, whether he be a private individual or a Police Officer, is an absolute necessity. Regarding the enquiry, the discretion is left with the Officer to decide the nature of it. But that an enquiry, whatever be its nature, is compulsory under the statute appears to be clear on the wording of the statute. The use of the word ‘necessary’ cannot mean that it is left to the Officer to decide if an enquiry is or is not necessary; in the context it could only mean that the nature of the enquiry which the Officer should make, must subserve the necessity of reaching the satisfaction mentioned in the section. It follows, therefore, that unless these two conditions are satisfied and the Court before which the prosecution is laid is also satisfied that these conditions are duly complied with, there is no scope for the application of the presumption under section 7 and, for the reasons already stated, before that departure from the normal law is made under section 7, there must be strict compliance with the terms of section 6. It is, however, argued by the learned Additional Assistant Advocate-General that P.W. 1 has expressly deposed at the very commencement of his chief examination that: “I submitted a complaint Exhibit No. 13 to the District Superintendent of Police at his Gokarn camp on 12th June, 1957. The District Superintendent of Police verified my complaint on oath and issued a search warrant. The District Superintendent of Police verified my complaint on oath and issued a search warrant. Exhibit No. 14 is the search warrant of the District Superintendent of Police which bears his seal and signature.” and there is no cross-examination, worth the name, on this point and that, therefore, the trial Magistrate was right in coming to the conclusion that the requirements of section 6 have been duly complied with and the warrant was such as to entitle the prosecution to the benefit of the presumption under section 7 of the Act; The learned Sessions Judge, however, thought that there was no satisfactory proof of the requirements of section 6 having been complied with. His discussion on this matter may be summarised as leading to two substantial reasons for his conclusion. Firstly he states that the warrant Exhibit 14 opens with the words “Whereas a complaint has been made upon oath or solem affirmation before me” and the fact that the District Superintendent of Police has not not scored out the nonessential words and indicated whether he administered oath or merely took a solemn affirmation, is indicative of the fact that he did not apply his mind to what he was doing. The second reason stated, particularly for refusing to place reliance upon the evidence of P.W. 1, is that he as a Police Officer is interested in getting a conviction in every gambling case, because if he succeeds he will become entitled to a reward. The criticism levelled against these two reasons stated by the learned Sessions Judge, do not appear to us to be entirely unwarranted. The omission to >core off unnecessary words from a set Form need not, in all circumstances, suggest anything more than certain amount of inattention in filling that Form. It need not necessarily mean that the person or Officer entering or signing that Form was totally oblivious of what he was doing. The second reason stated is obviously inaccurate. It is clear from section 11 which provides for distribution of fines as rewards, that it expressly excludes Police Officers from the class of persons to whom rewards are to be distributed. We think, however, that there are far more substantial and weighty reasons why we should not disturb the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge. It is clear from section 11 which provides for distribution of fines as rewards, that it expressly excludes Police Officers from the class of persons to whom rewards are to be distributed. We think, however, that there are far more substantial and weighty reasons why we should not disturb the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge. Exhibit 13 which is described as a complaint for the purpose of section 6, is a letter addressed by the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W. 1 to the District Superintendent of Police, being a request for grant of a warrant under section 6 of the Act. It opens by saying that he has received credible information to the effect that the tea-shop of the first accused is being used as a common gaming-house. It also contains a statement that the Sub-Inspector had every reason to believe that the first accused was using his shop for the purpose of gambling. The letter, as already stated, is dated 12th June, 1957. In the margin of it at the bottom of the first page, there appear the initials of the District Superintendent of Police over the date 12th June, 1957. The warrant is also issued on the same date. What may be described as the preamble portion of it reads: “Whereas a complaint has been made upon oath or solemn affirmation before me, Shri S.N. Warty, I.P.S. District Superintendent of Police, North Kanara District, Karwar, that there is reason to suspect that the shop of Ganapathi Vithoba Seth of Honavar, bearing S. No. 285/B and H. No. M/11/59-A and situated in Palli Bazaar at Honavar is used as a common gaming houses; and having satisfied myself after enquiry that there are good grounds for such suspicion.” That it was issued almost immediately on the receipt of Exhibit 13 is, in our opinion, clear from the two sentences in chief examination of P.W. 1 already extracted