JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the order of the First Labour Court, Bombay, dated 25 September 1998 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. The petitioner is an advertising agency. As a part of its work, it carries on the production of Audio-Visuals. The first respondent was appointed in the employment of the petitioner by a letter, dated 11th December 1987, as an executive in the Audio-Visual Department, with effect from 11th January 1988. By an order, dated 30th April 1991, the first respondent was promoted to the position of Group Manager, Audio Visual, with effect from 1st April 1991. Upon his appointment, the monthly emoluments of the first respondent were suitably revised as indicated in the said letter. It may be mentioned here that in the Audio Visual Department, as Group Manager, the first respondent was required to oversee the work of senior film executive, audio visual assistant, billing executive and stenographers. The services of the first respondent were terminated with effect from 2nd September 1991. The first respondent gave an advocate's notice on 9th September 1991 contending that the termination of his services was illegal and called upon the petitioner to reinstate him in service with full back-wages and continuity of service. By its advocates reply, dated 25th September 1991, the petitioner suitably replied the said notice and declined to accede to the demand. 3. The first respondent moved Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 before the Labour Court invoking items (1)(a), (1)(d) and (1)(f) of Sch. IV of the Act. The thrust of the case made out in the complaint was that while the first respondent was working in the Audio Visual Department, he had to carry out physical work as technician, cameraman and editor for various agencies, in house jobs. He specifically contended that he was doing mainly “manual and technician work” and had no power of an executive and administrative nature. For this reason, the first respondent contended that he was a “employee” within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act read with S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, entitled to protection under labour laws. For this reason, the first respondent contended that he was a “employee” within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act read with S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, entitled to protection under labour laws. He alleged that the action of abrupt termination of his service was mala fide and taken as retaliation for a complaint made by him about rifling of his table drawer and taking away of his personal belongings therefrom, including cash amount of Rs. 2000 on the night of 2nd September 1991. He also alleged that because of the said incident, in order to extract revenge on him, he was served on 7th September 1991 a back-dated letter, dated 2 September 1991. It was contended in the complaint that the order of termination of service was illegal and amounted to unfair labour practices under items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d) and (1)(f) of Sch. IV of the Act. The petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and contested the case. In a nutshell, it was the case of the petitioner that on and from 1st April 1991 the first respondent had been promoted to the post of Group Manager of the Audio Visual Department in a managerial category. The petitioner contended that the first respondent was not a workman even when he was working as Senior Manager and, much less so after he was promoted as Group Manager. The petitioner also denied that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the first respondent was not an employee within the meaning of S. 3(5) of the Act. On merits, the petitioner denied that the termination of the first respondent's service amounted to an unfair labour practice as alleged or at all and prayed for dismissal of the complaint. 4. The Labour Court tried the complaint and recorded elaborate evidence-lead by the parties. By its impugned order, dated 25 September 1998, held that the petitioner had, engaged in unfair labour practice under items (1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(d) of Sch. IV of the Act and directed reinstatement of the first respondent with full back-wages and continuity of service on the post which he was occupying prior to 1st April 1991 and on the wages drawn prior to 1st April 1991. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner is before this Court. 5. IV of the Act and directed reinstatement of the first respondent with full back-wages and continuity of service on the post which he was occupying prior to 1st April 1991 and on the wages drawn prior to 1st April 1991. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner is before this Court. 5. Sri Cama, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, straightway drew my attention to the unmistakable findings of the Labour Court made in Paras. 11 and 12 of the impugned order. After considering voluminous documentary evidence which dealt with the nature of work entrusted to the first respondent, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the initial lines and approving of several documents by the first respondent indicated that the first respondent was entrusted with supervisory powers and that he was exercising supervisory powers after 1st April 1991, i.e., after his promotion as Group Manager in Audio Visual Department. The Labour Court, however, took the view that the documents signed and initialed by the first respondent which pertained to the period prior to 1st April 1991 showed that he was performing duties which would fall within the ambit of S. 2(s). of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; that problems arose between the parties after 1st April 1991 after promotion of the first respondent as a Group Manager. The Labour Court then took the view that if such things are allowed, then it would be easy for an employer to promote a workman to a higher post by giving him work of that post for a few months and thereafter abruptly terminate his services and contend that, on the date of termination of his services, the workman was not covered by the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On this reasoning, the Labour Court set aside the order of termination served on the first respondent and directed reinstatement of the first respondent in the post held by him and salary drawn by him prior to 1st April 1991. 6. Sri Cama contended that, however, liberal the proceedings for adjudicating claims of workman under the labour laws are, the basic rules of pleadings must apply even to such proceedings. He strongly relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Ltd. [ 1979 (2) L.L.N. 72 ], in Para. 6. Sri Cama contended that, however, liberal the proceedings for adjudicating claims of workman under the labour laws are, the basic rules of pleadings must apply even to such proceedings. He strongly relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company Ltd. [ 1979 (2) L.L.N. 72 ], in Para. 30, at pages 86 and 87: “…A contention to substantiate which evidence is necessary has to be pleaded. If there is no pleading raising a contention there is no question of substantiating such a non-existing contention by evidence. It is well seeded that allegation which is not pleaded, even if there is evidence in support of it, cannot be examined because the other side has no notice of it and if entertained it would tantamount to granting an unfair advantage to the first mentioned party. We are not unmindful of the fact that pleadings before such bodies have not to be read strictly, but it is equally true that the pleadings must be