Judgment: This is a reference made by the Sessions Judge, West Godavari, recommending that the order of the First Additional District Munsif-Magistrate, Kowur, dated nth May, 1960, in Criminal M.P. No. 194 of 1959 be set aside and that an order under section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act be issued by this Court in favour of the Managing Trustee of a temple. In the village of Kanya Kumudavalli, there is a temple called Sri Kanchi Kamakshiammavari temple. Ramayanam Chitti Abboyi, as managing trustee of the temple filed a petition under section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act(XIX of 1951), hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ praying for delivery of properties, consisting of four items of land. Along with the petition, the petitioner filed a certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, which was to the effect that the lands in dispute belonged to the temple. Respondents 1 to 3 remained ex parte. Respondents 4 to 7 raised various contentions. The learned Munsif-Magistrate framed four points for decision as follows: “1. Whether the petition schedule lands do not belong to the Kanchi Kamakshiammavari temple? 2. Whether the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7 are necessary parties to this petition ? 3. Whether the said landlords are still rendering services to temple and hence entitled to be in possession? 4. Whether section 87 of the Act has no application to the present case?” On Point No. 1 the learned Magistrate answered it in the affirmative. He pointed out that even the fourth respondent, as R.W. 3, admitted in cross-examination that the lands belonged to the deity and that Exhibit P-6, the certified extract of the Inam Fair Register, clearly showed that Items 2 to 4 of the lands belonged to the temple. On Point No. 2 he held that the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7 were not necessary parties as they had already been made parties to proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Masulipatam. On Point No. 2 he held that the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7 were not necessary parties as they had already been made parties to proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Masulipatam. On Point No. 3 he held that though the lands belonged to the temple, those lands were granted as service inams to Respondents 1,2 and the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7 and that the petitioner failed to prove that the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7, who had to perform services, were not performing their services regularly and that, therefore, Respondents 1, 2, and 4 to 7 were entitled to be in possession of the petition schedule lands. On Point No. 4 he held that section 87 of the Act applied to the present case. The petitioner filed Criminal R.P. No. 17 of 1960 before the learned Sessions Judge, West Godavari. The latter observed as follows: “Now the point is whether the Magistrate could refuse to direct delivery of properties to the petitioner in spite of the mandatory provisions of section 87 that the Magistrate shall direct delivery on production of a certificate from the Deputy Commssioner.” He held that the order of the learned Munsif-Magistrate was clearly incorrect and untenable for various reasons and accordingly made reference to this Court, with the recommendation already referred to above. As regards title to the lands (Items 1to 4), the Munsif-Magistrate himself has found on the evidence as well as the clinching admission of R. W. 3 that the petition schedule lands belonged to the temple (deity). Further, there is the presumption contained in the Second Proviso to section 87 of the Act which provides that for the purpose of proceedings under section 87, the certificate issued by the Commissioner shall be conclusive evidence that the properties to which it relates belong to the religious institution. It is, therefore, clear that all the four items of land certainly belonged to the temple (deity). Item 1 consists of Northern half and Southern half. As pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge and as is clear from the evidence, none of the respondents claimed any interest in the Southern half of Item 1, Consequently, the learned Munsif-Magistrate was certainly wrong in refusing delivery regarding this Southern half of Item 1. In any case, delivery of this half has to be ordered. As pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge and as is clear from the evidence, none of the respondents claimed any interest in the Southern half of Item 1, Consequently, the learned Munsif-Magistrate was certainly wrong in refusing delivery regarding this Southern half of Item 1. In any case, delivery of this half has to be ordered. As regards the Northern half, the case of the respondents was that it belonged to Relangi Rajalingam, Birudukota Sarvesalingam and minor Birudukota Ramayya alias Ramalingam. Sarvesalingam and his brother Ramayya executed registered leases of Eastern half of this Northern half in favour of the fifth respondent by a document (Exhibit D-1), dated 26th January, 1955, for a period of six years. The Western half of this Northern half was leased by Relangi Chittamma by a registered lease deed (Exhibit D-2), dated 26th January, 