Satyanarayana Raju, J.- This Revision Petition raises a question as to the nature and extent of Government privilege contained in sections 123, 124, and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act. The question has arisen in the following circumstances: Respondents 1 to 4 herein filed a suit against the State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, and eight other defendants for a permanent injunction restraining the State from assigning the bed of a tank, by name Rolugunt, in the village of Marripalem, in favour of defendants 2 to9, as such assignment would seriously interfere with the accustomed supply of water for the irrigation of their lands. The Government (first defendant) resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the tank had been abandoned over sixty years ago and hence the plaintiffs had no right to question the assignment of the tank-bed. The first defendant also averred that there would be no diminution of water supply to the plaintiff’s lands as the Kotta Varakattu channel would be in a position to irrigate their lands. Pending suit, the plaintiffs applied for a temporary injunction restraining defendants 2 to 9 from raising paddy crop on the bed of the tank. They served upon the first defendant certain interrogatories and called upon the State to produce certain documents. The first defendant answered the interrogatories and filed the documents called for but at the same time claimed privilege in respect of six of those documents. The plaintiffs filed a counter-affidavit wherein they averred that the first defendant was not entided to claim privilege in respect of those docments. The District Munsif negatived the claim 01 privilege made by the Government. Hence this Revision. On behalf of the State, it is contended before us that the documents in respect of which privilege is claimed are communications made by one officer to another in “official confidence” and that the lower Court is in error in negativing the claim of privilege. Now, the law as to Government privilege is contained in sections 123, 124, and 162 of the Evidence Act and it will be convenient to read these provisions: “123. No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit. No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit. 124. No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure. 162. A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided by the Court. The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility. . . .” The foundation of the claim of privilege under section 123 is that the document from which evidence is sought to be derived is from any “unpublished official record relating to any affiairs of State.” Under section 124, the occasion for claiming privilege arises only when the evidence sought to be given is a communication made to a public officer in “official confidence.” The head of the department concerned in section 123, or the officer concerned in section 124, is the Judge as to whether a disclosure will or will not be prejudicial to public interest. Section 162 is mandatory. It says that when a witness is directed to produce a document, he must bring it to Court notwithstanding any objection that he may have with regard to its production or admissibility. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh1, has enunciated the principle underlying section 123 as follows: “A valid claim for privilege made under section 123 proceeds on the basis of the theory that the production of the document in question would cause injury to public interest, and that, where a conflict arises between public interest and private interest, the latter must yield to the former.. . . Care has, however, to be taken to see that interests other than that of the public do not masquerade in the garb of public interest and take undue advantage of the provisions of section 123. . . Care has, however, to be taken to see that interests other than that of the public do not masquerade in the garb of public interest and take undue advantage of the provisions of section 123. Subject to this reservation the maxim salus populi est suprema lex which means that regard for public welfare is the highest law is the basis of the provisions contained in section 123.” The words “official confidence” used in section 124have been the subject-matter of much debate and discussion in several decisions of the Madras High Court and of other High Courts of the country. The true import of this expression was considered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nagaraja Pillai v. The Secretary of State for India in Council2. After a scrutiny of the English and Indian authorities bearing on the subject, Oldfield, J., stated his view thus: “.....the words ‘communication in official confidence ‘import no special degree of secrecy and no pledge or direction for its maintenance, but include generally all matters communicated by one officer to another in the performance of their duties. The question whether such communication was made in the course of such performance is for the Court to decide.” In a recent decision of the Madras High Court, Venkatesam Naidu v. State of Madras3, Rajamannar, C.J., observed as follows: "A communication made by one Secretary to the Government to another Secretary to the Government would certainly be a communication in respect of which privilege can be claimed. Such interdepartmental correspondence cannot be compelled to be produced." The reason of the rule was stated in an earlier decision of the House of Lords by Viscount Haldane, L.C., in Local Government Board v. Arlidge1, with respect to the reports of a Health Inspector, thus: "It is said that the report of the Inspector should have been disclosed. Such interdepartmental correspondence cannot be compelled to be produced." The reason of the rule was stated in an earlier decision of the House of Lords by Viscount Haldane, L.C., in Local Government Board v. Arlidge1, with respect to the reports of a Health Inspector, thus: "It is said that the report of the Inspector should have been disclosed. It might or might not have been useful to disclose this report, but I do not think that the Board was bound to do so, any more than it would have been bound to disclose all the minutes made on the papers in the office before a decision was come to." In this, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline agreed and said: "And I feel certain that if it were laid down in Courts of law that such disclosure could be compelled, a serious impediment might be placed upon that frankness which ought to obtain among a staff accustomed to elaborately detailed and often most delicate and difficult tasks. The very same argument would lead to the disclosure of the whole file. It may contain and frequently doescontain the views of Inspectors, Secretaries, Assistants and Consultants of various degrees of experience, many of whose opinions may differ but all of which form the material for the ultimate decision. To set up any rule that that decision must, on demand, and as a matter of right, be accompanied by a disclosure of what went before, so that it may be weakened or strengthened or judged thereby, would be inconsistent, as I say, with efficiency, with practice and with true theory of complete parliamentary responsibility for departmental action." The same view was taken by Lords Parmoor and Moulton. In Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India in Council2, it was held that a communication relating to State matters made by one officer to another in the course of his official duty was absolutely privileged and could not be made the subject of an action for libel. In Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India in Council2, it was held that a communication relating to State matters made by one officer to another in the course of his official duty was absolutely privileged and could not be made the subject of an action for libel. The law on the subject was elaborately reviewed by the House of Lords in Duncan v. Cammell Liard & Co.3 At page 635, Viscount Simon, L.C., stated: "It will be observed that the objection is sometimes based upon the view that the public interest requires a particular class of communications with, or within, a public department to be protected from production on the ground that the candour and completeness of such communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be disclosed in subsequent litigation rather than on the contents of the particular document itself. Several cases have been decided on this ground protecting from production documents in the files of the East India Company held in its public capacity as responsible for the Government of India." At page 636, the Lord Chancellor stated the principle to be applied as follows: "The principle to be applied in every case is that documents otherewise relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the public interest requires that they should be withheld. This test may be found to be satisfied either (a) by having regard to the contents of the particular document, or (A) by the fact that the document belongs to a class which, on grounds of public interest, must as a class be withheld from production.