such as to give sufficient notice to the other party of the case it is called upon to meet. This view expressed in Tin Printers (Private), Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [1967 II L.L.J. 677], commends to us. The rules of fair play demand that where a party seeks to establish a contention which if proved would be sufficient to deny relief to the opposite aside, such a contention has to be specifically pleaded and then proved. But if, there is no pleading there is no question of proving something which is not pleaded. This is every elementary.” The contention of the learned counsel is correct. There is no doubt that even in proceedings under labour statutes, though certain amount of latitude may be shown in construing pleadings. Pleadings determine the conduct of the trial. When we peruse the pleadings on record, we see that it was nowhere the case of the first respondent that the promotion granted to him on 1st April 1991 was illegal or mala fide. On the other hand, his contention throughout appears to be that he was working as a manual and/or technical person, and therefore, he was covered by the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and S. 3(5) of the Act. One can sympathise with the dilemma with which the first respondent was faced. On the other hand, his contention throughout appears to be that he was working as a manual and/or technical person, and therefore, he was covered by the provisions of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and S. 3(5) of the Act. One can sympathise with the dilemma with which the first respondent was faced. If he had honestly admitted that on and after 1st April 1991 he had ceased to be a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the complaint itself would have been dismissed as without jurisdiction. In order to get over this difficulty, he resorted to the subterfuge of alleging that all along he had continued as manual and/or technical workman. This contention of the first respondent has been categorically rejected by the Labour Court. And, rightly so, considering the voluminous evidence, both documentary and oral. Though Sri Ganguli, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, contends that the Labour Court has made an erroneous finding of fact with regard to the nature of work of the first respondent and that if I reappreciated the evidence, it would demonstrate that the first respondent as not a workman. I decline to do so. It is not the function of this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, to sit in appeal over findings of facts. At any rate, it cannot be done on the first respondent's plea. Nonetheless, in order to satisfy my judicial conscience, I did scrutinise a few of the documents and I find that in each one of those documents the first respondent's signatures/initials are borne describing him as “Group Manager.” The contention of Sri Ganguli that the first respondent was never promoted to the post of Group Manager has, therefore, no basis and needs to be rejected. One fails to understand why the first respondent subscribed his signatures/initials to the several documents which described him as “Group Manager,” Audio Visual, if he was not holding that post. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the Labour Court's finding that, with effect from 1st April 1991, the first respondent was promoted to the post of Group Manager, Audio Visual, is correct and is liable to be upheld. 7. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the Labour Court's finding that, with effect from 1st April 1991, the first respondent was promoted to the post of Group Manager, Audio Visual, is correct and is liable to be upheld. 7. Turning next to the question as to what exactly was the work content of the post of Group Manager, the Labour Court, after careful appreciation of evidence, has recorded a clear finding that, as Group Manager from 1st April 1991 the first respondent was not carrying out duties which would, fall within the ambit of the duties of a “workman” within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Having perused the record and heard the learned counsel, I am not persuaded to take any different view of the matter, nor is it my function in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 8. There is one more question which needs to be considered. Having arrived at the conclusion that on and from 1st April 1991 the first respondent was not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with S. 3(5) of the Act, was the Labour Court justified in directing reinstatement on the basis that, at some point in his career, albeit a couple of months prior to the date of his termination of his service, the first respondent was a workman. In my view, it was wholly impermissible for the Labour Court to do. I repeatedly asked Sri Ganguli as to what was the cause of action pleaded in the complaint. With the help of the learned counsel, I perused the complaint and I find that it is not contended that the cause of action for the complaint was the promotion effected with effect from 1 April 1991. In fact, if this was so, then the Labour Court could not have entertained jurisdiction under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. Sri Ganguli was, therefore, constrained to contend that the cause of action was the termination of service with effect from 2 September 1991, but that it included within its ambit what had been done earlier by the employer as a necessary prelude. I am afraid it is not permissible to raise such new contentions in the High Court, when they were not even whispered before the trial Court. I am afraid it is not permissible to raise such new contentions in the High Court, when they were not even whispered before the trial Court. Here again, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shankar Chankravarti [ 1979 (2) L.L.N. 72 ] (vide supra), appears to conclude the matter. 9. Sri Cama sought reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Premier Automobiles Employees' Union [ 1988 (2) L.L.N. 686 ]. In my view, this judgment is apposite and virtually forecloses the contention urged by Sri Ganguli, which appears to have appealed to the trial Court. In Premier Automobiles (vide supra), this Court pointed out that whatever be the nature or character of employment prior to the date of termination of service, it is the character of employment as on the date of termination of service that determines the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. I respectfully concur with the view expressed in therein. Applying this law to the facts of the present case, I am of the view that it was the character of employment of the first respondent as on 2nd September 1991 which would govern the issue of jurisdiction of the Labour Court and not what happened prior thereto. The Labour Court has held that from 1st April 1991 and up to the date of termination of service on 2nd September 1991, the first respondent was not a “workman” within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent's complaint. Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 filed by the first respondent before the Labour Court at Bombay was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 10. In these circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Labour Court, dated 25 September 1998, made in Complaint (ULP) No. 243 of 1991 is hereby quashed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed. 11. The amount of Rs. 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) deposited by the petitioner, if held in a security, shall be released but actual disbursement of money not to be made for a period of one month from today. 12. Rule accordingly made absolute. No order as to costs.