1955, for a period of six years in favour of the fifth respondent. On 20th May, 1956, Relangi Rajalingam leased the entire Northern half of Item 1 to the fourth respondent for five years by a deed (Exhibit D-3). Thus, in effect, the fifth respondent was the lessee for six years on two separate lease deeds, dated 26th January, 1955 and the fourth respondent was the lessee of this entire Northern half by another lease deed, dated 20th May, 1956 for five years. As regards Items 2 to 4, the respondents plead to the following effect. These lands belong to P. Basavalingam and Venkata Krishnalingarn. Those two persons executed a lease deed (Exhibit D-11), dated 19th December, 1956, for five years in favour of the seventh respondent and under that lease, Respondents 6 and 7 are cultivating the lands in equal halves. Respondents 4 to 7 contended that the lands had been given to Kummaras, who were to do the duties of Archaka, and to Jangams who were to do the work of staging puppet shows at the festivals connected with the temple and that those persons were lawfully in enjoyment of the lands and lawfully leased out the respective items concerned to them (respondents). Respondents 4 to 7 claimed that they were bona fide tenants cultivating the lands and paying the rent without any arrears and that they were entiled to the benefits of the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956) and that, therefore, the petitioner had no right to ask for eviction. Respondents 4 to 7 claimed that they were bona fide tenants cultivating the lands and paying the rent without any arrears and that they were entiled to the benefits of the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956) and that, therefore, the petitioner had no right to ask for eviction. The learned Magistrate held that the petitioner, as P.W. 1, admitted in his cross-examination that when he became trustee, the petition schedule lands were in possession of Kummaras and Jangams on condition that the Kummaras should perform Archakatvam and Jangams should perform tocubommalatalu and that though the lands belonged to the temple, they have been granted as service inams to Respondents 1 and 2 and the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7. On the question whether the Kummaras and Jangams were performing their duties properly or not, he observed as follows: “It is no doubt true that the Depty Commissioner in his order in C.A. No. 24 of 1958, which is marked as Exhibit P-8, has come to the conclusion that the Kummaras and Jangams are not performing their duties properly and that hence the petitioner is entitled to take possession But I am of opinion that I am not fettered by the decision given by the Deputy Commissioner and I have to judge this question from the evidence that is placed before me. Whatever might have been the evidence that was placed before the Deputy Commissioner I am forced to come to a different conclusion from the evidence that is placed before me.” The learned Munsif-Magistrate, after discussing the evidence, finally concluded as follows: “Hence, from the evidence placed before me, I am of opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove that the servicedars are not performing their services properly. Hence it follows that Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 and the landlords of Respondents 4 to 7 are still rendering their services properly and hence entitled to be in possession of the petition schedule lands.” The learned Sessions Judge stated in his reference thus. The finding of the learned Munsif-Magistrate is in effect that the lands are of the nature of service inam or lands burdened with service and that they could be resumed by the temple on failure of service being rendered and that this finding was inconsistent withhis other finding that the lands belonged to the temple. The finding of the learned Munsif-Magistrate is in effect that the lands are of the nature of service inam or lands burdened with service and that they could be resumed by the temple on failure of service being rendered and that this finding was inconsistent withhis other finding that the lands belonged to the temple. After the Commissioner had held an enquiry and came to the conclusion that the service was not being performed, it was not open to the Munsif-Magistrate to reopen the question in a proceeding under section 87. The fifth respondent was a trustee and still claimed to have taken the lands of the temple on lease, setting up a hostile tide in a Stranger. It was hardly proper for the fifth respondent to claim that he was bona fide entiled to be in possession as against the trustee. The leases under the two deeds (Exhibits D-1 and D-2) in favour of the fifth respondent were each for six years and had not been sanctioned by the Commissioner. They offended the provisions of section 29 of the Act and were, therefore, null and void. As regards the fifth respondent, Exhibit D-1, dated 26th January, 1955, is a registered cowle deed executed by R. Sarvesalingam and others in his (R-5’s) favour for six years. Exhibit D-2, dated 26th January, 1955, is a registered cowle deed executed by Chittemma in his (R-5’s) favour for six years. Section 29 of the Act says that any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immoveable property belonging to, or