‘ In Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition, Volume 15, page 412) the following passage occurs. "Secrets of State, State papers; confidential official documents, and communications between the Government and its officers or between such officers are privileged from production onthe ground of public policy or as being detrimental to the public interest or service." In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh4their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows: "There may be another class of documents which could claim the said privilege not by reason of their contents as such but by reason of the fact that, if the said documents were disclosed, they would materially affect the freedom and candour of expression of opinion in the determination and execution of public policies. In this class may legitimately be included notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files, opinions expressed, or reports made, and gist of official decisions reached in the course of the determination of the said questions of policy. In the efficient administration of public affairs, Government may reasonably treat such a class of documents as confidential and urge that its disclosure should be prevented on the ground of possible injury to public interest In other words, if the proper functioning of the public service would be impaired by the disclosure of any document or class of documents such documents or such class of documents may also claim the status of documents relating to public affairs." While section 123 is confined to unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, section 124 refers to communications made to a public officer in official confidence. The difference between sections 123 and 124 may be stated thus: In section 124 the public officer is the Judge as to whether a disclosure will or will not be against public interest. In section 123 this discretion vests with the heed of the department concerned. But in both the sections, the Court is the judge as to whether the documents in respect of which privilege is claimed is a State document or whether the communication was made in official confidence. If a document comes within section 123, the Court cannot inspect it though it can take other evidence to determine the character attributed to the document. If the document falls within section 124, the Court can inspect it to determine the claim of privilege. It is, however, to be noted that the privilege under section 124 has been given not for the benefit of the person making the communication but for the protection of the public interests and the dominant intention of the section is to prevent disclosures to the detriment of the public interests. The words “official confidence” indicate that the section applies to communications from one public officer to another public officer, in the discharge of their official duties and not to communications to such officers by outsiders. Communications in official confidence, though they import no special degree of secrecy or protection, include generally all matters communicated by one officer to another in the performance of his duties. Two matters are involved in the section. Communications in official confidence, though they import no special degree of secrecy or protection, include generally all matters communicated by one officer to another in the performance of his duties. Two matters are involved in the section. Whether a particular document lor which privilege is claimed falls within section 124, i.e., whether the document is a communication made to a public officer in official confidence, is for the Court 0 decide. Whether the public interests would suffer by its disclosure is a matter with regard to which the public officer is the sole Judge and his opinion is conclusive only when he claims privilege on the ground that the public interests would suffer and not when it is claimed on any other ground. It is settled that reports made by one public officer to another in the discharge of his official duties would come both within the ambit of section 123 and within the scope of section 124. These reports are brought within the scope of documents which must be treated as confidential in the interests of efficient administration of public affairs and for the proper functioning of public services. Apart from such class of documents claiming the status of documents relating to public affairs within the meaning of section 123 of the Evidence Act, they can also be treated as privileged documents if and when the public officer to whom they are sent in official confidence considers that the public interests would suffer by their disclosure if they relate to matters relating to public policy. Indeed, in Nagaraja Pillai v. The Secretary of State for India in Council1, the privilege was claimed with respect to the report of a Supervisor to the Sub-Divisional Officer. The learned Judges held that the District Munsif was right in refusing to insist on the Supervisor’s report being produced. Sri Balaparameswari Rao has relied upon the decision of this Court in Public Prosecutor, Andhra v. Darner a Venkata Narasayya2. There, Krishna Rao, J., considered the question of privilege with regard to certain “enquiry and audit reports” made by the Deputy Registrar to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, from whom the reports were sought to be summoned, raised the question of privilege by filing an affidavit wherein it was stated that the documents summoned were irrelevant to the case against the petitioner. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, from whom the reports were sought to be summoned, raised the question of privilege by filing an affidavit wherein it was stated that the documents summoned were irrelevant to the case against the petitioner. The learned Judge pointed out that that reason had no substance because ‘relevancy’ was a matter for the Magistrate to decide and that the Magistrate was therefore right in overruling the claim of privilege under section 123. With regard to the privilege claimed under section 124, it was held that the Magistrate ought not to have decided the question of privilege without perusing the documents himself and the Magistrate was directed to determine the question afresh after inspecting the documents and hearing the parties. On a perusal of the judgment, we do not find that there is anything therein which runs counter to the well-settled principles laid down by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nagaraja Pillai v. The Secretary of State for India in Council1 and by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the latest case of State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh2. The question, however, remains as to what is the proper form in which objection could be taken that the production of documents would be contrary to public interest. In this case, it is objected by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the Personal Assistant to the Collector filed the affidavit claiming privilege and not being the officer to whom the official communication was made, he is not the person who could legally make the claim. The documents in respect of which privilege was claimed before the trial Court are not before us, and we are not in a position to decide whether this objection is well founded or not. We may, however, state that this would be a matter for the lower Court’s decision. Therefore, we allow the Revision and remand the petition to the trial Court to dispose of the claim of privilege in the light of the principles stated by us in this judgment. The costs of this Revision will abide and follow the result. If a proper request is made in that behalf, the lower Court will also consider the question of allowing the first defendant to make the claim of privilege by filing the affidavit of the proper public officer. G.S.M. ----- Revision allowed; Matter remanded.