by us. The question now before us is whether it could be said that the conditions which should be complied with before a warrant can be issued as stated above, have been complied with. The first of them is the administration of oath to the complainant. The complainant in this case was P.W. 1 and his statement that his complaint was verified by oath is, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, sufficient proof of oath having been administered. The first of them is the administration of oath to the complainant. The complainant in this case was P.W. 1 and his statement that his complaint was verified by oath is, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, sufficient proof of oath having been administered. Regarding the enquiry although it is not seriously disputed that the circumstances spoken to by P.W. 1 exclude the possibility of the District Superintendent of Police having made any independent enquiry, it is contended that the statement in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 to the effect that: “I had my confidential notes which I had shown to the District Superintendent of Police at the time of obtaining the warrant Exhibit No. 14.” is sufficient indication of the fact that the District Superintendent of Police did make some enquiry by way of looking into the papers maintained by P.W. 1 or putting questions to him which was in the circumstances sufficient compliance with the requirements of the statute. In addition, the appellant wants to derive support from Illustration (e) to section 114 of the Evidence Act, under which a natural presumption arises to the effect that “judicial and official acts have been regularly performed.” On the material on record, we have no doubt that the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the strict requirements of section 6. P.W. 1 has no doubt stated that his complaint was verified on oath by the District Superintendent of Police. It was argued in both the Courts below that, because the statute does not expressly require the complaint to be in writing and that even an oral complaint was sufficient material on which the Officer issuing the warrant could properly act, the fact that there is no written record of oath having been administered is not sufficient to discredit the oral testimony of P.W. 1. Although the argument in that form has not been pressed before us, it is strongly urged that in the absence of any cross-examination tending to discredit the testimony of P.W. 1 to the effect that his complaint was in fact verified on oath, the absence of a written record does not contradict his testimony, specially because of the presumption as to regularity of official acts under section 114 already referred to. We do not think that the absence of a written record can be so lightly brushed aside. We do not think that the absence of a written record can be so lightly brushed aside. If the Sub-Inspector of Police thought fit to put his complaint in writing and that writing constitutes the basis for further action by the District Superintendent of Police, we think it was necessary to make a record of the oath also in writing. It may be that the strict letter of the law does not require a writing either for a complaint or oath, but the conscience of the Court must be satisfied that the provisions of the Act are complied with. It is a matter which has a serious bearing on the probabilities of the case, Unless therefore recourse is had to the presumption available under section 114, Illustration (e), we are not satisfied that the prosecution has proved the compliance of the requirements of section 6. It needs no special mention that the presumptions under section 114 are what are called natural presumptions and it is not obligatory on the part of a Court to draw them in every case. These presumptions really represent observed uniformity in human conduct, common course of natural events and record the experience of generations of judges and lawyers. Having regard to the well accepted experience, it is considered that the Court may in certain circumstances dispense with the strict proof of certain facts. It does not, however, mean that a party-litigant before a Court is entitled to ask the Court to draw a presumption and exempt him from the proof of any particular fact. Because strong reliance has been placed upon this section, we think, we should state what, in our opinion, are the real or substantial reasons underlying the presumption of regularity attaching to official and judicial acts. All Judicial Tribunals and Officers exercising statutory functions are normally expected to inform themselves of the provisions of law governing the exercise of their powers and functions and to act with competence and honesty. Secondly, grounds of public policy require that there should not be unwholesome uncertainty about judicial or official orders and acts so as to imperil or impair the security of rights apparently acquired under those orders or acts. Secondly, grounds of public policy require that there should not be unwholesome uncertainty about judicial or official orders and acts so as to imperil or impair the security of rights apparently acquired under those orders or acts. Further, in all cases, where this presumption is drawn by Courts, there do exist circumstances involving a clearly discernible element of probability sufficient to satisfy the Court as to the act in question having been regularly done. It is also necessary to state further another limitation governing