given or endowed for the purposes of, any religious institution shall be null and void unlss it is sanctioned by the Commissioner as being necessary or beneficial to the institution. Beyond doubt, the lands under both the leases (Exhibits D-1 and D-2) are properties belonging to the temple which is a religious institution, Consequently, the leases under Exhibits D-1 and D-2 are null and void as they were not sanctioned by the Commissioner. Hence, the fifth respondent has no valid claim as lessee against the temple. As regards the fourth respondent, Exhibit D-3 is a registered lease deed, dated 20th May, 1956, executed by R. Rajalingam and himself in favour of each other for a period of five years. This lease deed is not void on the ground of contravention of section 29. Hence, the fifth respondent has no valid claim as lessee against the temple. As regards the fourth respondent, Exhibit D-3 is a registered lease deed, dated 20th May, 1956, executed by R. Rajalingam and himself in favour of each other for a period of five years. This lease deed is not void on the ground of contravention of section 29. It is a lease by a person who was certainly not a managing trustee competent to lease the land on behalf of the temple. The seventh respondent claims under a lease deed (Exhibit D-11), dated 19th December, 1956 executed in his favour by persons who were said to be performing service. The sixth respondent also claims under the same lease. The sixth respondent is not a lessee under that lease deed and so, he has no right under that deed (Exhibit D-11) independent of the seventh respondent. So, the only question is whether an order can be passed against Respondents 4 and 7 under section 87 of the Act. An order under section 87 can issue in the present case, if the person who resists the trustee from obtaining possession of the property is, (1) a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession; or (2) any person claiming or deriving tide from such trustee, office-holder or servant, not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of someperson not being such trustee, office-holder or servant."- The point is whether respondents 4 and 7 come under the above description. Certainly, they do not come under the first category. They claim to come under the second category, by deriving title under the respective leases from Kummaras and Jangams who are performing service. In Satyanarayana v. Venkatappayya1, the relevant facts were as follows. Certainly, they do not come under the first category. They claim to come under the second category, by deriving title under the respective leases from Kummaras and Jangams who are performing service. In Satyanarayana v. Venkatappayya1, the relevant facts were as follows. A temple represented by its Executive Officer, filed a suit for ejectment of the defendants oh the ground that the properties belonged to the temple (having been given to it by aninam grant), that Defendants 1 to 16 and their predecessors were Archakas rendering certain services and as such were in possession of the properties for and on behalf of the temple, that Defendants 17 to 43 were the lessees under the Archakas, that Defendants 1 to 16 were wrongfully claiming the properties as their own and the other defendants claimed to be in possession of portions of the properties as their lessees. The learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree for ejection. Some of the defendants went in appeal to the High Court and the latter dismissed the appeal. The said defendants filed an appeal to the Supreme Court wherein the points which arose for decision were (1) whether the inam grant was made in favour of the temple or whether the grant was made in favour of the Archakas burdened with the duties of service, and (2) what right did the grant confer on the grantee — whether it was a grant of the land itself or only of the melvaram interest in the properties. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held on Point No. 1 that the deity was the grantee. They recognised the distinction between a grant of inam being in favour of the temple and thereby the temple being the owner and the grant of inam being in favour of the Archakas burdened with the duties of service. In the present case, when it Is proved beyond doubt and also certificate of the Commissioner has been produced, it is clear that the land certainly belonged to the temple. So, it cannot be, and is not, land which was granted to Kummaras and Jangams burdened with the duties of service which they can enjoy as of right so long as they render service. So, it cannot be, and is not, land which was granted to Kummaras and Jangams burdened with the duties of service which they can enjoy as of right so long as they render service. Regarding the second point, their Lordships observed as follows (at page 197): "Finally, the learned Attorney-General submits that these Archakas who were rendering services, faithfully from generation to generation from ancient times should not, in equity, be ejected from the entire lands and that they should be allowed to remain in possession of the lands and be permitted to appropriate to themselves the expenses of the services and a reasonable remuneration and the rest of the income should be made over to the temple as its property......In a preceding for the framing of a scheme relating to a temple, it may be permissible to take into account the claims moral if not legal, of the Archakas and to make some provision for protecting their rights but those considerations appear to us to be entitrely out of place in a suit for ejectment on proof of title." It may be that the servants of a temple can ask for remuneration for services rendered by them and for that purpose approach the people in management of the temple and, in particular, the managing trustee, but the mere fact that they can expect remuneration does not give them a right to claim, obtain or retain possession of the lands of the temple and treat them in practice as if they were temple service inam lands though in fact they were lands belonging to the temple. In Dandaiah v. Venkatarama1, the material facts, so far as the present case is concerned, are to the following effect. The managing trustee of a templet obtained a certificate from the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board which stated that the lands noted in the schedule were lands of the temple. On the foot of this certificate, he filed an application before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Guntur, under section 87 read with section 103 of the Act, praying for an order directing the dismissed Archaka, and the tenants under him under the registered lease deed, to deliver possession of the lands with the crops thereon to the managing trustee. The learned Magistrate allowed the application and directed delivery. Against that order of the Magistrate, a Civil Revision Petition was filed. The learned Magistrate allowed the application and directed delivery. Against that order of the Magistrate, a Civil Revision Petition was filed. The learned Judges, after referring to the corresponding section 87 in the previous Act, observed as regards section 87 of the present Act as follows (at page 507): “Section 87 practically re-enacted section 78 with some necessary amendments. Instead of the Court, the Magistrate was directed to put the petitioner in possession of the properties. This was obviously intended to be a more expeditious method of restoring properties to public institutions. But the Magistrate is authorised to give possession only if the Commissioner, who is substituted for the Religious Endowments Board in the Act, gives a certificate setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution. The Commissioner shall give notice to the affected parties and consider the objections before issuing a certificate. This provision gives an opportunity to the affected office-holder prima facie to establish that the properties are his and the certificate so issued is made conclusive evidence for the purpose of its proceedings under section 87. This preliminary enquiry and the certificate issued after hearing parties, was thought by the Legislature to be a sufficient guarantee against arbitrary eviction. Under the section the aggrieved party can file a suit for establishing title to the suit property. This section is, therefore, an improvement on the earlier section; whereas in the earlier section the enquiry was contemplated by the Religious Endowments Board, under this section the Commissioner is authorised to make a judicial enquiry for the purpose of ascertaining prima facie whether the office-holder or the servant as the case may be, has any title to the property. His decision is not final for the aggrieved party can always file a suit to establish his title in a civil Court.” The learned Judges stated that if the conditions in section 87 are complied with, the Magistrate is bound to direct delivery of the properties and the records to the applicant. His decision is not final for the aggrieved party can always file a suit to establish his title in a civil Court.” The learned Judges stated that if the conditions in section 87 are complied with, the Magistrate is bound to direct delivery of the properties and the records to the applicant. Thus, it would appear that a certificate issued by the Commissioner under section 87 regarding the property is of the nature of a decree’ for possession on basis of title in which the judgment-debtors are not specified but they are the persons who come under the description given in section 87 and that the proper form and forum to challenge the right given under the certificate are a regular suit in a competent civil Court. The learned Judges then considered the question whether the archaka in that case was a trustee, office-holder or servant of the temple and the other persons were holding the property claiming under him. They observed that the archakas were in possession of the temple properties doing worship and looking after the affairs of the temple, that as stated by the learned Judge in the referring Order, the archaka had been practically managing the affairs of the temple and that, therefore, the archaka was a trustee under section 87. The learned Judges came to the following conclusion (at page 508): “It therfore follows that an archaka is either an office-holder or servant (of the temple) within the provisions of section 87. If the other conditions of section 87 are complied with - and it is not suggested in this case that they have not been complied with - the trustee would certainly be