the application of the presumption under that Illustration. It should be clearly noted that the presumption is limited to the regularity of an act. The presumption does not dispense with the proof of a particular act in respect of which it is claimed to have been actually performed or done. The official act in this case is not one under which any person acquires a right but one which leads to a serious liability attaching to the accused persons. The ground of public policy of avoiding uncertainly in respect of the rights conferred under the judicial or official acts cannot possibly have any application. The position being exactly the reverse, no such ground of public policy is available. Secondly, what may be called official act in this case is not confined to the mere issue of a warrant. The administration of oath is also an official act which is one under investigation before the Court. Therefore, no presumption is available so as to dispense with the proof of the fact that such an oath has actually been administered by the officer. It is also clear that the third condition as to the existence of an element of high probability is certainly not available in this case. Another reason why we should not draw the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act is the well-known principle that where the validity of an order or an act is itself the matter for adjudication, it is not open to rely upon the presumption of regularity. We do not think, therefore, that it has been satisfactorily proved that the District Superintendent of Police has administered any oath to the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W. 1 in respect of his complaint Exhibit 13. We do not think, therefore, that it has been satisfactorily proved that the District Superintendent of Police has administered any oath to the Sub-Inspector of Police P.W. 1 in respect of his complaint Exhibit 13. Regarding the enquiry, there is no doubt a statement in the warrant itself that the District Superintendent of Police has satisfied himself after an enquiry that there are good grounds for the suspicion mentioned in that warrant. As stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, some value should be attached to this statement. We should however add that but for the statement in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that his confidential notes were shown to the District Superintendent of Police by him, there is no basis whatever for the suggestion or for the inference that the District Superintendent of Police did in fact conduct any enquiry such as is sufficient to satisfy him that the allegations in P.W. 1’s complaint were correct, It is worthy of note that even in Exhibit 13, P.W. 1 states hardly any fact based upon his own knowledge. He opens the letter by stating that he has received credible information. Although he states later on that he has got every reason to believe the owner of the shop is using the same for the purpose of gambling for his profit and gain for long, hardly any value can be attached to it in the absence of any facts stated by him either within his own knowledge or the truth of which he has verified upon some investigation or otherwise. We cannot, therefore, completely rid ourselves of the impression that both P.W. 1 and the District Superintendent of Police have dealt with this matter as if it were a mere routine formality. Because serious consequences adverse to the accused flow from section 7 consequent upon the issue of a warrant and the total effect of these statutory provisions is virtually to substitute the information of the Police Officer for actual proof before the Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the Officers issuing the warrant under section 6 should apply their mind and satisfy themselves that suspicion of the type mentioned in section 6 is really well-founded. It should be emphasised that the section does not use such tame words as “information” or “credible information” but expressly states “good grounds for the suspicion”. It should be emphasised that the section does not use such tame words as “information” or “credible information” but expressly states “good grounds for the suspicion”. That is sufficient indication of the weight of the responsibility involved in issuing warrants. Consequently, before a criminal Court can permit the prosecution to take advantage of the presumtion under section 7, it should be completely and fully satisfied that the requirements of section 6 are complied with, not merely as a matter of formality but in the spirit of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence. And in arriving at such a conclusion, it will, for reasons already explained, be quite the proper exercise of discretion on the part of Courts to decline to draw the presumption under Illustration (e) to section 114 of the Evidence Act, so as to reduce or lessen the burden which, in our opinion, rests on the prosecution of proving due compliance with the requirements of section 6 governing the issue of warrants. Applying these tests, it cannot be said that Exhibit 14, the warrant in this case, was issued in compliance with statutory requirements. It cannot, therefore, form the basis of any presumption under section 7 of the Act. It is conceded that if the presumption under section 7 is not available, there is no justification for varying the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court on the appreciation of evidence. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.