entitled to take out an application before the Magistrate for directing the archaka to deliver possesion of the properties specified in the certificate as those belonging to the temple. If the archaka can be directed to deliver possession under the section, the tenant claiming under him cannot be in a better position.” In that case, the archaka who had leased out the lands to the lessees was a dimissed archaka and consequently, the lessees came directly under the description of persons given in section 87, whether that lessor was looked upon as dismissed trustee or dismissed servant of the temple who was not entitled to possession of trie property. It is significant that, in the above Judgment, the learned Judges have stated that the enquiry held by the Commissioner was a judicial enquiry for the purpose of ascertaining prima fade whether the office-holder or the servant of the temple had any title to the property. In the present case, the Commissioner, after holding an enquiry, came to the conclusion that the Kummaras and Jangams, namely, the persons doing the service of archakas and putting up puppet shows, had no title to the property. The learned Munsif-Magistrate has referred to the decision in Vendantam Narasimhacharyulu v. Paturu Kotayya and others1. In that case, certain archakas had a right in the lands granted to a temple for performing nityanaivedya deeparadhana and a petitioner under section 78 of the Act (II of 1927) questioned that right and claimed the petition schedule properties, seeking direction from Court to deliver possession of the same to himself and two other appointed trustees of the temple. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., held that such rights cannot be summarily disposed of in an application under section 78. That decision by a single Judge was expressly overruled by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Dandaiah v. Venkatarama2, referred to above. So, I do not find any need to discuss the effect of the decision in Vedantam Narasimhacharyulu v. Paturu Kotayya and others1. In Chidambaram Chettiar, In re3, the facts were as follows. The temple of Sri Patalisvaraswami, Tirupapuliur, through its Executive Officer, obtained a certificate that the concerned properties belonged to the temple. The Executive Officer filed an application under section 87 of the Act before the District Magistrate, Cuddalore, for execution of the same and also produced the certificate for possession against a person. That person raised a contention before the District Magistrate that he had not been the trustee and that his father had been the trustee and that, therefore, he did not come under section 87 of the Act. He also contended that he (objector) had been holding the lands as inam burdened with service for performing the milk kattalai which was being regularly performed. Ramaswami, J., observed that both the contentions were not tenable. He also contended that he (objector) had been holding the lands as inam burdened with service for performing the milk kattalai which was being regularly performed. Ramaswami, J., observed that both the contentions were not tenable. Regarding the latter contention, the learned Judge observed as follows (at page 315): “It is well-settled that proceedings for delivery under section 87 of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings by reason of the proviso contained in the section itself, which requires the Commissioner to hear the parties likely to be affected and consider their objections, if any, before issuing the certificate. It is also well-settled law in this State that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to question the correctness, legality or propriety of the decree which it is called upon to execute. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree. It must take the decree as it stands. The Court executing a decree cannot alter vary or add to the terms of the decree even by consent of parties.” The learned Judge referred to and relied upon the decision of the Bench of the Madras High Court in Dandaiah v. Venkatarama4. In the present case, the certificate of the Deputy Commissioner is that the petition lands belong to the temple and that fact is also amply proved. But the respondents contend that the properties were being enjoyed by them as they were performing services connected with the temple. This contention is substantially similar to the one raised in Chidambaram Chettiar, In re5, viz., that the property concerned in that case was being enjoyed by the objector as land burdened with the service of performing kattalai and that the service was being performed. But, this contention is repelled by the learned Judge. In Anjayya v. Venkateswaradas Bavaji6, the petitioners applied for possession of the temple of Sri Venkateswaraswamy at Lalapet, Guntur, under section 87 of the Act, on the ground that the first petitioner had been appointed Executive Officer and the second petitioner a trustee of that temple by the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Masulipatam. In Anjayya v. Venkateswaradas Bavaji6, the petitioners applied for possession of the temple of Sri Venkateswaraswamy at Lalapet, Guntur, under section 87 of the Act, on the ground that the first petitioner had been appointed Executive Officer and the second petitioner a trustee of that temple by the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Masulipatam. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Guntur, dismissed the petition on the ground that a scheme which had been framed for administration of the disputed temple among other temples, applied only to a temple at Kothapet and not to the temple at Lalapet and that the orders of appointment on which the petitioners claimed possession, really related to Kothapet temple though they mentioned Lalapet temple. Bhimasankaram, J., held that the Magistrate was not fight in taking into consideration any material other than the order of appointment. The learned Judge also observed regarding the Magistrate who was acting under section 87 of the Act, as follows (at page 264). "I rather think that he is acting like a Sheriff or any other Exeutive Officer of a Court. Of course it is his duty to see that the order is executed in respect of the right property and as against the right person; otherwise he acts at his peril. Therefore, to that end, he can always examine what may be described as facts relating to the exercise of his jurisdiction. If he is satisfied that the conditions precedent to the exercise of his jurisdiction exist, he must discharge his statutory duty. If, on the other hand, the conditions do not exist, he cannot exercise any power. Therefore, the enquiry that a Magistrate, conducts after notice to the respondent is an enquiry confined to what may be called jurisdictional facte The position of law is as follows: Enquiry held by a Commissioner, acting under section 87, for granting a certificate, is a judicial enquiry regarding title to the property. The certificate issued by the Commissioner is of the nature of a decree for possession of immoveable property based on title of the temple as regards the property mentioned in the certificate. The proceedings for delivery under section 87 are akin to execution of the certificate as a decree. The correctness of that certificate can be challenged only by means of a suit in a competent civil Court, but not in proceedings under section 87 based on such certificate. The proceedings for delivery under section 87 are akin to execution of the certificate as a decree. The correctness of that certificate can be challenged only by means of a suit in a competent civil Court, but not in proceedings under section 87 based on such certificate. It is the duty of the Court to see that the order is executed in respect of the right property and as against the right person. Merely because the archakas have been in possession and doing service, they cannot be held entitled to continue in possession in lieu of their rendering service. For, the property is property belonging to the temple and is not a temple service inam of which service-holders are entitled to be in possession so long as they render service. Right to continue in possession because of rendering service cannot be pleaded or upheld in proceedings under section 87 since it would be entirely out of place even in a suit for possession on basis of title and, therefore, in proceedings for possession on basis of the certificate. As the property belongs to the temple, the proper person to be in possession of the temple and to deal with it by way of lease or otherwise is the managing trustee and not a service-holder. In Dhanamurthi v. Balayya1, the relevant facts were as follows. The first respondent was the managing trustee of a temple. The petitioners claimed a right to remain in possession by reason of a lease granted to them by the second respondent who was the archaka of the temple and who, prior to the first respondent’s appointment as a trustee of the temple, was functioning as a trustee de facto of the temple. The petitioners also claimed occupancy rights in the suit lands under two enactments, namely, the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVII of 1956) and the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956,. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled in their own right to continue in possession. The petitioners also claimed occupancy rights in the suit lands under two enactments, namely, the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVII of 1956) and the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956,. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled in their own right to continue in possession. Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., observed as follows: "A Magistrate would be justified in ordering eviction of the petitioners under section 87 of the Act only if he is satisfied that the petitioners were not persons claiming in good faith to be in possession of the properties on their own account........Before decision could be taken with reference to the body of the section, the Magistrate is required to satisfy himself as to the nature of the claim of the petitioners. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the moment there is a certificate issued by the Commissioner the eviction should follow as a matter of course, the provisions in the body of the section would be completely unnecessary. The very fact that they are there indicates that the certificate of the Commissioner is not sufficient to support an order of eviction. The Magistrate must be satisfied either that the person resisting the possession of the lawful trustee, i.e., first respondent in these petitions derived his title from either a dismissed trustee, office-holder or other person not entitled in good faith or that he had no shadow of claim which could be regarded as bona fide". The learned Judge observed that the Magistrate, who passed the order under section 87 did not hold any enquiry at all in the matter. He, therefore, set aside the order and sent the matter back to the Magistrate to enquire into the question, namely, whether on the allegations and the proof that may be adduced by the petitioners, they can be regarded as persons claiming in good faith to be in their possession by their own account, by receiving evidence in support thereof adduced on either side. In M. Suryanarayanamurthy v. G. Jagga Rao and others1, Basi Reddi, J., also held that the revision in that case could not be disposed of without calling for a finding from the lower Court as to whether the first petitioner, who was an archaka of the temple in possession of the properties in question and refusing to deliver possession, was "otherwise not entitled to be in possession" within the meaning of section 87 (c) of the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the decisions in the above two cases. They only recognise the fact that a Magistrate, when enquiring into a petition under section 87(c), has got jurisdiction to go into the question whether the persons resisting possession are entitled to be in possession in their own right or whether they claim their title through ex-trustee, office-holder or servant of the temple who have been dismissed or suspended or otherwise not entitled to be in possession and that the Magistrate can pass order only if the persons resisting possession came under the description specically mentioned in section 87(c). This fact has been mentioned by Bhimasankaram, J., in Anjayya v. Venkateswaradas Bavaji2, as the order could be passed and executed only as against a right person in respect of the right property and not against any person who resisted the trustee from obtaining possession. The learned Munsif-Magistrate was right in going into the question as to whether the respondents came under the category of persons described in section 87(c). In this case, it is found from the evidence of the Temple Inspector and the petitioner (managing trustee) as P.W. 1, that he (P.W. 1) was appointed trustee even in 1954. So, on the dates on which the alleged leases are said to have been executed, in 1955 and 1956, there were trustees for the temple. Therefore, the. service-holders including the archakas were only temple servants and not trustees Consequently, they were not entitled to lease out the lands belonging to the temple. Hence the contesting respondents only claim as deriving title from temple servants and not from a trustee who was competent to lease the temple lands. The temple servants themselves were not entitled to be in possession as against the managing trustee; for, the lands were properties belonging to the temple and not service inam lands. Hence the contesting respondents only claim as deriving title from temple servants and not from a trustee who was competent to lease the temple lands. The temple servants themselves were not entitled to be in possession as against the managing trustee; for, the lands were properties belonging to the temple and not service inam lands. So, it cannot be said that the contesting respondents claim in good faith to be in possession on their own account or on account of some person not being trustee, office-holder or servant. The learned Munsif-Magistrate was wrong in holding that Respondents 4 to 7 were entided to be in possession of temple lands as they were rendering services. It is Contended on behalf of the contesting respondents that they have got rights to be in possession under the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956). Section 2(c) of the Tenancy Act defines ‘cultivating tenant’ as follows: ‘Cultivating tenant’ means a person who cultivates by his own labour, any land belonging to another; under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, but does not include a mere intermediary." In Pubbiri v. S. Govinda3, Ramaswami, J., held that tenants of an archaka (pujari) could not have any right under section 3 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) as the archaka was not a person capable of creating a tenancy. In the present case, the lands belong to the temple and can be leased out only by the managing trustee. They cannot be leased out by an archaka, puppet show performer or other temple servant. Therefore, the contesting respondents cannot get any right to be in possession under the Andhra Tenancy Act. In the result, I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the finding of the Munsif-Magistrate was wrong in refusing delivery of possession regarding all the items of land to the petitioner. I set aside the order of the Munsif-Magistrate and direct that an order under section 87 of the Act be issued, directing that the properties mentioned in the petition be delivered to the petitioner, who is the managing trustee of the temple. The reference is accordingly accepted. G.S.M. ----- Reference accepted; delivery ordered.